Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941

XXIII Stalin Lights the Fuse to World War II

a. Britain Is Reluctant to Regard Russia as an Ally

BEFORE THE PAPAL interlude in favor of world peace had even been set in motion, Russia had already made her first overtures to Germany for an accord. On April 17, 1939, Merekalov, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, paid a visit to the German Foreign Office and frankly informed Weizsäcker, State Secretary, that he saw no reason why relations between Germany and Russia should not be on a “normal footing.” Indeed, from this normal footing they might become “better and better.”1

On this same day, as the Germans and the Russians were putting out cautious feelers for a possible understanding, Prime Minister Chamberlain had a talk with Ambassador Kennedy and remarked with easy confidence that he felt he could “make a deal with Russia at any time now.” He would delay action, however, until he had gotten the “Balkan situation straightened away.”2

It is evident that he feared that any intimate understanding between Britain and Russia might “divide the Balkan resistance to Germany and that, if it drove Spain over to the Axis, we might thereby lose more in the West than we should gain in the East.” There was also the constant factor of Chamberlain’s deep-seated suspicion of Russia and her aims: “I can’t believe that she has the same aims and objects as we have, or any sympathy with Democracy as such. She is afraid of Germany and Japan, and would be delighted to see other people fight them.” He would postpone as long as possible any negotiations with Russia which looked towards a close political connection.3

The American Ambassador in Brussels (Davies) thought this policy of delay in dealing with Russia was a mistake and he made an appeal to Secretary Hull for immediate action. He was convinced that the

decisive factor in Hitler’s determination will be whether or not Russia will support Britain and France wholeheartedly. From personal knowledge I know that the Soviets did mistrust Britain and France; both their purposes and their performances. They do trust you [Secretary Hull]. They also believe in me.

I am impelled, therefore, to suggest that if you considered it advisable I could go to Moscow on the pretext of cleaning up personal affairs for a few days . . . and can personally, and if need be unofficially, see Litvinov, Kalinin and Molotov, and I am quite sure, Stalin also, with the object of aiding in securing a quick and speedy agreement with Britain against aggression. Neither the French nor the British, in my opinion, can personally reach the highest authorities there. . . . I am confident that I not only can see the proper people, otherwise unreachable, but that they have confidence in my good judgment and sincerity. . . . Speed is vital.4

The Department of State was not ready to authorize this special mission to Moscow, so the British and French governments continued in their own confused way to seek some basis for an accord. But the Soviet Government was not making this task an easy one. On April 20, London and Paris received from Moscow a proposal that the “three countries guarantee not only to fight at once in case of direct attack on any one of the three, but also that all three countries should guarantee to go to war in case of an aggression against any other country in Europe.” Bonnet at once objected that guarantees of this kind would not carry “conviction.” It would be “totally impossible” to get “French soldiers to march in case of a German attack on Estonia unless such an attack should first involve Poland.”5

While Britain and France were trying to find some alternative formula that would be agreeable to Moscow, the Baltic countries were showing a definite suspicion of Russian proposals to defend their integrity. In the third week in April 1939, Estonia and Latvia sent notes to the Russian Foreign Office which emphatically stated that they were in no danger of war and therefore did not need any Russian assistance. Two weeks later they announced their readiness to “sign a non-aggression pact with Germany.”6

Romania was also deeply suspicious of Russia. On April 25, Gafencu, the Romanian Foreign Minister, had a talk with Ambassador Kennedy in London. He confided to him that he had strongly urged the British Foreign Office “not to have anything to do with Russia . . . because Russia does not think the same way and is not really interested in peace as the rest of the world understands it.” He was convinced that Hitler did not want war but would seek to win “Danzig and the colonies with a battle of words.” But nevertheless, as a former soldier, he had stressed to Chamberlain the importance of immediate conscription in case his prophecy went wrong.7 It was apparent to him that the “policy of the Soviet Union was to become involved as little as possible in any European war in the hope that at the end of such a war . . . the Red army might sweep the Continent in the interest of Bolshevism.”8

The British Foreign Office shared some of Gafencu’s suspicions of Russia and could not be hurried into any close relationship with the Soviet Government. On April 24, Halifax sent instructions to the British Ambassador in Moscow directing him to ask the “Soviet Government immediately to issue a [unilateral] guarantee of Rumania and Poland on all fours with the British guarantees. . . . The French Government . . . considered this new British démarche extremely stupid and refused to order the French Ambassador in Moscow to join his British colleague in the démarche.” If the Soviet Government would issue the statement the only result “would be to enrage the Poles and the Rumanians.” As an alternative the French Foreign Office proposed that the Soviet Union be requested “to guarantee to give support to France and England in case either one should become involved in war due to promises to protect States in Eastern Europe. Similarly, France and England should agree to give support to the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union should become involved in war due to assistance to France and England.”9

While this matter was being discussed, Daladier was “increasing to the greatest possible extent French military preparations.” An imposing armament would have far more effect upon Hitler than fair words. The British Ambassador at Paris had expressed the belief that Hitler’s speech of April 28 had “left the way open for fruitful negotiations.” This viewpoint was regarded by Daladier as “dangerous nonsense.” There should be no pressure upon Poland to accept German proposals for an understanding.10

In many other respects the British attitude of mind disturbed Daladier. Lord Halifax was showing definite reluctance to accept the latest French proposals to Russia.11 The British Foreign Office was most anxious not to provoke the “susceptibilities of Poland and Rumania where Russia was concerned.” Moreover, it did not wish to forfeit the “sympathy of the world at large by giving a handle to German anti-Comintern propaganda,” nor did it wish to “jeopardize the cause of peace by provoking violent action by Germany.”

After giving this situation mature consideration, Lord Halifax sent to France this alternative proposal: the Soviet Government should make a public declaration on its own initiative which should make some reference to the new obligations assumed by Britain and France relative to certain eastern European countries. It should then state that in the event that Britain or France became involved in hostilities in fulfillment of these obligations, the assistance of the Soviet Government would be available if desired and would be afforded in such manner as might be most convenient. This cautious language, it was believed, would not offend in any way the susceptibilities of either Poland or Romania.12

It is apparent that the wary attitude of the British Foreign Office gave offence to Stalin. Payart, the French chargé d’affaires in Moscow, said that Halifax’s proposals had “enraged Stalin” who regarded them as an effort to relegate Russia to the role of a third-rate power. At any rate, on May 3, Litvinov suddenly resigned his office as Foreign Commissar and was succeeded by Molotov. In London, Sir Robert Vansittart, the chief diplomatic adviser to the Government, expressed to Bullitt his fears that the dismissal of Litvinov meant the adoption by the Soviet Government of a policy of isolation. If this were true it soon led to the “collapse of resistance to Hitler in Western Europe and the Balkans.” When Bullitt inquired if Litvinov’s resignation had been occasioned by the “dilatory and almost insulting policy which the British Government had pursued vis-à-vis the Soviet Union since Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia,” Vansittart answered that he “feared that British policy might have contributed to Stalin’s attitude.”

Bullitt pursued his conversation with Vansittart and suddenly received the surprise of his diplomatic career. To his question as to why the British Government had refused to accept the French proposals relative to action in concert with Russia, Vansittart frankly replied that “no French proposals had yet reached the British Government.” Sir Eric Phipps, in Paris, had apparently not considered them important enough to rush to the Foreign Office. After recovering from his astonishment, Bullitt gave to Vansittart an outline of the French proposals which the British diplomat at once pronounced to be “far superior“ to the ones sponsored by Lord Halifax. Without wasting any time, Bullitt now hurried to Paris and persuaded Daladier to telephone to Ambassador Corbin, in London, and direct him to present the French proposals to the British Foreign Office.13

But the British Foreign Office paid little attention to this pressure. On May 8 the British reply to the Soviet proposals of April 17 was delivered to Molotov by the British Ambassador in Moscow. In substance, the new British proposal contained the following items: (1) the Soviet Government should announce its willingness to assist Poland and Romania should those countries become the victims of aggression; (2) this assistance should be given in suitable form only if requested and only if Britain and France, in pursuance of the guarantee which they have given to Poland and Romania, had already moved to implement these guarantees.14

On May 11, in the columns of Izvestia, the Russian attitude towards these proposals was clearly expressed:

Great Britain’s suggestions avoid the subject of a pact of mutual assistance between France, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. and consider that the Soviet Government should come to the immediate aid of Great Britain and France should they be involved in hostilities as a result of the obligations they have assumed in guaranteeing Poland and Roumania.

