X: Mussolini Makes a Mockery out of Collective Security

X Mussolini Makes a Mockery out of Collective Security

a. Secretary Hull Defends American Policy

SECRETARY HULL’S press statement of November 15 convinced Mussolini that the United States should really be classed with the nations that favored economic sanctions against Italy. When Ambassador Long reported this shift in sentiment to the Department of State, Hull glibly explained that America was following an “independent policy” based upon the “spirit and intent” of the recent neutrality legislation.1 On November 22 he used the same explanation during a long conversation with the Italian Ambassador. He assured Signor Rosso that one of the main reasons for the broad suggestions in the statement of November 15 was the obvious fact that the American people were “almost wildly against war and are at all hazards in favor of keeping out of the present war.” Contact with belligerent nations might spread the infection of armed conflict, so the Roosevelt Administration had come to the conclusion that it was expedient to isolate America from such contacts as much as possible. “Heavy pressure” had been exerted upon the Department of State to include in its embargo list a “number of prime and essential war materials” out of which implements of war might be made. The Administration had finally decided to make some favorable response to this pressure.

Mr. Hull then directed the attention of Ambassador Rosso to the very considerable sacrifice the World War had entailed upon America. He also alluded to the large loans the Wilson Administration had extended to Italy during that conflict and to the fact that these loans had later been reduced to a “nominal sum.” Many Americans were now asking why the Italian Government was embarking upon a costly adventure in imperialism instead of liquidating these overdue financial obligations. As for Mr. Hull himself, he felt constrained to express his great surprise that “the Italian Government would make a complaint against this Government, in all the circumstances, in the severe language it does.”2 The position of the United States was very clear: “It opposed abnormal shipments for war purposes of strictly war materials.”

These explanations of Secretary Hull were far from satisfactory to the Italian Government. The League of Nations had named November 18 as the day on which economic sanctions would go into effect, and Mussolini had many fears concerning the impact of these restrictions upon the Italian way of life. The sanctions were divided into four categories: (1) an arms embargo upon ammunition and implements of war; (2) an embargo upon Italian exports; (3) a ban upon exports to Italy; (4) a financial boycott against Italy. The financial boycott, though very stringent, did not seriously affect Italy. The embargo upon Italian exports caused a sharp decline in trade with France and Britain, but the United States bought as much in March 1936 as in January 1935, and Germany, Austria, and Hungary came to the rescue of Mussolini. Although the gold reserves of the Bank of Italy shrank rapidly between November 1935 and March 1936, there was a balance sufficient to provide necessary purchases for a short war.3 The ban on exports to Italy was not as drastic and as extensive as some statesmen had wished. Coal, oil, and copper were not prohibited. For the three-month period, October through December 1935, the American proportion of Italy’s oil purchases rose to 17.8 per cent. Copper exports from the United States showed a similar increase, rising from $1,329,000 (November 1934-March 1935) to $2,201,000 (November 1935-March 1936). Despite the ardent admonitions of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, American business interests would not embargo exports that brought large profits.4

In November 1935 the Italian Government had no assurance that sanctions would fail to cripple its war effort. There was still a strong sentiment in Geneva to place oil on the embargo list, and there was also a possibility that Secretary Hull might be able to induce American oil companies to cease their exports. Ambassador Long believed that if the League banned the export of petroleum to Italy, Mussolini would “choose to fight rather than submit.”5

Laval also feared this possibility and was decidedly “lukewarm toward the enforcement of sanctions.” At a reception in Paris, Mme Laval informed the wife of the Italian Ambassador “in no uncertain terms how utterly opposed she was to the creation of any antagonism between France and Italy.” Persons “high in Government” felt that she was “echoing her husband’s point of view.”6

In the face of this threat of war from Mussolini, Britain quickly turned to the United States for advice. On December 5 the British Ambassador in Washington asked Secretary Hull if there was any possibility that the American Government would take “effective action” to prevent increased oil shipments to Italy in the event the League imposed an oil embargo or that the British Government embarked upon an independent course along the same line.7 Hull’s reply was quite cautious. While the Department of State was definitely opposed to the shipment “in abnormal quantities” of war materials to the belligerent nations, “those interested must use their own judgment” in attempting to forecast “the probable attitude and action of Congress” towards these abnormal exportations.

This Delphic answer did not satisfy Sir Ronald Lindsay who returned to the Department of State on December 7 to repeat his inquiry. Hull was somewhat annoyed by this persistence. During the course of his conversation with Sir Ronald he asked if the League were waiting for American assurances before taking any action. Before the Ambassador could reply, Hull indicated that the Department of State had “gone as far” as it could. It did not have any “legal authority to impose an oil embargo.” If the League was ready to take steps to put oil on its embargo list it would have to do so without reference to American action.8

Sir Ronald was taken aback by the tone and content of Hull’s remarks and finally murmured that he was not “disposed to make any further inquiry.” He could clearly see that the Department of State at that moment was not interested in any adventure in Anglo-American parallel policies.

b. The Hoare-Laval Agreement

Without Secretary Hull to stiffen his backbone, John Bull was a very pliant person. At times he could lend an ear to counsel of high principle, but upon other occasions had no difficulty in hearing the soft accents of intrigue. At Geneva the British Foreign Office had a mouthpiece in Anthony Eden who talked as impeccably as he dressed. In Paris the British had an expert, Mr. Maurice Peterson, who whispered in such low terms of realism that Pierre Laval regarded him as a kindred soul and assigned M. de Saint-Quentin to be his boon companion. During the early weeks of October when Eden talked of holding firm against Italian aggression, Peterson and Saint-Quentin were busily engaged upon a project that would frankly recognize the claims of Mussolini to a large portion of Ethiopia. These activities became so well known that the London Daily Herald published a plan of appeasement which was supposed to represent the viewpoint of this interesting pair. It provided for Italian domination over the empire of Haile Selassie.9

This plan was placed in diplomatic moth balls until after the General Elections in Britain. When Mr. Baldwin had been safely returned to office (November 14), Mr. Peterson resumed his work with Saint-Quentin. On December 4, Laval had an important conference with the Italian Ambassador, and on the following day the New York Times published the outline of a project for peace in Ethiopia.10 Apparently, it was difficult for the plans of Laval to remain secret.

