XIV: The Shadow of Dictatorship Begins to Darken the American Landscape

XIV The Shadow of Dictatorship Begins to Darken the American Landscape

a. European Statesmen Fumble for a Peace Formula

WHEN it became apparent to British and French statesmen that President Roosevelt would make no effort to point a path to peace they merely continued their policy of drifting towards the rim of the abyss. Eden mournfully confided to Ambassador Bingham that he “saw little prospect of a western Locarno pact in the near future although he felt such a pact necessary as a beginning towards restoring any bases of confidence in Europe.” The crux of the whole European situation was “Germany.” The Nazi Foreign Office kept digging up the old issue of colonies which Britain and France had hoped was safely buried in the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Ribbentrop had recently stressed the importance of concessions in this regard, but Eden had abruptly informed him that the “British position was unchanged.” This curt reply had drawn from Ribbentrop the rejoinder that such news “would be badly received in his country and would be a strong influence against any co-operation towards peace by Germany.”1

French statesmen did not follow this policy of drift with the calm demeanor affected by Anthony Eden, and they kept trying to pry out of the Department of State some slight assurance of American support. On March 18 the French Ambassador in Washington (Georges Bonnet) had a long conversation with Secretary Hull, during the course of which he remarked that he would be happy to learn of any plans the American Government had in mind relative to a peaceful settlement of the “chief international problems” which were clamoring for a prompt solution. Hull answered this provocative thrust by recourse to his usual platitudes. The American Government was “keenly aware of the numerous problems of an international character which in many respects were now growing more acute and dangerous.” It should be kept in mind, however, that any “definite, concrete steps” which the President had in mind towards the solution of these problems were the President’s own business and the Secretary of State could not disclose the slightest information concerning them. The ambassador felt that he had been firmly put in his place, so he merely murmured that he would continue to look for “opportunities to co-operate” with the Department of State, and the conversation closed with the usual amenities of diplomatic discourse.2

But these amenities did not hide the fear that was always present in British and French hearts with reference to the rising power of Germany. In London the Foreign Office still regarded the Nazi Government as the “greatest threat to European peace.” It was this fact that made Britain ready to appease Italy by refusing to take any steps that would effectively check Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War.3

This Spanish factor in the international equation seemed particularly significant to Anthony Eden who suddenly informed Norman Davis that the best way to arrive at a satisfactory answer was for the United States “to take the lead or act as mediator.” Davis immediately replied that President Roosevelt “had no desire or intention of interjecting himself in the European political situation.” It would be futile to “attempt anything until Europe makes up its mind that it wants peace and until the British . . . are prepared to get behind any efforts that may be made by anyone to achieve such a result.” The British Government should at once take steps in the direction of close “economic collaboration” with the United States. When Eden expressed the view that Chamberlain wished to achieve this objective, Davis dryly remarked that he hoped British statesmen would not wait “until they missed the boat.”4

The uneasiness in British and French minds caused by the Spanish Civil War was aggravated by the implications that lay underneath the Belgian situation. The Belgian ambassadors in London and Paris had made it crystal clear that their Government was determined “not to permit her soil to become the battleground of the next war; not to permit either the foot of a German, British or French soldier to be placed on her soil.” This neutral position had profoundly disturbed the Polish Foreign Office which quickly informed France that the Franco-Polish alliance was now “virtually useless.”

The position of Czechoslovakia was also adversely affected by this sudden change in the European diplomatic picture. When Bullitt asked Léger, in the Foreign Office, about possible French aid to the Czechs in case of need, he received the fantastic answer that French troops “would pass through Roumania and Yugoslavia.” At the same time Bullitt learned from another source that Russia would not “support Czechoslovakia in case of a German attack” upon that country.5

In summing up the situation in Europe, Bullitt remarked that it was generally felt that there would “probably be no war before next spring but that during that period French influence will diminish and German influence will increase throughout Central and Eastern Europe.”6

As an offset to this increasing German influence on the Continent, some statesmen, like Prime Minister van Zeeland, of Belgium, believed that British power was constantly growing to a point where, in a few years, Great Britain would “very nearly control the trend of international affairs.” But the British were now unfortunately retreating within the economic walls of their empire and subjecting other nations to increasing tariff restrictions. For this reason van Zeeland had determined to go on a mission to the United States in an effort to get President Roosevelt to take some effective action in breaking down some of the barriers to world trade. If America would take the lead in this matter, Britain would be compelled to follow her.

Bullitt then warned van Zeeland that the United States would not make “any political commitments and that it was almost inconceivable that European countries would be allowed to float loans in the United States.” But despite these pointed admonitions by Bullitt, van Zeeland still hoped that during some “utterly frank conversations” with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull some new avenue to unrestricted world trade could be opened.7

b. Belgium Breaks Her Bonds with Britain and France

The announcement of the Belgian Government that it would follow a policy of neutrality in the event of a new European war fell like a bombshell in many Foreign Offices. Czechoslovakia, France, and Poland immediately began to resurvey the situation. On April 30, Bullitt lunched with Delbos and Sir Eric Phipps, who had recently been transferred from Berlin to Paris. Delbos frankly admitted that the ability of France to “come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia . . . had been diminished greatly by the new policy of Belgium.” In order to give the Czechs adequate support it would now be necessary for the British Government to make it “clear that in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia” she would rush at once to her assistance. The Czech Foreign Office remembered with gratitude the statement of Britain that she was “not disinterested” in the “fate of Czechoslovakia.” But Delbos considered this statement “insufficient,” and he urged Phipps to secure from his Government a “definite promise to support Czechoslovakia.” The British Ambassador quickly replied that his Government “could not make any such promise in advance.” The only formula either Britain or France could rely upon was for both powers to “show their teeth to Germany and have behind them the benevolent neutrality of the United States.”8

