XXIV: Roosevelt Adopts a More Positive Policy towards the War in Europe

XXIV Roosevelt Adopts a More Positive Policy towards the War in Europe

a. The President Promises Peace for the U.S.

IMMEDIATELY after the outbreak of World War II, President Roosevelt made a radio address in which he reminded the American people that they should master “at the outset a simple but unalterable fact in modern foreign relations. When peace has been broken anywhere, peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.” This theme of a “one world” he emphasized again and again: “Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought does affect the American future.” In order to relieve the apprehensions that millions of Americans must have felt as a result of this stress upon the one-world concept, he then glibly gave the following assurance: “Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields. At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American neutrality.” This assurance was followed by a reference to the “historic precedent that goes back to the days of the administration of President George Washington.” America would remain “a neutral nation.” But he closed his address with a curtain line that had an ominous implication: “As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no blackout of peace in the United States.”1

b. The Mission of William Rhodes Davis to Berlin

One way to prevent a blackout of peace in the United States was to bring the war in Europe to a close. This might be effected through American mediation. In the early part of September 1939, William Rhodes Davis, an independent oil operator of large wealth, decided to ask President Roosevelt to approve a mission to Berlin and Rome for the purpose of arranging American mediation. Davis was a close friend of John L. Lewis who had bought Roosevelt’s good will by a halfmillion dollar contribution to the campaign fund of 1936. Davis himself had made a modest contribution of $300,000 to the same fund.

Through his intimate connections with Dr. Hertslet, representing German banking and industrial interests, and with President Cárdenas of Mexico, Davis had arranged large sales of oil to Germany. Inasmuch as a European war would put an end to these sales, Davis was extremely anxious to promote peace. After the outbreak of the war he hurried to Washington where, with the assistance of John L. Lewis, he arranged for a conference with President Roosevelt. On September 15 a meeting was held in the White House with the President, “Steve” Early, John L. Lewis, Adolf Berle, Cordell Hull, and Mr. Davis in attendance. It was decided to send Davis to Rome and Berlin in order to see if there was any possibility of arranging terms for American mediation in the war that had just broken out.

After some difficulty at Bermuda which required State Department intervention to permit him to continue on his trip, Davis finally arrived in Berlin for some important conferences with General Göring. At the first conference he made the following statement to Göring.

It is my opinion that immediate settlement would return to Germany . . . Danzig, the Corridor and the former provinces in Poland which were taken away from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, and that the question of the colonies formerly owned by Germany, prior to 1914 . . . could be compromised. If Mr. Hitler would set forth a reasonable basis of settlement and the assistance of Mr. Roosevelt requested as mediator, he would give it serious consideration. The President, I am sure, believes that a new economic arrangement should be arrived at by the contesting nations which would provide each nation with raw materials, goods and commodities essential to maintain its economic integrity and well-being.

The Field Marshal replied: “These statements are very surprising as the impression in Germany is that Mr. Roosevelt’s feelings are now against Germany and that he is sympathetic to England and France.” . . . Regarding the question of peace, the Field Marshal stated: “Germany is and always has been ready to work for peace in Europe on sound equitable lines. The views . . . which you have conveyed to me correspond substantially to the views of Mr. Hitler and his Government. A world conference appears under the circumstances to be the only practical medium through which these mutual hopes for peace can be achieved. Germany will welcome the aid of Mr. Roosevelt in bringing about such a conference. . . . The fundamental and motivating purpose of such a conference must be to establish a new order in the world designed to secure an enduring peace. A pre-requisite to that aim is the complete liquidation of the Versailles system. . . . Germany is prepared to accept any method and to welcome any suggestion, consistent with its inalienable right as a nation to live on a basis of equality with other nations, which will guarantee enduring peace for itself and the smaller European nations.”

On October 3, Davis had another meeting with Goring who remarked:

You may assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish State and a new Czechoslovakian independent government would come into being. However, this information is for him alone and to be used by him only if necessary to bring about a peace conference. . . . As for myself and my Government, I would be glad to attend and in the event of such a conference I would represent Germany. I agree that the conference should be in Washington.

In conclusion, Goring informed Mr. Davis that Hitler would speak on October 6 and his remarks would, in spirit and content, “be of a nature which impartial analysis must accept as a basis for negotiation.”2

After these conferences with Mr. Davis, Göring talked with Chancellor Hitler concerning this proposed American mediation. The Chancellor apparently took the matter very seriously and on October 6 he made a speech which he thought would lay the basis for a world conference. He emphasized the importance of an early calling of a conference of the “leading nations” on the European continent. It should be held “before millions of men are . . . uselessly sent to their death and billions of dollars’ worth of property destroyed. The continuation of the present state of affairs in the West is unthinkable. Each day will soon demand increasing sacrifices.”

After this introduction Hitler indicated the bases of an enduring peace: (1) the foreign policies of European states should frankly recognize the liquidation of the Treaty of Versailles; Germany’s colonial possessions before 1914 should be returned to her; (2) there should be a reorganization of the international economic system which would include a new system of markets and a final settlement of currencies; (3) the most important item in a program for the abolition of future wars was “the establishment of an unconditionally guaranteed peace and of a sense of security on the part of individual nations. . . . An essential part of this necessary sense of security, however, is a clear definition of the legitimate use and application of certain modern armaments which can at any given moment strike straight at the heart of every nation and hence create a permanent sense of insecurity.”3

While Hitler was presenting to the world this sane and moderate program, Davis was flying back to Washington with a record of the conciliatory conversations with Göring. At this same time Roosevelt commenced his momentous correspondence with Winston Churchill.4 Its influence cannot be judged until it has been carefully read and all the implications given extended consideration. But at any rate, something did change Roosevelt’s mind in October 1939. When Mr. Davis returned to Washington he phoned to Miss LeHand and indicated his readiness to report to the President on his Berlin trip. After a brief pause she informed him that “the Chief” was “in conference” and could not be disturbed. When this conference continued indefinitely, Davis wrote a long letter to the President (October 11) and told him in detail of his conferences with Goring and the fact that Hitler’s address on October 6 had been conciliatory in tone and an indirect assurance that the Führer would support the idea of American mediation. He received no answer to this letter and there was no invitation to the White House. A mission that seemed so bright with promise had suddenly ended in a dismal failure. Did one of the famous “sealed letters” from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt cause a rejection of this Hitler “feeler” for American mediation? Did American foreign policy thereafter follow British suggestions?

