XXI: Japan Proposes a Joint Search for World Peace but Hull Declines

XXI Japan Proposes a Joint Search for World Peace but Hull Declines

a. Germany Views with Evident Dissatisfaction the Outbreak of War between China and Japan

THE OUTBREAK of war between China and Japan aroused the deep concern of all the Western powers that had financial interests in the Far East. Even Germany, whose sphere of influence in Shantung Province had been lost as a result of the World War, took an active interest in the undeclared war in China. In an instruction to various German diplomatic missions, the Foreign Office stressed the fact that a policy of “strict neutrality” would be followed. An early peaceful settlement of the difficulties was strongly desired for the sake of German “economic interests in the Far East and in view of our anti-Comintern policy. A military showdown between China and Japan would benefit the Soviet Government which has an interest in engaging Japan elsewhere and weakening her by military operations.”1

The German Ambassador in Rome reported that the official Italian point of view on the Far Eastern conflict was identical with that of the German Foreign Office. The main question in Rome was with reference to the retention of the Italian military mission in China.2 Germany also had a military mission in China together with expanding economic interests. Oskar Trautmann, the German Ambassador in Nanking, was strongly pro-Chinese and he deeply regretted the adverse impact of the outbreak of war upon German commercial aspirations. He believed that Chiang Kai-shek was determined to have a “military showdown” with the Japanese, and he regarded the outlook for China as “not at all unfavorable.” It was essential that German military leaders like Marshal von Blomberg should realize that a Japanese victory was by no means “certain.”3

Under pressure from Japan, Germany stopped the shipment of arms to China, but she hesitated about recalling the German military mission from Nanking.4 The Foreign Office also informed Japan that it would be useless to ask for an invocation of the anti-Comintern Pact against China “since the Pact does not have for its object the combating of Bolshevism on the territory of a third State.”5 The Foreign Office then sent a long instruction to the Embassy in Tokyo. Regret was expressed at the outbreak of a war that would “prevent the consolidation of China” and thereby “further the spread of Communism in China.” Moreover, it was feared that such a conflict might “drive the Chinese into the arms of Russia.” It would be unwise at this time to recall the German military mission from Nanking. Their places would probably be filled with Russian advisers, and this might lead to an “undesirable result for the Japanese.”6

On July 28 the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin paid a visit to the Foreign Office to file a complaint that “Japan felt the lack of a complete understanding of the anti-Communist achievement inherent in the Japanese action against China.” He thought that the German Government should understand the fact that Japan was “performing an anti-Communistic task” that would benefit in an important way the Third Reich.7 As the ambassador grew more heated in his denunciation of communist activities in China, Weizsäcker tried the expedient of “laughing off” some of his vehement remarks. But this resort to humor made no impression upon the diplomat from Nippon who kept insisting that “behind the Nanking Government stands Communism,” and therefore it would be “in the interest of general peace not to encourage the Nanking Government.” This insistence finally led to the issuance of instructions to the German military mission in China “not to take part in military operations.”8

On July 31 the German Foreign Office sent pointed inquiries to its ambassadors in China and Japan with reference to the verity of Japanese reports that communist activity was behind the Peiping Incident. Trautmann, from Nanking, replied that the Japanese statements were mere propaganda “which no one in the Far East believes. On the other hand, I consider it quite possible that China is being driven by Japanese action into the arms of Soviet Russia.”9

From Tokyo, Ambassador Dirksen reported in a very different vein. Hirota had informed him that he had “unimpeachable evidence of intensified Communist activity in China on the part of the Chinese Communists as well as of the Comintern and the Soviet Government.”10 Some weeks later Dirksen indicated that there was growing resentment in Japan relative to the retention of the German military mission in Nanking.11 This fact was freely admitted by the chief of the Far Eastern Division of the German Foreign Office in a talk with the American chargé d’affaires. The anti-Comintern angle of the situation was also discussed by this Foreign Office official:

I [Prentiss Gilbert] may say that it appears rather evident here that Germany finds herself caught between her special relations with Japan under the anticommunist treaty and her interests in China. . . . Von Schmieden said that the Japanese were making a great propaganda effort out of Russian aid to China but that this effort was aimed chiefly at influencing Germany and that as far as he could ascertain Russian material assistance was, if it existed at all, extremely limited. . . . He said that the eventuality least to be desired was either a decisive Japanese or Chinese victory. Of the two a Japanese victory was more to be feared as he believed that Japan in such a case would act to eliminate Western interests from China and in general from the Far East. . . .

The Military Attaché informs me in regard to Germany’s maintenance in Nanking of a “Military Attaché’s office” said to comprise over one hundred officers who have been advising Chiang Kai-shek. . . . The Japanese Military Attaché here recently took up with the War Ministry the question of the withdrawal or at least the reduction in number of these officers. . . . The War Ministry declined on the ground that it would be dishonorable in view of the long and friendly relations which had existed between the Nanking office and Chiang Kai-shek.12

On August 28, Gilbert reported that he had learned that the acting head of the German Foreign Office had expressed himself “heatedly respecting Japanese action and policy.” He feared that “Japan’s entanglement in China . . . would be indefinitely protracted” and would therefore nullify “the value to Germany of the German-Japanese understanding respecting Russia which received a form of outward expression in the anti-Communist agreement.”13

But notwithstanding this hostility in some quarters of the German Foreign Office with reference to Japanese expansion in North China, the policy of the German Government towards Japan remained conciliatory. Taking advantage of these gestures of friendship, the Japanese Foreign Office, on September 22, requested the recall of Trautmann from Nanking. When von Neurath sharply replied to the Japanese Ambassador that Trautmann would “remain in Nanking,”14 Japan merely took this rebuff quietly. She was sure that she could use Germany to advance her interests and could afford to overlook occasional slights. In November 1937 she once more turned to the German Foreign Office and made use of it to launch a peace offensive. The terms of peace offered to China were regarded by Herr von Dirksen as “very moderate” and could be accepted by Nanking “without loss of face.”15 When these terms were made known to Chiang Kai-shek he remarked that the “Chinese Government would be swept out by the tide of public opinion” if it accepted them.16 The Generalissimo stated that he was ready to open peace negotiations on a more favorable basis, but he insisted that the whole transaction be kept secret.17 Hope for the success of these negotiations grew more slender after Japanese military successes in North China. Moreover, it now seemed to Hitler that Japan would be victorious in the struggle in China. He favored this result because he believed that “Communism existed to a menacing extent in China.” But in many circles in Germany there was a definite pro-Chinese slant. The Foreign Office, the Economics Ministry, and the War Office were reported to be “pro-Chinese together with a majority of German editors.” But Ribbentrop was definitely pro-Japanese and there were many other important Nazis who supported this viewpoint.18

