Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941

XXV Roosevelt Seeks a Pretext for War with Germany

a. Hitler Launches a Blitzkrieg along the Western Front

BEFORE THE NAZI armed forces had scored an important success in the Norway campaign, President Roosevelt began a series of endeavors to keep Italy out of the war. On April 29 he sent a telegram to Mussolini in which he expressed his deepest satisfaction with reference to “the policy of the Italian Government in exerting every effort to prevent war from spreading to southern and southeastern Europe.” A further extension of the area of hostilities would bring into the war “still other nations which have been seeking to maintain their neutrality.” He could see “no reason to anticipate that any one nation or any one combination of nations” could successfully “dominate either the continent of Europe . . . or a greater part of the world.” He earnestly hoped that the powerful influence of Italy would continue to be exercised “in behalf of the negotiation of a just and stable peace.”1

When Ambassador Phillips conveyed this message to Mussolini he was informed that “Italy, Germany and Russia did not desire an extension of the war.” The Duce then expressed the opinion that “Germany could not be beaten” and that an Allied naval blockade would be “completely ineffective.” The President should realize that the political system created by the Treaty of Versailles had been liquidated. In the new system Germany “would willingly permit a new independent Polish State” to be erected but it would not have the “old boundaries which were completely without justification.” Germany was “also willing that a new Czechoslovakian state be reestablished.” Last, but not least, certain important concessions should be given to Italy.

Throughout this conversation Mussolini appeared to go “out of his way to be friendly.” He requested Ambassador Phillips to “thank President Roosevelt cordially” for his message and he seemed to be “extremely appreciative of it.”2

In his diary, Count Ciano had a somewhat different story to tell. He noted that the Duce received the Roosevelt message with “ill grace” and that he said “little or nothing to the American Ambassador.”3 Mussolini then sent a brief note to the President in which he argued that responsibility for World War II did “not fall upon Germany but upon the initiatives of the Allies.” As far as he knew, Germany was “opposed to a further extension of the conflict, and Italy likewise.” With reference to the President’s belief that “an extension of the war fronts” might have a serious effect upon the Western Hemisphere, he called attention “to the fact that Italy has never concerned itself with the relations of the American republics with each other and with the United States (thereby respecting the Monroe Doctrine), and might therefore ask for ‘reciprocity’ with regard to European affairs.”4

Ciano regarded this note as “cutting and hostile.”5 It was certainly not conciliatory. The Duce was “literally exalted” by the news of Hitler’s victories in Norway. In a letter describing his successes the Führer complained that the “excessive rapidity” of the advance of his troops had not “permitted his involving the English forces more effectively” so as to “destroy them completely.” He intimated that he would have to “obtain a victory in the West as soon as possible” because of “hidden threats of American intervention.”6

On this same day (May 4) the German General Staff issued a statement that awakened instant apprehensions in Belgium and the Netherlands. The charge was made that those countries had not maintained an impartial neutrality. It was also alleged that on January 12, 1940, some extended discussions had taken place in Breda “between Dutch, Belgian, French and British staff officers.” These discussions were supposed to have been for the purpose of aiding British and French forces to launch an “attack on the Ruhr.”7

Alleging the necessity of anticipating this Anglo-French invasion, the German Government began a blitzkrieg upon the Western Front. News of this attack came to President Roosevelt early on the morning of May 10 when Ambassador Cudahy telephoned the White House to report that a large German air force was already over Luxemburg en route to Belgium and the Netherlands. Later during the morning “President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull called from time to time asking for latest developments.” Cudahy replied that the news was “entirely reassuring.”8 But King Leopold, of Belgium, was not so confident about the situation. Fearful of the outcome of the German invasion he sent a hurried telegram to President Roosevelt expressing the ardent hope that he would support with all his “moral authority the efforts which we are now firmly decided to make in order to preserve our independence.” The President could only reply that he and the American people cherished the strong desire that “policies which seek to dominate peaceful and independent peoples through force and military aggression may be arrested, and that the government and people of Belgium may preserve their integrity and freedom.”9

In Rome, Ambassador Phillips told Ciano that the German blitzkrieg was “bound to stir America profoundly.” It had already stirred the Pope who had sent telegrams to the “rulers of the three invaded states.” This act had incensed Mussolini who blurted out to Ciano that the Papacy was “a cancer which gnaws at our national life.” If necessary he would “liquidate this problem once and for all.” Later the Pope evidenced a “clear-cut intransigency” and remarked that he was “even ready to be deported to a concentration camp.”10

Into this tense and ominous atmosphere in Rome the President once more intervened by sending another note to Mussolini. Rumors that the Duce was “contemplating early entry into the war” had given him “great concern.” Most Americans believed that the whole world faced a “threat which opposes every teaching of Christ, every philosophy of all the great teachers of mankind over thousands of years.” Therefore, as the President of the United States he made “the simple plea that you, responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, stay wholly apart from any war and refrain from any threat of attack.”11

Ciano noted that the new communication from the President was not in a “covertly threatening style.” It was rather a “discouraged and conciliatory message.” Allusions to the “Gospel of Christ” would have “little effect upon the mind of Mussolini,” who was convinced that Germany would win the war. As an ally of Hitler, Italy could secure rich spoils of war.12

b. Roosevelt Regards Neutrality as an Outmoded Concept

While the President was pleading with Mussolini to remain neutral in the great conflict that was wrecking Europe, he himself was pushing America down the road to war. On April 16 it was reported that the Anglo-French Purchasing Commission could obtain planes of almost any type then being produced for the armed forces of the United States.13 This news encouraged the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, to send to Washington (May 14) the startling request that the American Government arrange for the “sale or lease of old destroyers.”14 On the following day Winston Churchill, who displaced Chamberlain as Prime Minister on May 10, sent a more ambitious request that was quite breath-taking:

All I ask now is that you [President Roosevelt] should proclaim non-belligerency, which would mean that you would help us with everything short of actually engaging armed forces. Immediate needs are: First of all, the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers; . . . Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of aircraft; . . . Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition. . . . Fourthly, the fact that our ore supply is being compromised from Sweden, from North Africa and perhaps from Northern Spain, makes it necessary to purchase steel in the United States. . . . I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same. Fifthly,. . . the visit of a United States Squadron to Irish ports . . . would be invaluable.15

The President replied that he could not make a deal concerning the destroyers “without authorization from Congress.” Moreover, America “needed the destroyers” for its “own defences.”16 Churchill greatly regretted this negative answer but he still hoped to get “at the earliest possible date” the “largest possible number of Curtiss P-40 fighters.” In conclusion he sounded a loud note of alarm that he knew would profoundly affect the President. If Britain were “left by the United States to its fate,” there was a definite danger that the British fleet might be turned over to the Germans as a bargaining point.17

We have already noted18 that in 1939, while Chamberlain was still Prime Minister, Churchill began his momentous personal correspondence with President Roosevelt. It has been stated that one of the first cablegrams sent by Churchill to Roosevelt was phrased in a most grandiloquent manner. The gist of it has been given as follows: “I am half American and the natural person to work with you. It is evident we see eye to eye. Were I to become Prime Minister of Britain we could control the world.”19

Churchill states that he sent “nine hundred and fifty” of these cablegrams to the President and received “about eight hundred in reply.” His relations with the American Chief Executive “gradually became so close that the chief business between our two countries was virtually conducted by these personal interchanges between him and me. . . . As head of the State as well as Head of the Government, Roosevelt spoke and acted with authority in every sphere.”20

It is obvious that Churchill regarded Roosevelt as an American dictator who had little concern for the opinions of Congress and the American people. With reference to the matter of war the Churchill cablegrams reveal that he believed that Roosevelt could plunge America into the conflict in Europe at any time he desired. The French Cabinet apparently had the same viewpoint.