c. The Barriers Preserving Neutrality Are Broken Down

Two days after Britain and France declared war against Germany, the President (September 5) issued two proclamations. The first closely followed the language of the neutrality proclamation issued by President Wilson after the outbreak of World War I. It emphasized the role America would play as a neutral, reminded American citizens of their duties under international law, and warned the belligerents against infringing upon American rights. The second proclamation implemented the Neutrality Act of 1937 and imposed an embargo upon the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerent powers.5

This embargo checked the shipment to Britain and France of some $79,000,000 worth of war materials for which export licenses had already been issued. Allied victory, as in World War I, depended upon an uninterrupted flow of munitions to British and French ports. Would the President be able to secure amendments to the Neutrality Law that would permit these shipments?

His first step in this direction was to issue on September 13 a summons to Congress to meet in special session on the twenty-first. When they met they listened to a Presidential message that was filled with inaccuracies designed to justify some radical changes in neutrality legislation. He contended that existing legislation altered the foreign policy of the nation in such a way as to impair peaceful relations with other nations. Our policy with respect to belligerent countries had, with one notable exception, been “based upon international law.” The exception had been the non-intercourse and embargo laws of the Napoleonic period and their effect upon the economy of the nation had been disastrous. These economic limitations had been the prelude to war. The Neutrality Act of 1935 had been another lamentable exception because some of its provisions had been “wholly inconsistent with ancient precepts of the law of nations.” He regarded the ban on arms shipments as “most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security and American peace.” In the proposed new legislation he wished provisions that would (1) forbid war .credits to belligerents; (2) prohibit travel by American citizens on belligerent vessels; (3) provide for a license system for the import and export of munitions of war; (4) restore the cash-and-carry provision which had expired on May 1; (5) authorize the exclusion of American shipping from combat areas.6

The President’s message aroused a tremendous debate in the press, over the radio, and in Congress. According to a poll conducted by the Christian Science Monitor, editorial opinion in the country was strongly in favor of the repeal of existing neutrality legislation.7 But letters and telegrams soon began to pour into the offices of senators and representatives in a veritable deluge. In these communications the ratio against repeal was reported to be five to one.8 Under the impact of this pressure a bill was reported on September 30 from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Its provisions reflected much isolationist sentiment: (1) when the President or Congress found a state of war existing between foreign countries, the President was required to name the belligerents and apply the act; (2) no United States vessel could lawfully carry passengers or goods to any port of the belligerent nations; (3) the cash-and-carry system was restored and made mandatory for all goods. They could be shipped only after the title and interest of American citizens had been extinguished; (4) a ban was placed upon the arming of merchant vessels of the United States; (5) the prohibition of travel by American citizens on belligerent ships was continued; (6) the President was authorized to forbid the entry of American ships into combat areas; (7) the President might bar the entry of foreign submarines or armed merchantmen into American ports; (8) belligerents were limited to ninety-day credit transactions with reference to the purchase of American goods.9

Before the debate in the Senate began on this proposed legislation, Senator Borah made a careful study of every aspect of neutrality legislation. As the outstanding member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, his viewpoint was of great importance. Since 1933 he had paid particular attention to the European picture with an emphasis upon Germany. In 1938 he expressed a strong desire to visit Germany and have a talk with Chancellor Hitler with reference to the plight of the Jews and many other topics connected with world peace. Through William K. Hutchinson, a prominent newspaperman, the German Government learned of Borah’s desire to visit the Third Reich. On November 28 the German Foreign Office sent an invitation to Borah to spend some time in Germany and have extended conferences with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Borah was anxious to accept this invitation but decided to place the matter before Secretary Hull. When Hull returned from the Pan-American Conference at Lima, our relations with Germany had grown more strained, and Borah realized that Hull would strenuously oppose any visit to Germany. The President was also hostile to such a move, so Borah finally postponed his trip indefinitely. The outbreak of war in September 1939 put an end to such dreams, but to the historian the incident has definite importance. In his conversations with William Rhodes Davis, Göring was distinctly conciliatory. The same conciliatory attitude towards Borah might have had significant consequences.10

While Borah was studying the situation after September 3, 1939, he began a correspondence with Professor Edwin M. Borchard, of Yale University. Borchard was an eminent professor of international law and was an able critic of the Roosevelt foreign policy. Borah had indicated his opposition to any lifting of the arms embargo after the outbreak of World War II. Such action seemed to him to be an infraction of international law. In support of this viewpoint Professor Borchard wrote to Borah on September 20. He firmly believed that “the changing of a neutrality law to relax a country’s neutrality with the motive or even with the effect of aiding one belligerent, is a distinct violation of international law. Changes may be made in neutrality during war, but only in the direction of tightening or safeguarding a country’s neutrality, and not in the direction of relaxing it. . . . I cannot escape the unfortunate belief that whatever we do or do not do to the Neutrality Act, the proposal and its dramatic submission indicate the Executive mood. . . . I fear that excuses for intervention may readily be found.”11 On the following day, in a letter to the New York Times, Professors Philip C. Jessup and Charles C. Hyde of Columbia University confirmed the position of Professor Borchard.12

On September 23, Professor Thomas H. Healy, of Georgetown University, sent to Borah a long memorandum in answer to several questions. He indicated that the President’s viewpoint that an arms embargo was against the principles of international law was quite incorrect. Such embargoes had long been a part of international practice. He then emphasized the fact that the embargoes and non-intercourse acts that preceded the War of 1812 had not caused that war. Finally, he expressed the opinion that the arms embargo could be abandoned only if it could be proved that such action was necessary for American interests and safety and not for the benefit of one set of belligerents.13