Ribbentrop and his circle were counting upon a succession of Japanese victories in North China and their expectations were justified. As the Japanese armies continued their steady advance, the peace terms offered China became increasingly stiffer. In December when Madame Chiang Kai-shek read the new Japanese terms she was filled with “the deepest consternation.”19 They could not be considered for one moment. Finally, on January 16, 1938, the Japanese Foreign Office declared that its peace offensive had failed and that all negotiations were terminated.20 German mediation between China and Japan had been a total failure.

The German Foreign Office was now ready to adopt a more pro-Japanese attitude. The more important items in this program of conciliation were: (1) German recognition of Manchukuo; (2) the recall of German military advisers from China; (3) the discontinuance of the export to China of munitions of war.21 The long arguments and fervid pleas of Trautmann in Nanking had failed in the face of Hitler’s desire to make the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis a dominant force in world politics.

b. The Abortive Brussels Conference, November 3-24, 1937

While Germany was trying to effect through mediation some solution to the impasse in North China, the Brussels Conference was working along the same line. On October 5 the Far-East Advisory Committee suggested that the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty meet in conference to decide upon a policy that should be pursued relative to the conflict in China.22 Secretary Hull immediately took the cue and issued a statement that the government of the United States had been “forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty . . . and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.”23 The Japanese Foreign Office countered with a statement which blamed China for the incident leading to the outbreak of the undeclared war. The “subsequent development of the Japanese military action has been but the unavoidable consequence of the hostile operations of China.”24

On October 12, President Roosevelt announced that the American Government was willing to “attend a conference of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty,” and three days later Ambassador Grew endeavored to persuade the Japanese Foreign Minister (Hirota) to accept an invitation to this proposed conference. Hirota returned a polite negative. He believed that this meeting of the powers would “merely result in bolstering up China and in prolonging rather than shortening the warfare.”25

This negative Japanese attitude indicated the real futility of holding a conference dealing with Far Eastern problems, but Belgium was finally prevailed upon to stage the meeting at Brussels. The instructions to the American delegation pointed out that the purpose of the conference was to “study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict“ which prevailed in the Far East. Particular attention should be paid to “the rights and interests of the United States under the Nine Power Treaty.” Stress was placed upon the fact “that the first objective of the foreign policy of this country is national security.” The delegates should constantly keep in mind “that public opinion in the United States has expressed its emphatic determination that the United States keep out of war.”26

The caution that was evident in these instructions was probably induced by the knowledge that Japan was in no mood to respond to pressure. This fact was confirmed by a dispatch from Tokyo. Ambassador Grew warned Secretary Hull that in Japan “all classes of the people feel that the security and future existence of the nation are involved in the present situation and that there can be no turning back no matter what pressure be brought by other Powers.”27

Although the conference had no program for exerting pressure upon Japan, it did not hesitate to declare that the “Japanese concept of the issues and interests involved in the conflict under reference is utterly different from the concepts of most of the other nations and the governments of the world.” It was apparent that direct negotiations between China and Japan would not lead to “any solution which would give promise of peace between those two countries.” Therefore, inasmuch as the conflict in China was the concern of all nations interested in the preservation of world peace, it was the duty of the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact to consult with reference to finding a formula that would put an end to the conflict in China.28

Norman H. Davis, the head of the American delegation at Brussels, had taken such an active role since the conference convened that many rumors arose to the effect that the United States had been principally responsible for the calling of the conference and for the preparation of its agenda. On November 16 the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed to Ambassador Grew his deep concern that the Japanese public would regard the United States as the “real leader” in the work of the conference. Up to this time Japanese public opinion had regarded Britain as the country that had been “foremost in endeavoring to develop a solid front against Japan.” He would deplore any shift of this onus to America. “Good relations with the United States” was the cardinal point in his foreign policy and he was greatly concerned lest it might be endangered by the proceedings of the Brussels Conference.29

When Grew reported this conversation to the Department of State he was instructed by Secretary Hull to present supplementary information to Hirota. On November 18, Grew went to the Foreign Office and assured Hirota that the American Government had not taken the initiative in calling the Brussels Conference. He also read that portion of Hull’s instruction that referred to American efforts to maintain and develop good relations between Japan and the United States. At the conclusion of the instruction there was an expression of apprehension that the situation in the Far East might “injure those relations.”30

It was evident that the Department of State was unusually careful not to offend Japanese sensibilities. This was further indicated in the declaration adopted by the conference on November 24. This statement placed a strong accent upon certain basic principles: respect for the sovereignty of other nations; abstention from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; and a determination to refrain from seeking political or economic domination over them. After this introductory statement, the declaration then expressed the view that “whenever armed force is employed in disregard of these principles the whole structure of international relations . . . is disturbed.” After stating that force could not provide a “just and lasting solution” for disputes between nations, the declaration finally asserted that a satisfactory settlement of the war in the Far East could be achieved only through friendly consultation between the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact.31

This quiet and nonexplosive declaration indicated that the powers were not ready to apply any sanctions against Japan. It was merely a pious admonition that expressed a hope for Japanese restraint. There was no thought of compelling that restraint by collective action.

c. The Panay Incident

The Panay Incident was a direct result of the Japanese offensive against Nanking. In the latter part of November 1937 the Chinese Foreign Office was removed to Hankow and this necessitated a change of residence on the part of the representatives of foreign powers. Some Americans refused to leave Nanking, so the gunboat Panay was stationed at that city with orders to give them needed protection. On December 8, the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai urged the foreign consuls resident in the city to request their nationals to evacuate Nanking without delay. On the morning of the following day the officer in charge of the American Embassy sent from the Panay a radio reply advising the Japanese authorities of the names of eighteen Americans planning to remain in Nanking.