The urgency of Churchill was translated into hysteria by Premier Reynaud. On May 18, Bullitt was informed by Alexis Léger, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office, that Reynaud was about to request President Roosevelt to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. Bullitt frankly informed Léger that such a request would be worse than useless: Congress would almost unanimously vote against such a declaration. The President then talked to Bullitt over the telephone and instructed him to say that “anything of this nature was out of the question.” But Reynaud continued to press for the impossible. On May 22 he told Bullitt that the German tide was growing more menacing every minute. There was grave danger that the French public would insist upon a separate peace with Germany. In that event a German victory over Britain “would follow in a few weeks.” After this dire event the Panama Canal would be destroyed by air bombardment and the “American Army would be able to offer little resistance.” Prompt action by the American Government was “the only real guarantee that Hitler would not some day be in the White House.”21

A week later the Reynaud appeals grew more frantic. On May 28 he warned Bullitt that he had convincing evidence that “if France and England were conquered, Hitler would move almost immediately against the United States.” The American fleet should be sent at once to the Mediterranean so as to exert pressure upon Mussolini to stay out of the war.22

The President did not send the fleet to the Mediterranean but he decided to permit American pilots to fly planes, ordered by the Allies, to Halifax and other ports in the Canadian maritime provinces. Before this decision the Dominion had been designated as a combat area and American nationals had not been allowed to enter it in aircraft belonging to belligerent nations. The President then urged Churchill to send additional planes to France but he was told that Britain needed all available aircraft for defense against expected German attack. Ambassador Bullitt became furious over this negative reply from Britain and he confided to Secretary Hull his belief that the British Cabinet “might be conserving their air force and fleet so as to use them as bargaining points in negotiations with Hitler.”23

Both the President and Secretary Hull discounted these observations of Bullitt. They were certain that while France “was finished,” Britain, with the aid of American supplies, could withstand a German assault. It was imperative, therefore, that these supplies be rushed at once to British ports. Joseph C. Green, chief of the Division of Controls, brought to Secretary Hull’s attention an old statute of May 12, 1917. The language of this statute could be interpreted so as to authorize the exchange of army and navy aircraft for new models of a more advanced type. Arrangements were made with a Buffalo concern to deliver to them fifty planes belonging to the Naval Reserve squadrons in exchange for planes of a “superior type.” These planes were then rushed to Britain. But Churchill wanted more than planes. In order to meet his importunate requests, the President turned to the Acting Attorney General, Francis Biddle, who conveniently ruled that the Secretary of War had the right to sell surplus war supplies to “any corporation or individual upon such terms as may be deemed best.”24

General George C. Marshall, as Chief of Staff, now came to the front and directed his chief of Ordnance and his Assistant Chief of Staff to survey the entire list of American reserve ordnance and munitions stocks. On June 3 he approved these lists. The first list was a lengthy one:

It comprised half a million .30 calibre rifles out of two million manufactured in 1917 and 1918. . . . For these there were about 250 cartridges apiece. There were 900 soixante-quinze field guns with a million rounds, 80,000 machine guns and various other items. . . . On June 3 all the American Army depots and arsenals started packing the material for shipment. . . . By June 11 a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay [Raritan] and anchored, and loading from lighters began.25

But this flood of war matériel reached the Allies too late to stop the rapid German advance. On May 15, General Winkelman, the Dutch Commander in Chief, signed articles of capitulation. German pressure upon Belgium rapidly mounted. When General Giraud’s Army in Holland was completely crushed and the French Ninth Army collapsed on the Mézières-Dinant front, it was evident that a crisis had arisen. After the news of the British retreat to Dunkerque was brought to King Leopold he realized that the situation had become critical. On May 27 the demoralization of the French military forces was so rapid and complete that he decided the time had arrived to ask the German High Command to state its terms for a suspension of hostilities. The blunt answer called for unconditional surrender. The King felt compelled to comply with this grim demand, and at 4:00 A.M. on the following day the Belgian Army obeyed a cease fire order from headquarters.26

c. The President Makes a Third Plea to Mussolini to Stay Out of the War

Before the bad news from Belgium was received in the United States, the President decided to make another plea to Mussolini to stay out of the war. In this third communication to the Duce, Roosevelt offered to act as a mediator between Hitler and the Allies. Ambassador Phillips was instructed to deliver this message to Mussolini personally, but Count Ciano bluntly informed him that this was not possible. When Ciano finished reading the President’s plea he was asked by Phillips as to the nature of the reply: “He said with conviction—‘it would be a no’ and he went on to explain that Mussolini’s position was not merely a question of securing Italy’s legitimate aspirations but that the Duce was determined to carry out his obligations under his alliance with Germany.” Later in the day Ciano sent for Ambassador Phillips and confirmed the statements he had made during the morning meeting. Mussolini desired to preserve his “freedom of action” and was not disposed to “enter into any negotiations which . . . would not be in the spirit of Fascism.”27

Although to Sumner Welles the “horizon looked extremely dark,”28 Roosevelt thought that the clouds might take on a silver lining if he could persuade Mussolini to stay out of the war. On May 30 he made his fourth appeal to the Duce. Ambassador Phillips was instructed to call upon Count Ciano and once more emphasize the fact that the entrance of Italy into the war would “immediately and prejudicially affect” the interests of the United States. While the American Government had never “asserted any political interests in Europe,” it had “asserted its clearly defined interests of an economic and property character. Through the extension of the war to the Mediterranean region and the inevitable destruction of life and property . . . the legitimate interests of the American people will be gravely curtailed.” Inasmuch as the relations between the Italian and American peoples had always been particularly close, it was hoped that nothing would be done adversely to affect them.29

On June 1, Ciano informed Ambassador Phillips that the Duce did not agree “with the point taken by the President with regard to the interests of the United States in the Mediterranean” and he maintained that the United States had the same interest in that area as Italy had, for example, “in the Caribbean Sea.” The decision had “already been taken to enter the war.”30

d. Reynaud Makes a Last Appeal to Roosevelt for Immediate Military Assistance

It had long been realized in Paris that Italy would probably enter the war as soon as Hitler’s armies had gained important successes. The early collapse of the Netherlands and Belgium had made a deep impression upon the mind of Mussolini who was intent upon securing some of the spoils of war. Ambassador Bullitt knew this fact only too well and for this reason he begged the President to consent to the delivery of some old destroyers that would strengthen French naval forces in the Mediterranean. The President’s reply remained negative: “Any exchange for American destroyers probably inacceptable because of enormous sea area which must be patrolled by us and would require Congressional action which might be very difficult to get. Our old destroyers cannot be sold as obsolete as is proved by fact. All of them are now in commission and in use or are in process of being commissioned for actual use.”31

Churchill was critical of the President’s continued refusal to send old destroyers to the Allies. On June 5 he remarked to Mackenzie King that although the American Chief Executive was an excellent friend he had sent “no practical help” to Britain. He had not expected any military aid from the Americans “but they have not even sent any worthy contribution in destroyers or planes.” It would be expedient not to let Americans view too complacently prospect of a British collapse, out of which they would get the British Fleet and the guardianship of the British Empire.”32

On the day that Churchill sent this letter to Mackenzie King, the Germans began the final phase of the Battle of France. In five days they blazed a path to Paris. With a crushing defeat staring him in the face, Reynaud sent another plea to President Roosevelt. Its tone was quite epic but there was a strong feeling that the French Premier was like some frightened boy whistling loudly as he walked down a very dark alley: “For six days and six nights our divisions have been fighting without one hour of rest against an army which has a crushing superiority in numbers and material. Today the enemy is almost at the gates of Paris. We shall fight in front of Paris; we shall fight behind Paris; we shall close ourselves in one of our provinces to fight and if we should be driven out of it we shall establish ourselves in North Africa to continue the fight and if necessary in our American possessions.” To make matters even worse, at this tragic hour Italy had “stabbed France in the back.” The Allies were in desperate straits and required at once all the material support of the United States “short of an expeditionary force.”33

Reynaud’s allusion of Italy’s entrance into the war was turned by Roosevelt into a sharp thrust at Mussolini. That evening, in an address at Charlottesville, Virginia, the President alluded to the sweep of the tides of war across the Continent of Europe and the consequent menace to America of such a martial flood. Then, adopting a graphic phrase from Reynaud’s plea earlier in the day, he suddenly remarked with dramatic intensity: “On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor.”34 This unexpected interpolation directed at the Duce indicated the President’s bitterness towards a dictator to whom he had made four futile pleas for nonintervention.