On the same afternoon (April 30) Bullitt had an intimate conversation with Sir Eric Phipps who exhibited a deep-seated hostility towards Germany. He was particularly annoyed to find in Paris some statesmen who still believed “that it might be possible for France to come to terms with Germany.” He considered such a rapprochement “totally impossible.” After listening to the acrid remarks of Phipps, Bullitt came to the conclusion that the British Ambassador had been instructed “to prevent the French from having any tête-à-tête conversations with Germany; that the policy of Great Britain is still to keep the Continent of Europe divided . . . and that little or nothing is to be expected from Great Britain in the way of support of the policy of reduction of barriers to international commerce and restoration of the economic life of the world.”9

This refusal of Britain to take any real step that would insure the maintenance of the political structure of Europe was deeply discouraging to Delbos, the French Foreign Minister. He had suggested to the governments of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia to “take a more decided attitude of opposition to Germany,” but they had replied that it was first necessary to secure from Britain definite promises of support. When Phipps had been sounded out in this regard he had made it entirely clear that “Great Britain would not guarantee either Czechoslovakia or Austria to say nothing of Roumania.” Phipps had also revealed that Britain would do nothing towards making van Zeeland’s mission to the United States a success.

When Delbos inquired whether “Britain was prepared as France was prepared to make concessions to Germany on the colonial field,” Sir Eric had tersely answered that France “might do what she pleased but Great Britain would not give Germany one inch of the territory of the British Empire including mandated territory.”

With reference to Austria, Delbos confided to Bullitt that France could make no promise of aid in the event of invasion. Mussolini had made it “clear to Schuschnigg that he would do nothing to keep Austria from falling into Germany’s hands.” Delbos believed that Schuschnigg would hold out “to the end” against absorption by Germany because he knew that the Pope was doing everything he could not only to support Schuschnigg “against the Nazis” but to influence him to maintain Austrian independence.

Delbos concluded his conversation with an assurance to Bullitt that “if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia, France would immediately declare war on Germany,” but his voice carried such a note of irresolution that Bullitt suspected that after Delbos paid his visit to Brussels the “decision of the French Government to go to war on behalf of Czechoslovakia may weaken.” It should be obvious to most statesmen that France “could take a strong position only if she should have the absolute support in England.”10

By the middle of May it was obvious that the search for a new agreement that would replace Locarno had been entirely fruitless. Prime Minister Blum sorrowfully admitted that the “net result of all the recent political conversations in London and Paris would be very small.” Litvinov had given assurances that if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia, and if France should go to war with Germany to defend the Czechs, the Soviet Union “would make war on Germany at once.” But Bullitt pointed out that the aid of Russia could not be very effective in view of the fact that “Soviet planes and armies could not cross Poland or Roumania.”

Blum admitted that Hitler had the “political initiative on the Continent of Europe at the moment and he did not see any way to take this initiative out of the hands of Germany.” The “single chance of preserving the peace in Europe” would be through the creation of a close entente between England, France, and Russia. When Bullitt expressed the opinion that it would not be easy to convince the British Government to have intimate relations with Soviet Russia, “especially in view of the recent wholesale exilings and shootings,” Blum ruefully remarked that there was no alternative. Litvinov had asked him to do his “utmost to bring about a rapprochement between England and the Soviet Union,” and under the circumstances he would work towards that end.11

c. Mayor La Guardia Hurls a Verbal Bomb at Hitler

While European statesmen were groping through the dusk that was settling over the Continent, American relations with Germany were disturbed as a result of some vituperation that Mayor La Guardia hurled at Hitler. On March 3, in an address before the women’s division of the American Jewish Congress, La Guardia proposed that the 1939 World’s Fair in New York should feature a temple dedicated to religious freedom: “But within that temple I’d have a Chamber of Horrors and as a climax I’d have a figure in it of that brown-shirted fanatic who is now menacing the peace of the world.”12

Joseph Goebbels countered with the Bowery invective of which he was such a master. After calling La Guardia a ruffian and a gangster, he then opened a barrage against the Roosevelt Administration: “One would think . . . the White House . . . would have sufficient power to curb procurers. . . . It seems, however, that the men of the government are afraid of New York’s underworld guns, which obey the chief gangster master as he whistles. They let the Jewish lout utter his abuses as suggested to his dirty mind.”13

A majority of American newspapers criticized the La Guardia attack upon Hitler as an example of bad taste on the part of an important municipal official. The Milwaukee Journal thought that “all decent sentiment in the nation” would regret the mayor’s words.14 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle condemned the mayor’s outburst as an exhibition of “atrocious bad taste”;15 the Detroit Free Press regarded them as “a wretched example of bad manners,”16 while the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle deprecated the mayor’s effusion as “foolish and ill-considered.”17