On December 7, Sir Samuel Hoare journeyed to Paris for a talk with Laval, during the course of which he expressed the view that unless some platform of peace were soon placed beneath the tottering structure of Ethiopia it would fall under the hammer blows of Marshal Badoglio. Laval quickly concurred in the gloomy predictions of the British Foreign Secretary. Ethiopia suddenly became the “sick man of Africa” and a major operation was necessary to save its existence. This operation was completed on December 8, and the chief surgeons were Hoare and Laval.

Laval’s major concern in December 1935 was the danger of a rapprochement between Italy and Germany. This had to be prevented even though Mussolini’s terms were high. It would be far better to place a large number of backward Ethiopians under Italian administration than to push Mussolini into Hitler’s arms and thus prepare the way for World War II. Under Emperor Haile Selassie conditions in Ethiopia were distinctly primitive and the lot of the average native was poverty and personal danger. There was a strong possibility that his way of life would be improved under Italian rule.

The viewpoint of Laval has been given understanding expression by Winston Churchill in his latest study of the background of World War II:

The French, therefore, felt very strongly that they should not be drawn into permanent estrangement from Italy because of all the strong feeling which had suddenly surged up in England against Mussolini. . . . Two divisions of troops were all we could send at the outset to France if she were invaded by Germany. One can certainly understand Monsieur Laval’s point of view at this time.11

Fear of Germany was a constant factor in the European equation of Laval, and after Hoare had been in Paris for a few hours he began to share this same apprehension. He finally gave his blessing to the labors of Saint-Quentin and Maurice Peterson, and the joint product soon became known as the Hoare-Laval Agreement for the settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Under its terms Ethiopia would cede to Italy some 60,000 square miles of territory and receive in return a slice of Eritrea with an outlet to the sea. The southern half of Ethiopia, approximating 160,000 square miles, would be reserved as a sphere of influence where Italy would enjoy certain economic privileges. Along with these advantages there would also go a definite amount of political control which would be equivalent to Italian domination.12 Sir Samuel was in full flight before Mussolini.13

Hoare’s retreat was both moral and physical. After the publication of the Hoare-Laval Agreement the British Foreign Secretary paid a hurried visit to Switzerland for a much-needed rest. Pictures were circulated showing him skating with great zest, but bad luck followed him. While executing a difficult figure on the ice he fell and broke his nose. The fall of man is an old story but to Hoare it seemed to take on new meaning. He should return at once to England and explain to Parliament why he had become a party to a plan for appeasing Mussolini. Prime Minister Baldwin agreed with this decision and for a while intended to fight alongside of Hoare under his well-known banner of “men not measures.” But aroused British public opinion compelled him quickly to lower that banner and frankly confess in Parliament that the Hoare-Laval proposals were “absolutely and completely dead.” There would be no attempt “to resurrect them.”14

Baldwin’s decision to abandon the Hoare-Laval Agreement was made after a storm of protest broke loose in the British press. The London Star called the agreement a travesty which was “horrifying men with a sense of justice”; the Yorkshire Post regarded it as a breach of “international morality”; the Liverpool Daily Post looked upon its terms as “shocking”; while the Manchester Guardian remarked that it was “incredible that the Government has accepted a plan so utterly remote from any it has ever given the country cause to think it would so much as tolerate.”15 The London Daily Herald, a leftist Labour organ, was particularly vehement in its denunciation of the agreement which it called a “breach of faith—a conspiracy to enter into a conspiracy with the aggressor in order to defeat the League.”16 The News Chronicle (Liberal) scored the arrangement as an “outrageous betrayal of the Covenant,”17 while the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post printed a similar lament.18 Harold Laski rushed into print with an acrid estimate of Sir Samuel Hoare: “He is simply the average Tory mind in power instead of out of power. . . . Sir Samuel acted in the crisis exactly as the old Tory mind approves. . . . He thinks in terms of power.”19

On December 16 the secret corollary to the Hoare-Laval Agreement was published. This article would really prevent the Ethiopian Government from building a railroad from the port of Assab into the interior of the country. The London Times regarded this corollary as something at “variance with even the most cynical interpretation of the civilizing mission” of Italy.20

The chains of newspapers belonging to Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere were generally in favor of the Hoare-Laval Agreement, but the majority of the British press was so sharp in its criticism that Hoare was compelled to resign and Anthony Eden was appointed as the new Foreign Minister. Baldwin thus made a bow in the direction of public opinion, but there was no conviction in the gesture. In June 1936, Hoare was brought back into the Cabinet as the First Lord of the Admiralty. It was impressively stated that his unusual talents as an administrator could not be overlooked. Apparently his colleagues thought that his talents, and not high moral principles, were the main requisite for a statesman.