Acting upon this advice, Borah led the fight in the Senate against any repeal of the arms embargo which he was certain was designed to aid Britain and France. Transport of troops would eventually follow the shipment of arms. After supplying them with arms and ammunition, “can we, if the hour of greater need should occur, refuse to send our armies? . . . The only way I see in which we can stay out of this war, having taken the first step for the reasons for which we are asked to take it, is for the war to end before we get in.” He was not impressed with the popular thesis that the Allies were fighting a crusade for democracy. To him the war was “nothing more than another chapter in the bloody volume of European power politics.”14

Professor Borchard warmly praised this speech of Borah. He had put his “finger on the real issue” and it should “not be lost from view.” It might be, “of course, that in the present temper many men will not be impressed, but will merely be irritated by the fact that the proposed change violates international law. Given the motive and the effect, nothing could in my mind be clearer.”15

During the debate in the Senate, Mr. Lundeen, from Minnesota, argued in favor of a prompt demand for Allied payment of war debts. If they did not comply with this demand he thought the British and French West Indies should be seized “in accordance with the Jacksonian theory, expounded in the days of good, strong, red-blooded, affirmative democracy. . . . Let us show that there is some red blood in us. . . . Now is the time to acquire them.”16

Outside the Senate the debate was carried on by numerous speakers who adopted widely different viewpoints. Former President Hoover believed that the Allies did not require the assistance of the United States to win the war. With their vast economic resources, combined with the pressure of a tight blockade, it would be impossible for Germany to win. He was opposed to any outright repeal of the arms embargo. It should be modified to permit the sale of “defensive weapons.”17 Colonel Lindbergh agreed with this Hoover viewpoint. In addition he avowed a warm attachment to isolationism which led him to chide Canada for staying within the British Commonwealth of Nations. “Sooner or later we must demand the freedom of this continent and its surrounding islands from the dictates of European power.”18

Dorothy Thompson grew so hysterical over the remarks of Colonel Lindbergh that she poured out her wrath in three long installments in the New York Herald-Tribune.19 These articles opened the eyes of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt who had “sensed” some Nazi ideal in the Lindbergh speech which she had not been able to bring herself “to believe was really there.”20

Colonel Stimson now leaped into the fray to joust with Colonel Lindbergh, and along the college front Presidents Butler, of Columbia, and Conant, of Harvard, lent their assistance to the movement to repeal the neutrality law. As a result of all this sound and fury and persistent pressure from the Administration, a new neutrality law passed both houses of Congress on November 3.21 On the following day the President signed the bill and at once issued two proclamations to implement it. One delimited the waters off the British Isles and the coasts of Western Europe as a combat area which no American vessel could enter “except under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed.” Under the law they could not carry cargo or passengers to any of the belligerent ports in Europe and Africa as far south as the Canary Islands, and under the proclamation they were prohibited from entering the neutral ports of Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway south of Bergen.22

On September 5 an embargo was applied to the shipment of munitions of war and military equipment to belligerents except on a cash-and-carry basis. This restriction did not seriously affect the exports of war matériel to the Allies. In September 1939 the shipments of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to France amounted to $4,429,323; in December the value of these shipments rose to $17,857,281. The value of shipments to Britain did not rise so abruptly. In September 1939 they amounted to $1,422,800; in December they rose to $4,184,377.23 It should be remembered that the title, right, and interest in this war matériel had to be extinguished before it could be exported. During the period from 1914-19:7 there were no restrictions on belligerent borrowing. Loans to the Allied governments had financed huge shipments of munitions of war to their ports. Under the Neutrality Act of November 4 belligerent borrowing was prohibited.

d. A Safety Belt for the Western Hemisphere

In September 1939 the foreign ministers of the American Republics met in Panama and adopted a large number of resolutions the most significant of which was the Declaration of Panama (October 3, 1939).24 Under the terms of this resolution a “safety belt” was drawn around the Americas south of Canada varying in width from 300 to 1000 miles. Belligerents were warned against committing any hostile action within this zone whether by land, sea, or air. This declaration was an interesting demonstration of collective Pan-American action, but it had little validity because the American Republics did not provide any force to maintain the neutrality of the zone.

In December 1939 the German pocket battleship Graf von Spee engaged in a running naval battle with three British cruisers and was finally blown up by order of its captain (December 17) near the port of Montevideo, Uruguay. The twenty-one American Republics sent a prompt protest to the governments of Britain, France, and Germany against this violation of the safety zone.25 Britain and France rejected any thought of compliance with the provisions of the Declaration of Panama unless an adequate naval force of the American Republics patrolled the safety zone and insured its neutrality.26 The German Government made the point that it was futile for it to take any affirmative action with regard to the safety zone because the British and French governments had already taken adverse action.27 When the American Government took no step to establish a naval patrol in the safety zone to make the provisions of the Declaration of Panama dangerous for belligerents to violate, the declaration became a mere pious aspiration. Pan-American collective action was a mere stuffed club without the armed support of the United States.

e. Secretary Hull Engages in a Battle of the Books

At the very opening of World War II, American attention was attracted to the implications of submarine warfare by the sinking of the S. S. Athenia (September 3) ten miles off the north Irish coast. Nearly one hundred persons lost their lives, including some thirty Americans.28 The German Government denied that the Athenia had been a victim of a German submarine; it had probably struck a mine. The American press was remarkably restrained in its comments upon the Athenia incident. There was no loud clamor for immediate reprisals.

The reprisals were taken by the British and French governments which on September 8 announced a long-range blockade of Germany. Germany responded by declaring a counterblockade against British and French coasts (September 11). In Britain a Ministry of Economic Warfare was hurriedly established which worked in conjunction with the French Ministry of Blockade. Long lists of contraband were published and British naval vessels were stationed in the North Sea near the Skagerrak to intercept merchant ships en route to the Baltic. Other patrols were established at Gibraltar and Suez. Contraband control bases were set up in the ports of Kirkwall, Weymouth, and the Downs in Britain; Dunkerque, LeHavre, and Marseilles in France; at Gibraltar, Malta, Oran, Port Said, and Haifa. Ships sailing for Germany or for neutral ports from which goods could be conveniently transported to that country, were urgently “advised” to call at one of these control bases for search. Otherwise they might be hailed upon the high seas and compelled to enter a base.29 Shipowners could escape this irritating practice if they secured from British consuls at the home ports “navicerts” or certificates which testified as to the innocent character of the cargo.

