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Moral Hazard and Socialism in Collective Security Agreements

Audio Mises Daily

Tags War and Foreign PolicyInterventionism

11/03/2014Patrick Barron

Collective security agreements allow many countries's politicians to shift the cost of national defense to taxpayers outside their own countries. Moral hazard, belligerence, and over-reliance on military solutions often ensue, writes Patrick Barron.

This audio Mises Daily is narrated by Robert Hale.

Author:

Contact Patrick Barron

Patrick Barron is a private consultant to the banking industry. He has taught an introductory course in Austrian economics for several years at the University of Iowa. He has also taught at the Graduate School of Banking at the University of Wisconsin for over twenty-five years, and has delivered many presentations at the European Parliament.

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