In Italy this bitter British reaction to the Hoare-Laval Agreement was attributed to the “working of antifascism, masonry and communism upon the misguided masses.” These forces did not exist in Germany and this fact prepared the way for an understanding with that country. The Italian press candidly admitted that German statesmen had “no love for Italy,” but it was felt that Hitler respected the Fascist State as a “stronghold against Communism, and as an indispensable element for the safety of Europe. . . . In a certain sense the fates of the two countries and regimes are considered to be linked, for both have the same powerful foreign and international enemies and both are working toward similar national ends.”21

With reference to British policy the feeling in Italy grew increasingly hostile. Even the temperate and optimistic L’Osservatore Romano expressed the opinion that the situation had become “extremely dangerous.”22 Sanctions had not impeded the Italian war effort, and in Rome there was “plenty of coal and plenty of food.” The Italian people were “ready for any emergency” and strongly disposed to “take any steps which their leader might decide for them.”23

c. President Roosevelt Chides Italy

The existence of this martial spirit in Italy was viewed by President Roosevelt with deep misgivings. In an address to Congress, January 3, 1936, he referred directly to Italy and to other have-not nations. These nations had failed to demonstrate the “patience necessary to attain reasonable and legitimate objectives by peaceful negotiation or by an appeal to the finer instincts of world justice.” He then contrasted these impetuous, grasping nations with peaceful and moral America.24

This homily on American virtues infuriated many Italian editors who indicated the many years that Mussolini had waited in vain for justice in the matter of a fair distribution of colonial territory:

It is easy for rich nations (like the United States who, through past ways of expansion and conquest in which natives were exterminated, has everything she needs and who to protect her high standard of living has barred immigration and imports to the detriment of poor nations) to condemn autocracies. . . . As to the beauties of democratic regimes . . . how about Roosevelt himself, who has . . . so thoroughly failed to uproot crime as to force America’s national hero [Lindbergh] to seek safety for his child on this side of the Atlantic.25

This sharp tone of criticism with reference to America was soon toned down as the Italian press began to reflect increasing optimism concerning the efficiency of the war machine. The American naval attaché in Rome reported that the Italian fleet was in a “very high state of efficiency” with a “high morale amongst the men and a calm and unexcited attitude on the part of the officers.”26 Colonel William J. Donovan, returning from a trip to Eritrea, stated that the “service of supplies was excellent, that morale was high, that health and sanitation were splendid, efficiency first rate, and that the military positions now occupied were secure and could be easily held.”27 In Rome there was a growing feeling that the African adventure would have a happy ending because Italian military strength had risen to such a point that Britain would not dare to intervene. This optimism was confirmed by glowing reports of success in the fierce engagements in the Tembyen, January 19 to January 23, 1936.

The message from President Roosevelt to Congress on January 3 was delivered in the evening over a nationwide radio network. After dealing specifically with international relations he turned to the matter of new neutrality legislation. This proposed new legislation would not only retain the mandatory embargo on the export of arms, munitions, and implements of war to belligerents but it would also empower the President to extend the embargo to the export, in excess of “normal commerce,” of other articles or materials used “in the conduct of war” when he believed that such action would “preserve the neutrality of the United States” or if he thought that the war would be prolonged if such an embargo were not put into force. The list of materials subject to these restrictions was left to the discretion of the President.28

These wide powers conferred upon the President by the proposed Pittman-McReynolds Bill were regarded by some eminent publicists as dangerous to American liberties. Judge John Bassett Moore declared that it was unwise to “give this unlimited power to any man. . . . The bestowal of such power would constitute the worst form of dictatorship ever set up.”29

A large number of Italian-American organizations reinforced these objections of Judge Moore’s to any enlargement of the President’s embargo power. Letters and telegrams began to pour into the offices of influential members of Congress. The League for American Neutrality sponsored a meeting in Faneuil Hall in Boston. Governor Curley, in a speech with strong political overtones, praised Mussolini as a lover of peace and a savior of Christianity. Other speakers were equally lyric in their praise of the Duce.30

As the attack on the proposed new neutrality legislation gained strength, Mr. Generoso Pope, publisher of the well-known newspaper, Il Progresso, rushed to Washington for an interview with President Roosevelt. The Chief Executive was most reassuring: “Gene, America honestly wishes to remain neutral; and I want you to tell the Italians . . . that our neutrality will in no way imply discrimination at the expense of Italy and in favor of any other nation.” When Mr. Pope asked if the existing neutrality legislation could not be re-enacted, the President replied: “Perhaps this could be a good solution.” Mr. Pope then pressed the same question upon Secretary Hull who “assured him that he had no personal objection to the idea if Congress should decide to accept it.”31

Whether as a result of this pressure or not, Congress rejected the section of the Neutrality Bill that enlarged the President’s embargo powers. It did forbid the granting of loans and credits to belligerents and it made mandatory the existing discretionary power of the President to extend the arms embargo to additional states when they became involved in war. It also exempted from the operation of the law any American republic at war with a non-American state and not “co-operating with a non-American State or States in such war.”32

It is apparent, therefore, that the Italian-American pressure group made strenuous efforts to defeat any neutrality legislation that would seriously affect Mussolini’s “African Adventure,” and it is the opinion of an able student of the situation in 1936 that this group “noticeably influenced the course of American neutrality.”33

d. Josef Beck Loses Confidence in the League

Italian victories in the spring of 1936 strengthened the efforts of Italian-Americans to prevent any amendments to neutrality legislation that would confer additional powers upon the President. They also indicated to European statesmen that Italian conquest of Ethiopia was inevitable. It was now realized with deep regret that it had been a mistake to abandon the Hoare-Laval Agreement which might have saved for Emperor Haile Selassie a considerable portion of his empire. In London the American chargé reported that it was “increasingly realized by those responsible for British foreign policy that whereas the methods employed by Hoare were faulty, the general aim of his policy was substantially right.” The former British Foreign Secretary had recognized the fact that Germany would greatly profit by any break in the Stresa front. His concessions to Italy were based upon the belief that Europe could not afford to alienate Mussolini. Eden was beginning to realize the truth of some of Hoare’s assertions, and his zeal for sanctions was fast disappearing.34

At Geneva, Hugh Wilson saw the shadow of Germany begin to darken the minds of many delegates to the League of Nations. He was struck with the “fact that nearly everyone with whom I have spoken has treated the problem of Germany with greater gravity than that of Abyssinia. . . . Massigli says that the French are much concerned lest Germany in the near future denounce the servitudes on the Rhineland.”35

