XIII: Europe Fails to Find a Substitute for Locarno

XIII Europe Fails to Find a Substitute for Locarno

a. Hitler Liquidates the Locarno Pact

As tension in Europe increased as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute there was a fear in some quarters that Hitler would exploit the situation in order to gain some substantial concessions. Hugh Wilson, American Minister at Geneva, wrote to Secretary Hull that it was the “concern regarding Germany which is decisively influencing the action of all the European . . . States today.” There was no “real fear of Italy” but many statesmen were “profoundly afraid of Germany.”1

One of the concessions that Hitler wished to extract from England and France was the return of the former German colonies. In June 1935, Bullitt wrote to Secretary Hull that he had just been told by a British diplomat that his government was ready to “concede as just and reasonable” Germany’s claim to colonial territory.2 In January of the following year he had a different story to report. The British Ambassador in Paris had bluntly informed him that the Foreign Office would “regard with displeasure the raising of the question of colonies.”3 It was during this very month that Ambassador Davies had a conversation with Dr. Schacht who confidentially remarked that his Government had authorized him to submit proposals to England and France that would guarantee the peace of Europe, reduce armaments, and settle the question of international boundaries if the matter of colonies were satisfactorily adjusted.4

Schacht made little impression upon the British Government which was in the mood to ask rather than grant concessions. In December 1935 the Foreign Office instructed Sir Eric Phipps, in Berlin, to ask Hitler if he had any objections to the establishment of “British air bases in Northern France and Belgium.”5 This point-blank question astounded the German Chancellor. It indicated either that the Foreign Office had lost all faith in the Locarno treaty of October 1925 or that it regarded him as an easy mark. He told Phipps with considerable vehemence that he was entirely opposed to any indirect repudiation of Locarno, and Paul Scheffer, in the Berliner Tageblatt, devoted a long editorial to the “inequitable features of any Franco-British mutual assistance arrangements vis-a-vis Locarno and the general discontent and apprehension in Germany which these alleged arrangements inspire.”6 When other German newspapers acidly commented upon this remarkable British proposal, the French Ambassador objected to such a barrage and it suddenly ceased.7

The German Foreign Office was also apprehensive concerning the Franco-British staff conversations which seemed to indicate military preparations against Germany. Ferdinand L. Mayer, the American chargé in Berlin, had a long conversation with Dieckhoff in the Foreign Office and the latter frankly disclosed many doubts relative to the Franco-British attitude towards Locarno:

Dieckhoff said that while the British and French had given most solemn assurances that their recent staff discussions referred only to the Mediterranean, he must state frankly that the value of those assurances was somewhat diminished by the fact that similar assurances given in 1913 and 1914, with regard to staff discussions, had proven valueless. Furthermore, these present assurances were weakened by the rather naïve and amazing question Phipps had asked Hitler last December when he requested what would Germany’s attitude be if England established air bases in Northern France and Belgium.8

The public statements of British statesmen still expressed a determination to adhere to Locarno. In the House of Commons, February 12, 1936, Anthony Eden insisted that His Majesty’s Government would “stand by those obligations and . . . faithfully fulfill them.”9 This meant that any German occupation of the demilitarized zone along the Rhine would be followed by prompt British action according to the terms of the treaty.

In France the situation was complicated by difficulties arising out of the debate upon the Franco-Soviet Pact. On February 11 this treaty had been placed before the Chamber for ratification. Flandin, the Foreign Minister, referred to the possibility of a German repudiation of Locarno but he did not seem deeply concerned about such a contingency. On February 27 the Chamber approved the treaty by a large majority and on March 3 it came before the Senate.10

British and French statesmen were carefully watching the diplomatic skies over Germany for storm clouds. They remembered Hitler’s speech of May 21, 1935, in which he had promised “scrupulously to maintain every treaty voluntarily signed” by the German Government. But they also recalled his reservation to the effect that German adherence to Locarno would last only “so long as the other partners are on their side ready to stand by that pact.” It was known that Hitler regarded the Franco-Soviet Pact as a violation of Locarno, and in February 1936 the German press had expressed bitter resentment over its possible ratification by the French Parliament.