This pattern of British procedure had been established during the years from 1914 to 1917 and history was merely repeating itself.30 This was also true with regard to the treatment of neutral mails. In the British control ports, neutral mail bags were examined with great care for contraband which included money and securities, and letters might be censored. Up to the middle of November 1939 the British had detained thirty-three American ships for examination, and had removed cargoes, wholly or in part, from seven of them.31 After November 4, under the terms of the Neutrality Act, American ships were forbidden to carry cargoes in combat areas in European waters. It was expected in Washington that British detentions would sharply decrease after this date. But the British Government, with the same irritating unconcern for American feelings that it showed during the years 1914 to 1917, continued the practice of detention and even compelled American ships to proceed to control ports within the combat area which was closed to them by the express terms of the Neutrality Act.

After invoking the doctrine of continuous voyage against shipments of goods from neutral ports to Germany, the British Government adopted another item from its practice of 1915. On November 27 an Order in Council was issued which provided that after December 4 any neutral vessel sailing from a neutral port, but having on board “goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property,” might be required to go to an Allied port and there discharge that portion of her cargo.32 To implement this order in an effective manner a joint organization of British and French officials was established in London, while British liaison officers were sent to Paris to work with the French blockade and naval ministries.33 Allied naval vessels were then instructed to intercept German exports on all the seven seas so that goods that had been smuggled through the naval cordon in the combat area might be seized before reaching their destination.

These measures, which were palpable infractions of international law, were justified on the ground that they were necessary reprisals against German violations of the law of nations. The old arguments of 1914-1917 were dusted off by the British Foreign Office and used with the same cool insolence. In reply Secretary Hull, with his tongue in his cheek, sent to London the usual protests. On December 8, 1939, he specifically objected to the Order in Council of November 27 because it unlawfully interfered with the “legitimate trade” of American nationals. There could be no justification “for interfering with American vessels or their cargoes on grounds of breach of blockade.” Likewise, the question of contraband could “not arise with respect to goods en route from Germany to the United States.”34 On December 14 another note filed a sharp protest against the British practice of compelling American vessels to proceed to ports within the combat area for detailed examination of their cargoes. Such actions were “without regard to the municipal law of the United States or the rights, obligations, and liabilities of American vessels under that law.”35 Some two weeks later (December 27), a third protest was made in connection with the British treatment of American mails. The Foreign Office was warned that the American Government could not admit the right of the British authorities “to interfere with American mails on American or other neutral ships on the high seas nor can it admit the right of the British Government to censor mail on ships which have involuntarily entered British ports.” It felt compelled, therefore, to “make a vigorous protest against the practices outlined above.”36

British expansions of the contraband list and British black lists gave further cause for American protests but notes from Secretary Hull were regarded in London as mere exercises in diplomatic double talk. The Foreign Office was well aware of American practices after April 1917. From American intervention in 1917 to the close of the war in November 1918 the Department of State had sanctioned some of the infractions of international law against which it had previously protested. It was difficult for Secretary Hull to press the Allies too sharply with reference to practices which the American Government had adopted when it entered the World War against Germany.37 Like a model watchdog, the conscience of Secretary Hull barked only at strangers.

f. Hitler Adopts a Conciliatory Policy towards the U.S.

The outbreak of World War II came as an unpleasant surprise to the German Admiralty which had hoped the conflict might be postponed until 1944. Admiral Raeder promptly advised an all out war against Britain in the form of unrestricted submarine warfare, but Hitler immediately rejected this counsel. He was deeply shocked at the news of the sinking of the Athenia, and upon the advice of the Naval Staff he denied German responsibility. Later when it was learned that the U-30 had torpedoed the liner, the commander, Lieutenant Lemp, was severely reprimanded.38

On September 7, during a conference with Admiral Raeder, Hitler insisted that “in order not to provoke neutral countries, the United States in particular, it is forbidden to torpedo passenger steamers, even when sailing in convoy. Warfare against French merchant ships, attacks on French warships and mine laying off French ports is prohibited.”39 These orders were partially modified on September 10 so that mixed British-French convoys, if escorted by French or French and British forces, might be attacked north of Brest. On October 16 there was a further modification: “All merchant ships definitely recognized as enemy ones (British or French) can be torpedoed without warning. Passenger steamers in convoy can be torpedoed a short while after notice has been given of the intention to do so.” Passenger ships were already being torpedoed when “proceeding without lights.”40

Hitler now made a conciliatory gesture towards the United States. On October 9, the American freight steamer, City of Flint, bound for a British port, was captured by the German pocket battleship, Deutschland. After a brief visit to the Norwegian port of Tromsö and the Russian port of Murmansk, the City of Flint with a German prize crew put into another Norwegian port where the authorities interned the German crew and returned the vessel to its American commander. On November 10, Admiral Raeder submitted a report to which Hitler agreed: “The City of Flint case has been mismanaged. . . . It appears advisable to allow the City of Flint to return to the United States unmolested. . . . The Fuehrer agrees with the Commander in Chief, Navy; no further action is to be taken against the City of Flint.”41

At the end of December 1939 the rules controlling submarine activity were formulated as follows: “The following ships are subject to submarine attack without warning: (1) All merchant ships recognized as enemy; (exceptions are passenger ships sailing alone which are definitely unarmed); (2) all neutral ships sailing in enemy convoy; (3) all ships sailing without lights; (4) all ships refusing to stop or making use of radiotelegraph; (5) American crews are [to be] treated with the greatest consideration.”42

Thus, at the close of four months of warfare on the high seas, German anxiety to conciliate America had resulted in exceptional treatment of United States vessels. Ninety ships carrying neutral flags had been sunk but not one of the ninety had flown American colors. Only four American ships had been stopped at sea by German naval vessels; none had been compelled to enter a German port for search and none had been attacked by commerce raiders. Thanks to pressure from the Führer the German Navy was on its good behavior.

g. Finland Goes Down Fighting Soviet Aggression

While Hitler was making conciliatory gestures towards France and the United States, Soviet Russia was showing to all the world how well founded the fears had been of Russian aggression on the part of the small Baltic states. With the large slice of Poland acquired under agreement with Germany the Russian appetite was stimulated to further seizures. On September 29, Estonia was forced to sign a mutual assistance pact which permitted the Soviet Union to establish naval and air bases within its territory and to maintain garrisons to protect them. On October 5, Latvia was compelled to sign a similar pact, and on October 16, Lithuania followed suit. In Izvestia this highhanded procedure was delicately described as a means of showing how the “Soviet government respects the rights of small nations.”43 The same solicitude was soon shown towards Finland.