There were some papers and periodicals, however, which supported the exuberant mayor. To the New Republic the mayor’s words were an “expression of honest and indignant opinion.”18 The New York Daily News agreed with the “Mayor’s general criticism of Hitler,”19 and the Boise Idaho Daily Statesman concurred in the sentiment “without apology.”20 The pungent pen of Westbrook Pegler rushed into words of approval: “The little inconvenience to the State Department occasioned by La Guardia’s remark that Hitler belongs in a chamber of horrors probably was worth while after all.”21

d. Secretary Hull Regrets the Action of La Guardia

On March 4, the counselor of the German Embassy presented to the Department of State a protest against Mayor La Guardia’s verbal assault upon Hitler. Mr. Dunn, chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, assured the counselor that he had no doubt that “Secretary Hull considered it most unfortunate that a city official should express himself in terms which might cause offence to a foreign government.” In addition to this assurance, Dunn stated that the Secretary would also “pursue the matter in any manner in which he properly could within the limitations of the lack of authority which existed here to repress or control any free expression of opinion.”22

On March 5, Secretary Hull made a statement with reference to the La Guardia remarks. After stressing the right of freedom of speech the Secretary then remarked that this fact did not “lessen the regret of the Government when utterances either by private citizens or by public officials speaking in an individual capacity give offence to a Government with which we have official relations. I very earnestly deprecate the utterances which have thus given offence to the German Government.”23

In Germany the mayor’s caustic remarks let loose a flood of abuse directed, not only against La Guardia, but against America as well. Ambassador Dodd was greatly surprised at the “language with which the attack was implemented,” but he also noted that the Foreign Office held a conference with the Propaganda Ministry “with a view to muzzling the Angriff on its American publicity.”24

After receiving the Dodd dispatch, Secretary Hull instructed the ambassador to make a formal protest against the “coarse and wholly indecent character” of the German press attacks upon “American womanhood and American institutions.” There could be no “human provocation which would justify such language.”25 Dodd immediately sought an interview with von Neurath who informed him that he had already discussed the matter with Goebbels who had rebuked the editor of Der Angriff. When Dodd pressed the matter further, Neurath said that he could “not state that any other paper had been rebuked or that retraction had been published.” While not expressing any formal regret, “Neurath’s attitude was distinctly understanding and sympathetic.”26

But von Neurath’s understanding attitude completely changed when Mayor La Guardia, on the evening of March 15, made a fresh attack upon Chancellor Hitler. Two days later the German Ambassador called at the Department of State and requested that Secretary Hull make a “strong and definite apology” for this new outburst and offer “new and special regrets.” Hull first remarked that the Mayor of New York was denouncing Hitler as a means of building up political capital to help in his race for re-election. This capital would grow much larger if the German Government continued to take formal notice of the mayor’s insulting comments. He assured the ambassador that the President was “deeply anxious to preserve suitable relations between our countries and our governments, but that it presented an impossible situation when the German Government took seriously every objectionable utterance of politicians and others of this country who were not under the control of the Federal Government.” The ambassador seemed satisfied with this explanation of Secretary Hull and said that he would do his “very best” to induce his Government to view the matter with an understanding heart.27

Ambassador Luther was apparently successful in persuading the Foreign Office to overlook the insulting remarks of Mayor La Guardia, although on March 18, Dieckhoff asked Dodd if he could “recommend that the President or the Secretary of State stop the Mayor’s talk about Germany and the Chancellor.”28 It was difficult for the Nazi Government to appreciate the fact that the American Federal Government is one of definitely limited powers.

e. Cardinal Mundelein Creates Tension between the Vatican and Germany

The last echoes of the La Guardia incident were slowly dying away when certain critical remarks of Cardinal Mundelein concerning Hitler aroused such a storm of indignation in Germany that the relations between the Vatican and the Nazi Government were seriously strained. On May 18, 1937, at a meeting of the Catholic clergy of the archdiocese of Chicago, Cardinal Mundelein gave a review of the situation in Germany and then referred to Hitler in the following language: “Perhaps you will ask how it is that a nation of 60 million intelligent people will submit in fear and servitude to an alien, an Austrian paper hanger, and a poor one at that, and a few associates like Goebbels and Goering, who dictate every move of the people’s lives.”29

Ambassador Dieckhoff, in Washington, refrained from filing a formal protest against these remarks because the Cardinal held an office that had “no connection with the United States Government” and therefore he was regarded merely “as a private person.” But the ambassador did send Herr Thomsen, counselor of the Embassy, to the Department of State to protest informally against the Cardinal’s strictures. Thomsen talked the matter over with Mr. Dunn, chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, and endeavored to impress upon Mr. Dunn the unfortunate effect of the Cardinal’s outburst upon German-American relations.30

Although the Nazi Government refrained from filing a formal protest against Mundelein’s biting words, it immediately shifted the attack to another quarter. The German Ambassador in Rome was instructed to discuss the matter with the Papal Secretary of State. Rome and not Washington was to be held responsible for the Cardinal’s verbal assault.