The British and French ambassadors, therefore, should not have been greatly surprised when on March 7 they (along with the ambassadors from Belgium and Italy) were summoned to the Wilhelmstrasse where Neurath informed them that German military reoccupation of the demilitarized zone had already begun. He then handed them a memorandum which explained the reasons for this action. At noon Hitler addressed the Reichstag and then read to it the memorandum that had been handed to the ambassadors representing the Locarno powers. Emphasis was placed upon the need for some new political alignment that would restrain the Red tide of Russia. The best way to erect a strong dyke against the Soviet tide would be the prompt ratification of four agreements: (1) a multilateral treaty which would provide a new demilitarized zone along the frontiers of Belgium, France, and Germany; (2) a twenty-five year nonaggression pact between Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; (3) an air pact which would insure Western Europe against a surprise attack; (4) a series of bilateral nonaggression treaties with the countries on the eastern frontier of Germany.11

b. American Press Opinion Relative to the Rhineland

In the United States the news of the Nazi occupation of the Rhineland evoked nationwide interest. The Baltimore Sun12 and the Louisville Courier-Journal13 were suspicious of Hitler’s proposals, and the San Francisco Chronicle was confident that anything that emanated from Hitler was counterfeit: “The world does not trust him at all.”14 The Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman feared that a general European war was imminent. After this Hitler coup, war would “ensue inevitably.”15 The Emporia Gazette shared this view: “The danger of a European war draws nearer.”16 The Portland Morning Oregonian refused to be frightened by the specter of war,17 and the Hearst press put on a similar brave front.18

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch was inclined to look with favor upon Hitler’s peace proposals: it was high time for a New Deal in Europe.19 The Omaha World-Herald expressed a similar opinion: “One can only wait and see—and hope. Hitler presents the possibility that he may become the post-war peacemaker. . . . The Versailles Treaty could well be sacrificed for such positive gains.”20

The Cincinnati Enquirer went so far as to defend Hitler’s bold move into the Rhineland: “Great Britain and France, not to mention Russia, Japan and the United States are at work building unprecedentedly great military machines. . . . The Powers, therefore, have no logical objection to Chancellor Hitler’s newest move into the Rhineland.”21

c. Europe Views the Hitler Coup with Alarm

Immediately after the news of Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland the French Government favored a call upon the other signatories of Locarno to implement their obligations. After a Cabinet meeting on the evening of March 7 it was decided to follow a more cautious line of action. An appeal would be made to the Council of the League of Nations. If the Council should find that Germany was guilty of a violation of Locarno the signatory powers could rush at once to the assistance of France.22

While this procedure was being followed some nations like Russia and Czechoslovakia were giving France assurances of support. In Moscow, Ambassador Bullitt talked with Litvinov whose excitement can be read between every line of the dispatch to Secretary Hull:

Litvinov displayed almost violent rage in his comments on Hitler. I asked him if he would not welcome the German-Lithuanian pact of non-aggression proposed by Hitler. . . . He replied that the promise of a dog, liar and blackguard like Hitler was worthless to Lithuania or any other country. . . . I asked Litvinov if he hoped that France would march troops into the Rhineland. He replied that he did not as that would mean immediate war. . . . He said that he was disgusted by the proposal of Hitler to re-enter the League of Nations and even more disgusted by the fact that the British would welcome the reentry of Germany.23

Ambassador Dodd, in Berlin, regarded Hitler’s speech before the Reichstag as “impressive,” and he noted the “great spontaneous applause” which greeted the statement concerning Germany’s willingness to re-enter the League of Nations. Some American newspapermen in Berlin were of the opinion that “Hitler’s move may not have been unwelcome to the British particularly as it made such striking concessions with regard to international co-operation with the League.”24

It was soon evident that Belgium and Italy would take no action that would anger Hitler, and Poland was equally cautious.25 The British Government held the key to the future. Eden quickly indicated that he was strongly opposed to any “hasty action” and in this course he was supported by a large section of the British press. The Observer counseled the British public to keep “cool heads and just hearts.” The first need for Britain was “to repair her defenses. The second is to consider Herr Hitler’s proposals in a spirit of sympathy and good will.” The Sunday Despatch made a comment which expressed the sentiment of multitudes of British: “The Locarno Pact is dead. It was a commitment to which the people of Britain never gave their sanction.”26