Great Britain says nothing about the aid which the U.S.S.R. should naturally receive on the principle of reciprocity from France and Great Britain should it be involved in hostilities owing to the fulfilment of the obligations it may assume in guaranteeing any of the States of Eastern Europe.

It thus follows that under this arrangement, the U.S.S.R. must find itself in a position of inequality.15

Daladier sympathized with this Russian criticism of the attitude of the British Foreign Office and he did not blame the Soviet Government for its rejection of the British proposals. In commenting upon the existing diplomatic deadlock he confided to Bullitt that he would insist that the French proposals be made the basis of any further negotiations with Russia. All that the British had accomplished by their “dilatory and half-hearted proposals was to make the Russian terms stiffer.” He had “few illusions” about the Soviet Union but he believed that it was “essential” to have Russia in the concert of nations against Hitler.16

Under strong pressure from France, the British Foreign Office receded from its uncompromising attitude towards Russia. On May 24, Lord Halifax instructed Sir Ronald Lindsay, in Washington, to the effect that the Soviet Government had been informed that Britain was “now disposed to agree that effective co-operation between the Soviet, French and British Governments against aggression in Europe might be based on a system of mutual guarantees in general conformity with the principles of the League of Nations.” This co-operation would cover direct attacks on any of the three governments by a European state and cases where any of them was engaged in hostility with such a state “in consequence of aggression by the latter upon another European country.”17

But these British proposals made no reference to any assistance that might be given to Estonia, Latvia, or Finland in case these Baltic countries should become the victims of aggression. In a speech on May 31, Molotov called attention to the dangers of German infiltration into the states bordering upon Soviet Russia, and he expressed the opinion that the British Government had not as yet envisaged a system of real reciprocity in its proposed concert of powers. On June 3 the Russian reply to the latest British proposals was received in London. It emphasized the necessity of a definite guarantee of Estonia and Latvia even though those states were opposed to such an arrangement. On June 7, Prime Minister Chamberlain informed the House of Commons of the strong distaste of the Baltic countries for any guarantee of their status. On this very day Estonia and Latvia gave expression to their suspicions of Russia by signing nonaggression treaties with Germany.18

In the Morning Post, June 8, Winston Churchill made an attack upon the attitude of the Chamberlain Government towards Russia and attempted to justify the demands of the Soviet Government for the inclusions of the Baltic states in the proposed system of guarantees. In order to meet this criticism and to quiet public sentiment in this regard, Chamberlain announced that William Strang, chief of the European Department of the Foreign Office, would be sent on a special mission to Moscow. But he felt that his hand had been forced in this whole Russian matter and he poured out his feelings in a conversation with Ambassador Kennedy:

He [Chamberlain] said that he does not regard the situation in a favorable light at all. . . . He regards the most important thing that could be done would be for the French to make some gesture to the Italians on the question of their demands. . . . The Russian situation is most annoying to him. He is not at all sure that the Russians have the slightest idea of concluding the pact and if they do not accept the latest proposition, he is not at all sure that he will not call the whole thing off.19

It is obvious that Chamberlain was dragging his feet along the unwelcome path to a possible accord with Russia. Under the impact of the pressure of public opinion he had arranged for Strang to go to Moscow but this special mission would amount to nothing because Strang’s instructions were so uncompromising that they could not lead to an understanding with the Soviet Government. With reference to the Baltic states and to Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Switzerland he held out strongly against the “imposition of a guarantee on Powers unwilling to receive it.” Inasmuch as His Majesty’s Government had no intention of proposing a guarantee of Poland against Russia, “they feel that Great Britain should not guarantee or be guaranteed by Russia against a Polish attack.” In conclusion, His Majesty’s. Government was not ready to make a “tripartite agreement not to conclude a separate peace . . . before objectives of peace had been decided upon.”20

Armed with these instructions, Strang began his diplomatic conversations with Molotov on June 15. Apparently, the Russian Foreign Commissar was willing “temporarily to shelve” proposals relative to a guarantee of the Baltic states if British objections were “insuperable.” According to his prescription the proposed tripartite pact would be a “guarantee against direct aggression” and would exclude the contingency “of an attack upon one of the signatories resulting from assistance given by the latter to a third Power.” This suggestion did not please Mr. Strang who pointed out that Britain was anxious to have Russian help in the event she became involved in hostilities arising out of assistance to Poland. Molotov, however, held his position strongly and also insisted upon the inclusion of a “no separate peace” clause in the proposed arrangement.21

Molotov seemed particularly concerned about the possibility of German infiltration of the Baltic states and a subsequent coup détat which would install officials friendly to German designs. For this reason he stressed the importance of an “undertaking to give assistance in the case of indirect as well as of direct aggression.” He also demanded that the proposed political agreement should go hand in hand with a military convention of a detailed nature. His demands were strongly contested by the British and French delegations at Moscow.22

b. Chamberlain Begins to Pursue the Russian Phantom

British opposition to Russian demands became weaker as the European situation grew more grave. By the last of June the British Foreign Office was ready to go to great lengths to appease Russia. This story was told very frankly by Daladier to Ambassador Bullitt:

Daladier said that the British were now falling over themselves to accede to the Russian demands. Two texts for submission to the Soviet Government had been prepared today. The first contained no specific mention of the Baltic States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, but would be accompanied by a secret memorandum covering them. The second contained a complete acceptance of the Russian demands. Strang in Moscow would be instructed tonight or tomorrow to present these two texts to the Soviet Government and to state that the British and French preferred the first text but were ready to accept the second if the Russians should insist.

I asked Daladier if he believed that this would conclude the negotiations or if he believed the Russians would insist upon subjecting this political accord to the conclusion of a future military agreement. He said that he had urged the British to take up the question of a military agreement with the Russians before taking up the matter of the political agreement but the British had refused to do this. He was by no means certain that the Russians would surrender this demand and feared that the negotiations might be dragged out indefinitely. . . . He added that the Soviet Government had repeatedly assured the French and British Governments that it was not negotiating in any way with the German Government.23

c. Germany Seeks an Accord with Russia

These assurances were only partly true. The basis for a German-Russian accord had already been laid. On May 30 the German State Secretary in the Foreign Office wrote to the German Ambassador in Moscow an instruction which contained a revealing paragraph: “Contrary to the policy previously planned, we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union.” Astakhov, the Russian chargé d’affaires in Berlin, was called to the Foreign Office for a conversation with Weizsäcker who referred to the remarks of the Russian Ambassador in April relative to an “improvement of Russo-German political relations.” He then stated that he did not know “whether there was still room for a gradual normalization [of relations] after Moscow had, perhaps, already given ear to the enticements of London.” Astakhov cautiously replied that he would await instructions from Moscow before discussing the matter any further.24

Russia made the next move through the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin. On June 15 he called at the Foreign Office and had a talk with Dr. Woermann, head of the Political Division. He stated emphatically to Woermann that if “Germany would declare that she would not attack the Soviet Union or that she would conclude a non-aggression pact with her, the Soviet Union would probably refrain from concluding a treaty with England.”25