The Cardinal Secretary of State was not seriously disturbed by this German barrage. In his studiously cool reply he first noted that he was not in the habit of commenting upon speeches until he had before him the “absolutely correct text” of the speech in question. After this thrust he asked some very pertinent questions of his own: “What has the German Government done, and what does it intend to do in the future against the malicious slander and defamation, against the disgraceful calumnies directed at churches, ecclesiastical institutions, the Pope, the cardinals, priests, etc., which appear . . . in German newspapers and in the speeches of prominent personages?”31

After recovering from his astonishment at such a tart reply, the German Foreign Secretary instructed the ambassador in Rome to inform the Cardinal Secretary of State that the “unexpected and incomprehensible conduct” of the Holy See in this matter had “eliminated the conditions necessary for a normal state of relations between the German Government and the Curia. The full responsibility for this development rests solely with the Curia.”32

The German Foreign Office waited for some break in the attitude of the Curia, and on June 9 the chargé d’affaires in Rome reported that there was a “certain inclination towards conciliation” in Vatican circles. Avvenire d’Italia had carried an article by a well-known Jesuit priest, Father Yves de la Brière, which had characterized Cardinal Mundelein’s words as “somewhat violent and lacking in diplomatic finesse.”33

On June 24 the Cardinal Secretary of State addressed a long note to the German Embassy in Rome. The Holy See had now received the “complete text” of the Mundelein remarks and was therefore able to comment upon them. In the first place, it should be remembered that the German Ambassador in Washington had presented a protest to the Department of State and had been content that no formal reply had been made to this protest. This official silence on the part of the Department of State had not adversely affected German-American relations. Apparently it was quite different with regard to the relations between the Vatican and the German Government. When the Holy See made no formal reply to a German note of protest, the silence in this case led to a second German note which stated that Papal non-action had “eliminated the conditions necessary for a normal state of relations between the German Government and the Curia.” The application of such a “double standard” was more than “unusual.” This was particularly true in view of the fact that Cardinal Mundelein was an American citizen “who made use of the right guaranteed him by his country’s Constitution to express opinion freely in the sphere of publicly-known facts.” It should also be kept in mind that the Cardinal’s remarks were made on the assumption that they were not “intended for the public.” Their publication was “not according to his intention.” Although the Cardinal of Chicago, as a bishop, was under the “authority of the Holy See,” he was not “an official of the Holy See such as a nuncio.” The “Holy See itself and its representatives” were always scrupulous in “observing the line between objective controversies and those colored by personal factors.”34

This note from Cardinal Pacelli gave little satisfaction to the German Ambassador to the Holy See who noted four days later that the mood of the Papal Secretary of State was “more irritated than ever.”35 This irritation was soon transferred to the ambassador himself when Pope Pius XI, on July 17, received a group of American Catholics from Chicago. On this occasion His Holiness had words of praise for Cardinal Mundelein, who was so “solicitous and zealous in the defense of the rights of God and of the Church and in the salvation of souls.”36

Cardinal Pacelli tried to assure the German Ambassador that the Pope’s words of praise of Cardinal Mundelein carried no implication of approval of the Cardinal’s critical remarks concerning Hitler,37 but the Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs was not impressed with this explanation. He suggested to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that all “diplomatic business” with the Curia be suspended. Von Neurath refused to accept this suggestion,38 but he did veto any thought of making a visit to Rome for the purpose of discussing with Cardinal Pacelli the existing difficulties between the Church and the Nazi Government. Such a visit would have to be postponed until after “a settlement of the Mundelein case satisfactory to us has been made by the Holy See.”39

It was impossible for the Vatican to settle the Mundelein case in a manner satisfactory to the Nazi Government, so the rift between Rome and Berlin widened. The effect of this friction upon American Catholics was clearly depicted by Ambassador Dieckhoff in a dispatch to the Foreign Office. After referring to the close ties between the Vatican and American Catholics, he remarked:

American Catholics formerly were among the Americans who understood Germany best, and many of them up to four years ago sympathized with Germany as the champion in the struggle against Communism. We cannot ignore the regrettable fact that they have gone over to the enemy camp in increasing numbers during the last few years.40

f. The American Press Is Critical of the Bombardment of Almeria

The American press was not too deeply interested in the case of Cardinal Mundelein but it flared into hot indignation over the news that Almeria had been bombarded in reprisal for the bombing of the German pocket battleship Deutschland by a Loyalist airplane. The partial destruction of this small Spanish town by a squadron of German warships evoked numberless bitter comments in the periodical and daily press.

The Providence Journal was certain that the shelling of Almeria had “brought all Europe, indeed the world, face to face with one of its gravest crises in many years.”41 The Spokane Spokesman-Review believed that the action against Almeria would “revive reluctant memories of German submarine atrocities in the World War.“42 The Atlanta Constitution feared that the Almeria incident had “precipitated the most serious crisis in Europe since the dawn of the World War,”43 while the Seattle Daily Times felt that “nothing short of diplomatic miracles can avert a full-powered descent of Germany and Italy upon Spain.”44

Many papers believed that the dangerous implications of the Almeria incident had been exaggerated. The Richmond Times-Dispatch expressed the opinion that the crisis would soon subside: “No European government wants war now.”45 The Springfield Republican was hopeful: “The chances seem to be that not even yet has the edge of the precipice been reached.”46 The Kansas City Journal-Post thought that if England and France followed a parallel policy they could make “Hitler ‘be nice’ about Spain.”47