The British Foreign Office adhered to the belief that some deal could be made with Hitler that would at least temporarily quiet the situation. It was clear to the American chargé in London that Eden hoped to handle this Rhineland muddle in a “realistic manner.” Eventually the Foreign Office could find some satisfactory formula in which France would have to acquiesce.27

In France there was some feeling, “even in official circles,” that the Premier had been too abrupt in dealing with Hitler. There was definite skepticism about any prompt British assistance under the terms of the Locarno Pact. It was obvious from Eden’s speech in the House of Commons that Britain would go to France’s rescue “only in case of invasion of or attack on French territory.”28

The cautious attitude of the British Foreign Office had its effect upon France. On March 10, Flandin assured Eden that “French policy was one hundred per cent pacific and was not intended to lead to a conflict.”29 But France was eager for British support of economic and financial sanctions against Germany, and Russia was pressing hard for action that would “foster the further encirclement of Germany through the ‘most resolute action’ by the League Council.”30 When the Baldwin Ministry insisted upon following a conservative course, the French press reflected a growing bitterness “towards Hitler and Baldwin.” Tabouis, in L’Oeuvre, claimed that a “strict liaison had been established between London and Berlin and claims to know from an authorized source that it was during Lord Londonderry’s trip to Berlin, after King George’s funeral, that Hitler made known to him that the military occupation of the demilitarized zone would be accomplished early in March.” Ambassador Straus then added this confidential item: “The Embassy has reason to believe that Madame Tabouis’ information is in the main correct.”31

While Belgium and France were showing their deep concern about the final result of the German occupation of the Rhineland, other nations were equally worried over the re-entry of Russia into European politics. In Budapest the Hungarian Foreign Office was particularly concerned about the “construction of air bases in Czechoslovakia especially one near the Hungarian border.” Eckhardt told the American Minister that he would soon speak on this subject in Parliament and added: “If Germany should offer to assist Hungary to combat this danger could any Prime Minister take the responsibility of refusing such an offer?” In Hungary it was apparent that the “re-entry of Russia into Europe is generally considered a new Communist menace.”32

In view of this threatening international situation, Eden anxiously sought some solution that would prove satisfactory. On March 11 he asked the German Ambassador in London if he would not immediately inquire if his Government would be willing to withdraw from the demilitarized zone all but a symbolical number of troops and also to give a promise not to erect any fortifications there during the present emergency. The Nazi Government responded by giving assurances that the number of German troops in the zone would not be increased and would not be stationed near the border.33 This small concession led the League of Nations on March 14 to invite the German Government to send a representative to sit with the League Council during its consideration of the Rhineland question. Germany accepted this invitation and on March 19, Herr von Ribbentrop presented Germany’s case. It was too big a task for a man whose brain was usually on the tip of his tongue. The Council adopted the Franco-Belgian resolution declaring Germany guilty of a breach of the Versailles and Locarno treaties.34 Inasmuch as the Council made no recommendation for the application of sanctions, this victory for France had little practical value.

Although the British representative on the League Council had voted in favor of the French-Belgian resolution of censure, public opinion in France held to the view that the “tentative London accords” were quite “fragile” and that the importance of the results “so painfully obtained by the French delegation” were only relative.35 In order to dissipate these French fears Eden made a speech on March 26 in which he stated that Britain would stand behind her obligations under Locarno. This assurance displeased some of the British newspapers like the Daily Mail which expressed the opinion that Eden’s promises would not “satisfy this country which is fearful of the possibilities of war.”36 In France the language of Eden was criticized as “too moderate and open-minded.” The general conclusion “drawn by the majority of the press is that France must henceforth count upon herself only and the strengthening of her own forces.”37

While the League Council was giving careful consideration to the problem of Germany’s violation of the Locarno Pact, Hitler ordered a plebiscite to be held on March 29 with reference to German occupation of the Rhineland. The top Nazi leaders worked feverishly to get an overwhelming affirmative vote:

Goebbels spoke seven times in Berlin and vicinity, Goering in the Rhineland, and Hess in Stuttgart, while Hitler made an impassioned address at Frankfort. . . . Hitler’s tone is increasingly Messianic, the German people are “His people” and he takes God as his witness and asks to be struck down if he is doing wrong.38