On the basis of this intimation, Schulenberg called at the Russian Foreign Office on June 29 and had a long conversation with Molotov. He gave an assurance that “we would welcome a normalization of the relations between Germany and Soviet Russia. . . . For this we had furnished a number of proofs, such as reserve in the German press, conclusion of the non-aggression treaties with the Baltic countries and desire for resumption of economic negotiations. . . . We . . . would continue to take advantage of any opportunity to prove our good will.” Molotov replied that the foreign policy of the Soviet Government was “aimed at the cultivation of good relations with all countries and this of course applied, providing there was reciprocity, to Germany too.” He finally remarked that “normalization of relations with Germany was desirable and possible.”26

d. Britain and France Make New Overtures to Russia

The Western democracies were ignorant of the secret negotiations that were being carried on between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Daladier had some doubts about Russian assurances, but he had no idea that the Nazi-Soviet accord was really moving towards an early conclusion. Léger expressed to Bullitt the opinion that “there were eighty chances in a hundred” that the Anglo-French conversations with Molotov in Moscow “would be concluded successfully in the near future.” But there were other difficulties:

Relations between Poland and France had again become extraordinarily unpleasant. At a moment when it was absolutely essential for the French Government to know the exact thoughts of the Polish Government with regard to Danzig, the Polish Ambassador in Paris was so nervous and irritable that it was impossible to have any really intimate conversation with him. He had insulted both Daladier and Bonnet so grossly that Daladier would no longer see him and Bonnet could get nothing out of him. Similarly, Beck in Warsaw had no relations of an intimate nature with the French Ambassador. As a result, all the French Ministers from Daladier down were reluctant to do anything of a concrete nature for Poland. He [Léger] believes that both France and England should give loans to Poland and send airplanes to Poland at once in order to convince the Germans that France and England are determined to support Poland if Poland should become involved in war with Germany. The Polish Ambassador was entirely right in his demands for such assistance; but his manner of presentation . . . was such that he killed his own case.27

Léger’s optimism concerning the satisfactory progress of the Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Government was distinctly premature. The matter of guarantees caused serious concern because some of the states that would be covered by these proposed pledges were openly against them. Finland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland strongly voiced their objections in the first week in July,28 and this fact forced Britain and France to seek desperately for some formula that would be generally satisfactory. On June 30 the British Ambassador was directed to submit to the Soviet Government a proposal which placed “all States who might receive assistance on the same footing.” It also gave to the Soviet Government the right to “decide upon the need” for giving assistance to one of the guaranteed states. Assurances would also be given to Moscow of “Anglo-French aid once hostilities had started.” The British Ambassador in Moscow was also instructed to indicate the “prejudicial effect on the peace front (in view of public or private objection by Baltic States and Rumania and the unknown attitude of Holland to a Soviet or tripartite guarantee) of Russian demands for publication in treaty of a list of States guaranteed against aggression.” He should express British preference for the enumeration of these guaranteed states in a secret supplementary agreement. It was also important to include the Netherlands, Switzerland, and possibly Luxemburg in the list of states whose protection would be guaranteed.29

Molotov was willing to have the list of guaranteed states extended so as to include Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Turkey, but he strongly objected to the addition of the Netherlands and Switzerland unless pacts of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and Turkey be immediately concluded. He also wished the term “indirect aggression” to be defined as “an internal coup détat or a reversal of policy in the interest of an aggressor.”30 There were several alternative formulas dealing with “indirect aggression,” but none of them was satisfactory and conversations continued. Agreement upon the matter of a military convention was also difficult. On July 7, Lord Halifax was ready to make further concessions to the Soviet Government. He would accept the following definition of indirect aggression: “Action accepted by State in question under threat of force by another Power and involving abandonment of its independence or neutrality.” The British Ambassador in Moscow was directed to endeavor to include “consultation in case of aggression against Holland, Switzerland or Luxemburg.” If agreement was impossible on this suggestion then he was to try to secure a “limited tripartite agreement susceptible of extension and providing for consultation in the event of aggression against another Power.” It was made clear that the Foreign Office would not “agree to make entry into force of agreement depend on conclusion of military conversations.”31

On the same day that Lord Halifax sent these instructions to Moscow, Ambassador Bullitt had a conversation with the French Foreign Minister. The difficulty of finding some acceptable definition of “indirect aggression” once more came to the front:

This afternoon Bonnet said to me that instructions had now been sent to the British and French Ambassadors in Moscow ordering them to say to the Soviet Government that the Soviet definition of “indirect aggression” was totally inacceptable to the French and British Governments. He said that the portion of the Soviet note which had especially shocked the French and British was the phrase that “any change in the makeup of the Government of any of the Baltic States which tended to favor an aggressor must lead to immediate military action by the Soviet Union, France and England.” Bonnet added that this phrase, if accepted, would make it possible for the Soviet Union to invade any of the Baltic States at any minute on any flimsy pretext with the armed support of France and England. It was obvious that neither France nor England could accept such a proposal.

Bonnet added that the French and British Ambassadors in Moscow had been given a large number of alternative definitions of aggression which they would propose to Molotov. . . . They had also been ordered to inform the Soviet Union that France and England were ready to adjourn immediate signature of an agreement with regard to Switzerland and Holland provided the Russians would agree to discuss the matter later.

I [Bullitt] asked Bonnet if he still thought the negotiations with the Soviet Union could be brought to a successful conclusion. He replied that he really had no idea. The Russian demands had been so extraordinary that he was no longer certain that the Soviet Government really desired to reach an agreement.32

Some two weeks later [July 19], the British Foreign Office made another concession but would not accept the entire Russian program. The situation was tersely described to Ambassador Kennedy by Lord Halifax:

Halifax said that their final words to the Russians now is that they will accept the military pact but will not accept the Russians’ definition of indirect aggression and if the Russians insist on it the English are going to call the whole deal off.33

The following day Kennedy had a talk with Prime Minister Chamberlain. Although he was fairly optimistic about the general outlook for the next thirty days, he was

sick and disgusted with the Russians and while he believes that the Russians are willing to continue talking without accomplishing anything, his patience is exhausted. He told me he had a conversation with Prince Paul, of Jugoslavia, and Prince Paul was definitely of the opinion that if England did not consummate a deal with the Russians, Germany would. The Prime Minister said he does not feel there is any danger of that.34

On August 5, Lord Halifax sent to Sir Ronald Lindsay, in Washington, a brief notation: “At interview on August 2nd, Molotov again refused to accept our definition of indirect aggression.”35 The game was just about up and Molotov was almost ready to show his hand. The farce of further conversations continued on August 12 when the British and French military missions arrived in Moscow. Voroshilov promptly asked the highly embarrassing question whether Poland and Romania would permit the passage of Russian troops through their territories in the event of German aggression. General Doumenc telegraphed to Paris and urged the Daladier Government to accept the Soviet viewpoint and exert pressure upon Poland in favor of concessions to Russia.36

e. Germany Signs an Important Treaty with Russia

While the British and French governments were anxiously seeking some formula of accommodation with Russia, the German Government was making successful efforts to establish a rapprochement with its eastern neighbor. On the evening of July 26, Dr. Carl Schnurre, head of the Eastern European Division of the Foreign Office, invited to dinner Astakhov, the Soviet chargé d’affaires, and Barbarin, the chief of the Soviet Trade Mission to Germany. Astakhov referred to the close community of interests in foreign policy that had formerly existed between Germany and Russia. Dr. Schnurre quickly took up this theme and indicated that the old friendly relations could be restored by adopting the following program: (1) the re-establishment of collaboration in economic affairs; (2) the normalization and improvement of political relations; (3) a new arrangement which would take account of the vital political interests of both parties. Astakhov concurred with this view but cautiously advised that the movement towards this accord should be “very slow and gradual.”37

But Germany was in a hurry to push to completion this understanding with Soviet Russia. On August 2, Ribbentrop had an important conversation with Astakhov during which he stressed the opinion that the German Government was “favorably disposed toward Russia.” If Moscow had a similar disposition there was “no problem from the Baltic to the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us.”38