It was not difficult for French statesmen to see that Hitler would take advantage of any coolness between Britain and Italy, and Massigli clearly forecast the German movement in the Rhineland. Britain’s pressure upon Poland in the matter of sanctions had distressed Colonel Beck in Warsaw who let Laval know that he had “lost confidence in the League of Nations as an instrument for promoting peace.”36 Anthony Eden’s insistence upon a firm policy with reference to Italy soon brought many chickens of hatred to roost in the muted halls of the League of Nations.

e. Implications of the Maffey Report

The Italian chickens were offered a comfortable roost on the well-known “Maffey Report” which was published in part in the Giornale d’ltalia. This confidential British document, dated June 18, 1935, was regarded by the Italian press as a justification of the Italian program in Ethiopia. Sir John Maffey, British Permanent Under Secretary for Colonies, was appointed chairman of a special committee to examine into the more important aspects of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Eden admitted that the report of this special committee concluded with a statement that “there was no important British interest in Abyssinia with the exception of Lake Tana, the waters of the Blue Nile, and certain tribal grazing rights.” During the early months of 1935, British ministers acted as if they agreed with the findings of this Maffey Report, and “what is more, seemed to care little about their obligations toward the League of Nations in relation to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. . . . It is little wonder, then, if Mussolini concluded that the British Lion was peacefully and purposely dozing.”

But this slumber was rudely interrupted by the announcement on June 27, 1935, of the results of the “Peace Ballot” which since November 1934 had been conducted by some private organizations under the auspices of the League of Nations Union. Approximately eleven and a half million persons in Great Britain and North Ireland recorded their opinions on five questions. On the question as to the advisability of using “military measures” to stop aggression, 74 per cent of the vote cast was in favor “of military sanctions.”

This large affirmative vote deeply disturbed the Baldwin Government which had just refused to consider sanctions against German rearmament. The policy of the Foreign Office had been governed by expediency rather than principle, and it was difficult for it suddenly to “stand forth convincingly as the White Knight of collective security.”37 When the attempt was made in connection with Italian expansion in Ethiopia, Mussolini felt that he had been double-crossed and he refused to be impressed with British recitations of certain formulas of peace.

In order to justify his suspicions of British policy he had pertinent paragraphs of the Maffey Report published in the Italian press. They contained sharp criticism relating to “Ethiopia’s unworthiness of belonging to the League, her ill-will toward Italy and her menace to all neighboring colonies.” The Italian Government had in “due time informed the British Government of the situation in Ethiopia,” and had expressed a desire for co-operation. Why was co-operation denied and why did the British Foreign Office fail to “go into the fact that, as the Maffey Report showed, Abyssinia was a violator of League principles and obligations?”

After reading the excerpts from the Maffey Report as published in the Giornale d’ltalia, most Italians believed that British action in the Ethiopian dispute was based upon a “dislike of Fascism; determination to destroy the Franco-Italian alliance; a desire to maintain absolute hegemony in the Mediterranean; and Eden’s personal ambition and, at a later stage, the bitter enmity toward Mussolini.” Italians were “bewildered by what they regard as the criminal, and also suicidal, policy of England.”38

From England, Sir Leo Chiozza Money, former Parliamentary Secretary to the British Ministry of Shipping, wrote a brief letter to President Roosevelt and inclosed many documents that placed Italian penetration of Ethiopia in a favorable light. It was evident to him that the Italians in Ethiopia were “cultivating, teaching and healing, founding hospitals and dispensaries, sinking wells, freeing slaves . . . and in the words of Major Fiske (an American, by the way), doing in 100 days more than had been done in 1,000 years.”39

In Rome, Ambassador Long realized the significance of the Italo-Ethiopian impasse with regard to European alignments. The Italian Government had made it clear that a “continuance of the present policy of the League under British direction and French backing will make Italy revise her whole foreign policy.” The heavy concentration of the British fleet in the Mediterranean was deeply resented by Mussolini who had been giving careful attention to the suggestion that an ultimatum be sent to London demanding a reduction in the number of British warships in those waters.40

The possibility of such a step was strengthened by the electrifying news of a series of brilliant victories gained by Italian armies in Ethiopia. On February 15, Marshal Badoglio won a decisive battle at Amba Aradam, where the forces of Ras Mulugeta were crushed so completely that it amounted to a national disaster. On February 27, Italian forces drove the Ethiopian troops from their strongly fortified positions in the Tembyen, and on April 12 the Italian flag was hoisted on the northern shore of Lake Tana. Emperor Haile Selassie realized the shattering effect of these defeats, and in a desperate attempt to stem the Italian tide he attacked the First Italian Army Corps near Lake Ashangi on March 31. After five days of bitter struggle the Emperor’s troops fled in wild disorder down the road to Dessie, and the eventual Italian conquest of Ethiopia was assured.41

f. Britain Wishes Oil to Be on List of Sanctions

The Italian victories in February 1936 seemed to spur the British Government into a final attempt to tighten economic restrictions upon Italy and to impose the long-threatened oil sanction. On March 2, Signor Bova Scoppa, the head of the Italian delegation at Geneva, informed the French Foreign Secretary (Flandin) that Mussolini would seriously resent the imposition of the oil sanction. When Flandin informed Eden of this fact, the British Foreign Secretary stated that he had been instructed by the Cabinet to push this very measure. Flandin opposed this move so vigorously that Eden talked with Prime Minister Baldwin over the telephone and secured a postponement of action upon oil.42 On the following day (March 3) the Committee of Thirteen adopted a resolution which called upon both belligerents to open negotiations for the “definite restoration of peace.” It was expected that the Italian and Ethiopian governments would have their replies ready for the meeting of the committee on March 10.