Thanks to these strenuous efforts the plebiscite was a one-sided victory for Hitler. Approximately 98.79 per cent of the votes were cast in favor of the march into the Rhineland. This fact gave Hitler “at least the appearance of complete support for his present policy” and it represented a “record vote in his favor and a correspondingly strong springboard for his next international move.”39

d. Hitler Offers a New Formula for Peace

Hitler’s next move was the submission to Britain on March 31 of a far-reaching peace plan. In the United States the majority of press comments upon this plan were unfavorable. The Los Angeles Times believed that Hitler was trying to “drive a wedge between France and her Allies. She cannot accept these terms without abandoning her Allies to the East.”40 The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle was of the opinion that Hitler had assumed “the power of dictating terms of peace to the rest of Europe, and he appears in the phrase of the day, to get away with it.”41 The Salt Lake City Deseret News expressed a spirit of pessimism: “If Europe endeavors to check Hitler it will mean war. If Europe fails to do so it will mean unrestrained dictatorship.”42

The New York Times breathed a spirit of optimism: “Europe has been granted an interval in which the forces of peace may be brought into play with promise of greater success than has for months past seemed possible.”43 The Springfield Republican was even more hopeful: “The new proposals, largely based upon the principles of Woodrow Wilson, give a splendid opportunity to force Germany to declare itself for a settled peace on all fronts.” Now that the immediate crisis has been passed it was up to the “other Powers and especially for the Locarno group to decide whether they will meet Hitler halfway and attempt to give Europe more security and good will than the present generation has known.”44

The religious press appeared to view the Rhineland crisis with an open mind. America thought it was “hard to condemn the desire of the German people to hold the Rhineland as their own.”45 The Christian Century expressed similar sentiments. Versailles was fundamentally wrong. Permanent peace could not be built “upon the theory that one of the [nations of Europe] occupies a lower status and enjoys a smaller degree of independence than any of the others.”46 The Catholic World, after an extended critique of Versailles, turned its guns upon Hitler who was denounced as a “cold-blooded, calculating murderer.”47

e. Eden Turns with Each New Diplomatic Breeze

The French Government would have agreed with the Catholic World concerning Hitler and it was convinced that it would do no good to give his proposals any serious consideration. On April 6 the French Cabinet approved two documents that had been drafted by the Foreign Office. They constituted a detailed critique of the Hitler program. After presenting a long bill of indictment they finally produced the outline of a plan that would make the League of Nations more effective in preserving the peace of Europe.48

On April 8 the Committee of Thirteen met at Geneva to consider the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. The French members of the committee took this occasion to present the French case with regard to the Rhineland problem and they insisted that all efforts to conciliate Germany should cease. Eden refused to accept the thesis that negotiations with Hitler had broken down, and he secured approval of the idea that the British Government should inquire “what was the meaning attached by the German Government to the bilateral treaties which it proposed and how these treaties would fall into the framework of collective security.”49

On April 15, Ambassador Straus informed Secretary Hull that the French Government did not know the exact form in which the British inquiries would be put to the German Government but he supposed that he would soon receive the text of the document. He had learned that the British Foreign Office had received assurances “in principle” from Germany regarding the “non-fortification of the Rhineland during the proposed four-month period of negotiations.”50

From London, Ambassador Bingham made a brief report on the indecision that marked the efforts to settle the Rhineland deadlock:

During the course of my interview with the Under-Secretary of State this afternoon he . . . said that in view of the insistent demand of the French that the German forces should withdraw from the heretofore demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, it had been necessary to make such concessions to the French Government as would induce them to arrive at a position where negotiations were possible. It was on this basis that conversations among the general staffs were agreed to by the British Government. As a result the French had moved from an extreme position to a middle ground where negotiations were possible. . . . The German Government apparently felt that they had won a great success and had assumed a completely recalcitrant . . . position. [If Hitler would not recede from this stand] the negotiations had no hope of success.51

In Berlin, Ferdinand L. Mayer, the American chargé d’affaires, had a talk with the French Ambassador and found him “quite pessimistic” about arriving at a satisfactory settlement of the Rhineland question.52 This pessimism was well founded. On May 7 the British Ambassador in Berlin submitted to the Foreign Office a detailed questionnaire which reflected a strong inclination towards the views expressed in the French memorandum of April 6.53 Eden knew very well that Hitler was not prepared to give a pledge to respect all the remaining operative clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. He was also aware of the fact that the German Foreign Office would not agree to any real limitation of air power and would refuse to enter into a nonaggression pact with Soviet Russia. British policy had suddenly changed from conciliation to challenge.