On December 10 the Japanese launched a sharp offensive against Nanking. As a measure of protection the position of the Panay was communicated to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai with a request “that he notify Japanese forces so that ship might not be endangered by their military activities.”32 As the Japanese increased their offensive on December 11, “shells began falling on the near shore not far up river from Panay.” The Panay delayed moving up the river “until shells were falling in the water ahead and on the opposite bank.” It dropped anchor twelve miles from Nanking and the officials still left in the American Embassy sent a naval radiogram asking the Department of State to make their position known to the Japanese since bombing planes were constantly in the air above the position of the Panay.33

On December 12, while flying a large American ensign and with two newly painted American flags on her top deck, the Panay was repeatedly bombed by Japanese planes. After severely damaging the gunboat, the planes then bombed three vessels of the Standard Oil Company, setting fire to two of them and causing the other to be beached. Two members of the crew of the Panay died from their wounds, while Lieutenant Commander Hughes and ten of the officers and crew were seriously injured.34

On the following morning, before any protest could be received from Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Hirota called at the Embassy. He said that the Japanese naval commander at Shanghai had accepted full responsibility for the incident, and then expressed the profound apologies of his government.35 At twelve-thirty on that day (December 13), the President handed to Secretary Hull a memorandum requesting him to inform the Japanese Ambassador, when he called at the Department of State, that the American Chief Executive was “deeply shocked and concerned by the news of indiscriminate bombing of American and other non-Chinese vessels on the Yangtse,” and that he expected “full expressions of regret and proffer of full compensation.”36

That evening Secretary Hull sent an instruction to Ambassador Grew which embodied the items in the President’s memorandum. He then stressed the importance of assurances that in the future “American nationals, interests and property in China” would not be “subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces.”37

At first Grew feared that the bombing of the Panay might “result in a breach of diplomatic relations and that Saito would be given his passports and that I would be recalled.” His apprehensions were relieved by Hirota’s apology, a promise of indemnity, and by the conciliatory actions of Japanese naval authorities.38 It was apparent that throughout Japan there was deep concern over the Panay Incident. By December 16, Grew was reporting to Secretary Hull that cash donations were pouring into the Embassy and into newspaper offices for eventual transmission to the Embassy.39

On December 18 the Division of Far Eastern Affairs prepared a memorandum which recited the fact that the Panay Incident had “not inflamed public opinion in the United States,” and that the “firm position adopted by this Government seems to have satisfied public opinion.”40 The way was open for a settlement of the incident. On December 24, Hirota sent the expected note containing a reference to the apology expressed in his previous communication of December 14. As to the future he stated that the strictest orders had been issued to the military and naval forces so as to prevent a recurrence of the Panay Incident.41 On the following day (Christmas), Secretary Hull sent an instruction to Grew accepting the explanations and promises of Hirota. When Grew presented this note, Hirota exclaimed: “I heartily thank your Government and you yourself for this decision. I am very, very happy.”42

The Panay Incident was formally closed by the acceptance of an indemnity of $2,214,007.36. The whole matter had been handled with admirable restraint by the officials of both countries. It is greatly to be regretted that this pacific spirit soon faded away.

d. The Mission of Admiral Ingersoll to London

The Panay Incident was not settled by the conciliatory letter of Foreign Minister Hirota (December 24). The attack on the American gunboat had deepened the distrust in the President’s mind that had been given explosive expression in the quarantine speech of October 5. In December he began to give earnest consideration to the matter of arranging a closer understanding with Great Britain with reference to the Far East. He was well aware of the fact that increasing tension in Europe kept the British Foreign Office from exerting strong pressure upon Japan. On December 15, Pertinax, in the Echo de Paris, gave a terse description of the situation:

The worst would be that Great Britain, under the pretext of supporting the United States and of gaining the United States for a permanent co-operation, should let herself go in a dangerous counter-stroke in the China Sea. In the condition of Europe today, British forces should not be withdrawn from the principal task, which consists of holding in check the two totalitarian states which are our neighbors. It is not by action in the Far East but by action in Europe that British prestige may be reestablished.

It was evident to most statesmen that Britain could exert pressure upon Japan only in close concert with the United States. In order to prepare the way for that concert, Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, kept hammering upon this theme in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. He insisted that the United States “should stand shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain in opposing Japanese depredations because injury to British interest in the Far East would automatically injure the interests of the United States.” Grew realized the danger that attended the proposed close concert with Britain, and feared that America would have to pay the price “of British ineptitudes, both of action and of statement, which have contributed their full measure toward the developing of the feeling of exacerbation now prevailing between Great Britain and Japan.” Moreover, he did not “altogether share” Craigie’s views “that a lowering of British prestige and influence in the Far East must necessarily injure American interests.” He thought that the American policy of moving along parallel rather than joint lines with Britain had been “sound and sane.”43

But President Roosevelt was now convinced that we should move closer to Britain, and with this thought in mind he decided to send Admiral R. E. Ingersoll to London to explore the situation. Ingersoll arrived in the British metropolis in January 1938. The “primary purpose” of his mission was

to investigate and to talk with the British Admiralty officials as to what we could do if the United States and England would find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific, to explore all the means, what means could be used, what arrangements it would be necessary to make in regard to command relationships, in regard to communicating with each other, of establishing liaison officers and preparing certain codes and ciphers, and so forth.