Relations between Finland and Russia had long been based upon the Treaty of Tartu (October 14, 1920) which had established the boundaries between the two countries. Russian acceptance of the terms of this treaty was confirmed by the nonaggression treaty of January 21, 1932.44 This was followed by a treaty of conciliation (April 22, 1932) under whose terms the high contracting parties agreed to submit to a conciliation commission for the amicable settlement of all disputes which could not be handled satisfactorily through diplomatic channels.45 On April 7, 1934, the formal nonaggression treaty was extended to December 31, 1945.46

During the summer of 1939, while Britain and France were vainly endeavoring to reach some agreement with Soviet Russia concerning the building of a barrier against German aggression, the Kremlin kept insisting that the negotiations should include a guarantee of Finnish independence. The Finnish Government strenuously objected to any such arrangement on the ground that it would give Russia an excuse for quartering soldiers in Finland. The Soviet pact with Nazi Germany put an end to these negotiations and provided the impetus that pushed Europe into war. Shortly after the outbreak of war (September 17) the Soviet Government gave to the Government of Finland an assurance that she would “pursue a policy of neutrality” in her relations with her neighbors at Helsinki. But this policy of neutrality had a Russian twist that was given an ominous illustration with regard to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In order to save Finland from a similar fate, President Roosevelt sent a message to President Kalinin (October 11), the head of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, calling attention to the “long-standing and deep friendship which exists between the United States and Finland,” and expressed the hope that no demands would be made upon that country which would be inconsistent with its independence. Kalinin’s reply was the usual Soviet exercise in mendacity. The “sole aim” of Russia was to strengthen “friendly co-operation between both countries” and to effect a guarantee of the “security of the Soviet Union and Finland.”47

Soviet friendly co-operation now took a strange turn. On October 14 the Kremlin demanded the cession of an area on the Cape of Hanko, a large number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and a portion of the Karelian Isthmus. Molotov then made a speech (October 31) in which he intimated that Finland would be wise not to expect any help from foreign countries like the United States.48 This threat was followed on November 26 by a charge that Finnish troops had attacked some Russian forces along the border. On November 28, Moscow denounced the nonaggression treaty with Finland, and on the following day severed diplomatic relations. It was apparent to the Department of State that a crisis had been reached in the relations between Finland and Russia so mediation was offered by Secretary Hull.49 This was abruptly rejected by the Kremlin and on November 30, Soviet armed forces launched an attack upon Finland by sea, air, and land. This brutal aggression caused the Council of the League of Nations (December 14) to adopt a resolution declaring that “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is no longer a Member of the League.”50

In the United States the action of Soviet Russia evoked intense indignation. On December 1, at a press conference, President Roosevelt denounced the invasion of Finland as “a wanton disregard for law.”51 The American press echoed this indictment. The New York Times scored Soviet aggression as “the most flagrant example to date of a completely unjustifiable attack.”52 The Atlanta Constitution condemned the assault upon Finland as a demonstration of “ruthless savagery”;53 the Dallas Morning News was shocked at the “murderous and unprovoked attack”;54 the Cleveland Plain Dealer was nauseated at the “sheer brutality of the Soviet action”;55 while the Washington Evening Star was aghast at the “peculiarly revolting lust of Stalin.”56

Encouraged by these strong expressions of sympathy for Finland, President Roosevelt (December 6) instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to set aside in a separate account Finland’s annual debt installment ($234,693), with a thought of eventual repayment. On December 10 it was announced that through the agencies of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank, credits amounting to $10,000,000 had been opened to make it possible for the Finnish Government to purchase agricultural surpluses and supplies in the United States.57 But Finland needed arms and munitions of war rather than plows and pious platitudes. It was not long before the Russian steam roller crushed all signs of Finnish resistance, and when the Finns in 1941, with Hitler’s help, once more waged war against the Soviet armed hordes, American opinion suddenly changed to warm support of Stalin. A break had occurred in the relations between the German and Russian dictators. Instead of welcoming war between these enemies of democracy and sitting on the side lines with cheers for their mutual destruction, America, led by the Roosevelt Administration, espoused the cause of Russia and started the flow of lend-lease goods to that country that eventually transformed her into the Frankenstein that now menaces the world. After June 1941, “brave little Finland” was attacked in many American quarters as the ally of the hated Nazis and some Americans looked at Helsinki through the eyes of the editors of the New Masses and the Daily Worker.

h. The Mission of Sumner Welles

The heroic struggle of Finland against Soviet aggression evoked warm admiration in Italy and was one of the many indications that seemed to point to the possibility of driving a wedge between Italy and Germany. Since the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 there was a growing feeling in Italy that the Rome-Berlin Axis was out of date. Count Ciano was constantly pouring this viewpoint into the ears of the Duce, and on December 16, in an address to the Grand Council, he boldly expressed his opinions to an important group of leading Fascists. He proclaimed the fact that the Nazi-Soviet treaty had been negotiated without any prior understanding with Italy. The vain attempts of the Duce to find a formula of peace in August-September 1939 were impressively rehearsed and the attitude of Germany was depicted in a none-too-friendly spirit. In Italy, Ciano himself said that his address was widely regarded as a funeral oration over the death of the Axis.58