Mussolini was not disposed to pay much attention to this request of the Committee of Thirteen. He would make peace upon his own terms when Italian armies had crushed Ethiopian resistance. France could read this military writing upon the wall of Ethiopia and it spelled a policy of nonintervention. Flandin was determined to conciliate rather than irritate Mussolini, and his attitude was praised by Virginio Gayda (March 3).43 On that same day the Duce, in an address to his Cabinet, commended the American Government for its refusal to heed “League solicitations” with reference to the imposition of a sanction upon the export of oil to Italy.44

In Rome the feeling against an oil sanction had been very strong and Mussolini had several times intimated that he would regard such action as almost the equivalent of a declaration of war. He was, therefore, deeply grateful to Flandin for his pressure upon Eden. But this gratitude to France was soon partially diverted to Hitler when the Nazi leader moved his troops into the Rhineland (March 7) and thus liquidated the Locarno Pact. Once more Germany rocked the foundations of the European state system and made France labor desperately in an attempt to maintain the Stresa front. Mussolini must now be courted rather than chided.

g. Mussolini Makes a Peaceful Gesture

In March the Italian Foreign Office saw at a glance that a profound change had suddenly taken place in the European scene. With victory in Ethiopia now assured, Italy could make some slight gesture of peace. On March 8, Mussolini informed the Committee of Thirteen that he accepted in principle their plea for a restoration of peace. But negotiations for a cessation of Italo-Ethiopian hostilities must be based upon a recognition of the alleged fact that Ethiopia was the “aggressor nation.” Moreover, in any peace program acceptable to Italy there should be an assurance that “security and treaty rights” would be guaranteed, and it should be made clear that “the military situation” must be the basis for negotiation.45

Engert, in Addis Ababa, ridiculed these terms of peace and vehemently denied the reports of Italian military successes. In recent important engagements the Italian plan for encircling the Ethiopian Army had failed and the Italian “forces, especially the Alpinis, suffered heavy losses.” The morale of the Ethiopian soldiers was “excellent and has not been affected by Italian lies.” Mussolini’s legions were in a “precarious situation and their lines of communication are at the mercy of Ethiopian patrols who take the fullest advantage of it. . . .

Ethiopia is determined to eject the invader from her territory.”46

Mussolini knew the situation in Ethiopia far better than the American Minister in Addis Ababa, and he counted upon the fact that time was on his side. In Rome he evinced a co-operative disposition and let it be understood that he was in favor of a settlement of the Rhineland difficulty “with such a show of strength against Germany that it would make the Reich realize the seriousness of any further infractions” of the Treaty of Versailles.47

This apparent conciliatory disposition had some effect upon the Committee of Thirteen which reassembled on March 23 in London. After considering the answers of Italy and Ethiopia to its plea for the restoration of peace, the committee requested its chairman to “take such steps as may be called for” in order to “bring the two parties together . . . and to bring about a prompt cessation of hostilities.” On this same day Mussolini made a bitter attack upon sanctions.48 The path to peace was still blocked by barriers that only an Italian victory could remove.

This victory would not be long delayed. Italian armies were on the road to complete military success in Ethiopia, and the fleet was ready to give a good account of itself. Captain L. N. McNair, the naval attaché at Rome, was much impressed “with the physical preparations in the form of equipment and with the moral and spiritual preparations of the men and officers of the Italian Navy.” Within the last six months the situation in the eastern Mediterranean had changed distinctly in the direction of Italy’s advantage.49

h. Britain Becomes More Friendly with Hitler

Britain was not happy to see this increase in Italian military strength, and was inclined to court Germany as one means of balancing the new political equation in the Mediterranean. There was a “distinct pro-German attitude among English people including high army circles.”50 Reliance upon some measure of German support relieved the British Government of the necessity of conciliating Italy, and in Paris it was believed that “relations between Italy and Great Britain are so tense as to be the really grave danger point on the European horizon today.”51 From Berlin, Dodd reported on the possibility of a rapprochement between Germany and Britain. Several well-informed and experienced observers were of the opinion that “the British may have to choose shortly between following French advice and make up with the Italians . . . or pursuing the obvious alternative of virtually allying herself with Germany.”52 If Hitler were smart he could, according to Ambassador Dodd, drive an excellent bargain.

British statesmen were well acquainted with the old dictum that he who sups with the Devil must use a long spoon. They feared that Hitler would ask a high price for any diplomatic support he might give to the British position at Geneva, and Neville Chamberlain insisted that “no demand for the transfer of British colonies to Germany would be entertained for a moment.”53 As a friendly gesture towards Germany, however, the British Cabinet would be willing to “remove the ‘guilt clauses’ from the Treaty [of Versailles] if Germany gives up claims for mandates.” Britain would not “permit Germany to be put again in the ‘dock.’ ” An effort should also be made to “grant France necessary security while at the same time Germany must be granted full equality.” But no matter what diplomatic deals the situation in Europe demanded it should always be kept in mind that Italy should never be permitted to dominate Ethiopia.54

The items in the British Cabinet memorandum which Prentiss Gilbert disclosed to Secretary Hull were given additional confirmation by Ambassador Bingham. It was now very evident that the British Foreign Office was greatly disappointed that the Hoare-Laval Agreement had been defeated. During a conversation with Bingham the British Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs frankly admitted that he was “more than ever convinced that the Hoare-Laval proposals would have been a great advantage primarily to Abyssinia and indeed to the whole world and he thought that in the end public opinion would come around to this belief.”55

i. The League Attempts to End the Italo-Ethiopian War

British belief in the advantages of the Hoare-Laval Agreement was induced by Italian military successes in March and April 1936. On April 15, Baron Aloisi appeared in Geneva and proposed to the chairman of the Committee of Thirteen that peace negotiations be opened on the basis of “the actual situation as it presents itself after six months of military operations.” The Ethiopian delegation to the League promptly opposed this proposal and instead suggested the imposition of more rigorous sanctions. Anthony Eden listened with favor to these drastic suggestions, and when the Council met on the afternoon of April 20 he indicated the willingness of the British Government to exert more pressure upon Italy through the enactment of “any further economic and financial sanctions that may be considered necessary . . . for the fulfilment of the obligations which we all of us bear in this dispute.”