After extensive conversations with the officials in the War Plans Division of the British Admiralty it was arranged that there should be a “distribution of codes and ciphers.” There was no definite agreement based upon these conversations, but the exploration of the probability of Anglo-American joint action was significant. As Admiral Ingersoll frankly stated: “Everybody knew as indicated by this trip that I made to London in 1938, that sooner or later, we were all going to be involved in a war in the Pacific which would include the Dutch, the Chinese possibly, the Russians, the British, and ourselves, and we had to make preliminary arrangements to explore what could be done to arrange for a means of communicating with each other.”44

If “everybody” in the Roosevelt circle knew that “sooner or later” we would intervene in World War II, the pointed Roosevelt protestations in 1940 to the contrary would indicate how he became a master of mendacity.

e. Japan Establishes a Series of Puppet Governments in China

It was apparent to Japan after the undeclared war had extended several months that the Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek would continue to fight for an indefinite period. Therefore, it might be good strategy to set up a series of puppet governments that would be responsive to Japanese desires. On December 14, 1937, the “Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic” was proclaimed in Peiping. Several months later (March 28, 1938) the “Reformed Government of the Chinese Republic” was erected in Nanking. These rival puppet governments lasted until March 30, 1940, when the Provisional Government in Peiping disappeared and the “Reorganized National Government” was established at Nanking.45

In order to secure economic concessions from these puppet governments, Japan created the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company. Within the areas controlled by Japanese troops, the currency systems were revised and tariff schedules on Japanese manufactures were reduced. A Federal Reserve Bank was established and the puppet regime at Peiping decreed that its issues should be the only currency that could circulate within its jurisdiction.46 On May 31, Peiping officials announced that the North China tariff duties would be extended to Central China.47 The Open Door in China was fast becoming a mere phrase.

The British Foreign Office watched these Japanese moves with rapidly increasing concern because of their effect upon British trade with China. On February 14, Sir Alexander Cadogan sent to Mr. Hornbeck a memorandum containing the outline of a settlement of the situation in the Far East which Foreign Office officials regarded as “reasonable.” To impose this settlement upon Japan would require close Anglo-American concert. The governments of the two powers should inform Japan that their interests in the Far East were suffering serious damage through the failure of the Japanese Government “to observe the terms of Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty.” It should then be plainly stated that the two governments did not “intend to acquiesce in any further or continuing breach of the terms of the Treaty.” After these bold words, the note of the two governments should then deal with the question of Shanghai. It should be obvious that China could hardly “develop the effective and suitable Government contemplated in the Nine Power Treaty so long as Chinese authority is in any degree excluded from Shanghai. . . . The traditional aim of American and British policy . . . has been to encourage China to develop into a modern State. But this aim has been to a large extent frustrated by inability to break away from the older tradition of imposing tutelage and protecting foreign interests by armed force.” It was doubtful whether security could “be obtained for foreign interests by the old methods of foreign administered areas and foreign garrisons.” Moreover, China was becoming increasingly reluctant to “accept a situation in which one-half the population of their greatest city is withdrawn from Chinese control.” The best solution would probably be to ask Japan to surrender what other powers would also surrender. “The only alternative to maintaining the International Settlement by force is to surrender all foreign control and restore complete Chinese control.” The existing municipal administration of the Settlement should be “merged into a larger body which, while remaining a Chinese authority, would contain a foreign element with full representation of Japanese, British and other foreign interests.”48

After studying this far-reaching proposal of Cadogan for two months, Hornbeck replied in a letter that amounted to a flat rejection. He thought that Japan would in due time be brought to see the error of her ways through the pressure “of the moral indignation of other nations and her own economic difficulties.” There was also the possibility that the American Government might employ some form of economic reprisal against Japan in order to induce her to change her policy.49

Before the Department of State gave any serious thought to planning economic reprisals against Japan, Secretary Hull thought it expedient to reiterate the principles that guided his policy. In an address at the National Press Club (March 17, 1938), he threw a direct challenge in the face of Japan. America would not withdraw from the Far East because of Japanese pressure in that area:

To waive rights and to permit interests to lapse in the face of their actual or threatened violation—and thereby to abandon obligations—in any important area of the world, can serve only to encourage disregard of law and of the basic principles of international order, and thus contribute to the inevitable spread of international anarchy, throughout the world. For this country, as for any country, to act in such manner anywhere would be to invite disregard and violation of its rights and interests everywhere, by every nation so inclined, large or small.50

Some two months later (May 31), a vehement protest was sent to Tokyo against the continued exclusion of American businessmen from their places of business and missionaries from work in areas where hostilities had ceased and where Japanese nationals were busily plying their trades.51 When the Japanese Government failed to take any steps to remedy this situation, the American Chamber of Commerce and the American Community Committee sent a cablegram to Secretary Hull urging the Department of State to take a firm stand against Japanese practices.52 Secretary Hull responded with another pointed protest to Japan. After citing a list of Japanese discriminatory practices like currency manipulation, trade controls, tariff preferences, and monopolies that worked to the exclusion of foreign trade, Hull observed that these policies indicated a purpose “to establish in areas which have come under Japanese military occupation general preferences for, and superiority of, Japanese interests, an inevitable effect of which will be to frustrate the practical application of the principle of the Open Door.”53

f. The Far East after Munich

The Anglo-French capitulation at Munich gave the Japanese Government a signal to go ahead in the Far East without any apprehension of serious interference on the part of Britain or France. Even before Munich the British Government had abdicated as far as China was concerned. In the first week in September 1938, Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador at Tokyo, informed Grew that “owing to the crisis in Europe he had been directed by his Government to avoid a showdown with the Japanese Government at present and to carry on as best he could.”54

Knowing that Britain was helpless in the Far East, Japan prepared another military drive to conquer China. On October 12 a Japanese expeditionary force of 30,000 troops was landed near Hong Kong and began its advance upon Canton. In less than ten days (October 21), Canton fell before the invaders, and on October 26, Japanese troops entered Hankow. The government of Chiang Kai-shek had hurriedly evacuated Hankow and moved 800 miles up the Yangtze to Chungking. After this impressive military success, the Japanese Government issued a statement which proclaimed a new order in eastern Asia—the complete political, economic, and cultural co-ordination of China and Manchukuo with the Japanese system. The object of this new order was to “secure international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia.” Japan was confident “that other Powers will on their part correctly appreciate her aims and policy and adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in East Asia.”55