But Reynaud needed more than bitter allusions. Churchill rushed to France and tried to recall to Marshal Pétain the glorious stand of the Allied armies in the spring of 1918. The Marshal replied very quietly “that in those days he had a mass of manoeuvre of upwards of sixty divisions; now there was none.” In 1918 there had been “sixty British divisions in the line.” In 1940 the story was tragically different and Pétain was “haunted” by the grief he felt “that Britain, with her forty-eight million population had not been able to make a greater contribution to the land war against Germany.”35

The remarks of Marshal Pétain irritated Churchill considerably. On June 12 he sent to President Roosevelt the latest news from the French front and in this communication he permitted his resentment to color his message: “The aged Marshal Pétain, who was none too good in April and July, 1918, is, I fear, ready to lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace for France.” This was the moment for the President to “tip the balance in favour of the best and longest possible French resistance.”36 In the White House it was believed that Reynaud’s arm might be strengthened by brave words and bright promises. The Premier was assured that the American Government was “doing everything in its power” to make available to the Allied powers the war matériel they so urgently needed. The “magnificent resistance of the French and British armies” had profoundly impressed the American people.37

When Ambassador Kennedy brought to Churchill a copy of this Presidential salute to Allied courage, the Prime Minister pressed for its immediate publication. It could play a “decisive part in turning the course of world history.” At the very least it would “decide the French to deny Hitler a patched-up peace with France.”38 In a hurried note to Reynaud, Churchill indicated the compromising character of the Roosevelt message. If France, on the basis of this assurance from the American Chief Executive, would continue in the war, it should be obvious that the United States was “committed beyond recall to take the only remaining step, namely, becoming a belligerent in form as she has already constituted herself in fact.”39

The President realized the truth of this Churchill statement. He had already committed beyond recall the United States to take part in the war then raging in Europe but he could not afford in the summer of 1940 to let this fact become known. His campaign for re-election as President would soon take shape and he knew he could not hope for success if the voters knew that he was secretly putting America into World War II. He quickly sent word to Churchill explaining that he could not agree to the publication of his message to Reynaud. The Department of State saw in such publication the “gravest dangers.” Churchill would not take this “disappointing telegram” as a final answer from the White House. On June 15 he frankly told the President that events in Europe were moving “downward at a pace where they will pass beyond the control of American public opinion.” Eventually America would enter the struggle; why not now? It would be expedient to remember that if the Churchill Government fell a new cabinet might give the British fleet to Hitler. What would the United States do in that event? There was desperate need for the delivery of thirty-five destroyers at once. This matter should not be delayed.40

Reynaud realized that he could not wait for several months until American assistance reached France. It was now or never. On June 14 he sent a message to Roosevelt that plumbed the depths of despair. German troops had just burst into Paris. Would it pay France to “continue to sacrifice her youth in a hopeless struggle?” Unless America could rush to France’s aid with armed force she would “go under like a drowning man and disappear after having cast a last look towards the land of liberty from which she awaited salvation.“41 When Roosevelt replied with a warm encomium upon the “resplendent courage” of the French armies but with no promise of immediate military aid, Reynaud requested Churchill to release his Government from its obligations not to negotiate a separate peace. The Prime Minister hastened to France in a vain effort to save the situation, but Reynaud had resigned by the time he reached Bordeaux. Marshal Pétain now assumed the burden of leadership and forwarded to Berlin a request for an armistice.42

On June 18, Ambassador Biddle was assured that the French fleet would “never be surrendered to the enemy.”43 After receiving this comforting news Secretary Hull instructed the American representatives in Berlin and Rome that the government of the United States “would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power.”44 Germany would not be permitted to occupy any French islands in the Caribbean.

e. The Destroyer Deal

The fall of France imparted a sense of urgency to the Administration’s program for aiding Britain by the sale or lease of war matériel. The President’s qualms about constitutional limitations slowly disappeared under the drumfire of repeated requests from Churchill. Moreover, he brought into his Cabinet certain new members who were not averse to a prowar inclination. This was particularly true of the new Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, who was a notorious war hawk. It is apparent that after June 1940 the Administration embarked upon a phony bipartisan policy that pointed directly to American intervention in the European conflict.

This policy was given a green light on June 10 when Senator Sheppard offered an amendment to a pending defense bill authorizing the War Department to exchange unserviceable or surplus materials for others of which there was a scarcity. Senator Clark, of Missouri, declared that the purpose of the amendment was “an evasion of international law and of the Neutrality Act.”45 But the amendment was adopted by a large majority and the measure finally became law on July 2, 1940.

In the meantime Senator David I. Walsh had sponsored legislation that would provide against any “limitation or reduction in the size of our Navy.”46 The Act of June 28, 1940, embodied the ideas of Senator Walsh. It was not long, however, before the fertile mind of Benjamin Cohen, special assistant to the Attorney General, found several loopholes in this act. The President still had wide powers he could use without previous consultations with Congress. This opinion of Mr. Cohen was shrewdly argued but the Chief Executive “frankly doubted” if it would “stand up.” He also feared that Congress was “in no mood at the present time to allow any form of sale.”47

These doubts were dissolved under the impact of pressure from Churchill. On June 24 he wrote to Mackenzie King and once more emphasized the danger that if England fell there was the possibility that Hitler would get the British fleet.48 Four days later, in a letter to Lord Lothian in Washington, he repeated this disturbing thought which should be repeated to Roosevelt. He also complained that Britain had “really not had any help worth speaking of from the United States so far.”49 After more than a month of silence he wrote again to the President (July 31) to inform him that the need for destroyers had “become most urgent.” The whole fate of the war might rest upon the speed with which these destroyers were delivered. He was confident that the President would not “let this crux of the battle go wrong” for want of the much-needed warships.50 When Lord Lothian spoke of an exchange of naval bases for destroyers, Churchill indicated his preference was for an indefinite lease and not an outright sale.51

Churchill’s cablegram to the President (July 31) had led to a Cabinet meeting in the White House on August 2. There was immediate agreement that “the survival of the British Isles under German attack might very possibly depend on their getting these destroyers,” but there was also recognition that legislation would be “necessary” to authorize any deal concerning the destroyers. If the British Government would give positive assurances that the British fleet “would not under any conceivable circumstances fall into the hands of the Germans,” the opposition in Congress would be “greatly lessened.” Perhaps William Allen White would work upon Wendell Willkie, Joseph Martin, and Charles McNary and thus divide the Republican ranks! When the President talked with White over the telephone he elicited a promise from the famous editor to get in touch with Willkie at once.52

There was no doubt in Churchill’s mind that any transfer of American destroyers to Britain would be a “decidedly unneutral act by the United States.” It would justify a declaration of war by Hitler.53 Such action would be eminently agreeable to Churchill who would ardently welcome American help in the struggle against the dictatorships. But the situation had to be handled carefully. When Lord Lothian (August 6) cabled that the President was exceedingly anxious for a pledge that the British fleet would not be turned over to the Germans in the event that Britain fell, Churchill refused to give one. The British nation would “not tolerate any discussion of what we should do if our island were overrun.” It would be best to couple the transfer of destroyers with the lease of naval and air bases in Newfoundland and on some British islands in the Caribbean.