As far as German-American relations were concerned, the shelling of Almeria was distinctly unfortunate because it convinced many Americans that Hitler’s Germany was reviving all the brutal practices of former years. The Los Angeles Times condemned the German action as “outright savagery,”48 while the Portland Morning Oregonian directed a heavy blast against German cruelty: “May God have pity on a generation of men which has committed itself, in the prosecution of war, to the use of terrorism! It is obviously the purpose of the war and naval colleges to make the civilian populations the chief victims of the next general war.”49

g. Points of Friction along the Economic Front

This rising tide of American dislike for Nazi Germany was not contained within strong dykes of mutual economic interest. The foreign commerce between Germany and the United States was seriously affected by different theories of international trade. Under the terms of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Secretary Hull pushed a program which emphasized the principle of equality of treatment as the basis of commercial relations. He was insistent that the idea of equality should not be defeated by the imposition on the part of other nations of exchange controls, government monopolies, and quotas. He was particularly opposed to barter deals.

In 1934, President Roosevelt named George N. Peek to the Office of Foreign Trade Adviser, and Peek lost no time in negotiating with Germany a barter agreement whereby the Nazi Government would buy 800,000 bales of American cotton through the facilities of the ExportImport Bank. Payment for this cotton would be arranged so that one-fourth of the price would be paid in American dollars and three-fourths in German currency plus a premium of 22 1/2 per cent. The banks would sell this currency to American importers of German goods who could use it for their purchases.

Secretary Hull voiced vehement opposition to this barter deal and was able to secure not only its defeat but also the abolition of the Office of Foreign Trade Adviser.50 Needless to say, this action was a blow to everyone who had hoped that the development of economic ties with Germany might lead to better political relations.

The difficulties of 1934 expanded into further friction in 1936. Under the terms of a ruling by the Attorney General, the German plan for subsidizing exports was classified as a discriminatory trade practice. The Treasury Department then applied the antibounty provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 with countervailing duties ranging from 22 to 56 per cent on about a dozen German commodities. The German Government at once sent a group of experts to Washington in an effort to obtain the removal of these high duties.51 Failing in this endeavor, it then tried to conciliate the Treasury Department by issuing a decree which forbade the use of Aski marks and barter deals in German-American trade.52

The Treasury Department refused to look with favor upon these gestures of accommodation. Instead, it struck another blow at German-American trade by instructing American consular officials in Germany to require that every invoice of exported German goods should be accompanied by a complete declaration of “any benefits or privileges, including marks subject to special exchange” which had been extended to the shipper by his government. Since under German law the revelation of business secrets to foreigners was strictly forbidden, the new regulation by the Treasury Department was highly effective in depressing the volume of trade between the Reich and the United States.53

On August 13 the German Government announced that subsidies on exports to the United States would be discontinued. The Treasury Department cautiously replied that the countervailing duties would be revoked when satisfactory assurances were received that German exports actually did not receive any artificial stimulation.54 To conserve the small volume of trade that continued despite all these difficulties, the Continental Export and Import Company was established to act as a clearinghouse for German-American commercial exchanges. Exporters of American raw materials were brought into contact with American importers of German goods, and a balance was struck between the respective debits and credits. It was a condition of trade upon weak crutches with the probability that either might slip or break at any moment.55

h. The Department of State Authorizes Attendance at Nazi Parteitag

In 1937, Ambassador Dodd was determined to follow his usual practice of refusing to attend the Nazi Party celebration at Nürnberg. In order to insure his nonattendance he made a special trip to the United States with the expectation of staying several months. Shortly after his departure from Berlin, the French Ambassador called to see Mr. Mayer, the American charge d’affaires. He frankly informed Mr. Mayer that it appeared to his Government that it would not be “desirable any longer to continue to ‘boycott’ the Nuremberg Party rally.” To adhere to the “past practice would be conspicuous if not antagonistic.” The Nazi Party had now “become the State and to refuse the invitation would be acting out of accord with realities.” The French and British ambassadors had agreed to attend the celebration on September 10 and on the morning of the following day. American agreement on this point would be welcomed as “continuing the identic attitude which the three governments had pursued in the past.”56

After this conversation with the French Ambassador, Mayer cabled to Secretary Hull and asked for a specific instruction relative to attendance at the Nürnberg rally. The Secretary replied that the matter should be left to the discretion of the Embassy in Berlin.57 In the end, the American chargé in Berlin accepted the invitation of the Nazi Government and attended the Nazi Party celebration in Nürnberg. This action evoked a strong protest from Congressman Emmanuel Celler who protested that this attendance would subject the Department of State to “severe criticism.”58 But Secretary Hull remained firm and informed Mr. Celler that the American Government was merely following the practice of other governments that maintained relations with Nazi Germany.59

On September 4, Ambassador Dodd was surprised to read in the New York Herald-Tribune a paragraph taken from his confidential letter to Secretary Hull advising against having an American representative at the Nazi Party celebration in Nürnberg. There was also a reference to a telegram he had recently sent to the Department of State repeating his former advice. The fact that the department permitted the publication of these communications was an indication that the opinions of Ambassador Dodd were not highly regarded in official circles.60

i. Secretary Hull Is Critical of Ambassador Dodd

When Ambassador Dodd landed at Norfolk on August 4 for an extended vacation in the United States, he made a statement to the effect that the basic objective of “some of the Powers in Europe was to frighten and even destroy Democracies everywhere.” These pointed remarks led Ambassador Dieckhoff to pay a prompt visit to the Department of State where Secretary Hull assured him that “Dodd’s pet hobby was known to be ideal Jeffersonian democracy; on this subject Dodd was ‘somewhat insane.’ ” Hull was also certain that Dodd, in making his statement, had “no particular country in mind.”61