In Moscow, Schulenburg discussed the situation with Molotov who frankly admitted that his government “desired normalization and improvement” of relations with Germany. But this admission was guarded and Molotov was so cautious in his admissions that it seemed evident to the German Ambassador that it would take “considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet Government to swing about.”39 It was soon evident that Ribbentrop was ready to make this effort. On August 14, Schulenburg was instructed to see Molotov and emphasize the opinion that the period of opposition between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany could be “brought to an end once and for all” by a frank appraisal of mutual interests. There were no “real conflicts of interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R.” Indeed, there was distinctly lacking any “cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the other.” It should be obvious that “German-Soviet policy today has come to an historic turning point.” The situation in Europe called for German-Soviet co-operation, not conflict. It would be fatal “if through mutual lack of views and intentions, our peoples should be finally driven asunder.” The existing crisis was of so grave a nature that von Ribbentrop himself was ready to visit Moscow to present the German viewpoint to both Molotov and Stalin.40

Molotov assured Schulenburg that he “warmly welcomed German intentions of improving relations with the Soviet Union” but he insisted that “adequate preparation” for a discussion of outstanding problems in German-Soviet relations was “indispensable.” During the conversation Molotov seemed so “unusually compliant” that Schulenburg was of the opinion that the Soviet Foreign Office regarded the suggestion of a German visit to Moscow a “very flattering” testimonial of an ardent desire for Nazi co-operation with Russia. The situation was improving so rapidly that it appeared as though the Reich would “achieve the desired results” in the pending negotiations.41

With negotiations moving rapidly towards a favorable conclusion, the German Foreign Office accelerated the tempo of its efforts. Schulenburg was instructed to assure Molotov that Germany was ready for the signature of a nonaggression pact. Moreover, the Reich would guarantee the Baltic states jointly with the Soviet Union and would exercise her influence “for an improvement of Russian-Japanese relations.” In order to speed the signature of a treaty covering these points, von Ribbentrop indicated that he was prepared to take a plane to Moscow any time after August 18.42

Molotov welcomed the proposed visit of von Ribbentrop to Moscow as an indication that the German Government valued more highly cooperation with Russia than did the Chamberlain Government of Britain which had sent to Moscow merely a chief of one of the divisions of the Foreign Office (Strang). But he wished to make it clear that Russia desired the conclusion of an economic agreement before the establishment of a political understanding.43 This wish was easily fulfilled by the signature, at Berlin, of a convention that dealt exclusively with economic matters. On August 20, Hitler himself sent a telegram to Stalin in which he expressly accepted the draft of a nonaggression treaty which Molotov had prepared. He then requested that Stalin receive Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on August 22 or 23.44 Stalin made a favorable reply and the stage was prepared for a German-Soviet accord that ushered in World War II.45

Meanwhile, conversations continued between Voroshilov and the members of the Anglo-French military mission. The demands of Voroshilov were purposely inacceptable. Not only did Russia insist upon the right of Russian troops to enter Polish and Romanian territory but also to occupy the principal ports of the Baltic states and the main islands near their coasts if she thought such measures were necessary to forestall German aggression. These demands made a very unfavorable impression upon Polish statesmen who were fearful of Russian good faith. When the French Ambassador asked for acquiescence in the Russian request for the right to send troops across Polish soil, Foreign Minister Beck replied: “We concede to no one, under any form, the right to discuss the use of any part of our territory by foreign troops.”46 On August 21, according to Daladier, he overcame Polish objections in this regard and authorized General Doumenc to sign with Russia the proposed military convention. M. Bonnet and M. Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador in Paris, gave different versions,47 but the matter is of no great importance because the announcement of the Ribbentrop mission to Moscow sounded the death knell of any rapprochement between Russia and the Western democracies.

On the afternoon of August 23, Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow. That evening he had a long conference with Stalin who burst out into bitter criticisms of Britain. Ribbentrop sounded the same note and acidly complained that Britain had always sought to “disrupt the development of good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.” She was obviously weak and “wanted to let others fight for her presumptuous claim to world domination.” Stalin agreed with this indictment. He had not liked the attitude of the British military mission which “had never told the Soviet Government what it really wanted.” There was no doubt in his mind that Britain, in a military sense, was distinctly weak. Her domination of the world in spite of this fact was “due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed.” After appropriate toasts, the signature of the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty was hailed as the dawn of a new political day in world politics.48 To millions of fearful persons in panic-stricken lands from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, it was the beginning of night over Europe.

f. The Duce Tries to Sit on a Slippery Diplomatic Fence

During the fateful month of August, Mussolini tried desperately to maintain a dignified position on a very slippery diplomatic fence. As early as July 7 he had told the British Ambassador (Loraine) that “if England is ready to fight in defense of Poland, Italy will take up arms with her ally Germany.” But he became exceedingly vacillating as the crisis deepened. On August 10 he instructed Ciano frankly to “inform the Germans that we must avoid a conflict with Poland since it will be impossible to localize it and a general war would be disastrous for everybody.”49 Ribbentrop resented this policy of caution: “The decision to fight is implacable.” After talking to Hitler, Ciano realized that there was “no longer anything that can be done. He [Hitler] has decided to strike, and strike he will.”50

Ciano returned to Rome “completely disgusted with the Germans, with their leader, with their way of doing things. They have betrayed us and lied to us.” Mussolini, after considering the reports of Ciano, decided (August 15) that Italy should “not march blindly with Germany. . . . He wants time to prepare the break with Germany.”51 On the eighteenth, however, the Duce’s doubts reappeared and he remarked to Ciano that “Germany might do good business cheaply.” Moreover, he feared “Hitler’s rage.” On the twenty-first the Duce announced to Ciano that he had decided to go along with the Germans, but after much argument he consented to a conference between Ciano and Ribbentrop. He agreed that Ribbentrop should be informed that Italy would “not intervene if the conflict is provoked by an attack on Poland.”52 But the Nazi-Soviet Agreement of August 23 upset Ciano’s calculations and the proposed meeting with the German Foreign Minister was abandoned.

g. Chamberlain Expands His Pledges to Poland

While the Duce was endeavoring to squirm into a favorable position on a precarious perch, Chamberlain was still trying to reason with Hitler. On August 22 he sent to Berlin a warning that, despite the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Agreement, Britain would still carry out her obligation to defend Polish independence.53 When Nevile Henderson went to Berchtesgaden to deliver this communication he found Hitler in a mood of “extreme excitability.” During a second interview the Führer was more composed although sharply critical of British policy. No longer did he “trust Mr. Chamberlain” who had given a “blank check to Poland.”54 In a letter to the British Prime Minister he strongly asserted his constant desire for peace with Britain and he complained that his pacific advances had always been rejected. With reference to the questions of Danzig and the Corridor he observed that he had been ready to settle them “on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity.” But Poland, acting upon assurance of armed assistance from Britain in case of conflict with Germany, had refused to accede to a German request for the return of Danzig to the Reich and for a railway and a motor road across the Corridor. Also, Britain and France were mobilizing their armed forces as a threat to compel Germany to recede from her firm stand with reference to Poland. This action would force Germany to answer mobilization with mobilization.55

This diplomatic impasse made European statesmen realize that World War II was just around the corner of tomorrow. In order to avert such a dread contingency, King Leopold of Belgium, speaking for the so-called “Oslo Powers” (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), broadcast an appeal to “those in whose hands rests the fate of the world,” to avoid “the catastrophe which threatens humanity.” With prophetic vision this appeal stressed the fact that the impact of a second world war would destroy “the spiritual and material values created by centuries of civilization”; no nation would emerge as a “victor.”56