There was no expectation that this challenge would soon be answered.

The attitude of the German Foreign Office towards Eden’s vacillations was clearly revealed in a conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He assured Bullitt that “the deepest desire of Hitler was to come to a real understanding with France,” but every attempt he or Hitler had made to draw closer to the French had “resulted in either no reply from France or a rebuff.” With regard to England he said that he regretted

greatly that no really friendly contact had been established between the German and British Governments. I asked him if he meant that he did not talk and could not talk with Eden or the British Ambassador in Berlin as simply and directly as he was talking to me. He replied that he absolutely could not and that it was totally impossible. . . . He went on to say that the entire matter of the British note of inquiry had been mishandled grossly by the British Foreign Office. He said that Sir Eric Phipps had brought him the note with the request to keep its contents absolutely secret. . . . He [von Neurath] said that to his utter astonishment Sir Eric Phipps had then telephoned to him and said that he regretted greatly to inform him that there had been a leak as to the contents of the note and that it would be essential for the British Government to publish it the following morning.

Eden’s reversal of policy towards Germany came in the face of certain knowledge that German military strength was the main barrier that held back the tide of bolshevism that constantly threatened to inundate Europe. In this regard the conversation between Bullitt and von Neurath assumes additional importance:

We discussed relations between Germany and the Soviet Government. Von Neurath said that he considered the hostility between Germany and the Soviet Union absolutely irremovable. He asserted that the Soviet Union believed that Nazi Germany was the one obstacle to the conquest of Europe by Communism. This, incidentally, is the view of the Soviet Government.54

The German Foreign Office did not bother about making a formal reply to the British memorandum, and Prime Minister van Zeeland, of Belgium, confided to Ambassador Bullitt that he “regarded the future most pessimistically.”55 In order to banish this pessimism, representatives of Belgium, Britain, and France met at London on July 23 and issued a communiqué setting forth their views. The three powers were now ready to meet Germany in conference as soon as possible in order to endeavor to find some formula that would replace Locarno. Germany did not respond to this overture, so the King of Belgium on October 14 made a speech to his Cabinet which clarified the situation as far as his country was concerned. He was anxious for Belgium to return to her prewar status of guaranteed neutrality. Her policy should “aim resolutely at putting us outside the conflicts of our neighbours.”56 Locarno was dead beyond any hope of revival.

Over the ashes of Locarno hovered the shadow of bolshevism. It carried increasing consternation to European minds because of the collapse of collective security. To Ambassador Dodd, in Berlin, this collapse was largely the fault of France:

Under French leadership the League itself became partisan and only emphasized the duration of the dictated peace of Versailles and divided Europe into opposed camps. Germany’s refusal in March, 1935 longer to endure this situation shattered the delicately poised artificiality and thereby . . . all of Europe was thrown into a ferment and a scramble for adjustment. . . .

Heretofore the Bolshevik menace in Europe has been typified by the subterranean activities of the Third International rather than by Russian nationalistic militarism. Latterly, however, . . . there seems to have been a significant and aggressive change in Russian sponsorship of World Revolution. We incline to feel that this may have reached a point where the prospect for this revolution, as far as Europe is concerned, . . . has persuaded Stalin and his advisers of the desirability of coming out into the open and aggressively combining Russian militant imperialism with Russian Communism. . . . Through the Franco-Soviet alliance, through the apprehensions felt in many quarters in Europe over Germany’s renaissance, and through Russia’s adroit diplomatic maneuvers, the Soviets have been able to pose as the saviour to those States in Europe most fearful of the rebirth of a powerful Germany.57

f. Hitler and Mussolini Reach an Important Accord

In order to meet this mounting menace of communism and at the same time strengthen their position in Europe, Hitler and Mussolini through the summer of 1936 moved towards an accord. The revolution in Spain and the fateful Austro-German Agreement of the same month, accelerated this movement. On July 25, Hitler closed the German Legation in Addis Ababa thereby announcing his readiness to recognize the Italian conquest of Ethiopia.58

The visit of Lloyd George to Berchtesgaden during the summer of 1936 slightly delayed the German drift towards Italy. For a brief period Hitler revived his interest in a real rapprochement with Britain. Conversations with Lloyd George confirmed his belief in the rising power of Germany and led him to discount the possibility of American intervention in a second world war.59 But the German Foreign Office was suspicious of Eden who never seemed to know just what his attitude towards Nazi Germany should be.