On August 13 the essential paragraphs in this agreement were worked out during a conference between the President, Secretaries Knox, Morgenthau, and Stimson, and Sumner Welles.54 In the meantime William Allen White had received assurances from Wendell Willkie that he would “not make a campaign issue of the transfer.” The services of General Pershing were next enlisted. The old warrior warned the American public in a broadcast that Britain needed immediate aid. This could best be given by placing at the disposal of the British and Canadian governments “at least fifty over-age destroyers which are left from the days of the World War.”55 Admirals Yarnell, Standley, and Stirling supported this viewpoint.

On August 16, President Roosevelt issued a statement that he was negotiating with the British Government for the acquisition of naval and air bases.56 Nothing was said about a deal for destroyers. Senator David I. Walsh was still showing strong opposition to such a transaction. With the hope of changing the Senator’s opinion in this regard the President wrote him a letter with the familiar salutation, “Dear Dave.” He assured the Senator that the British islands were “of the utmost importance to our national defence as naval and operating bases.” After reminding him that Jefferson in 1803 had purchased Louisiana “without even consulting Congress,” the President then expressed the hope that there would be no further opposition to a deal that would be the “finest thing for the nation that has been done in your lifetime and mine.”57

“Dear Dave” did not fall for this bait so he was later smeared as a loose character. But even so stanch a New Dealer as Secretary Hull had doubts about a destroyer deal and he regretfully informed Lord Lothian that in order “to meet the wishes of your Government an amendment to these provisions of law [the United States Code and the Act of June 28, 1940] may be necessary.”58 But this would take time and Britain’s need was immediate. In the meantime Churchill on August 20 had announced in Parliament that negotiations were in progress for leasing air and naval bases in Newfoundland and on British islands in the Caribbean to the United States. Two days later he explained to President Roosevelt the difficulties that would attend any exchange of letters that would admit “in any way that the munitions which you send us are a payment for the facilities.” The dispatch of war matériel to Britain should seem to be “a separate spontaneous act on the part of the United States, arising out of their view of the world struggle.”59 But Sumner Welles informed Lord Lothian that under existing legislation it was “utterly impossible” for the President to send destroyers to Britain as a spontaneous gift; they could be sent only as a quid pro quo.

On August 23 the President confessed to Secretary Hull that the negotiations with Britain “on the bases and destroyers have bogged down. Please see what you can do.”60 In an extended conference among the President, Secretary Hull, and Lord Lothian the matter was further explored. Secretary Hull made it clear to the British Ambassador that the President “had no authority whatever to make a gift of public property to any Government or individual.” But Attorney General Jackson had no trouble finding convenient loopholes in existing legislation. His assistant, Ben Cohen, had also discovered them some months previously. The Act of June 15, 1917, made it unlawful to send any ship out of the United States that was “built, armed or equipped as a vessel of war, with any intent or under any agreement or contract . . . that such vessel shall be delivered to a belligerent nation.” This restriction did not apply “to vessels like the over-age destroyers which were not built, armed, equipped as, or converted into, vessels of war with the intent that they should enter the service of a belligerent.”61

Mr. Jackson blandly pushed aside the pertinent provisions of the Treaty of Washington (May 8, 1871) and Article 8 of the Hague Convention XIII of 1907 which required that a neutral government take measures to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to engage in belligerent operations, if the vessel was specially adapted within the neutral’s jurisdiction to warlike use. The one precedent that Mr. Jackson adduced to support his contention concerning the transfer of destroyers was a most dubious one. Indeed, the opinion of the Attorney General was distinctly “phony” and was based upon the familiar dictum: “What’s the Constitution between friends.”

The way was now prepared for the destroyer deal. On September 2 notes were exchanged between Secretary Hull and Lord Lothian which first recited that the British Government, freely and without consideration, granted to the United States a lease for the “immediate establishment and use of naval and air bases and facilities” on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda. The second item dealt with the establishment by the United States of air and naval bases on certain British territory in the Caribbean (Bahamas, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and British Guiana) in exchange “for naval and military equipment and material which the United States Government will transfer to His Majesty’s Government.” The leases would run for a period of 99 years.62 At the same time Churchill also gave an assurance that the British fleet would not be scuttled or surrendered. This assurance was not to be published.

From the viewpoint of international law the destroyer deal was definitely illegal. As Professor Herbert Briggs correctly remarks: “The supplying of these vessels by the United States Government to a belligerent is a violation of our neutral status, a violation of our national law, and a violation of international law.”63 Professor Edwin Borchard expressed a similar opinion: “To the writer there is no possibility of reconciling the destroyer deal with neutrality, with the United States statutes, or with international law.”64 The whole matter was correctly described by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in a pertinent headline: “Dictator Roosevelt Commits an Act of War.”65

f. Propaganda Pushes America towards Intervention

During the years 1914 to 1917, British propaganda played a significant part in preparing the American mind for intervention in the World War. In the period prior to American intervention in World War II the British Government did not have to bear a heavy burden of propaganda: there were thousands of Americans who eagerly assumed this responsibility. The colorful story of these merchants of death has been told in such detail that it will be given merely a brief mention in these pages.66

Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick gave Roosevelt an excellent cue when he remarked that “of all the ways for Christians to make a war seem holy, the simplest way is to get Jesus into it.”67 The President followed this tip on January 4, 1939, when he addressed Congress on the state of the nation. Storms from abroad were challenging three institutions “indispensable to Americans, now as always. The first is religion. It is the source of the other two—democracy and international good faith. . . . We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world which observe the sanctity of treaties and good faith in their dealings with other nations cannot safely be indifferent to international lawlessness anywhere. They cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations.”68

The belligerent implications of these words were not lost upon members of Congress who fully realized the dangers and futility of embarking upon a holy war. Their fears were heightened when the President enlarged upon the same theme in an international broadcast under the auspices of the Christian Foreign Service convocation: “Today we seek a moral basis for peace. . . . It cannot be a moral peace if freedom from invasion is sold for tribute. . . . The active search for peace which the early Christians preached meant meeting and overcoming those forces in the world which had set themselves against the brotherhood of man and which denied the equality of souls before the throne of God.”69

Catholic leaders did not respond to this summons to enlist the churches in a movement towards intervention. Catholic cardinals like O’Connell and Dougherty were strongly opposed to America’s entry into World War II, and the Catholic press was outspoken in its criticism of the implications in the President’s policy. The Catholic World thought Americans “were in no position to save anyone. We shall be lucky to save ourselves. . . . What kind of madness has got hold of those who advocate our settling the quarrels of the world, changing the habits of nations that have been fighting for the last thousand years? Who do we think we are?”70 The Ave Maria was equally opposed to intervention: “The people of this country do not want war at this moment; they can see no transgression against our safety or honor to justify a war. . . . They have no commission, human or divine, to challenge aggression not directed against them.”71

The Ave Maria was particularly sharp in its criticism of William Allen White, famous Kansas editor, who was “doing everything humanly possible to get us into the European conflict.” It was certainly true that White had been very busy in the fight against fascism. He was a member of the Union for Concerted Peace Efforts, the American Committee for Non-participation in Japanese Aggression, the National Refugee Service, the Council Against Intolerance, and the Non-partisan Committee for Peace through the Revision of the Neutrality Law. This last organization was an active pressure group in favor of sabotaging existing neutrality legislation.