This appeal by King Leopold was followed by one from Pope Pius XII (August 24), who admonished European rulers that “nothing is lost with peace; all may be lost with war.”57 On the previous day, President Roosevelt had sent an urgent message to King Victor Emmanuel of Italy exhorting him to “formulate proposals for a pacific solution of the present crisis.”58 Ciano thought that the President’s appeal did not “make much sense,”59 and after waiting several days the King replied that “there has been done and there is being done by us whatever is possible to bring about peace with justice.”60 Without waiting for this reply, the President also sent appeals to President Móscicki, of Poland, and Chancellor Hitler (August 24), urging them to try to settle their differences by direct negotiation or by arbitration.61

Móscicki replied at once (August 25) that he strongly favored direct negotiations. When no answer came from Hitler, President Roosevelt (August 25) sent him a second message alluding to the readiness of the Polish Government to try to find some path to peace through direct negotiations.62 In response to this pressure, Hitler answered that he had “left nothing untried for the purpose of settling the dispute between Germany and Poland in a friendly manner. Even at the last hour he accepted an offer from the Government of Great Britain to mediate in this dispute. Owing to the attitude of the Polish Government, however, all these endeavors have remained without result.”63

While the second Roosevelt message was en route to Hitler, the Führer sent a message to Mussolini in which he intimated that action against Poland would begin “in a short time.” He then asked for “Italian understanding” of his position. The Duce replied that Italy was “not ready to go to war.” Ciano, in order to implement this reply, began to make out a long list (“enough to kill a bull—if a bull could read”) of military needs essential to any Italian war effort.64

While Ciano was making these calculations, Hitler summoned Nevile Henderson to the Chancellery. He emphasized the importance of an early settlement of the dispute between Germany and Poland and then made an offer of friendship and eventual alliance between Germany and Britain. Speaking with “calm and apparent sincerity,” he described his efforts as a “last effort, for conscience’ sake, to secure good relations with Great Britain.”65 He could have saved his breath because on this very day (August 25) Chamberlain had entered into a far-reaching treaty with Poland. It provided that if “one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against the Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.” The treaty then obligated Britain and Poland to maintain the status quo in vast areas in Eastern Europe.66

This action of Chamberlain is as difficult to understand as his pledges to Poland in March and April. If he had been willing “to write off eastern Europe as geographically indefensible, to let Hitler move eastward, with the strong probability that he would come into conflict with Stalin,” such a policy would have been “the sanest and most promising course western diplomacy could have followed.”67 Instead, the British Prime Minister assumed a series of obligations he could not possibly fulfill, and to make sure this was so he failed to expedite the matter of building up the British Army. Although the House of Commons approved a bill for conscription on April 27, the first contingent of British recruits was not called to the colors until July. No troops could be rushed to Poland and a pitifully small force would be ready for service in France. It is evident that André Géraud (Pertinax) should write a book on the “grave-diggers of Britain.”

h. Hitler Sends a Warning to France

After sending Nevile Henderson to London with another note to Chamberlain, Hitler turned to France. On August 25 he called the French Ambassador (M. Coulondre) to the Chancellery and submitted a statement that was to be forwarded to Daladier. He disclaimed any wish for war with France, particularly on account of Poland. In the spring of 1939, he had made “extremely fair proposals to Poland, demanding the return of Danzig to the Reich and of a narrow strip of territory leading from this German city to East Prussia.” But the Poles had not only rejected these “proposals” but had also subjected the German minority “to the worst possible treatment.” To make matters much worse the Polish Government had decreed general mobilization and were shooting at German planes crossing the Corridor. Such actions were intolerable. If Germany took suitable action against them, and if France gave support to Poland in this event, war between Germany and France would be inevitable.68

The reply of Daladier was dignified and able: “Unless you attribute to the French people a conception of national honour less high than that which I myself recognize in the German people, you cannot doubt that France will be true to her solemn promises to other nations, such as Poland, which, I am perfectly sure, wants also to live in peace with Germany.” He was confident that there was no real barrier to a pacific solution of the existing crisis if the will for peace existed “equally on all sides.” As for himself, there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that he was ready to make all the efforts “an honest man” could make “to ensure” the success of any real step towards a just settlement of differences.69

When he presented this note to Hitler, M. Coulondre begged him “in the name of history and for the sake of humanity, not to thrust aside this last chance.” He remarked that the Führers prestige was great enough “outside Germany to remain undiminished even after a gesture of appeasement.” Hitler quickly replied that the decision was really up to Poland. If she would make concessions there would be peace, but “Poland’s mind was set in morbid resistance.” Therefore, if she evinced an apparent willingness to “talk matters over it would, doubtless, be in order to gain time for her mobilization.”70

On August 27, Hilter sent his formal reply to Daladier’s letter. After repeating his desire for peace with France he referred to increasing Polish provocations and alleged brutal treatment of the German minority under Polish control. This “Macedonian situation must be liquidated on our eastern frontier.” It was now necessary to formulate a precise prescription for peace: “Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany.”71 Such terms were equivalent to a declaration of war.

i. The Führer Turns Once More to Britain

But despite the fact that his demands were equivalent to a declaration of war, Hitler still harbored some hope that Chamberlain would break at the last moment and prepare the way for a new Munich. It is evident from the Nürnberg documents that “some time. . . after signing of the treaty with Soviet Russia [August 23, 1939],” Hitler issued the “order for the campaign against Poland.” The beginning of this campaign was “ordered for 25 August but on 24 August, in the afternoon, it was postponed until 1 September in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador.”72

This testimony of General Göring was confirmed by Ribbentrop: “Hearing that military steps had been taken against Poland, I asked him [the Führer] to withdraw it and stop the advance. The Fuehrer at once agreed to do it. . . . This was the 25th of August, 1939, and then negotiations with Mr. Henderson in Berlin started. . . . The Fuehrer made again an offer of friendship and of close collaboration with Great Britain. When this didn’t come off, the Fuehrer decided to treat directly with the Poles.”73

On August 26, Henderson arrived in London with this latest Hitler proposal. After two days of careful consideration the British Cabinet sent Henderson back to Berlin with a lengthy answer. It was agreed that there should be a prompt settlement of the “differences between Germany and Poland,” but “as a prerequisite to this settlement the German Government should clearly understand that His Majesty’s Government had obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honor.” It should, however, be entirely possible that a “reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could be effected by an agreement . . . which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential interests.” This agreement should then be “guaranteed by other Powers.” If desired, His Majesty’s Government “would be ready to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee.” In order to arrive at this meeting of minds between Germany and Poland, direct discussions between the two powers should be promptly initiated. Failure to reach a “just settlement” of existing difficulties would “ruin the hopes of better understanding between Germany and Great Britain,” and would “bring the two countries into conflict.”74

This last sentence has a definite ominous ring which indicated that as Hitler became more conciliatory after August 25, the British Cabinet became more fixed in its determination to stand behind Poland. With reference to the reasons why Hitler pursued this policy of conciliation, Henderson has some pertinent observations. He had “reason to believe . . . that the order for the German Army to advance into Poland was actually issued for the night of August 25th-26th. It is difficult otherwise to find justification for the various orders and arrangements which came into force on August 26th and 27th. . . . The fact may well be . . . that Hitler had had in consequence of the Prime Minister’s letter one last hesitation and countermanded the orders to his army. . . . His hesitation was due . . . to one final effort to detach Britain from Poland.”75

The Nürnberg documents show that Henderson’s “hunch” concerning the sudden switch in Hitler’s plans with reference to Poland was remarkably correct. After issuing orders to the German Army to move against Poland he lost his nerve and made a last attempt to induce the British Government to write another chapter of appeasement. He knew that the German and Russian armies would crush Poland in the matter of a few weeks, and that Britain could interpose no barrier to impede their progress. But this Polish campaign aroused many misgivings in his mind. In the end, how big a price would he have to pay Stalin for his assistance? Would it not be possible to drive a better bargain with the credulous Chamberlain?