On the following day Secretary Hull showed that he did not correctly appreciate the aims of Japan in East Asia. In a statement to the press Hull remarked that the attitude of the American Government towards the situation in Asia was still governed “by the generally accepted principles of international law, by the provisions of treaties to which the United States and numerous countries—among them China and Japan—are parties, and by principles of fair dealing and fair play between and among nations.”56 The Japanese answer to Hull’s statement was given on November 18 with distinct overtones of defiance. It attempted to deny that there had been any real discrimination in Japanese-controlled China against the business interests of foreign nationals. Restrictions had been imposed for the purpose of preserving peace and order. Normal conditions would be restored as soon as circumstances would permit. It should be clearly understood, however, that “any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past would neither contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issue.”57

On December 19, Foreign Minister Arita once more referred to the new order in the Far East. In a statement to foreign correspondents in Tokyo he insisted that the formation of a Japanese-Manchurian-Chinese bloc was politically necessary as a measure of defense against communism and economically necessary because the rest of the world was erecting higher and higher tariff walls and resorting to other measures in the direction of economic self-sufficiency. In this new order the three countries would maintain their independence and individuality. Also the new regime would not aim at “excluding European and American economic activities from East Asia” although the “requirements of national defence and of economic security might make it necessary to impose certain restrictions on the activities of third powers.”58

This indirect way of denouncing the Nine-Power Treaty did not please Secretary Hull who replied that the “people and the Government of the United States could not assent to the establishment, at the instance of and for the special purposes of any third country, of a régime which would arbitrarily deprive them of the long established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment which are legally and justly theirs along with those of other nations.”59

g. Chiang Kai-shek Suggests Another Washington Conference

It was evident to most observers in the Far East that Japanese-American relations in the fall of 1938 had reached an impasse which might be difficult to break. To Chiang Kai-shek it seemed a golden opportunity for an invitation to another Washington Conference. On October 8 he sent an impassioned plea to President Roosevelt along this line. While the President’s notes to European nations had contributed greatly towards quieting the situation on that continent,

the resort to brutal force and slaughter still prevail in the Far East and world peace is still far from realization. I am confident that you, Mr. President, who have already done so much in the past for peace, surely will not ignore the problem of peace in the Far East. . . . It is said that, owing to heavy human losses and economic difficulties, Japan is beginning to realize that force solves no problem. More than once she has sought mediation for peace by Germany and Italy. But Mr. President, my people feel that they can only look to your Government for leadership in the active search for peace because we have complete faith that the kind of peace the American Government is inspired to sponsor will be a just peace.

Now that the European situation is settling down, may it not be possible for the American Government to initiate a move for the peace of the Far East by inviting all the Governments interested to attend a Conference, stipulating a general cessation of hostilities as a pre-condition and aiming at seeking a lasting settlement through calm and fair-minded deliberation?60

When Mr. Hornbeck, the adviser on Political Relations, was shown this plea from Chiang Kai-shek he prepared a memorandum for the guidance of Secretary Hull. He thought that the reply of the President to this communication should consist of “little more than a polite acknowledgment with an assurance of interest and attention.” He believed that an attempt to call a conference at this time with regard to the Far Eastern situation would produce far more of harm than it could possibly “produce of good. It is believed that the same would be true of any attempt which might be made by the American Government to say anything at this time on the subject of mediation in relation to that situation. It is believed, however, that it would be inadvisable and inexpedient to say either of those things to Chiang Kai-shek.” The reply should be “noncommittal.”

The reply drafted under this Hornbeck prescription was so cool and colorless that the President sent it back to Sumner Welles with the notation: “Can you make this message to Chiang Kai-shek a little more personal and a little warmer?” A new note from the President to Chiang was drafted and, on October 19, Hornbeck handed it to the ambassador from China. It indicated that the American Chief Executive was “giving close and sympathetic attention to the situation . . . and that he was observing every development with a desire so to act as to contribute . . . toward an alleviation of the distress, destruction and suffering which are inherent in and produced by the Chinese-Japanese hostilities.”61 The Chinese Ambassador accepted this brush-off with Oriental calm and the incident was closed. Subsequently, Chinese pressure upon the President would elicit a more prompt and satisfactory response.

h. The Economic Ties That Failed to Bind Japan Closely to the United States

American relations with China have given eloquent disproof of the theory of economic determinism. Despite the fact that American investments in Japan and American trade with that country have been many times larger than our economic interests in China, American policy towards China has been distinctly more friendly that it has been towards Japan. In 1938 it was estimated that our investments in China (exclusive of mission property) were approximately $132,000,000, as compared with $387,000,000 in Japan.62 Our trade with Japan was considerably greater than that with China:

	U.S. Exports to China	U.S. Exports to Japan	U.S. Exports to Russia	U.S. Exports to all South America
1928	$137,661,000	$288,158,000
1930	89,600,000	164,700,000
1932	56,200,000	134,500,000
1934	68,667,000	210,000,000	$15,011,000
1936	46,819,000	204,348,000	33,427,000	$204,222,000
1937	49,697,000	288,378,000	42,903,000	318,384,000

These statistics give a significant picture of our rapidly growing trade with Japan and our relatively small trade with China.63 The China market had always been a disappointing one and continued so down to the outbreak of World War II. But the dream of 450,000,000 Chinese customers clamoring for American goods kept haunting millions of Americans who conveniently forgot that China had little to exchange for the products of this country.