After this work had been carried to a successful conclusion, White helped to launch the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. The implications of this movement should have been evident to him. In December 1939, Robert Sherwood wrote to White to express the view that “it was necessary for the United States to intervene in a military way to check aggression by dictators.” In his reply White remarked that he had always stood with Sherwood “in spirit” but had been constrained “by an old man’s fear and doubt when it comes to lifting my voice for war.”72

In the spring of 1940 after this new organization had begun its activities, White became feverish in his anxiety to speed the gift of munitions of war to the hard-pressed Allies. In July he and the members of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies bent every effort to secure “the release of fifty or sixty over-age but recently reconditioned American destroyers to England.” When the President failed to show any great enthusiasm to push through a destroyer deal, White felt that “he had, as it were, lost his cud.”73 Contact was made with large numbers of influential persons throughout the United States and they were urged to exert pressure upon the Chief Executive. The committee with its six hundred local chapters and thousands of volunteer workers was able to inundate the Capitol in Washington with a flood of letters and telegrams favoring the destroyer deal. The President owed a big debt to White who was so naïve as to believe that America could walk halfway down the road to war and then stop.

This naïveté was clearly indicated on December 20, 1940, in a letter he wrote to Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain. He assured Howard that “the only reason in God’s world” he was a member of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was to keep America “out of war.”74 Some of the war hawks on the committee deeply resented White’s letter to Howard. When Frederick McKee flew to Emporia to persuade White to issue a statement that he was “not for peace at any price,” he was met with a flat refusal. But White then showed his mental confusion by signing a round-robin letter to the President urging him to do “everything that may be necessary to insure defeat of the Axis powers.” This letter, as the committee recognized, had “more warlike implications than the repeal of the neutrality law or the convoy issue.”75 But there were still some lingering doubts in the mind of Clark Eichelberger who wired White on December 26 about the “unfortunate repercussions” of the letter that had appeared in the Scripps-Howard newspapers. It was at last apparent to White that he had failed to understand the real intentions of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Its real drive was towards war, not peace. In his letter of resignation he confessed that he was “amazed” that he was “so far behind the procession,” but he would go “no faster nor no further.”76 He had been used as a convenient façade by an organization that had talked of peace while rushing down the road to war. He was the symbol of millions of Americans.

g. Lend-Lease—Back Door to Intervention in World War II

It was entirely fitting that lend-lease legislation should have a prelude of promises by the President that American boys would not be sent abroad to die along far-flung frontiers. It had been evident to the President in the summer of 1940 that American involvement in World War II might be just around the corner of the next year. Senator Wheeler had read between the lines of the President’s pronouncements and when he saw the word war written in bold letters he tried to block such a contingency by a strongly-worded plank in the Democratic platform. But the pledge to keep out of “foreign wars” was nullified by the pregnant phrase—“except in case of attack.”77 It would not be difficult for an Administration seeking war to push one of the Axis powers to the point where an attack was inevitable.

But the American people, like William Allen White, had to be fooled by pacific phrases. When the election currents in the fall of 1940 appeared to be making a turn towards Wendell Willkie, the President made some new pledges at Philadelphia on October 23: “To every man, woman and child in the nation I say this: Your President and your Secretary of State are following the road to peace. . . . We are arming ourselves not for any purpose of conquest or intervention in foreign disputes.”78 A week later, in Boston, his pledge became more specific: “While I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”79

Robert Sherwood who helped to prepare this Boston speech had some qualms of conscience in later years: “For my own part, I think it was a mistake for him [the President] to go so far in yielding to the hysterical demands for sweeping reassurance, but, unfortunately for my own conscience, I happened at the time to be one of those who urged him to go the limit on this. . . . I burn inwardly whenever I think of those words ‘again—and again—and again.’ ”80

In the spring of 1941 these fires of conscience were burning very low in the President’s entourage. Under the impact of appeals from Churchill in England the entire structure of American neutrality was finally demolished by the legislative bomb of lend-lease. This bomb was many months in the making. On November 6, 1940, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt to express his profound relief at the election results: “I feel you will not mind my saying that I prayed for your success and that I am truly thankful for it. . . . I must avow my sure faith that the lights by which we steer will bring us all safely to anchor.”81 Those lights would lead America into the war.

On December 8, 1940, Churchill sent another long letter in which he outlined in great detail the pressing needs of Britain. In Churchill’s eyes these needs were also America’s needs because Britain was fighting our war as well as hers. The safety of the United States was “bound up with the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations.” Therefore, America should rush to Britain war matériel of specified kinds together with the gift or loan “of a large number of American vessels of war.” It was useless to expect Britain to pay for these loans. The moment was approaching when the British Government would “no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies.” The few dollars Britain had left were badly needed for domestic requirements. It would be wrong “in principle” for Britain to be “divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone.” America should bear a large part of the financial burden for a new crusade in Europe.82

Roosevelt received this communication while he was cruising in the Caribbean. When he returned on December 16 he signified his ardent approval of aid to Britain at America’s expense. On the following day, at a press conference, he recited an interesting parable:

Suppose my neighbor’s house catches fire and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out the fire. Now what do I do? I don’t say to him before that operation, “Neighbor, my garden hose cost me fifteen dollars; you have to pay me fifteen dollars for it.” No! What is the transaction that goes on? I don’t want fifteen dollars—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over. . . . What I am trying to do is to eliminate the dollar sign.83

What he really meant to say was that he was trying to eliminate the dollar sign so far as Britain was concerned. The American taxpayers would have it before their anxious eyes for the next generation. But before they had time to make any estimates, a lend-lease bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. It bore the significant number H.R. 1776. In that year we declared our independence from Britain; in 1941 we put it into grave peril by giving Britain a blank check which Churchill filled in with great gusto and then sent back to Washington for Roosevelt’s indorsement. Harry Hopkins was the contact man in this regard and while still in Britain he heard Churchill’s famous broadcast in which the following dangerous nonsense was beamed to rapt American listeners:

It seems now to be certain that the Government and the people of the United States intend to supply us with all that is necessary for victory. In the last war the United States sent two million men across the Atlantic. But this is not a war of vast armies, firing immense masses of shells at one another. We do not need the gallant armies which are forming throughout the American Union. We do not need them this year, nor next year, nor any year that I can foresee.84

These assurances of Churchill were of the same stripe as the Roosevelt assurances during the last days of his campaign for re-election. He probably remembered Lord Northcliffe’s sharp indictment of the American masses during the World War: “What sheep!” They could be sheared once more for British benefit by constant repetition of the old propaganda line about Britain fighting America’s fight. Roosevelt repeated this line on December 29 in a “fireside chat” to the American people. Aid to Britain was now a question of “national security.” If Britain were conquered, “all of us in the Americas would be living at the point of a gun.”85