With London hesitant about improving relations with Hitler, Rome showed a spirit of friendship which led the Foreign Office to send Hans Frank to survey the situation. Frank’s visit to Rome was followed by Ciano’s trip to Berlin. In his portfolio Ciano carried two documents that had fallen into Mussolini’s hands. When Ciano showed Hitler a telegram from Sir Eric Phipps to the British Foreign Office in which the German Government was criticized as one of “dangerous adventurers,” Hitler flew into the expected rage. He was eager for a pact with Italy against the “inept creatures” who formulated British foreign policy.60

In America the Hitler-Mussolini Pact evoked little comment. The Baltimore Sun feared that the “understanding” between Ciano and Hitler had “far-reaching significance for it reveals that the two Fascist dictators have agreed upon a common plan of action in their future diplomatic relations with the other Western European Powers.”61 The Richmond Times-Dispatch looked upon the pact as an “exceedingly ominous” portent for the future,62 but the Christian Science Monitor hoped that “sound economic adjustments between these two countries might improve rather than endanger the peace of Europe.”63

g. Versailles Undergoes Another Attack

Shortly after the announcement of the Hitler-Ciano Pact, Hitler produced another tremor throughout Europe by repudiating those clauses in the Treaty of Versailles which placed important German waterways under the control of an international commission.64 The main question that now plagued American minds was whether he would soon attack the territorial clauses in the dictated pact of Versailles. The Los Angeles Times feared that a “war of revenge at Germany’s earliest opportunity is now almost inevitable,”65 and the Chicago Daily News was deeply concerned over the effects of the Nazi unilateral denunciation of important treaties.66 The Springfield Republican expressed a very different viewpoint. The signatories to the Treaty of Versailles should have remedied the situation long ago and thus prevented the development of the fierce nationalism that was “splitting Europe into badly damaged fragments.”67 The Providence Journal thought that the whole difficulty stemmed back to the “short-sighted statesmanship” that produced the “impractical” Treaty of Versailles.68

h. Germany and Italy Recognize Franco

When Hitler and Mussolini recognized the Franco Government (November 18) the Portland Morning Oregonian remarked that the “situation in Europe is daily more dangerous.”69 The Birmingham News was apprehensive that Russia would soon take some action that would bring on a “general war.”70 The Atlanta Constitution took a more hopeful view: “It is more probable that the strengthened alignment against Communism will act as a powerful deterrent against aggressive steps by Russia.”71

The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle was able to distill some sunshine from the grey wash of the news from Europe: “There are too many points of rivalry between Italy and Germany to permit a real military alliance between them. Neither can get along without the cooperation of France and Britain. Together, however, they may help to bring about a four power pact that will serve the interests of all.”72

i. The German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, November 25, 1936

The Baltimore Sun was gravely concerned about the implications of the Anti-Comintern Pact: “There is no use in denying that most of the world Powers are rushing pell-mell towards war.”73 The Cleveland Plain Dealer feared that the pact might become “the opening wedge of the next war.”74

The Des Moines Register believed that the new German-Japanese treaty was a distinct threat to the historic American position in the Far East: “Shall we abandon, lock, stock and barrel our whole basic policy as to the far side of the Pacific, or shall we . . . continue to play the balance of power game in the far Pacific?”75

The business press had few comments to make on this accord between Germany and Japan, but Barron’s thought that its purpose was evident: “While the German-Japanese understanding is aimed at Communism and ostensibly has nothing to do with Soviet Russia as a country, the mask is so obviously thin as to be almost deliberately transparent. In effect, these countries are saying to the Spanish Leftists and to the world: ‘We now show our strength. If any country wishes to interfere with our plans, that country must take the consequences!’ ”76

j. Europe Tries to Replace Locarno

The increase in German military strength through the creation of accords with Italy and Japan aroused great concern in the minds of many European statesmen. Georges Bonnet had a conversation with Ambassador Bullitt during which he stressed the importance of a “reconciliation between France and Germany.” He felt that an effort should be made to achieve that objective but he was certain that the “blessing of the United States would be necessary.” Bullitt hastened to assure him that any effort to “reach such a reconciliation would have the full benediction of the United States.”