Ciano’s address was followed by a significant letter from Mussolini to Hitler. After describing the strong sympathy felt in Italy for the fighting Finns, the Duce then told how British propaganda was successful in pointing out the ominous aspects of Nazi-Soviet collaboration. Because of the friendship that had existed between Poland and Italy he urged the creation of a Polish national state under the aegis of Germany. With reference to a spring offensive against Britain and France he questioned whether it was wise to beat the Allies to their knees at the expense of the “flower of Germany’s youth.” The democracies bore “within themselves the seeds of their inevitable decay.” Let time work its inevitable course with them. The real foe to be taken care of was Russia: “The solution of your Lebensraum is in Russia alone.”59

The Italian Ambassador in Berlin (Attolico) took this letter to Hitler on January 8, 1940. The Führer read it with great care and clearly understood all its implications. With Ribbentrop and Goring he discussed every aspect of German-Italian relations and then decided to postpone an answer until he had the situation in better shape. Moreover, the suspense would arouse profound concern in the Duce’s mind and make him feel that he must conciliate the Führer.

In this period of the Duce’s indecision the moment seemed opportune for an attempt to drive a wedge between Germany and Italy. In the early days of January 1940, President Roosevelt sent for Sumner Welles and discussed with him the advisability of sending a representative to Europe to canvass the “possibilities of concluding a just and permanent peace.” The President had no interest in a “temporary or tentative armed truce.” Something more fundamental would have to be achieved. Perhaps Welles himself would be the man of the hour who could open the portals of peace. At any rate, in February 1940 the President decided to send him to Rome and Berlin, and from there to Paris and London. Conversations with Mussolini and Hitler might offer some hint as to peaceful procedures that would prevent the dreaded spring offensive. From Germany there had come certain whispers of a desire for peace. Under the proper encouragement these whispers might gain significant volume.

Welles arrived in Rome on February 25 and had an interview with Ciano on the following day. He found Ciano “always cordial and entirely unaffected,” with an evident desire to be helpful.60 In the Ciano Diaries, Welles is described as “distinguished in appearance and manner,” and the tone of the conference was “very cordial.”61 Ciano made no attempt to conceal his detestation of von Ribbentrop and his “underlying antagonism toward Hitler.” When Welles brought up the matter of a “just and permanent peace,” Ciano outlined the terms that Hitler would have accepted in October 1939, but he was uncertain about the Führer’s present viewpoint.62

The interview with Mussolini was quite a different affair and Ciano regretted its “icy atmosphere.” The Duce appeared to Welles as a man laboring “under a tremendous strain.” He was “ponderous and static rather than vital,” and during the interview sat most of the time with his eyes closed. As soon as the formalities of introduction were completed, Welles handed to Mussolini a letter from President Roosevelt. It was an interesting missive which emphasized the “satisfaction which the United States government would derive from a continuation of Italian neutrality,” and which indicated the President’s strong desire “to meet personally with the chief of the Italian government.” In the event of such a meeting the President believed he could “persuade Mussolini that the best interests of Italy could be served only if he refused to prostitute the Italian people to the greater glory of Hitler.”

The Duce seemed pleased with the suggestion of a meeting with Roosevelt. He had hoped for a long time that “this meeting . . . would really take place.” When he remarked that there were so many miles of ocean between Italy and America that it would be difficult to arrange for a conference, Sumner Welles quickly interjected with the statement: “There are halfway points which would halve that distance.” The Duce responded: “Yes, and there are ships to take us both there.”63 But no plans were actually made for this meeting which might have changed the history of the world. Instead, Welles and the Duce merely talked of the importance of breaking down economic barriers between countries and the necessity for a program of real disarmament. The conversation then shifted to the terms of peace Germany might accept and concluded with a direct question from Welles: “Do you consider it possible at this moment for any successful negotiations to be undertaken between Germany and the Allies for a lasting peace?” “Yes,” answered the Duce with emphasis, and Welles was now ready for his journey to Berlin.64

The interview with Ribbentrop was in sharp contrast to the encouraging talks with Ciano and the Duce. The Foreign Minister received Welles “without even the semblance of a smile, and without even a word of greeting.” After a moment’s pause, Welles spoke a few words in English because he knew that Ribbentrop had spent some time in the United States and spoke English fluently. Instead of responding to this overture, Ribbentrop barked at Dr. Paul Schmidt the German word “interpret,” and the conversation began its uneasy course. After Welles indicated that he had been sent to Europe to canvass the possibility of establishing a permanent peace, Ribbentrop took his cue and commenced a turgid oration that lasted over two hours. In conclusion, he insisted that Germany wanted peace but only on condition that “the will on the part of England to destroy Germany is obliterated once and for all.” The only way that objective could be accomplished was “through complete and total Germany victory.”

The interview with Hitler on March 2 was less of an ordeal. He greeted Welles “pleasantly” and was “dignified, both in speech and in movement.” When Welles remarked that his conversation with Mussolini had instilled the hope that the “foundations of a durable peace might still be laid,” Hitler began to discuss the basic importance of some general agreement upon a program of disarmament. He had long been in favor of disarmament but had received no encouragement from Britain or France. He agreed with Welles that “a liberal, unconditional most-favored-nation international trade relationship” was an ideal “toward which the nations of the world should strive.” Under “more normal conditions Germany would gladly co-operate toward that end.” He then outlined Germany’s objectives. They were historical, political, and economic. Germany had no aim other than the return of the “German people to the territorial position which historically was rightly theirs.” Germany’s political aims emphasized national security. There was no real desire to dominate non-German peoples. If such peoples adjacent to her boundaries did not constitute a threat to German security, there was no intention to interfere with their independence. From the economic standpoint Germany claimed the right to profit through trade with the nations close to her in central and southeastern Europe. She would no longer permit the Western powers of Europe to infringe or impair her preferential position in that respect. Germany would also insist that “the colonies stolen from her at Versailles be returned to her.” In conclusion, he repeated the words of Ribbentrop: “I can see no hope for the establishment of any lasting peace until the will of England and France to destroy Germany is itself destroyed. I feel that there is no way by which the will to destroy Germany can itself be destroyed except through a complete German victory.”65