On the following day the President summoned to the White House, Secretary Morgenthau and Arthur Purvis, head of the Anglo-French Purchasing Commission, to discuss the details of lend-lease legislation. On January 2, 1941, Edward Foley, Morgenthau’s general counsel, and his assistant, Oscar Cox, began the arduous task of drafting the bill. When opposition to the bill developed in certain circles in the State Department, Secretary Knox remarked to Morgenthau in his best seriocomic manner: “Let’s organize a hanging bee over there someday and hang the ones that you and I pick out.”86 Some of the clique around the President probably would have regarded the matter of a hanging bee very seriously when Senator Wheeler began a series of blasts against lend-lease legislation. On January 4, 1941, he asked some very pertinent questions: “If it is our war, how can we justify lending them stuff and asking them to pay us back? If it is our war, we ought to have the courage to go over and fight it, but it is not our war.”87 A week later, in a radio broadcast, he feathered a shaft that evoked an immediate cry of pain from the sensitive President. He regarded the lend-lease program as “the New Deal’s ‘triple A’ foreign policy—to plow under every fourth American boy.”88 The President deeply resented these prophetic words and denounced the Wheeler comment upon lend-lease as the “rottenest thing that has been said in public life in my generation.”89

Although Admiral Stark expressed on January 13 the opinion that “we are heading straight for this war,”90 the lend-lease program was sold to the American people as a form of peace insurance.91 On March 11, 1941, the lend-lease bill was signed by the President, and it was not long before a forecast of Senator Taft was proved correct: “I do not see how we can long conduct such a war [undeclared war] without actually being in the shooting end of the war.”92

h. Hitler Is Anxious to Avoid Conflict with the United States

This “shooting end of the war” was greatly feared by Hitler who strove in every way to avoid any incident that might lead to war with the United States. In order to conciliate public opinion in neutral countries, submarine commanders, from the very beginning of the war, had been directed “to conform to the Hague Convention.” Passenger lines were not to be torpedoed even when under escort.93

In September and October 1939, Hitler had high hopes that America might be induced to accept the role of mediator and thus bring to an early close a war that he had entered with many misgivings. In a previous chapter we have dealt with the mission of William Rhodes Davis to Berlin for the purpose of arranging mediation.94 It is apparent that Berlin took this mission quite seriously. In Hitler’s speech of October 6 there were evident indications of his readiness to accept Roosevelt as mediator, and on the following day Mr. Kirk, American chargé d’affaires in Berlin, cabled to Secretary Hull that “someone close to Hitler had conveyed the thought that the President might use Hitler’s speech as the occasion to send a confidential message to him endorsing his ‘efforts toward peace.’ ”95 On October 9, Kirk cabled that a German press spokesman informed him that Germany “would certainly accept from the President a suggestion for a truce and negotiations toward peace and intimated that Germany might take part in a conference somewhere far removed from the war theater—which some interpreted to mean Washington.”96

The terms of peace that Germany would present to such a peace conference were made known to the President and Secretary Hull through the long letter that William Rhodes Davis had sent to the Chief Executive. General Göring had spoken to Mr. Davis (October 3) in the following terms:

You may assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish State and a new Czechoslovakian independent government would come into being. . . . As for myself and my Government, I would be glad to attend and in the event of such a conference I would represent Germany. I agree that the conference should be in Washington.97

At this time Germany was already profoundly disturbed by the way the Russians were acting in Poland. During the meetings of a peace conference in Washington there would be an opportunity to focus the eyes of the world upon the ills of Europe and attempt to remedy them. If the President had possessed real courage and vision he would have welcomed these German overtures and staged a peace conference that would have saved both Poland and Czechoslovakia. But he and Secretary Hull were fearful that a move towards peace might benefit Hitler and discourage the Allies so they rejected the German peace feelers98 and thus prepared the way for eventual Red domination over both those countries. In the long chapter of historical might-have-beens, Roosevelt plays a prominent and dismal part.

Roosevelt’s rejection of the idea of a peace conference in Washington did not put an end to Nazi efforts to conciliate the United States. Hitler was exceedingly anxious not to have war with America. This fact is clear in the testimony given during the Nürnberg trials. Ribbentrop insisted upon the pacific disposition of the Führer concerning the United States,99 and Weizsäcker confirmed this fact: “No German desired to be at war with the United States or looked for trouble in that direction. . . . We were not to let ourselves be provoked to be the ones who bring the conflict to the open daylight. Wherever there would be unfriendly acts,. . . we would not be the ones who start.”100

The German press, under strict instructions, stopped its sharp criticism of the United States and of prominent American officials. Nazi officials became increasingly careful about any statements that might offend American sensibilities, and the German chargé d’affaires in Washington (Dr. Hans Thomsen), in a press release, went so far as to call President Roosevelt “high-minded” and to praise his admonitions of neutrality.101 In April 1940, General Walther von Brauchitsch assured representatives of the press that he had always admired the youthful strength of the United States and its people to which he attributed the “gigantic success of the new continent.”102

The new American neutrality law (November 4, 1939) gave certain satisfaction to Hitler who assured leading Nazis that it would render the United States harmless.103 Under this law the waters around the British Isles and the entire European coast from Bergen to the Spanish border were closed to American ships.104 These restrictions pleased the Führer who decreed on December 30, 1939, that American crews were to be treated “with the greatest consideration.”105 In this same spirit Admiral Raeder issued instructions that American ships were not to be pursued or sunk in order that “all difficulties which might result from trade war between the United States and Germany might be avoided at the very beginning.”106 But this German policy of conciliation was sorely tried by incidents arising out of the establishment of a neutrality zone announced by the Panama Conference, October 3, 1939. This safety belt around the Americas south of Canada varied in width from 300 to 1000 miles. Belligerents were warned to refrain from naval action within that area, but no armed forces were stationed along the safety belt to enforce this regulation.

In order to conciliate America the German Admiralty issued orders designed to prevent naval engagements within this safety belt.107 When the Admiralty wished to recede from this position, Hitler refused to permit any change of orders.108 Moreover, the Führer adhered to this conciliatory policy even when American vessels adopted a course that must have enraged him. In December 1939 the German liner Columbus left Veracruz and was closely trailed by the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa which constantly broadcasted her position. This action compelled the Nazi captain to scuttle his ship some 450 miles east of Cape May.109 The same tactics were pursued by the U.S.S. Broome in trailing the Rhein, which also was scuttled by her captain.110 The freighter Idarwild was followed by the Broome until it was destroyed by H.M.S. Diomede (November 1940), with the Broome standing by to watch the result of her pursuit.111 The German Government refrained from filing any protest at these actions.

At a naval conference on March 18, Admiral Raeder was finally able to secure an important concession from the Führer. This took the form of a new blockade order (March 25, 1941) which not only included Iceland but went as far as the waters of Greenland.112 The first naval incident in the North Atlantic would soon take place.

The background for such an incident had been carefully filled in by President Roosevelt. In August 1940 he had sent Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Major General D. C. Emmons, and Major General George V. Strong to London for exploratory conversations concerning eventual “armed co-operation with the British Commonwealth.” After some months of conversations with important officers in the British armed services, Admiral Ghormley, in October 1940, sent to Admiral Stark a full report on his mission. Stark, in turn, presented to Secretary Knox on November 12 a memorandum on national objectives. One of the most important items in this memorandum was “the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire.” In order to achieve this objective, in January 1941 a series of secret staff conversations began in Washington. Two months later (March 27, 1941), the ABC-1 Staff Agreement was consummated which envisaged a “full-fledged war co-operation when and if Axis aggression forced the United States into the war.”113

One of the sections of this agreement was aimed at creating an incident that would “force the United States into the war.” It contained the following explosive phraseology: “Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers.” In order to carry out this task the Royal Navy hastened to give the United States Navy the “benefit of its experience, and of the new devices and methods for fighting submarines that had already been evolved.” The responsibility “now assumed by the United States Navy meant the organization of a force for escort-of-convoy.” On February 1, 1941, this patrol force was given “the new and appropriate designation of Atlantic Fleet,” and its commander, Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, was promoted to the rank of Admiral and designated Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet.114 The first naval incident was almost at hand.