The importance of Japan as America’s thin customer is well described by John W. Masland:

Between 1931 and 1941 the outstanding fact is the number one position held by Japan both as buyer and seller. Between 1931 and 1940, inclusive, American exports to Japan averaged 48% of total exports to the Far East, and imports from Japan averaged 21 per cent of total imports to us. During this period Japan was America’s third best foreign customer, outranked only by Great Britain and Canada, and we were her best customer. . . . American-Japanese trade, moreover, was mutually profitable and satisfactory, based upon an exchange of goods and commodities required by each but unavailable at home. . . . Among a large proportion of American exporting and importing firms doing business with all or several of the Far Eastern countries, Japan was the best customer or the chief source of supply, whichever the case. . . . American business men were usually well pleased by their contacts with Japan. They found that the Japanese were prompt in meeting their obligations and that Japanese goods kept up to quality standards.64

It should also be kept in mind that Japanese domination over a large portion of China and her exchange controls and other devices that deeply worried Secretary Hull did not seriously affect American trade with China. Indeed, quite the reverse. American exports to China in 1939 were $55,614,000 as compared with $46,819,000 in 1936, and this export trade in 1940 was $77,590,000 as compared with $49,697,000 in 1937. These welcome returns from trade caused commercial groups to look “with considerable disfavor upon the use of embargoes and other strong measures against Japan. . . . It was not until 1941, as the war crisis approached, that trading groups accepted drastic economic pressures.”65

But commercial pressure groups had little influence in the shaping of American policy in the Far East. A far more vocal and influential pressure group was composed of missionaries to China and their ardent supporters in the United States. In 1937 there were fifty societies and boards in the United States interested in Chinese missions. There was a $50,000,000 investment in these missions with an annual outlay of $4,000,000. In China there were some 2500 Protestant missionaries. The cause of these missions was ardently espoused by such organizations as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., the Associated Board of Christian Colleges in China (13 of them), and by groups representing twenty-seven colleges and universities in the United States.

Propaganda in favor of China was spread through the numerous contacts between the administrative officials of these missionary boards and societies, and officials in the Federal Government. Dr. A. L. Warnshuis, of the Foreign Missions Conference, was particularly active and successful in influencing the minds of many government officials. Propaganda was also circulated by letters from missionaries in China and from mission boards to churches and foundations. Some of these letters which were bitterly critical of Japan were distributed in America in very large numbers.

This American missionary propaganda in favor of China had a very important influence in molding the American mind against Japan. It also prepared a climate of opinion favorable to embargoes and trade restrictions that would seriously affect Japanese-American commerce.

It was significant that one of the important pressure groups that called for economic reprisals against Japan was the Committee on Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression with Henry L. Stimson as the chairman.66 Stimson had pressed Japan to the wall at Geneva in 1933 and as a member of the Roosevelt Cabinet in 1940-1941 was strongly inclined towards war with Japan. He welcomed the moral imperatives of the missionaries in their criticisms of Japan, and they hardly realized that he was a real war hawk whose shrill cries for economic restrictions would become a summons to war.

i. Secretary Hull Rejects a British Suggestion for Exerting Economic Pressure upon Japan

In the early months of 1939 there was increasing pressure upon Secretary Hull in favor of economic reprisals against Japan. On December 31, 1938, the British Ambassador in Tokyo submitted to Ambassador Grew a long memorandum which outlined in detail an economic offensive against the Japanese Empire. First of all, emphasis was placed upon Japanese needs for certain essential raw materials—mineral oil, ores and metals, cotton, wool, rubber, wood pulp, and heavy chemicals. The principal sources for these materials were the United States and the British Empire. In order to create exchange for the purchase of these much-needed products, Japan could sell to foreign nationals merchandise, shipping services, and gold. But “her sales of all three . . . did not provide sufficient funds to pay for what she bought from abroad during the years of industrial and military and naval development previous to 1937. . . . Since the beginning of 1937 . . . Japan’s difficulties in finding funds to pay for her necessary imports from abroad have greatly increased. She has not been able to borrow money abroad since 1932 . . . and there is no likelihood of her being able to borrow abroad in the near future.” Her receipts from shipping services had been greatly reduced since July 1937, and her sales of merchandise had not brought in the hoped-for revenues. In the period from January to November 1938, she paid in foreign currencies for merchandise alone 2058 million yen and received from her “sales of merchandise in foreign currencies, 1636 million yen, so that her debit balance in foreign exchange was 422 million yen.” In order to offset the debit balances in foreign exchange of 961 million yen in 1937 and 422 million yen in January-

November 1938, Japan exported to the United States gold to the value of 876 million yen in 1937 and 670 million yen in 1938.

In view of these facts, it seemed apparent that if “there were to be imposed even a relatively small restriction on Japan’s exports of merchandise or gold and if credits and loans were simultaneously to be withheld, Japan’s economic situation would immediately become critical. If an embargo were to be placed on Japan’s exports to the British Empire, the United States and France (thus affecting 70% of her total foreign exchange producing trade), the effect would set in motion a process which must rapidly prove disastrous for Japan’s economy.”67

On January 7, 1939, Grew sent this memorandum to Secretary Hull with some observations of his own. He did not discount the impact of an embargo upon Japan which he was sure would at least reduce the standard of living in that country, but he stressed certain psychological factors that helped to balance this uncertain equation. The Japanese were

a hardy race, inured to personal and national sacrifice; they have been accustomed throughout their history to meeting catastrophe and disaster; in them the “do or die” spirit is more deeply ingrained than in almost any other people. . . . For Japan to admit defeat in the present hostilities after pouring out so much blood and treasure in China . . . is an hypothesis which we in this Embassy find it very difficult to entertain. To support if not to prove this thesis by quoting figures and statistics is simple enough, and it is on the basis of figures and statistics that my colleagues rest their opinions concerning the effectiveness of economic sanctions. I should add, parenthetically, that these colleagues had been confidently predicting for the past two years that the economic collapse of Japan was about to occur.68

On February 3, Mr. V. A. L. Mallet, the British chargé d’affaires, had a conversation with Mr. Welles concerning the views of Ambassador Craigie. After a brief exchange of views, Mr. Welles bluntly remarked that the American Government “would not consider for the time being undertaking retaliatory measures against Japan.” In the event that the Department of State wished to “consider the matter further,” it would “inform the British Government accordingly and discuss further with them some of the issues involved.”69