Welles now clearly realized that his mission to Germany was in vain, but he felt obliged to have a frank talk with General Göring at Karinhall. Göring’s manner was “simple, unaffected and exceedingly cordial.” He quickly assured Welles that Germany had “no ambitions of any kind . . . which could affect the Western Hemisphere,” and he challenged the assertion that a war in Europe would profoundly affect America. Welles then shifted the conversation to the topic of German discriminations against the Jews. This evoked the reply that racial discriminations were in effect in a large portion of the United States with regard to Negroes. In conclusion, Göring repeated the comments of Ribbentrop and Hitler with special reference to the desire of Britain and France to destroy Germany. If they succeeded in that objective they would create a community of “Bolsheviks and Communists.”66

From Berlin, Welles went at once to Paris for conversations with important French officials. He regretted that President Lebrun did not have the driving force of Poincaré who had guided French destinies during World War I. While talking with Senator Jeanneney, President of the French Senate, he was reminded of a trenchant saying of Clemenceau anent the Germans: “There is only one way in which to deal with a mad dog. Either kill him or chain him with steel chains which cannot be broken.” But France lacked both the will and the ability to forge those chains.

In England he found the will to forge chains that would keep Germany in subjection for a long period. This will was vehemently expressed by Winston Churchill. He was certain that no solution of the European crisis would be found “other than outright and complete defeat of Germany, the destruction of National Socialism, and the inclusion, in the new peace treaties, of provisions which would control Germany’s course in the future in such a way as to give Europe and the world peace and security in the days to come, at least for a hundred years.”67 He still adhered to the pattern of Versailles.

It is significant that Churchill had no words of criticism of Russia even though it was apparent that Hitler could not have gone to war in 1939 without some assurance of Soviet support. The menace of bolshevism gave Churchill little concern in 1940. In the following year when Hitler attacked Russia, Churchill worked feverishly to send her armed assistance. A real statesman would have recognized the dual threat of both nazism and communism and would have welcomed them with bloody hands to hospitable graves.

Sumner Welles apparently agreed with this British viewpoint. The “pencil with two ears”68 made no adverse comment upon such dangerous blindness. To him, as well as to Churchill, the only real enemy was Nazi Germany. This made it all the more necessary for him to hurry back to Rome and try to separate Mussolini from Hitler. But Ribbentrop had preceded him with a long letter from Hitler. The Führer insisted that Italy would have a glorious future only if she worked in close collaboration with Germany. He was confident that the Duce saw this unmistakable fact: “I. . . believe that the destinies of our two States, of our two Peoples, of our two revolutions, and of our two regimes are indissolubly linked.”69

Ribbentrop was not as successful as he had hoped he would be in his conversations with Mussolini. The Duce was still opposed to a German spring offensive against Britain and France, and it would take a personal conference between the two dictators to change Mussolini’s mind. This should be held, according to Ribbentrop, at Brenner Pass on the morning of March 18.

While Ribbentrop was making these preparations for the meeting at Brenner Pass, Welles arrived in Rome on March 16 and had conferences with both Ciano and Mussolini. Ciano frankly informed him that from Ribbentrop he had learned that “Germany was determined to undertake an all-out military offensive in the near future.” She was “not considering any peace solution short of a military victory.” This it was believed could be accomplished “within five months. . . . France would crumble first and England shortly after.” Ciano himself was by no means convinced of a German victory. If the Allies could prevent a break-through of their defensive positions it was quite possible that victory might be theirs.

On the evening of March 16, Welles saw Mussolini and noted at once that he seemed to have shed the worries that had tormented him a few weeks before. When Welles brought up the matter of laying the basis of a permanent peace, the Duce promptly remarked that Ribbentrop had “insisted that Germany would consider no solution other than a military victory, and that any peace negotiations were impossible.” He also informed Welles that he had learned that Germany was ready to start “an immediate offensive.” In Germany it was expected that France would fall “within three or four months.”

In view of these German expectations it would be necessary for the Allies to bait their hooks of peace with juicy concessions. Germany must have adequate Lebensraum. With reference to the independence of the Polish people he believed that “in any determination of new boundaries for Poland the transfer of populations recently carried out by the Germans must be regarded as definitive.” Moreover, the just claims of Hungary should be taken into account and “all of the claims of Italy” must be given a “satisfactory solution.”

These terms were so far-reaching that Welles remarked that he would have to telephone to President Roosevelt and ask for specific instructions. He would communicate the President’s decision to Count Ciano that evening. When he put through a long distance telephone call to Washington the President shied away from any discussion of the political bases of the proposed peace. He expressed the opinion that “the problem of security was the fundamental issue,” but he offered no solution of this problem. He was extremely cautious in his comments, but he did make the observation that neither Britain nor France wished “to destroy either Germany or the German people.”70 To Hitler this assurance would appear as either naïve or disingenuous.

It was evident to Mussolini that President Roosevelt was not able to outline any bases for peace that would prove inviting to Hitler. He would have to attend the conference at Brenner Pass without any ammunition that might induce the Führer to abandon a spring offensive in favor of peace proposals. On March 18 he listened to Hitler’s long presentation of the thesis that the destinies of Germany and Italy were indissolubly joined. Italian intervention in the war was inevitable. It was noticeable that the Führer gave no details of his planned spring offensive. He still harbored a definite suspicion of Italian trustworthiness. But this long “Brenner Monologue” had its effect upon the Duce who finally cast aside all his apprehensions and emphatically asserted his intention of entering the war on the side of Germany.71