On August 31, Dodd wrote to the German Foreign Office and explained that his remarks on August 4 had “no reference to Germany at all.” If there was any “criticism at all it was of certain things done in my own country.”62 A few weeks later Ambassador Dieckhoff had a conversation with Sumner Welles. When the subject of Dodd’s remarks came up, Welles “frankly confessed that Dodd was as incomprehensible to him as to us.”63 On October 1, Welles informed Dieckhoff that the President had decided to recall Dodd as ambassador to Germany. He would soon return to Berlin but “only to arrange his affairs there.”64 Dodd himself urged the President to appoint Professor James T. Shotwell as his successor “because of his university connections as well as his national reputation as a scholar.”65 Dodd seemed confident that only professors could fill satisfactorily the position of ambassador to Germany.

j. The President Advocates a Quarantine of Aggressors

It is an age-old axiom that rulers often, in periods of dire economic distress, seek by a bold foreign policy to divert attention from the home front to distant stormy horizons. Some historians believe that, in 1937, President Roosevelt followed this axiom with regard to his famous quarantine speech delivered in Chicago on October 5, 1937. There is no doubt that he was deeply concerned over the severe economic recession in the United States which became manifest in the late summer of 1937. After a conversation with the President on August 11, Ambassador Dodd recorded in his diary that the Chief Executive was “greatly troubled about the danger of war and also the continued depression in the United States.”66

Between August and December 1937, the index of industrial production declined about 27 per cent, and stock-market averages about 37 per cent. In the last two months of the year more than 850,000 factory workers lost their jobs. The transition from prosperity to economic distress was the “most severe the country had ever experienced in so brief a period.”67 According to Professor Beard, the shock of the “economic collapse was startling to President Roosevelt and his advisers.”68

But the economic factor was not the only one that disturbed the domestic equation. The appointment of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court and the widespread and bitter opposition that arose when it was discovered that at one time he had hidden beneath the robes of the Ku Klux Klan, made many of the President’s advisers look with alarm at the evident dangers that lurked along the political front.

These facts do not prove, however, that the President decided to file a vigorous indictment against aggressor nations in order to divert public attention from the home scene. It should be kept in mind that as early as January 1933 he had regarded with favor the Stimson theory of nonrecognition as applied to Japanese expansion in North China. In October 1937, Japan had once more moved ahead in Manchuria, and in Ethiopia the legions of Mussolini had conquered an empire. The Stimson “stop sign” was applicable in both situations, and there were many moralists in America who wished the President to plant it boldly along those far-flung horizons and to call upon the world to stand behind it. Even if the domestic scene had remained perfectly calm there was still a possibility that the Chief Executive would have directed a blast against “aggressor nations.”

At any rate, on October 5 at Chicago, the President delivered a sonorous denunciation of all wicked nations who were disturbing the peace of the world. After referring to the destruction of life and property resulting from wars abroad, he then endeavored to show that if these conflicts continued their sparks would fly to America and cause similar havoc here: “Let no one imagine that America will escape, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked.” The world could not be safe from aggression until moral standards were “adhered to by all.” Apparently these standards would be widely accepted if some structure of collective security could be created to enforce them. The easiest measure of enforcement would be an international quarantine against aggressors.69

k. American Opinion of the Quarantine Speech

Raymond Leslie Buell, head of the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, promptly praised the President’s speech as a rejection of the isolationist philosophy which he had followed since 1933. He then expressed a fervent hope that the Department of State would adopt a “positive foreign policy.”70 Oswald Garrison Villard thought that the President had “rendered a tremendous service to the world.” The time had come when he should “reassume the moral leadership of the world which Woodrow Wilson abandoned when he surrendered to the ‘peacemakers’ at Paris.”71 Nicholas Murray Butler warmly commended the President’s strong words and hoped they would be followed by the creation of an international police force that could maintain world order. The “folly” of an isolationist policy was exceeded only by its “immorality.”72

A large section of the American press echoed these sentiments of Villard and Butler. In New York the World-Telegram regarded the President’s words as a “reminder and a warning.” They reminded us “that we cannot live unto ourselves alone” and they warned us “that mere wishing will not suffice to keep us safe.”73 The New York Daily News had already on October 3 advocated a long-range naval blockade of Japan in the event she were to threaten the position of the Western powers in China. On October 6 the quarantine speech was given strong indorsement, and the principal editorial had the significant heading: “Shall We Take Them Now or Try It Later?”74

The Washington Post joined this chorus of approval. The President had “enormously strengthened his reputation as one of the great leaders of mankind.”75 The Washington Evening Star added its voice to this acclamation: “Not since Woodrow Wilson’s message to Congress in April, 1917, have more prescient words fallen from the lips of the President of the United States. . . . They are the words that needed to be uttered from such a place at this critical hour.”76

In the Middle West the Chicago Daily News had “nothing but praise for the broad generalities” of the quarantine speech.77 The St. Louis

Globe-Democrat praised the President’s words of warning and was certain that Secretary Hull could be depended upon to “steer a safe course.”78 The Cincinnati Enquirer gave its support to the idea of collective pressure in applying sanctions against aggressor nations but was opposed to unilateral American action.79

Along the Pacific coast the San Francisco Chronicle had strong and laudatory words for the “soundness” of the views of the Chief Executive on foreign affairs.80 The Los Angeles Times took a similar stand: “This Chicago utterance says forcibly things which need saying and utters warnings which should be uttered.”81 The Portland Morning Oregonian believed that the United States should not “shirk its responsibility” if the great powers decided upon sanctions to curb aggressors.82 In these same sections of the country there was a larger number of papers that dissented from these favorable views of the President’s speech.