Within the Department of State there was a considerable amount of further discussion with reference to opening an economic offensive against Japan. On February 11, Mr. Hornbeck prepared a memorandum on the subject. Up to the turn of the twentieth century the Japanese were looked upon as “a comparatively amiable, artistic and art loving and peaceful people who needed to be taught and could be patronized.” But Japan’s character was “not what it was thought before 1895 to be,” and her “strength is not what it has been thought since 1905 to be.” Over and over since 1905 the world has, because of “fear of Japan, acquiesced in aggressive predatory activities on Japan’s part. . . . Step by step Japan has moved forward. . . . There are three methods by which . . . nations may offer resistance: by moral opposition, by economic opposition, and/or by military opposition.” For many years the United States had tried moral opposition to Japan’s unlawful progress, but it had not effectively protected American rights. Proposals had been made to try economic opposition but objections had been promptly made that the Japanese are a “militant and powerful people” who might retaliate “by an appeal to arms.” Thus, “moral opposition not sufficing and economic opposition being not even tried,” the prospect is that in the long run “the situation will so develop that military opposition by this country will have to be offered.”70

Herbert Feis, the adviser on International Economic Affairs, was not so military-minded as Mr. Hornbeck. He was impressed with some of the arguments presented by Sir Robert Craigie with reference to the effect upon Japan of increasing economic pressure exerted by Britain, France, and the United States. He was certain that this pressure would mean much more than a mere lowering of the standard of living in Japan. But he did “not wish the foregoing criticism of the economic analysis of the American Ambassador to be interpreted as an argument in favor of imposing sanctions on Japan.” After some criticisms of the Craigie memorandum relative to the exhaustion of Japan’s gold reserves, he discusses the effect of an embargo upon the sales of gold by the Japanese Government:

I am dubious of the conclusion that “the simplest and most effective first step would appear to be for Great Britain, the United States of America and France to refuse to purchase any further gold from Japan.” Since the United States holds so much of the world’s gold, it would not be to its interest to take action which would make it less desirable for other nations to hold gold as an emergency measure. Hence I do not believe that an embargo on gold exports from Japan should be undertaken unless extremely drastic measures are contemplated, and the embargo on gold is undertaken simultaneously with an embargo on exports of goods from Japan. Before such drastic action as this is undertaken it would appear to me more logical to try less extreme measures such as denunciation of our existing commercial treaty with Japan.71

In a memorandum on the feasibility of exerting strong economic pressure upon Japan, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs agreed with Mr. Feis that no action should be taken relative to refusing to buy Japanese gold. It also agreed with him that an embargo upon commerce with Japan, undertaken by Britain, France, and the United States, would “bring chaos to Japan’s economy and soon reduce drastically the effectiveness of her military forces.”72

When these memoranda were sent to Ambassador Grew he was not deeply impressed with them. He particularly disagreed with the memorandum prepared by Herbert Feis. It was entirely possible that the impact of economic sanctions might overthrow the existing capitalistic system in Japan, but Mr. Feis overlooked the fact that “a new economic system might be devised to meet a condition of extreme emergency.” It was also true that Mr. Feis did not go into the question “of the uses to which Japan could put new resources available in the occupied areas in China.” Attention should be called to the fact that Japan was “selfsufficient in the matter of food supplies.” It should also be remembered that for several years the Japanese Government had been building large reserves of “military raw materials.” This being true, it could not be said with authority that an embargo upon the commerce of Japan would seriously affect her military operations or her political program. The elements in power in Japan had “repeatedly declared their intention to evolve, if necessary, a new economic system which would enable Japan, notwithstanding the restrictions imposed in the matter of sanctions, to continue her present program in China.” The question whether the Japanese people would accept and support this new system “is a political and not an economic one.”73

Mr. Feis had the last word in this argument, which he answered by stating that it was not at all clear to him that “some type of socialism or fascism will enable the Japanese to acquire necessary raw materials or to avoid the drastic physical overhauling and rebuilding of their economy which would follow the application of sanctions. . . . No mere alteration of the social or political framework within which the Japanese economy operates would necessarily solve the basic economic problems that would follow from effective sanctions.”74

j. China Anticipates War in Europe and Asks Britain and France to Consult with Her with Regard to a Common Front against Japan

It is apparent that during the spring of 1939 there was a great deal of talk concerning economic sanctions against Japan. They could be effective, it was widely believed, if several of the great powers took concerted action. On April 4, the Chinese Ambassador (Wellington Koo) handed to M. Léger, Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (France), a memorandum containing proposals for action against Japan. It proposed, in view of the threat of war in Europe, that there should be “immediate practical consultation between the French, British and Chinese Governments for joint action in the Far East against Japanese aggression and offers to collaborate fully in the preparation of a plan [involving] military and economic measures.” Later, the “Soviet Union should be asked to join them, and the United States should be asked to take parallel action.” China should agree “to supply all the man-power including military effectives and materials at her disposal and the French and British Governments should send to the Far East all available air and naval forces for the joint prosecution of the war. . . . China, England and France should . . . apply jointly to Japan economic and financial sanctions.”75

The British Government answered this Chinese proposal by saying

that they would be unwilling to enter into any agreement now with the Chinese Government based on the hypothesis that if Great Britain should become involved in war in Europe, Japan would attempt to seize British possessions in the Far East. The British Government stated further that they had hopes that the presence of the American fleet in the Pacific might prevent a Japanese attack on British possessions in the Far East. In case Japan should attack British possessions in the Far East and in case no assistance from the United States should be forthcoming, the British Government had decided that they could bring no assistance to their possessions in the Far East until the successful conclusion of war in Europe.76

The French Government was not so immediate and so explicit in their answer to China. After waiting a considerable time the French Foreign Office replied that the Chinese proposal was “most interesting but that it seemed premature to give consideration at the present time to entering into any such agreement.” The chief of the Far Eastern Division of the French Foreign Office informed Ambassador Bullitt that he thought it would be “unwise to reply to the Chinese proposal by a categorical refusal” and thereby drive Chiang Kai-shek into Japanese arms. It would be expedient to “keep the Chinese ‘dangling.’ ”77

k. Japan Asks Secretary Hull for a Joint Japanese-American Effort to Find Some Formula of Peace for Europe

While Chinese statesmen were endeavoring to build up a tripartite front against Japanese attacks when World War II broke out in Europe, the Japanese Foreign Office was seeking feverishly for some formula that would preserve the peace of Europe. Japan did not relish her ties with Nazi Germany and she was profoundly worried about intimations that Hitler was seeking some accord with Stalin. Communism had long been recognized as a dire threat to the Japanese position in the Far East. Any understanding between Hitler and Stalin would help undermine Japanese security.