At any rate, Hitler once more tried conciliation. When Henderson arrived in Berlin on the evening of August 28 with the reply of the British Government to Hitler’s latest proposal, he went at once to the Chancellery. He found the Führer “once again friendly and reasonable and appeared to be not dissatisfied with the answer which I had brought to him. He observed . . . that he must study it carefully and would give me a written reply the next day. . . . Though he had been noncommittal, he had been calm and even conciliatory.”76

But on August 29 the situation changed for the worse. The Polish Government decreed a general mobilization of their armed forces and this word reached Berlin within a few hours. The British Government had sent a warning to Warsaw that such a step “would create the impression all over the world” that Poland was “embarking on war.” For this reason the Polish Government postponed the public announcement of mobilization “for several hours.”77 But the news was soon in Hitler’s hands and it greatly disturbed his uneasy nervous balance.

Henderson quickly discovered this fact when he was summoned to the Chancellery at 7:15 on the evening of the twenty-ninth. Hitler immediately launched into an excited denunciation of the atrocities committed upon German nationals in Poland. This ghastly state of affairs was “unbearable for a Great Power.” He now insisted upon “the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, and the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland.” While the British Government apparently believed that these grave differences between Germany and Poland could be settled by “direct negotiations,” the German Government did not share this viewpoint. But as a proof of the sincerity of its intentions “to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain,” it would accept British mediation on the basis of “securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers.” It was expected that this emissary would arrive on Wednesday, August 30.78

The time limit fixed for the arrival of this proposed Polish plenipotentiary seemed to Henderson to have the “ring of an ultimatum.” Hitler emphatically denied this implication: he wished merely to stress the urgency of the situation. He then terminated the interview with a brief but “quite honest” assurance of his “liking for Englishmen generally and his constant endeavor to win Britain’s friendship.”79

j. Zero Hour in Europe

Although Henderson discounted some of these protestations of friendship for Britain, he promptly informed the Foreign Office of the contents of Hitler’s note. A few hours later he received a reply which expressed the view that it was unreasonable to expect that His Majesty’s Government could produce a Polish plenipotentiary in Berlin within twenty-four hours. Moreover, it would be more in accord with usual diplomatic practice for the German Government to send to Warsaw, through the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, an outline of the proposals to be discussed by the Polish plenipotentiary and the German Foreign Office.80

It is significant that although the British Foreign Office opposed the hurried dispatch of a Polish emissary to Berlin to discuss German proposals for a settlement of existing differences, the French Ambassador in Berlin held quite a different viewpoint. He thought that the “Polish Government should agree to appoint a plenipotentiary since, after all, the German Chancellor accedes to the suggestion made to him by Britain and France for direct contact between Berlin and Warsaw.”

This plenipotentiary should be M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin.81

In the meantime, Nevile Henderson waited daring the afternoon and evening of August 30 for some further communication from the German Foreign Office. In the note that Hitler had handed to him on August 29 it had been stated that the Foreign Office would immediately draw up proposals which, “if possible,” would be “placed at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.” It soon became apparent to Henderson that Ribbentrop would not find it “possible” to send these proposals to the British Embassy, so he tried to stave off war by imploring the Polish Ambassador in Berlin “to urge his Government to nominate without delay someone to represent them in the proposed negotiations.”82

But Poland refused to be moved by this pressure, so at midnight (August 30) Henderson called at the German Foreign Office to discuss the situation with von Ribbentrop. When he suggested that the Polish Ambassador be invited to the Foreign Office, von Ribbentrop indignantly replied that such a course would be “utterly unthinkable and intolerable.” Henderson noticed that the Foreign Minister appeared to be in a state of “great excitement” and kept “leaping from his chair and . . . asking if I had anything more to say.” Henderson insisted upon reading the entire British note and when he had concluded, Ribbentrop produced the promised German proposals which he “gabbled through . . . as fast as he could in a tone of the utmost annoyance. . . . When he had finished, I accordingly asked him to let me see it.” But the Foreign Minister “refused categorically, threw the document with a contemptuous gesture on the table and said that it was now out of date since no Polish Emissary had arrived in Berlin by midnight.”83

The German proposals were surprisingly moderate and some arrangement for preserving peace might have been concluded if a Polish plenipotentiary had arrived in Berlin on August 30. The proposals provided for the return of Danzig to the Reich, but the fate of the Corridor was to be decided by a plebiscite of its inhabitants. The “exact frontiers” of the Polish port of Gdynia were to be determined by discussions between Germany and Poland, and, if necessary, were to be delimited by an international committee of arbitration.84

Although Henderson returned to the Embassy feeling that the German Army would invade Polish territory at any moment, a new respite was gained through the intervention of Mussolini. On August 31, Count Ciano called Halifax on the telephone “to tell him that the Duce can intervene with Hitler only if he brings a fat prize: Danzig. Empty-handed he can do nothing. . . . After a while Halifax sends word that our proposal regarding Danzig cannot be adopted.” Ciano then had a hurried conference with the Duce who agreed to a new proposal which favored the calling of a five-power conference “with the object of reviewing clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which are the cause of the present disturbance in the life of Europe.” The British and French ambassadors welcomed this proposal with enthusiasm, and in his telephone conversation with Halifax, Ciano insisted upon a “quick answer.” But the day passed without any word from the British Foreign Minister and at 8:20 P.M. the telephone central office informed Ciano that “London has cut its communications with Italy.”85

While this attempt of Mussolini to preserve peace was breaking down, the French Ambassador in Berlin went to the Polish Ambassador (M. Lipski) and entreated him to get in touch with Ribbentrop. Lipski was impressed with this advice and telephoned to Warsaw for instructions. At 2:00 he received instructions that the Polish Foreign Office favored “the establishment of contact” with the German Government.86 After a telephone conversation with the German State Secretary of the Foreign Office (Weizsäcker), a conference between Lipski and Ribbentrop was arranged for 6:30. When Lipski called at the Foreign Office, Ribbentrop immediately inquired if he had “special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations.” When Lipski answered in the negative, Ribbentrop seemed taken aback and closed the conference with the remark that he would inform the Führer of the situation.87

According to his instructions from the Polish Foreign Office, Lipski was merely to “establish contact and to discuss where and how negotiations could be opened.”88 It should have been apparent to the Polish Foreign Minister that the tides of war were moving too rapidly to be stopped by a mere point of contact in Berlin and an inquiry concerning future negotiations. Colonel Beck missed the bus to Berlin and Poland paid in terms of a fourth partition.

While the Polish Foreign Office still expected to discuss proposals for the settlement of differences between Germany and Poland, the Polish War Office pushed its plans for general mobilization. When Hitler heard of these plans he decided to strike early on the morning of September 1. As a background for this military advance an official German communiqué was issued at 9:00 P.M. on August 31. After referring to the failure of Poland to send to Berlin by the evening of August 30 a plenipotentiary invested with the authority to engage in direct conversations, the communique stated that instead of talking terms of peace, Poland had speeded preparations for war. Such preparations had forced Germany to strike in self-defense.89

In the early morning of September 1, German troops crossed the Polish frontier at several points and German planes began to bomb Polish airdromes and lines of communications. At 10:30, on the same morning, Hitler addressed the Reichstag. During the preceding night Polish soldiers had “fired the first shots” across the German frontier. Bullets were now being answered with bullets, bombs with bombs. This crisis would make it necessary for the Führer once more to “put on that uniform which was always so sacred and dear to me. I shall not take it off until after the victory—or I shall not live to see the end.”90 After he had completed this address, he sat for several minutes “with bowed head.” It had been noticeable that his delivery “did not have quite the customary fire and vehemence, and the speech sounded less cohesive and well prepared.”91

In summing up responsibility for the September outbreak, Ulrich von Hassell made the following entry in his diary:

My final conclusions about the week’s events up to September 1 are as follows: Hitler and Ribbentrop wanted war with Poland and knowingly took the risk of war with the Western Powers, deluding themselves to varying degrees up to the very last with the belief that the West would remain neutral after all. The Poles, for their part, with Polish conceit and Slavic aimlessness, confident of English and French support, had missed every remaining chance of avoiding war. The government in London, whose ambassador did everything to keep the peace, gave up the race in the very last days and adopted a kind of devil-may-care attitude. France went through the same stages, only with much more hesitation. Mussolini did all in his power to avoid war. His mediation proposal of September 2 offered no more hope of success because England no longer could or would back down. The attitude of France on this day is not quite clear.92

In taking the momentous step of September 1, Hitler apparently believed that his military preparations would command success. It is estimated that he had spent some forty billion dollars on armaments, excluding the weapons he had seized in Austria and Czechoslovakia. The German military machine had a minimum of 160 divisions of which at least 100 were fully equipped with modern weapons. Several of these divisions were armored. Hitler could also count upon at least 1,000 aircraft assigned to tactical units. But this air force was too weak to blast Britain into submission, and the German Navy was not strong enough to insure a landing of sufficient German troops to conquer the poorly prepared British Isles. Without a chance of defeating Britain, “let alone the British Empire, Germany could not win the war; at best a stalemate would have ensued which, however, would have made it impossible for Hitler to attain his more distant, major objectives.”93

k. Roosevelt Makes an Appeal for Civilian Populations

On September 1, President Roosevelt issued an appeal to Britain, France, Germany, and Poland to refrain from bombing civilian populations in unfortified cities. Unless such a procedure were followed, thousands of innocent human beings “who have no responsibility for the hostilities which have broken out will lose their lives.”94 Hitler immediately replied that he “unconditionally endorsed” the President’s plea, and this action was followed by Poland on the same day.95 On September 2 the British and French governments issued a declaration stating that they were “entirely in sympathy with the humanitarian sentiments” which inspired the President’s appeal.96

l. Last-Minute Attempts at Mediation

Pope Pius XII was not satisfied with merely softening the asperities of war. It was far more important to prevent the outbreak of World War II. On August 31 he sent an urgent appeal to Germany and Poland to do “everything within their power to avoid any incident and to abstain from taking any measure likely to aggravate the existing tension.”97

The powers paid little attention to this Papal plea but a suggestion from Count Ciano for a conference attracted more attention. After Hitler had indicated to the Italian Foreign Minister that he would not “reject the proposal completely,” Ciano called Bonnet and Halifax on the telephone and once more proposed a conference to discuss the bases of a possible settlement of the existing emergency. Bonnet welcomed the suggestion, but Halifax, after a Cabinet meeting, stated that the proposal could be accepted only if Germany would first agree to evacuate the Polish territory they had invaded. This was an impossible condition; for a second time Britain defeated Italian attempts to find some formula of peace.98

In Berlin, Nevile Henderson was deeply dejected. During a conversation with the American chargé d’affaires he remarked that “if the Polish Government had agreed to direct negotiations and had appointed a plenipotentiary, precipitate action by Germany might have been prevented or at least delayed. The statement made by the Polish Ambassador to Ribbentrop was not. . . sufficiently comprehensive.”99

In Paris, on the morning of September 2, the Polish Ambassador called on Foreign Minister Bonnet and insisted that the “French alliance with Poland obliged France to give immediate and automatic military assistance to Poland.” Bonnet replied that no ultimatum could be sent to Germany until after the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on that afternoon. The German Government would then have forty-eight hours in which to reply. The Polish Ambassador became so excited at this remark that he rushed to Daladier to complain of the seeming indifference of the Foreign Office to the treaty engagements of France. He stated that the British Government was “intensely disturbed by the delays of the French Government.” Daladier quickly caught this infection of excitement and burst out: “It is clear that in spite of all reverence for warnings, that box (meaning the Quai d’Orsay) has not yet learned its duty.” He assured the Polish Ambassador that he “would send for Bonnet at once and would take the direction of foreign affairs into his own hands.”100

He found this easier to say than do. Bonnet remained as Foreign Minister and he continued to plague the Polish Ambassador. On the afternoon of September 2, after the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, the ambassador called at the Foreign Office and inquired if “the French Government intended to order the French Ambassador in Berlin to demand an immediate reply to his demarche of yesterday.” Bonnet blandly replied that this question would be discussed at a Cabinet meeting which might be held that evening or on September 3. After this meeting “an ultimatum of 48 hours probably would be sent to Germany.” Bonnet’s unruffled manner once more caused the Polish Ambassador to lose his temper and he demanded the issuance of “an immediate ultimatum to Germany.” As a result of this pressure, it was decided to “propose to the British Government that the British and French Ambassadors in Berlin should be instructed tonight to call at the German Foreign Office tomorrow morning and state that they could not wait longer than seven o’clock tomorrow evening for a reply to their démarches of yesterday.”101

At 9:00 on the morning of September 3, Nevile Henderson paid a visit to the German Foreign Office and delivered an ultimatum to the effect that unless assurances were given before 11:oo of the suspension of hostilities and the withdrawal of German troops from Poland, Great Britain would be at war with the Reich from that hour.102 When Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, translated this ultimatum to the Führer and to Ribbentrop, there was

complete silence. Hitler sat immobile, gazing before him. He was not at a loss, as was afterwards stated, nor did he rage as others allege. He sat completely silent and unmoving. After an interval . . . he turned to Ribbentrop: “. . . What now?” asked Hitler with a savage look, as though implying that his Foreign Minister had misled him about England’s probable reaction. Ribbentrop answered quietly: “I assume that the French will hand in a similar ultimatum within the hour.” As my duty was now performed, I withdrew. To those in the anteroom pressing around me I said: “The English have just handed us an ultimatum. In two hours a state of war will exist between England and Germany.” . . . Goering turned to me and said: “If we lose this war, then God have mercy on us.” Goebbels stood in a corner, downcast and self-absorbed. Everywhere in the room I saw looks of grave concern.103

At 12:00 the French Ambassador presented the expected ultimatum with a time limit fixed at 5:00. For a second time in the twentieth century diplomacy had failed to avert a world war. The old myth of successful Anglo-French diplomatic formulas faded before the lurid realities of a world conflict that would reduce both Britain and France to second-rate powers.

In London, Lord Halifax confided to Ambassador Kennedy that the outbreak of war

reminded him of a dream he once had in which he was being tried for murder. When he was finally convicted and found guilty he was surprised what a feeling of relief came over him. It was very much the same now; he had planned in all ways to keep away a World War and had worked himself into a sad state of health and now that he had failed he found himself freshened up for the new struggle. . . .

It became more and more apparent to one as Halifax talked . . . that what Britain depends on more than anything else to end the war before the world collapses, is the internal collapse inside of Germany. They had definite confidence in their secret service reports that the oil and gasoline supply is definitely not over four months and that there is a definite feeling in Germany against war and if it got too tough economically, Hitler would be out.104

The reports of British intelligence experts were as inaccurate in military matters as they were with reference to gas and oil supplies in the Reich. General Ironside informed the British Cabinet, on the basis of a series of reports, that German strategy was based upon a quick campaign. Some of the terrain leading into Polish territory was quite rugged. If the Poles made it “tough” for the invading Germans “so that it required a couple of months to make any headway,” Hitler’s “hordes would have great difficulty in retreating or advancing.”105

The American military attache in Berlin was equally optimistic with regard to checking the progress of the German military machine. The Poles were following a preconceived plan that envisaged “delaying the German advance with covering forces and stubbornly holding fortified areas. . . . They are making the Germans pay dearly for every kilometer gained and are exhausting the best German divisions.” The Polish defense was “being carried out as planned by the Poles and the French and British missions, and appears to be succeeding.”106

These dispatches from Berlin read like chapters from Alice in Wonderland, and in 1939 it appeared as though Neville Chamberlain was assuming the role of the Mad Hatter when he could not send even token assistance to the hard-pressed Poles. Nowadays it seems evident that the real Mad Hatter was Franklin D. Roosevelt who pressed Chamberlain to give promises to the Poles when there was no possibility of fulfilling them. According to some reports, it was William C. Bullitt who cast Roosevelt in this grotesque role.