The New York Herald-Tribune sharply criticized any thought of applying sanctions in an effort to stop the so-called aggressor nations: “Presumably we shall soon know what the President intends. One can only hope that the public will at the same time realize the full meaning of whatever course his restless and adventurous nature may now be leading him to adopt.”83

The New York Sun belabored the President with its heaviest sticks of type: “If Mr. Roosevelt had no further thought than to give voice to moral indignation, he chose an unfortunate manner and time. The note he struck was hectoring and supercilious. . . . Surely he does not suppose that the United States can impose its own standards of political morality on other nations by the simple process of slapping them rhetorically on the wrist.”84

In its criticism of the President’s speech the Boston Herald struck a loud isolationist note: “Americans must not, knowingly or unknowingly, jointly or alone, embark on another costly attempt to reform the world.”85 The Boston Post feared that the road of collective security was a “dangerous one for us”;86 the Philadelphia Inquirer warned that the path of an “aggressive peacemaker” is “beset with pitfalls,”87 while the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin felt that any boycott of Japan would be imprudent and unsuccessful.88

In the Middle West the Chicago Tribune led the assault: “Does not Mr. Roosevelt’s policy invite the coming of the day when he, too, may have no alternative but to resort to arms?”89 The Detroit Free Press was vehement in its opposition to the President’s viewpoint: “Certainly at best the President’s words are likely to accomplish nothing good that could not be accomplished as well and far less dangerously by the use of quieter methods.”90 The Minneapolis Tribune was apprehensive that the quarantine speech might lead to war: “If we do not intend to fight for the underdog. . . we would do well to avoid the dangers which lie in the persistent dramatization of the underdog’s predicament.”91 The Spokane Spokesman-Review ominously remarked: “That disquieting pronouncement approximates a declaration of war”;92 while the San Francisco Examiner, representing the Hearst press, published a strong warning against warlike gestures: “Don’t Stick Out Your Neck, Uncle!”93

The religious press failed to see any moral imperatives in favor of taking a strong stand against aggressor nations. America insisted that “the people of the United States positively are opposed to foreign imbroglios.”94 The Catholic World thought it was ridiculous for the President to imagine that he could frighten Germany, Italy, and Japan “with a few explosive phrases!” His language had belligerent overtones but it should be remembered that Uncle Sam was no longer a fool in international relations. The Allied powers had “lured him into one war to make the world safe for democracy,” but Sam would not fall for that stale bait another time.95 Ave Maria was equally critical of any drift towards war and alluded to the fact that we had gained nothing from the World War: “We have only unpaid foreign debts to add to our own ones to show for our sacrifices, offered in France, to bring victory to the Allies.”96 The Christian Century, the influential voice of American Protestantism, expressed deep suspicions of the President’s policy, and it made the remarkable prophecy that in the event of war a victory for China would also result in a victory for Russia.97

Two important journals representing the business press were outspoken in their opposition to war. The Wall Street Journal printed a leading editorial under the arresting headline: “Stop Foreign Meddling: America Wants Peace,”98 and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle sounded the same note: “There should be stern repudiation of any steps that would lead us into another conflict.”99

l. The Nazi Regime Is Placed upon an Uneasy Defensive

On October 11, the German Ambassador called to see Sumner Welles, the Acting Secretary of State. After discussing some aspects of the civil war in Spain, the ambassador directly inquired as to the “exact interpretation” which his Government should give to the President’s quarantine speech. Welles replied that

it seemed to me hardly necessary for me to attempt to interpret the President’s speech inasmuch as it was in my judgment a speech which spoke for itself. . . . I said that the President sincerely believed that all of the difficult problems with which the countries of the world were today confronted could be solved through a spirit of friendly co-operation and by recognition of each other’s difficulties, and that permanent solution could never be found through force.

The ambassador then remarked that “this was exactly the view which he himself had taken of the speech,” and that he had “to express his regret that the press in Germany, as well as a portion of the press in the United States, should through erroneous and exaggerated interpretations of the President’s statements, endeavor to create further ill-will between the two peoples.”100

In his dispatches to the Foreign Office, Ambassador Dieckhoff stressed the viewpoint that the Chicago address was “mainly, if not exclusively, directed against Japan and that the possibility of assuming a more active role in European questions was not contemplated.”101 A week later, Dieckhoff reported that the “sharp tone” of the quarantine speech had greatly surprised Secretary Hull himself. The first draft of the speech had not contained any “quarantine threat.” This passage “originated with the President himself,” and was not incorporated into the text of the speech “until immediately before his arrival in Chicago.”