The German Foreign Office tried to divert suspicion from their overtures to Russia by warning the Japanese diplomats about the sinister moves of Britain in the direction of Moscow. On April 27, Lord Halifax told Ambassador Kennedy that he had just assured the Japanese Ambassador that “any talks they had with Russia did not presuppose any mixing up in the Japanese proceedings at all, and that the British were inclined to confine themselves wholly to the situation in Europe provided the Japanese behaved themselves reasonably well.”78

These crosscurrents in diplomacy led the Japanese Foreign Office to seek an intimate association with the United States in a search for a formula that would scatter the clouds of war that were gathering along the European horizon. It was evident that she could no longer trust any European associates.

The first move in the direction of a Japanese-American accord came on May 16 at a luncheon given in honor of Ambassador Grew “by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confidant of high officials at the Court.” At the conclusion of the luncheon, this Japanese host who enjoyed court favor, had a confidential conversation with Grew. He pointed out that strong pressure was being exerted by Germany and Italy and “by reactionary groups in Japan,” towards “entering into some arrangement . . . which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by Democratic nations.” The group to which the host belonged “had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the ’strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact.’ ” This same group was evidently in favor of a closer association with the United States. Grew responded to this overture by stating that it should be “obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States.”

On the following day (May 17), Grew attended another luncheon given in his honor by Foreign Minister Arita. Grew had instructed the American chargé d’affaires, Eugene H. Dooman, to sound out Arita on the conversation of the previous day. Dooman found out that Arita knew all about the talk between Grew and his important Japanese host. The conversation then passed on to the topic of Japan entering into a more comprehensive anti-Comintern pact with Germany and Italy. Arita remarked that while Japan was “very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe,” yet it could not ignore the fact that “Russia straddled Europe and Asia and that whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other.” He was glad, however, to give an assurance that the new proposed Anti-Comintern pact “would contain no military, political or economic clauses.”

These diplomatic conversations were resumed on May 23 when Mr. Dooman had dinner with Baron Hiranuma, the Prime Minister. Hiranuma confided to Dooman his “horror” over the possibility of a second world war which he feared would “result in the total destruction of civilization.” He believed that dreadful contingency might best be prevented by Japan acting as the middleman between the dictatorships and the democratic nations. In the Far East he had sought to stabilize the situation by following the course of “moral diplomacy.” The sphere of this line of policy could be widened. Japan, like the United States, “was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe, and it was his thought that these two nations . . . were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe.” Dooman answered this lead by stating that the principal difficulty “in the way of collaboration was. . . Japan’s policies and actions in China.” The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the fact that Americans assumed “that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of the country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China.” If Secretary Hull would insist that a “settlement of the China conflict” should be a condition precedent “to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe, . . . the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned.”79

The reply of Secretary Hull to these Japanese “feelers for peace” was cool and discouraging. It would be best for Japan to work for peace in Europe by exerting pressure upon the European governments with which it had “special relations.” If Japanese statesmen were anxious to “see a true world peace established and maintained,” it would be expedient for them to take effective action towards putting an end to existing hostilities in the Far East. In the meantime, the Department of State was “sincerely interested” in the proposed Japanese-American search for a formula for preserving European peace and would be glad to receive further communications in that regard.80

Dooman, in Tokyo, thought that this reply was a little unconciliatory, and delayed its presentation. During this interval the President decided to take some definite action against Japan. In this regard he was partly influenced by the advice of Stanley K. Hornbeck who had strongly advised that the Department of State adopt a more positive policy.81 He was also influenced by the fact that on July 18, Senator Vandenberg had introduced a resolution requesting the President to give the required notice to Japan of the termination of the treaty of 1911 in six months.82 On July 26, Secretary Hull sent a note to Ambassador Horinouchi informing him that the treaty of February 21, 1911, contained provisions which needed “new consideration.” Towards preparing the way for such consideration and with a view to a better “safeguarding and promoting [of] American interests,” the American Government decided to give a formal notice that the treaty of 1911 would terminate on January 26, 1940.83

As Frederick Moore aptly remarks, this note of July 26 sounded a definite note of casuistry. The American Government had hitherto “been pretty frank in its dealing with Japan. But this Note seemed to me to lack frankness. The Treaty was being abrogated because of Japanese actions in China for which the American Government could not obtain redress, and because of the widespread American demand upon the Government that we stop supplying the Japanese with war materials. Yet the Note gave as the reason that ‘changes may need to be made toward better serving the purposes for which such treaties are concluded.’ When the Japanese pointed this out to me I could only reply that in my opinion this was casuistry, that the Department could not fail to know that once the Treaty with Japan were terminated it could not possibly obtain ratification of another from the Senate in its present mood towards Japan. I was annoyed with the Department for resorting to what seemed diplomatic evasion. Had the Japanese done that, we would have put it down as another act of duplicity.”84

The termination of the treaty of 1911, together with the refusal of Secretary Hull to give any serious consideration to the Japanese proposal for a joint effort to discover some formula that would preserve the peace of Europe, was a clear indication to the Japanese Foreign Office that America was adopting a new policy in the Far East. It would be a more positive one with Japan feeling the brunt of the new pressure. In Tokyo the American chargé d’affaires (Dooman) felt this at once and he advised Secretary Hull that he was “strongly impressed by the primary significance which is generally attached in Japan to the fact that notice of termination of the commercial treaty was given by the United States without prior intimation as there would have been had the action been motivated in large part by economic considerations. The deduction that the motivating considerations were political in character is confirmed by noting American press and other popular reaction to the notice of termination.”85

Few Americans realized that through hostile press comments a climate of opinion was being created that was so hostile to Japan that a war psychosis would eventually develop. Hull’s casuistry in the note of July 26 helped to produce in Japan a feeling that America had begun to move down the road to war under the banner of mendacity. That banner came more and more to the front as the Roosevelt Administration moved towards the tragedy of Pearl Harbor.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941