Monsieur Paul-Boncour completely disagreed with the Eden viewpoint. France was determined to adhere to a policy of conciliation. The Italian Government had signified its desire to support the existing political structure in Europe. This attitude should be encouraged and not flouted. The Russian delegate (Potemkin) denounced the tendency in the League to treat aggressors with “tolerance or even indulgence,” and Madariaga referred to the difficulty of conciliating a nation which the League had condemned as a violator of the Covenant. At the close of the session on April 20 the Council finally adopted a harmless resolution which renewed the appeal of the Committee of Thirteen to the two belligerents for a “prompt cessation of hostilities and restoration of peace in the framework of the League of Nations.”56

This action of the Council was an obvious defeat for Eden. As Hugh Wilson reported from Geneva, “the current has changed. Where previously the general desire was to increase the severity of sanctions under British lead and against French restraint, now the ebb has set in and the British realize that they must maneuver carefully if existing sanctions are not to be swept away.” The British Government had been gambling “on a time factor. If before the rains in Abyssinia set in towards the end of May, Abyssinia’s resistance is fully crushed, it will mean a disastrous defeat to British policy.” At the close of the session of the Council, Wilson encountered Eden who wryly remarked: “It is slipping badly. We have done our best but I fear it [the collective effort against Italy] is going to crumble.”57

j. Britain Continues to Court Hitler

Despite the apparent disintegration of the League front against Italy, Eden still worked feverishly to keep it intact. In doing so he once more looked towards Berlin for assistance. In Paris, Straus learned that there were “certain personalities in Great Britain” who were “taking the dangerous course of encouraging Hitler” to stage an “early Nazi coup in Austria.” They were playing this reckless role in order to “show Mussolini the error of his ways.”58

In Berlin these British friendly gestures were welcomed and the Foreign Office deprecated the collapse of collective security at Geneva because it “greatly affected British prestige.” The recent Anglo-German conversations in London “were entirely satisfactory, the German officials . . . having found the British as helpful as their treaty commitments could possibly permit. . . . Reference was made to the disadvantage to the British of being tied to the French apron strings. This it was felt worked against British Empire interests, League interests, and the attempt with which England and Germany are both so concerned to bring about better general European relations and conditions. There were clear implications in my conversations with the Foreign Office yesterday of its feeling that sooner or later the British would come to realize the community of Anglo-German interests vis-à-vis Italian imperialism.”59

While British statesmen were making “friendly gestures to Hitler,”60 Italian armies were battering on the gates of Addis Ababa. On May 2 the Emperor and his family hurriedly left the capital, and three days later the Italian advance guard entered the city without any opposition. Mussolini at once issued a proclamation announcing to the “Italian people and to the World that peace is re-established.”61

The capture of Addis Ababa and the flight of the Emperor was an unmistakable indication to the world that the Italian adventure in Ethiopia had been successful. British policy had received a severe defeat and this fact was emphasized in the British press. Britain had backed down before the threats of Mussolini, and according to the London Daily Herald “the League might as well be shut up for any roaring bully could shut it up by threatening war if it grimaced at him.”62 The London Daily Mail believed it was time for a reversal of the Eden policy: “The right course for Great Britain is to clean the slate and give notice as soon as possible that she will have nothing more to do with sanctions or with the penal clauses of the Covenant. Friendship with Italy is of vital importance both to her and to ourselves.”63

It was significant to note that the Opposition in Great Britain still clamored for the continuance of sanctions. Its attitude was sharply assailed by the Morning Post: “The war is over; the Italian armies are in occupation of Ethiopia, but our Socialists say that the sanctions must be continued. . . . They have been clamouring for the closing of the Suez Canal to Italian transport, and yesterday Mr. Eden told them plainly that such a measure would inevitably lead to war with Italy.

. . . The Opposition, having done their best to disarm this country, appear to be willing to face that risk and it is a remarkable fact that exactly those people who worked hardest for disarmament are now working hardest to embroil us in war.”64

In France the Opposition played the same sinister game. The leftist press called for “revenge on Italy and the prevention of the exploitation of her conquest by the preservation and strict continued application of League principles. . . . Certain organs of the extreme Left press rise in indignation and press for a showdown at once in a crisis which the Geneva Powers had hoped to postpone.”65

British and French statesmen refused to be pushed into conflict with Italy by the loud clamor of the belligerent Opposition. Some of them were beginning to believe that it was high time for a radical change in the direction of British foreign policy. Lord Lothian was one of the prominent spokesmen of this new viewpoint. He expressed the opinion that it was expedient to eliminate from the Covenant of the League of Nations every obligation “to go to war all over the world which neither we nor the Dominions are willing . . . to live up to.” The League should be an instrument for international conciliation and not “an international war office.” Moreover, a new attitude should be adopted towards Britain’s foes in the World War. It should be evident that a “strong Germany will be the best security for peace and stability. There will certainly be no stability in Europe or Africa so long as we connive at attempting to maintain that system of encirclement and inequality against Germany which has been the root of European unrest for fifteen years, and the main cause of the rise of the Hitler regime. . . . Once the system of universal collective security goes, the next best basis is that of a regional balance, and once Germany has her rightful place in Europe and is a member of a revised League alongside of Russia, Italy and France, it may be possible . . . to secure that twenty-five years of certain peace of which Herr Hitler talks.”66

k. America Refuses to Adopt a Realistic Policy

It was hardly likely that a period of peace would bless Europe if the principle of nonrecognition were still adhered to by the major powers. It was some time before British statesmen recognized this fact. On May 9, 1936, the King of Italy signed a decree which proclaimed that the former Empire of Ethiopia had been conquered by Italian armies and was therefore under the “full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy.” Emperor Haile Selassie replied to this proclamation with a telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations (May 10) requesting the formal adoption of the nonrecognition principle with reference to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.67 Faced with this challenge, the Council (May 12) adroitly postponed the question of nonrecognition until its next meeting on June 15. By that time the war in Ethiopia would have reached its final stage and a realistic decision could be reached.