The reason for this sharp tone and the incorporation of the quarantine threat was the “intensification of the Far Eastern conflict. . . . It is certain that the Chicago speech was aimed principally at Japan.” The reception of the speech in the United States was “overwhelmingly negative; the war cry, which was immediately sounded by some groups, caused considerable reaction, and meanwhile things have become rather quiet.”102

The ambassador’s reports from Washington, stressing the unfavorable reaction in the American press to the President’s speech, aroused such a deep interest in Hitler’s mind that he suddenly determined to send one of his personal friends, Fritz Wiedemann, on a brief American tour. According to Ambassador Dieckhoff, Wiedemann “looked around very thoroughly,” and returned to Germany with “very deep impressions of America.”103 According to Prentiss Gilbert, who talked with Wiedemann in Berlin after his return, Hitler’s special agent had been “appalled by his observations of anti-German sentiments throughout the United States,” and he was at a “loss what to suggest to the Chancellor,” to whom he would report directly, “respecting steps Germany might take looking to a betterment of the situation.”104

m. Mussolini Pays a Momentous Visit to Berlin

One of the reasons for these “anti-German sentiments” in the United States was the fear that Mussolini and Hitler were plotting against the peace of the world. In the event that a second world war would break out there was always a strong possibility of American involvement with its consequent heavy loss in life and mounting national debt. Pacifism was close to the hearts of most Americans who watched with anxious eyes the movements of the restless European dictators.

On September 4, an announcement was made in Rome of an imminent visit of Mussolini to Berlin. On September 23 the Duce began the first stage of his journey, flanked by three ministers and a retinue of about a hundred persons. On September 28, in Berlin, a crowd of some 800,000 gathered on the Maifeld to listen to Hitler and Mussolini exchange courtesies. Halfway through Mussolini’s speech a tremendous thunderstorm burst upon the scene of festivities, and the Duce made his disconsolate way to his car almost unescorted, soaked with rain, and on the point of collapse.105 The Berlin adventure already showed its ominous side.

Mussolini and Hitler had been too busy with social activities to pay much attention to political affairs. No treaties or agreements were negotiated, but a rapprochement had been confirmed with all its dangerous implications. It was probably this fact that disturbed President Roosevelt and sharpened the tone of his Chicago address on October 5.

The American press took this meeting between the two dictators very seriously. The Albuquerque Journal thought that the world might be “witnessing, in the meeting of these two strong men, one of the important events of contemporary history.”106 The Los Angeles Times was fearful that catastrophe might follow this meeting of dictators: “No one knows what has gone on behind the scenes in Berlin. It may be new war, new conquest, new centralizing of power.”107 The Birmingham News expressed its evident apprehension of sudden war: “These two blatant gentlemen are today the greatest individual enemies of peace. They are today the greatest threats to the peace and security of Europe and the world.”108 In Chattanooga the Daily Times remarked that if “Hitler and Mussolini did not enter into a military alliance, Mussolini achieved a working agreement for any emergency.”109 In the Middle West the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, in a vitriolic editorial entitled, “As the Gods Laugh,” went to the limit in an invective against Hitler:

The Gods must rock with ironic laughter as they hear Benito Mussolini refer to Adolf Hitler as “the herald and defender of European civilization against subversive activities.” Hitler is defending his country against the poetry of Heine and the music of Mendelssohn. . . . In the name of European civilization he has crushed the twin heresies of democracy and liberty. . . . He has wrecked the universities and sent their greatest men into pitiful exile. . . . Yes, Hitler is the defender of European civilization, the civilization of the thumbscrew and rack, the civilization of . . . ignorance and bestiality.110

It was no wonder that Fritz Wiedemann was “appalled” at these extreme expressions of American opinion of Nazi Germany. A large portion of the American public was filled with deep suspicion and strong dislike of Hitler and all his works. This hostility reached a peak after Munich and it gave ample support to the Roosevelt policy of moving down the road to war while talking loudly about the importance of peace.

American exports to Germany		American imports from Germany
1935	$ 91,980,719	1935	$78,336,330
1937	126,342,536	1937	91,175,901
1938	107,129,899	1938	62,532,302

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
90Ibid., p. 5.
91Ibid., pp. 6-7.
92Ibid., p. 9.
93Ibid., pp. 10-11.
94Ibid., p. ix.
95Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. III, 4389.
96January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
97January 9, 1927.
98January 25, 1927.
99March 17, 1927.
100January 21, 26, 1927.
101January 23, 28, 30; February 3, 5, 9, 1927.
102March 22, 1927.
103January 25, 1927.
104Consul John K. Davis to Secretary Kellogg, Nanking, March 28, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1927, II, 151-63.
105MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 151.
106Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 164.
107British Ambassador (Howard) to Secretary Kellogg, April 5, 1927. Ibid., pp. 179-81.
108Memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 6, 1927. Ibid., pp. 182-83.
109Consul General at Hankow (Lockhart) to Eugene Ch’en, April 11, 1927. Ibid., pp. 189-90. These demands included the following items: (1) adequate punishment of commanders of the troops responsible for the murders, personal injuries, and indignities and the material damage done as also of all persons found to be implicated; (2) apology in writing by the Commander in Chief of the Nationalist Army including an express written undertaking to refrain from all forms of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property; (3) complete reparation for the personal injuries and material damage done.
110Memorandum by the Secretary or State, April 20, 1927. Ibid., 204-5.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941