Foundations of Libertarian Ethics

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2. The Praxeological Case for an Ultimate End

  • Foundations of Libertarian Ethics

Tags Philosophy and MethodologyPraxeology

06/27/2006Roderick T. Long

Claims of ultimate ends, like happiness or well-being, are impossible, says Hobbes. In this life, the fact that you are still acting shows that you have not achieved any ultimate end. Does action really express dissatisfaction? You can act to keep something happening, rather than to try to change things.

An ultimate end is not praxeologically impossible. Is it required? Yes. There has to be some final end. There is a minimum threshold of things worth striving for. Above that level, you are happy. Once there, higher levels can make you happier. We are committed to having some overarching goals – but not impossible ones, nor ones too easy.

The second of ten lectures from the Foundations of Libertarian Ethics seminar with Roderick T. Long.

The Praxeological Case for an Ultimate End | Roderick T. Long


Contact Roderick T. Long

Roderick T. Long is a senior fellow of the Mises Institute and a professor of philosophy at Auburn University. He runs the Molinari Institute and Molinari Society. His website is

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