On that same day (May 12), the British Ambassador in Rome informed Mussolini that his Government would “not recognize” the Italian regime in Ethiopia. It was fully realized in London that the Duce would deeply resent this step and the British Cabinet felt that the situation was “extremely grave.”68

British action on May 12 was needlessly provocative. The Foreign Office under Eden’s guidance was holding fast to a policy that was decidedly unrealistic. But Mussolini with victory in his grasp was content to overlook this verbal challenge. The legions of Marshal Badoglio had proved far more potent than the economic sanctions of the League of Nations. Italy had scored a major political and diplomatic success, and the frowns of Anthony Eden would eventually change into the tight smile of acquiescence.

In America, however, there was determined opposition to the adoption of a realistic policy concerning Ethiopia. Secretary Hull gave little heed to the fact that in Europe the political weight of Italy was badly needed to balance the scales against the fast-increasing pressure of Hitler. Hull had a golden opportunity to help maintain the Stresa front by a slight nod of encouragement to Mussolini. Instead he adhered to the old Stimson formula of nonrecognition with a tenacity that was strengthened by a glow of righteousness. He would rather be right than save the world by a touch of realism.

On May 12, the Italian Ambassador paid a visit to the Department of State for the purpose of explaining to Secretary Hull the civilizing mission of Italy in Ethiopia. Hull regarded this explanation as “somewhat rambling” and was not favorably impressed with its content.69 The ambassador was disturbed by the Secretary’s lack of friendly response, so he stopped at the office of Mr. Phillips, the Under Secretary of State, and hesitantly remarked that the annexation of Ethiopia was “by far the best solution of the problem; that he felt in due course Geneva would recognize the facts as they existed.” When he inquired “what position the United States would take in the circumstances,” Phillips hastily informed him that the American Government had “not yet decided what course” it would pursue.70 The words of Mr. Phillips were quite indecisive but his manner was friendly so Ambassador Rosso left the Department of State with a slight feeling of hope in his heart.

l. Eden Recommends that Sanctions Be Lifted

With victory assured in Ethiopia, Italian statesmen made strenuous efforts to show how conciliatory they could be towards countries that had looked askance at the Duce’s program in Africa. In Addis Ababa, Marshal Badoglio was exceeding cordial to Mr. Engert. He referred in the friendliest terms to his visit to the United States when he had had the good fortune to meet President Roosevelt, then serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He also spoke of his “dear friend General Pershing.”71

Mussolini was in similar good form. In an interview published in the Intransigeant on May 24 he tried to quiet British apprehensions by stating that he was “asking nothing of England. I am ready to give her all possible assurances.”72 In London, Dino Grandi stressed Mussolini’s desire for a “better understanding with Great Britain and reiterated the assurance that Italy had no designs against British interests.”73

On May 28, Mussolini granted an interview to Gordon Lennox, the London Daily Mail correspondent in Rome. He was profuse in his protestations that “the interests of Great Britain in so far as the waters of Lake Tana are concerned will be strictly respected.” When he was questioned about Anglo-Italian relations he replied that not only was a rapprochement between those two countries desirable but was really “necessary.” He then stated that he would do everything in his power “to bring it about.”74

But these assurances had no effect upon ardent advocates of sanctions like Sir Alfred Zimmern, Professor Gilbert Murray, and Lord Hugh Cecil. They did, however, carry conviction to Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer. In a speech before the 1900 Club (June 10) he condemned the continuance of sanctions as the “very midsummer of madness.” British leaders should open their eyes “to realities.” The policy of sanctions had been “tried out and it has failed to prevent war, failed to stop war, failed to save the victim of aggression.” Such a policy should be abandoned.75

It was evident that the British Cabinet was preparing to reverse its attitude towards Italy, and this fact was made even more clear by the “reinclusion” of Sir Samuel Hoare as the First Lord of the Admiralty. On June 18, Anthony Eden announced in Parliament that he would recommend at Geneva that the sanctions in force against Italy should be lifted. The Morning Post warmly approved this statement: “The policy of sanctions against Italy had become an affront to common sense and a menace to the peace of Europe.”76 The Daily Mail expressed the same viewpoint: “The Daily Mail has from the first maintained that the sanctions policy was stupid and disastrous.”77 But the News Chronicle criticized the action of the Government as “grovelling submission,”78 while the Daily Herald called the change in front a “complete and unconditional surrender.”79

Australia and Canada followed the lead of London, and other members of the League scrambled on the British bandwagon. On July 4 the League Assembly voted to end sanctions. Some months later the question of nonrecognition was raised in Parliament (December 16) and Eden announced that the British Government still adhered to that principle.80 Therefore, it was not “the intention of His Majesty’s Government to accord de jure recognition to the annexation of Abyssinia.” In making this announcement he was careful to conceal the fact that the Cabinet had already decided to extend de facto recognition to Italian control over Ethiopia. This decision was soon revealed in a law suit before the Chancery Division of the Supreme Court of Judicature,81 and later it was reluctantly wrung from the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during a debate in the House of Commons (March 17, 1938).82

On April 16, 1938, an Anglo-Italian agreement was signed in Rome which amounted to a full recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.83 The stage was all prepared for League action. On May 10, Lord Halifax stated to the members of the Council that the Anglo-Italian agreement dealt solely with affairs between the two nations. The verity of this remark was challenged by Litvinov, and an explosive discussion was precipitated by an appeal from Emperor Haile Selassie against any recognition of Italian conquests in Ethiopia. But most of the members of the Council supported the British viewpoint, the Polish delegate going so far as to denounce the nonrecognition principle as a “source of conflict.” Although no vote was taken at this session of the Council, it was obvious that a majority of the members were ready to abandon the principle for which Mr. Stimson had fought with vigor and tenacity.84