On April 10, 1941, the destroyer Niblack (Lieutenant Commander E. R. Durgin), in the waters off Iceland, picked up three boatloads of survivors from a torpedoed Netherlands freighter. As the last men were being pulled aboard, the sound operator made contact on a submarine. The division commander, D. L. Ryan, immediately assumed that the submarine was approaching for an attack so he ordered Mr.

Durgin to drop some depth charges which caused the submarine to retire. This was the first action between United States and German armed forces.115

As the system of convoy escorts developed in accordance with Anglo-American plans, other incidents were bound to occur. On April 17, John O’Donnell, well-known newspaper commentator, published a statement that “battlecraft” of the American Navy and Coast Guard were “giving armed escort to munition-laden British merchantmen leaving American ports.” The President, through his secretary, Mr. Early, replied that American naval forces were merely on “neutrality patrol” in the Atlantic. He then charged that Mr. O’Donnell was guilty of a “deliberate lie.”116 On April 25, during a press conference, the President expressly denied that naval escorts were being provided for fleets carrying lend-lease goods, and he developed at great length the difference between patrolling and convoying.117 A month later (May 27), in a national broadcast, he insisted that the delivery of war matériel to Britain was “imperative” and then stated that he had extended “our patrol in north and south Atlantic waters.”118

It was evident to Senator Taft that the President’s broadcast disclosed “an intention on his part to push further and further toward war without consulting the people. . . . His speech contains vague threats of aggressive, warlike action to be undertaken in his sole discretion.”119 Two weeks later the Washington Post printed a story by two columnists, Alsop and Kintner, to the effect that more than a month earlier there had been an encounter between American and German vessels of war and this had been followed by offensive operations on the part of an American destroyer.120 The columnists were making a specific reference to the Niblack incident which had been kept very quiet by navy authorities. Secretary Knox promptly denounced this story but failed to confirm or explicitly deny it.121 In further statements he was purposely vague.122

While these exercises in double talk were being carried on, the President was taking active measures to see that Greenland did not fall into German hands. On January 9, 1941, the Department of State issued a release indicating that an American consulate had been established at Godthaab, and that provision had been made for the purchase in the United States of small arms for the Greenland police.123 These steps were followed by the signature (April 9, 1941) of an agreement authorizing the United States to occupy Greenland for defensive purposes. Inasmuch as the Danish Minister in Washington (Henrik Kauffmann) had no authority to conclude such an agreement, he was recalled by the Nazi-controlled Danish Foreign Office. He preferred to remain in Washington and was recognized by Secretary Hull as the regularly accredited minister.124 Needless to say, from the viewpoint of international law, this whole transaction was legally indefensible.125

In the meantime the Führer was showing a strong determination to adhere to his policy of keeping out of war with the United States. In May 1941 the German attitude was summed up at a meeting between Hitler and his naval advisers:

Whereas up to now the situation confronting submarines and naval forces on operations was perfectly clear, naval warfare in the North Atlantic is becoming increasingly complicated as the result of the measures taken by the U.S.A. In order to help Britain, the American neutrality patrol, which was hitherto confined to the area within the American neutrality zone, has been reinforced and considerably extended toward the east to about 38° W., i.e. as far as the middle of the Atlantic. The true character of the American neutrality patrol is shown by the fact that vessels on patrol have also been instructed to report by radio any battleships encountered. . . .

We have laid down the following rules for naval warfare in order to comply with German political aims with regard to the U.S.A.:

No attack should be made on U.S. naval forces and merchant vessels.

Prize regulations are not to be applied to U.S. merchant ships.

Weapons are not to be used, even if American vessels conduct themselves in a definitely unneutral manner.

Weapons are to be used only if U.S. ships fire the first shot.

As a result of these instructions and of the constant endeavors on the part of Germany not to react to provocation, incidents with the U.S.A. have been avoided up to the present time.

It is unmistakable that the U.S. Government is disappointed about this cautious attitude on the part of Germany, since one of the most important factors in preparing the American people for entry into the war is thus eliminated. The U.S. is therefore continuing its attempt to obliterate more and more the boundary line between neutrality and belligerency, and to stretch the “short of war” policy further by constantly introducing fresh measures contrary to international law.126

The next naval incident involving German-American relations was the sinking of the American merchant ship (May 21, 1941) Robin Moor, New York to Cape Town, by a German submarine. There was no visit or search but the crew and passengers were allowed to take to open lifeboats.127 As the sinking occurred outside the blockade zone it is evident that the submarine commander disregarded orders concerning American ships. Admiral Raeder immediately issued orders to prevent further incidents of this nature, and Hitler, after confirming these instructions, remarked that he wished to “avoid any incident with the U.S.A.”128 On June 20 the President sent a message to Congress in which he bitterly criticized Germany as an international outlaw.129 He followed this message with another move in the direction of war. On July 7 he ordered American occupation of Iceland. Two days later Secretary Knox gave a statement to the press which implied that the American patrol force in the North Atlantic had the right to use its guns when the occasion arose.130

This occasion arose on September 4, 1941, when the destroyer Greer, bound for Iceland, was informed by a British plane that a submerged U-boat lay athwart her course some ten miles ahead. The Greer at once laid a course for the reported submarine, and after having made sound contact with it, kept it on her bow for more than three hours. During this period a British plane dropped four depth charges in the vicinity of the submarine without effect. Finally, the submarine commander grew tired of this game of hide-and-seek and launched a torpedo which the Greer was able to dodge. When the Greer counterattacked with depth charges, the submarine launched another torpedo which was avoided. When sound contact with the submarine could not be reestablished, the Greer resumed course for Iceland.131

On September 11 the President gave a broadcast which presented a distorted version of the Greer incident. He conveniently forgot to tell that the initiative had been taken by the Greer: “She [the Greer] was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable. She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine. . . . We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. . . . The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.”132 American vessels would now shoot at sight.

In the face of this serious incident that clearly showed the aggressive character of American naval patrolling, Hitler maintained his policy of avoiding difficulties with the United States. On September 17 orders concerning American merchant vessels exempted them from attack, even when in convoy, in all zones except that immediately surrounding the British Isles. In the Pan-American safety belt “no warlike acts” were to be carried out on German initiative.133

The American answer to these pacific gestures was to authorize escort duty for American destroyers. It was arranged that an American escort group, based on Argentia, should take over from a Royal Canadian Navy escort at a designated place off Newfoundland and hand over the convoy to a Royal Navy escort at an agreed mid-ocean meeting place. Convoying was now an established practice, and it should be kept in mind that Secretary Knox, during the lend-lease hearings, had frankly admitted that he regarded convoying as an “act of war.”134

This de facto war in the Atlantic soon produced another incident. On October 16 five American destroyers rushed from Reykjavik, Iceland, to the help of a convoy that was being attacked by submarines. On the following day, while in the midst of the fighting, the destroyer Kearny was struck by a torpedo and slowly made its way back to Iceland.135 It had deliberately moved into the center of a pitched battle between German submarines and British and Canadian warships and had taken the consequences. It was not long before President Roosevelt gave to the American people a twisted account of the incident. On October 27 he recounted the happenings on October 16 and 17 and asserted that he had “wished to avoid shooting.” America had “been attacked. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child in this Nation. . . . Hitler’s torpedo was directed at every American.” In order to give additional overtones of villainy to his description of Nazi wickedness he then stated that he had a secret map made in Germany which disclosed Hitler’s plan to put all the continent of South America under his domination. But that was not all. He had in his possession another document made in Germany that revealed Hitler’s intention, if he was victorious, to “abolish all existing religions.”