I recently received from Mr. Verne Marshall, former editor of the Cedar Rapids Gazette, a letter in which he made the following significant statements:

President Roosevelt wrote a note to William Bullitt [in the summer of 1939], then Ambassador to France, directing him to advise the French Government that if, in the event of a Nazi attack upon Poland, France and England did not go to Poland’s aid, those countries could expect no help from America if a general war developed. On the other hand, if France and England immediately declared war on Germany [in the event of a Nazi attack upon Poland], they could expect “all aid” from the United States.

F.D.R.’s instructions to Bullitt were to send this word along to “Joe” and “Tony,” meaning Ambassadors Kennedy, in London, and Biddle, in Warsaw, respectively. F.D.R. wanted Daladier, Chamberlain and Josef Beck to know of these instructions to Bullitt. Bullitt merely sent his note from F.D.R. to Kennedy in the diplomatic pouch from Paris. Kennedy followed Bullitt’s idea and forwarded it to Biddle. When the Nazis grabbed Warsaw and Beck disappeared, they must have come into possession of the F.D.R. note. The man who wrote the report I sent you, saw it in Berlin in October, 1939.107

After receiving this letter from Mr. Marshall I wrote at once to Mr. Bullitt and inquired about this alleged instruction from the President. He replied as follows: “I have no memory of any instruction from President Roosevelt of the nature quoted in your letter to me and feel quite certain that no such instruction was ever sent to me by the President.”108

Mr. Joseph Kennedy sent to me a similar negative answer with reference to this alleged instruction from the President, but the Forrestal Diaries would indicate that Bullitt did strongly urge President Roosevelt to exert pressure upon Prime Minister Chamberlain and that Roosevelt responded to this pressure. The following excerpt has far-reaching implications:

27 December 1945: Played golf today with Joe Kennedy (Joseph P. Kennedy, who was Roosevelt’s Ambassador to Great Britain in the years immediately before the war). I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain’s position in

1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy’s view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt’s (William C. Bullitt, then Ambassador to France) urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn’t fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain’s backside. Kennedy’s response always was that putting iron up his backside did no good unless the British had some iron with which to fight, and they did not. . . .

What Kennedy told me in this conversation jibes substantially with the remarks Clarence Dillon had made to me already, to the general effect that Roosevelt had asked him in some manner to communicate privately with the British to the end that Chamberlain should have greater firmness in his dealings with Germany. Dillon told me that at Roosevelt’s request he had talked with Lord Lothian in the same general sense as Kennedy reported Roosevelt having urged him to do with Chamberlain. Lothian presumably was to communicate to Chamberlain the gist of his conversation with Dillon.

Looking backward there is undoubtedly foundation for Kennedy’s belief that Hitler’s attack could have been deflected to Russia.109

Mr. Kennedy is known to have a good memory and it is highly improbable that his statements to Secretary Forrestal were entirely untrustworthy. Ambassador Bullitt was doing a lot of talking in 1939 and he was regarded as the mouthpiece of the President. In January 1939 he had a long conversation with Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, and left him with the impression that “he [Bullitt] had received from President Roosevelt a very detailed definition of the attitude taken by the United States towards the present European crisis. He will present this material at the Quai d’Orsay. . . . The contents of these directions . . . were: (1) The vitalizing foreign policy, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries; . . . (2) it is the decided opinion of the President that France and Britain must put [an] end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries.”110

In February 1939, Bullitt had a conversation with Jules Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador in Paris, and once again he seemed to speak with authority. He confided to Lukasiewicz that Washington official circles were greatly concerned about the outbreak of war in Europe. If Britain and France were defeated, Germany “would become dangerous to the realistic interests of the United States on the American continent. For this reason, one can foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain. . . . One thing . . . seems certain to me, namely, that the policy of President Roosevelt will henceforth take the course of supporting France’s resistance . . . and to weaken British compromise tendencies.”111

These excerpts from the dispatches of the Polish ambassadors in Washington and in Paris afford a clear indication of the fact that President Roosevelt, through Bullitt, was exerting steady pressure upon Britain and France to stand up boldly to Nazi Germany. When this policy led to a war in which Nazi armed forces easily crushed French resistance, it is easy now to understand the poignancy of Premier Reynaud’s pleas to Roosevelt for prompt assistance. He and Daladier had taken the assurances of Bullitt seriously and the hysterical tone of Reynaud’s repeated wires to the White House indicates a feeling of betrayal. From the battered walls of Warsaw there were loud murmurs about broken British promises. When their muted echoes reached London, Neville Chamberlain must have remembered the constant “needling from Washington” in favor of a more resolute stand against Hitler, and Joseph Kennedy must have had reluctant recollections of the many occasions when the President “kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain’s backside.” Germany had been baited into a war with Britain and France when she would have preferred a conflict with Russia over the Ukraine. Chamberlain got plenty of iron up his backside, but it was Nazi hot metal that seared him and all Britain and helped to break into bits a proud empire that all the King’s horses and all the King’s men can never put together again.

• 1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
• 2February 10, 1904.
• 3February 10, 1904.
• 4February 11, 1904.
• 5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
• 6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
• 7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
• 8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
• 9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
• 10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
• 11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
• 12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
• 13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
• 14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
• 15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
• 16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
• 17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
• 18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
• 19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
• 20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
• 21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
• 22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
• 23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
• 24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
• 25Ibid., p. 69.
• 26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
• 27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
• 28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
• 29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
• 30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
• 31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
• 32Ibid., p. 319.
• 33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
• 34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
• 35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
• 36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
• 37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
• 38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
• 39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
• 40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
• 41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
• 42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
• 43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
• 44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
• 45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
• 46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
• 47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
• 48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
• 49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
• 50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
• 51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
• 52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
• 53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
• 54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
• 55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
• 56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
• 57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
• 58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
• 59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
• 60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
• 61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
• 62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
• 63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
• 64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
• 65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
• 66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
• 67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
• 68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
• 69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
• 70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
• 71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
• 72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
• 73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
• 74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
• 75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
• 76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
• 77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
• 78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
• 79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
• 80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
• 81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
• 82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
• 83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
• 84Ibid., p. 5.
• 85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
• 86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
• 87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
• 88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
• 89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
• 90Ibid., p. 5.
• 91Ibid., pp. 6-7.
• 92Ibid., p. 9.
• 93Ibid., pp. 10-11.
• 94Ibid., p. ix.
• 95Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. III, 4389.
• 96January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
• 97January 9, 1927.
• 98January 25, 1927.
• 99March 17, 1927.
• 100January 21, 26, 1927.
• 101January 23, 28, 30; February 3, 5, 9, 1927.
• 102March 22, 1927.
• 103January 25, 1927.
• 104Consul John K. Davis to Secretary Kellogg, Nanking, March 28, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1927, II, 151-63.
• 105MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 151.
• 106Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 164.
• 107British Ambassador (Howard) to Secretary Kellogg, April 5, 1927. Ibid., pp. 179-81.
• 108Memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 6, 1927. Ibid., pp. 182-83.
• 109Consul General at Hankow (Lockhart) to Eugene Ch’en, April 11, 1927. Ibid., pp. 189-90. These demands included the following items: (1) adequate punishment of commanders of the troops responsible for the murders, personal injuries, and indignities and the material damage done as also of all persons found to be implicated; (2) apology in writing by the Commander in Chief of the Nationalist Army including an express written undertaking to refrain from all forms of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property; (3) complete reparation for the personal injuries and material damage done.
• 110Memorandum by the Secretary or State, April 20, 1927. Ibid., 204-5.
• 111MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, April 23, 1927. Ibid., pp. 209-10.