On March 19, Ciano was back in Rome and assured Welles there was “no threat of an immediate military clash.” The President would have time “to study Welles’s reports and perhaps to take some peace steps.” Welles was so pleased with the prospect that he talked of a possible meeting between Mussolini and the President in the Azores. He also remarked to Blasco d’Aieta that “even without undertaking any offensive, Germany will be exhausted within a year.” He considered “the war already won by the French and English.”72 After other conversations equally fatuous, Welles returned to Washington with a full budget of misinformation for the President.73

i. Britain and Germany Flout the Neutrality of Norway

While Sumner Welles was making ready to visit Rome and Berlin in February 1940 the first signs of the spring military offensive were becoming evident. The German ship Altmark had taken refuge in a Norwegian fiord with several hundred British sailors on board as prisoners. A search by Norwegian gunboats had failed to disclose the presence of these sailors, but the British Admiralty had information concerning their detention on the Altmark. On February 16, Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, ordered Captain Vian to proceed in H.M.S. Cossack to Norwegian waters and liberate the prisoners. In effecting this rescue Captain Vian deliberately violated the neutrality of Norwegian coastal waters and the Norwegian Government sent a prompt protest to London. The Prime Minister excused this violation on the ground that previous German infractions of international law had compelled the British to take similar action.74

This Altmark incident was merely one expression of the intention of the British Government repeatedly to violate the neutrality of Norwegian waters for the purpose of adversely affecting the German war effort. As early as September 19, 1939, Winston Churchill, after consulting the British War Cabinet, brought to the notice of the First Sea Lord and others the importance of stopping the transportation of Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany. Inasmuch as the German ore ships kept within the Norwegian three-mile limit the only way they could be stopped would be by mining those marginal waters. In 1918 this had been done and Churchill suggested that Britain “should repeat this process very shortly.”75 The first German memorandum with reference to action in Norwegian waters was written on October 3, 1939. Thus, as Lord Hankey clearly shows, “the British Government began to plan their major offensive in Norway a fortnight before the Germans.” It is significant that the Nuremberg Tribunal purposely overlooked the memorandum of Winston Churchill and contended that the idea of attacking Norway “originated with Raeder and Rosenberg. . . . The omission to mention this part of the story in the Judgement is the more inexplicable because the whole story was told to the House of Commons by Mr. Churchill in April 1940, and it was a matter of public knowledge.”76

On December 16, 1939, Mr. Churchill prepared another memorandum which he presented to the Cabinet six days later. The subject was once more the stoppage of iron ore from Narvik to Germany. He regarded such a stoppage as “a major offensive operation of war,” and it could be accomplished by laying “a series of small minefields in Norwegian territorial waters at the two or three suitable points on the coast, which will force the ships carrying ore to Germany to quit territorial waters and come onto the high seas.” This action would compel Germany to “undergo a severe deprivation, tending to crisis before the summer.” This mining of Norwegian waters was a mere technical infringement of international law. No evil effect would be produced in the United States by such an infringement where it would be looked upon “in the way most calculated to help us.”77

As Lord Hankey points out, the judgment at the end of the Nuremberg Trial made much of German plans against Norway in mid-December 1939, but it did “not contain a word of Mr. Churchill’s Memorandum to the War Cabinet dated December 16. . . . Any detached person would think this is a supremely important piece of evidence for the Tribunal, for it places the British plan on the same level of importance as the German plan, which is so severely condemned as a crime in law in the Judgement.” Although the War Cabinet refused to accept the reasoning of this Churchill memorandum, it did permit “the preparation of plans for landing a force at Narvik for the sake of Finland. . . . These proceedings also show the pressure the War Cabinet was under from their most powerful colleague . . . to persuade them to a technical act of aggression liable to set all Scandinavia ablaze—a ‘crime,’ to use Nuremberg’s extravagant language, for which the Germans were destined to be so severely condemned by the Tribunal. Not a single word of it appears in the Nuremberg Judgment.”78

The judgment is completely silent on the action of the Supreme War Council of the Allies when (on February 5, 1940) it “approved plans for the preparation of three or four allied divisions for service in Finland, and for persuading Norway and Sweden to permit the passage of supplies and reinforcements to the Finns and ‘incidentally to get hold of the Gallivare ore field.’ From then on the preparations for despatch of allied troops to Norway were intensified.” By the beginning of April 1940 the preparations “for the major offensive in Norway had been completed by both camps. . . . The actual landing, that is to say the German major offensive did not take place until April 9. Twenty-four hours before that, namely between 4:30 and 5 A.M. on April 8, the British minefields had been laid in the West Fjord near Narvik!”79 Needless to say, these facts were not given any place in the Nuremberg Judgement.

While the Norwegian Foreign Office was drafting a note of protest to London, word came that German warships were approaching Oslo. On the following day Norwegian batteries sank the German heavy cruiser Blücher and seriously damaged the cruiser Emden. This spirited defense merely postponed the fall of Oslo.

A German attack upon the iron ore port of Narvik was successful in spite of heroic resistance by Norwegian warships, and Hitler’s plans for the occupation of Norway proceeded according to schedule. British plans for the stoppage of ore shipments to Germany were completely defeated. At the same time (April 9), German troops crossed the Danish frontier and thus another northern neutral came under Nazi control.

j. Greenland Is Placed under the Monroe Doctrine

When the news came to Washington that German troops had occupied Denmark and Norway, President Roosevelt (April 10) issued a proclamation extending the combat zone (closed to American ships) northward along the entire Norwegian coast and eastward along the Russian Arctic coast to a point 200 miles east of Murmansk.80 He also issued an executive order “freezing” Danish and Norwegian holdings of securities and other property in the United States in order to prevent their use by German authorities. As a result of the German invasion of Denmark, the Parliament of Iceland adopted a resolution declaring that the “government of Iceland, for the time being,” was no longer shared with the King [of Denmark], The Parliament then took over the control of foreign relations. Prime Minister Hermann Jónasson now opened negotiations with Secretary Hull looking towards the establishment of a legation in Washington and a Consulate General in New York City. In return, the American Government would open a consular office in Reykjavik, capital of Iceland.81

On April 12, Secretary Hull had a conversation with the British Ambassador (Lord Lothian) in which he stressed the view that the Monroe Doctrine covered the Western Hemisphere “without qualification.” It was obvious that Greenland came within the scope of that doctrine. After discussing the situation with Canadian officials, an American Consulate was established at Godthaab and Coast Guard cutters were sent to patrol the waters around Greenland. It was not long before the Department of State took more decisive action.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941