It should be evident that the “forward march of Hitlerism” should be stopped. . . . We are pledged to pull our own oar in the destruction of Hitlerism.” The American Navy had been given orders to “shoot on sight.” The Nazi “rattlesnakes of the sea” would have to be destroyed.136

This declaration of war was confirmed by the Reuben James incident. On October 31, while the Reuben James was escorting a convoy to Iceland, some German submarines were encountered about 600 miles west of that island. The American destroyer was struck by a torpedo and rapidly sank. Only 45, out of a crew of about 160, were saved. When the news of the sinking of the Reuben James reached Germany, Hitler remarked: “President Roosevelt has ordered his ships to shoot the moment they sight German ships. I have ordered German ships not to shoot when they sight American vessels but to defend themselves when attacked.”137 On November 13, 1941, the directives for conduct of German warships when encountering American naval vessels remained pacific: “Engagements with American naval or air forces are not to be sought deliberately; they are to be avoided as far as possible. . . . If it is observed before a convoy is attacked that it is being escorted by American forces, the attack is not to be carried out.”138

Germany was trying desperately to stay out of war with the United States. America’s attitude was clearly stated by Sumner Welles at Arlington on November 11: “Beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror has reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom. It is his boast that his system shall prevail even unto the ends of the earth. . . . The American people after full debate . . . have determined upon their policy. They are pledged . . . to spare no effort and no sacrifice in bringing to pass the final defeat of Hitlerism and all that which that evil term implies. . . . We cannot know, we cannot yet foresee, how long and how hard the road may be which leads to that new day when another armistice will be signed.”139

To the mind of Welles and to others in the White House group it was obvious that America was really in the war. But the American people did not realize that momentous fact, nor did they know that they were pledged “to spare no effort and no sacrifice in bringing to pass the final defeat of Hitlerism.” It was easy for Mr. Welles to speak glibly of sacrifice. He had long enjoyed wealth and high social position. The word “sacrifice” had always been excluded from his dictionary. As the spokesman for the President he was suddenly breaking to the American people the dread news that they had become involved in a war they had ardently wished to avoid. The war hawks of 1941 were never tired of sneering at the majority of Americans as benighted isolationists who had tried to build a Chinese wall around the United States and thus cut it off from all foreign contacts. They knew their sneers were patent lies. America had never been isolated from the social, economic, religious, and cultural forces that shaped the modern world. Thanks to its geographical position it had escaped the recurring tides of conflict that had crumbled the walls of ancient civilizations and washed away the heritage men had earned through dauntless courage and high endeavor. Americans had been isolationists only against war and its evident evils, and their country had grown prosperous beyond the dreams of the founding fathers. But in 1915, President Wilson began to nurse the thought of sharing America’s ideals and wealth with the rest of the world, and two years later he led us into a foreign war that he hoped would make the world safe for democracy. But this theme song turned sour in American ears when it led to the great parade of 1917 which ended for many men in the vast cemeteries in France. It gained new popularity after 1933, and with Roosevelt as maestro, the old macabre accents began to haunt every home. In 1941 his orchestra of death was anxiously waiting for the signal to begin the new symphony. He had hoped for a German motif but Hitler had refused to assist with a few opening martial notes. Perhaps some Japanese statesman would prove more accommodating! At any rate, after the Reuben fames incident had fallen flat he turned his eyes towards the Orient and sought new inspiration from the inscrutable East. He found it at Pearl Harbor when Japanese planes sounded the first awesome notes in a chorus of war that is still vibrating throughout the world. The story of how the first notes in the script of that chorus were written in by President Roosevelt is told in the next chapter.

• 1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
• 2February 10, 1904.
• 3February 10, 1904.
• 4February 11, 1904.
• 5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
• 6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
• 7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
• 8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
• 9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
• 10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
• 11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
• 12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
• 13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
• 14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
• 15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
• 16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
• 17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
• 18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
• 19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
• 20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
• 21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
• 22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
• 23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
• 24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
• 25Ibid., p. 69.
• 26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
• 27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
• 28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
• 29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
• 30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
• 31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
• 32Ibid., p. 319.
• 33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
• 34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
• 35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
• 36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
• 37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
• 38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
• 39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
• 40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
• 41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
• 42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
• 43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
• 44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
• 45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
• 46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
• 47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
• 48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
• 49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
• 50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
• 51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
• 52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
• 53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
• 54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
• 55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
• 56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
• 57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
• 58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
• 59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
• 60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
• 61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
• 62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
• 63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
• 64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
• 65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
• 66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
• 67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
• 68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
• 69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
• 70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
• 71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
• 72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
• 73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
• 74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
• 75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
• 76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
• 77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
• 78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
• 79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
• 80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
• 81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
• 82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
• 83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
• 84Ibid., p. 5.
• 85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
• 86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
• 87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
• 88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
• 89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
• 90Ibid., p. 5.
• 91Ibid., pp. 6-7.
• 92Ibid., p. 9.
• 93Ibid., pp. 10-11.
• 94Ibid., p. ix.
• 95Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. III, 4389.
• 96January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
• 97January 9, 1927.
• 98January 25, 1927.
• 99March 17, 1927.
• 100January 21, 26, 1927.
• 101January 23, 28, 30; February 3, 5, 9, 1927.
• 102March 22, 1927.
• 103January 25, 1927.
• 104Consul John K. Davis to Secretary Kellogg, Nanking, March 28, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1927, II, 151-63.
• 105MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 151.
• 106Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 164.
• 107British Ambassador (Howard) to Secretary Kellogg, April 5, 1927. Ibid., pp. 179-81.
• 108Memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 6, 1927. Ibid., pp. 182-83.
• 109Consul General at Hankow (Lockhart) to Eugene Ch’en, April 11, 1927. Ibid., pp. 189-90. These demands included the following items: (1) adequate punishment of commanders of the troops responsible for the murders, personal injuries, and indignities and the material damage done as also of all persons found to be implicated; (2) apology in writing by the Commander in Chief of the Nationalist Army including an express written undertaking to refrain from all forms of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property; (3) complete reparation for the personal injuries and material damage done.
• 110Memorandum by the Secretary or State, April 20, 1927. Ibid., 204-5.
• 111MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, April 23, 1927. Ibid., pp. 209-10.
• 112Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, April 25, 1927. Ibid., pp. 210-11.
• 113Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, April 28, 1927. Ibid., pp. 215-16.
• 114United States Daily, April 26, 1927.
• 115North China Herald, April 30. 1927.
• 116Borg, op. cit., p. 344.
• 117Ibid., p. 351.
• 118Bulletin of the American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, August, 1927.
• 119China in Chaos, p. 2.
• 120June 18, 1927.
• 121MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, June 20, 1928. Foreign Relations, 1928, II, 184-85.
• 122Ibid., pp. 475-77.
• 123Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, August 10, 1928. Ibid., pp. 192-93.
• 124Ibid., III, 230-35.
• 125H. W. Briggs, American Journal of International Law, XXXV (1941), 506-13.
• 126Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1941, I (May 22, 1941), 68-69.
• 127Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1940-1941, III, 417-19.
• 128Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1941, II (June 21, 1941), 1.
• 129Documents on American Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 58-60.
• 130New York Times, July 10, 1941.
• 131Morison, op. cit., pp. 79-81; Congressional Record, 77 Cong., 1 sess., pt. 8, 8314.
• 132Peace and War, pp. 737-43.
• 133Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing uith the German Navy. 1941, II. 44.
• 134Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Lend-Lease Bill, 1941, pt. 1, p. 211.
• 135Morison, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
• 136Peace and War, pp. 767-72.
• 137Trefousse, op, cit., p. 122.
• 138Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1941, II, 66-67.
• 139Peace and War, pp. 784-87.