According to Professor Malbone W. Graham, who discussed the situation with Mr. Munters, president of the League Council, it was frankly admitted in Geneva that the decision to abandon the doctrine of nonrecognition was adopted under pressure from Lord Halifax.85 Impressed with this British example of appeasement, several members of the League granted recognition to Italian rule in Ethiopia by issuing letters of credence accrediting their envoys to “His Majesty the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia.”86

Everything was now prepared for a complete repudiation of Eden’s assurance that it was not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to “accord de jure recognition of the annexation of Abyssinia.” On November 2, 1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain introduced in the House of Commons a motion to the effect that “this House welcomes the intention” to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement (April 16, 1938) “into force.” After a brisk debate the House approved the motion by an overwhelming vote and the House of Lords did likewise.87 Anthony Eden had to swallow his brave words of December 16, 1936, and there is no evidence that he gagged too violently over this task.

m. The Principle of Nonrecognition Is Invoked by the United States

In the United States the action of the British Government was followed with keen interest if not with approval. After Mussolini’s proclamation announcing the annexation of Ethiopia, Ambassador Long made a cordial statement that warmed the heart of the Duce and caused the Italian Government and press to be “outspoken in protestations of friendship for the United States.”88 On June 16, Count Ciano, recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, assured Secretary Hull that he would use “every endeavor to further the existing friendly relations between our two countries.”89 Four days later, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation declaring that a state of war no longer existed between Italy and Ethiopia and therefore the arms embargo was no longer in force.90

But the Department of State had no intention of recognizing the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy. When Breckinridge Long retired as ambassador to Italy and his successor, William Phillips, was sent to Rome in August 1936, his letter of credence was addressed merely to “the King of Italy.” In October, Mussolini sent to the United States a new ambassador, Signor Fulvio Suvich. His letter of credence employed two titles: “King of Italy—Emperor of Ethiopia.” But President Roosevelt was careful to receive him only as the ambassador from the “King of Italy.”91

The British Government was far more realistic. On January 14, 1938, the Prime Minister informed President Roosevelt that he was prepared, “if possible with the authority of the League of Nations, to recognize de jure the Italian conquest of Abyssinia (by which Signor Mussolini sets great store), and to take other action if he found that the Italian Government on their side were ready to give evidence of their desire to contribute to the restoration of confidence and friendly relations.”92 The President promptly replied that he was “concerned” over this statement of Prime Minister Chamberlain. At a moment “when respect for treaty obligations would seem to be of such vital importance in international relations,. . . and at the time when our two Governments have been giving consideration to measures in support of international law and order in the Far East,. . . I cannot help but feel. . . that a surrender by His Majesty’s Government of the principle of nonrecognition . . . would have a serious effect upon public opinion in this country.”93

But the British Government paid little attention to this plea of President Roosevelt’s. On April 16, 1938, it concluded with Italy an agreement which specifically recognized the Italian annexation of Ethiopia. The nonrecognition policy had been buried deep in the grave of expediency. But the Roosevelt Administration adhered to the Stimson doctrine. On April 19, with special reference to the Anglo-Italian Agreement, President Roosevelt remarked that “this Government has seen the conclusion of an agreement with sympathetic interest because it is proof of the value of peaceful negotiations,” but with his tongue in his cheek he added the proviso that he was not making any attempt to “pass upon the political features” of such an accord.94 A few weeks later, Secretary Hull made it clear that the principles governing the conduct of American foreign relations had not undergone any change.95 As a proof of this statement, President Roosevelt sent a birthday telegram of congratulation to Victor Emmanuel III (November 11, 1938) who was addressed merely as the “King of Italy.”96

But this consistency was really the hobgoblin of small minds. The Roosevelt Administration was stubbornly clinging to a formula that made for war rather than peace. It served no useful purpose. As a distinguished authority in the field of international law aptly remarks: “It seems safe to conclude that the policy of non-recognition as practiced today is of slight value either as a sanction or as evidence that the rule that conquest confers valid title has been superseded. . . . Conceived of as a solution of the centuries-old problem of the cause and cure of war, it appears somewhat fatuous.”97

As one reviews the whole story of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, it is evident that the policy of Britain was worse than “fatuous.” Fatuity does not necessarily lead to war, but the persistently hostile attitude of the British Foreign Office towards Italian acquisition of Ethiopia pointed definitely in that direction. When Mussolini moved his legions into a country that was hopelessly backward and in dire need of intelligent direction under some highly civilized state, the British Government pretended to be deeply disturbed as a matter of principle.98 The compromise policy of Sir Samuel Hoare in December 1935 proved that previous protestations of principle were a mere sham.99 The French Government was never fooled by the pious platitudes of Eden, and Mussolini regarded them as an insult to his intelligence. British insistence upon sanctions completely destroyed the Stresa front. This fundamental change in political relationships in Europe may be laid directly at the door of Eden who posed as a Lancelot lost in a modern world of intrigue. His unfortunate role, and that of the Baldwin Government, is clearly described by Winston Churchill:

His Majesty’s Government had imprudently advanced to champion a great world cause. They had led fifty nations forward with much brave language. . . . Their policy had for a long time been designed to give satisfaction to powerful elements of opinion at home rather than to seek the realities of the European situation. By estranging Italy they had upset the whole balance of Europe and gained nothing for Abyssinia.100

With the collapse of the Stresa front the way was wide open for the creation and extension of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Hitler was glad to smile when Eden frowned, and Mussolini quickly learned to prefer the friendly atmosphere of Berlin to the chilly fogs of London. These fogs of misunderstanding hid from most British eyes the stark fact that World War II was just around the corner. Thanks to Eden, and others of his ilk, that corner would soon have to be turned.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
90Ibid., p. 5.
91Ibid., pp. 6-7.
92Ibid., p. 9.
93Ibid., pp. 10-11.
94Ibid., p. ix.
95Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. III, 4389.
96January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
97January 9, 1927.
98January 25, 1927.
99March 17, 1927.
100January 21, 26, 1927.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941