Later that afternoon the German Ambassador called at the American Embassy in Paris and confided to Bullitt that he had been instructed by Ribbentrop to discuss the matter of effecting a “full understanding” between France and Germany. His Government “ardently desired” such an understanding and wished to know if Bullitt could propose some steps towards that end. Bullitt assured the ambassador that the French Government “desired intensely to reach an understanding with Germany.” The best way to insure this objective would be “through discreet conversations” between representatives of the two countries. The ambassador then said that he had

initiated such conversations by bringing Schacht to Paris; that Schacht’s conversation with Blum had been most promising but that the French had then conferred with the British and because of British opposition had not followed up the initiative of Schacht. He then pointed out that England, the Soviet Union and Italy were all opposed to Franco-German reconciliation and that the United States was the only Great Power in the Western world which would regard such reconciliation favorably. I told him that our Government would certainly favor such reconciliation. . . . I asked him what would be the attitude of the German Government if Delbos would say to him that France would like to enter into such a global negotiation. He replied that the German Government would accept with enthusiasm.77

On this same afternoon Bonnet discussed with Bullitt the possibility of “creating a close collaboration between France, England and the United States.” The three great democracies should first agree upon some plan for world peace and then offer it to Germany. If Germany could be convinced that the great democracies were standing shoulder to shoulder she would not dare attack in the next eighteen months. Bullitt bluntly informed Bonnet that he felt that there

was not the slightest chance that the United States would participate. I explained to him that while we were deeply and sincerely interested in the preservation of peace, not only in the Western Hemisphere but also in Europe and the Far East, there were certain absolute limits beyond which we could not go. He and all other French statesmen must realize that the United States would not send troops, warships and money to Europe again to support France and England. He should also realize that we would not become involved in the political difficulties of Europe.78

But despite Bullitt’s blunt words the French statesmen continued to place before him “different variations of a plan for the settlement of the difficulties of Europe.” Great international corporations should be established “with capital drawn chiefly from England, France and the United States but with representation on the board of all the leading nations of the world.” These corporations would be world clearing houses for the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. Coupled with this proposal, which was “designed essentially to relieve Germany of her present economic difficulties, would be a proposal for limitation of armaments.” French statesmen hoped that President Roosevelt would “take the lead in making a proposal of this sort.”79

Although Bullitt had warned the French Foreign Office that the President would not take the initiative in any search for a formula that would insure the peace of Europe, there was still hope in Paris that America would abandon her policy of isolation and assume the burdens of leadership. Dr. Schacht had an important conversation with Ambassador Davies who was passing through Berlin en route to Moscow. He stated that the “present condition of the German people was intolerable” and that he had been authorized to submit to England and France significant proposals that might save the situation.80 He had found Prime Minister Blum “surprisingly agreeable,” but England had “flatly rejected” the proposals and had refused even to have informal discussions on the subject. Schacht thought the only way out of the existing dead-end street was for President Roosevelt to call an international conference that would discuss the abolition of the numerous barriers to world trade.81

Davies was slightly more encouraging than Bullitt. He told Schacht that the President would be indisposed to “become entangled in these matters unless there was some assurance of success.” It would, in the meantime, be wise for German leaders to tone down the aggressive spirit that was so manifest in the recent speeches at Nürnberg.

While Schacht in Berlin was putting out peace feelers, Blum in Paris was doing the same thing. He told Bullitt that the French Ambassador had just reported a “most amicable conversation” with the German Foreign Minister who had been profuse “in his assertions that Germany desired nothing but peace.” Blum agreed with von Neurath’s opinion that any “real conciliation between France and Germany must be prefaced by a settlement of the Spanish conflict.” When this was effected there could then be conversations that would “explore the possibilities” of economic co-operation on a large scale.82

It was apparent that Blum was in favor of definite concessions to Germany in the hope of building some bridge of understanding between France and the Nazi Government. This inclination towards appeasement was abruptly halted by Anthony Eden who made a visit to Paris for the purpose of giving Blum some blunt advice.83

On January 19, Eden made a speech in the House of Commons in which he stressed the opinion that “economic collaboration and political appeasement must go hand in hand.” He then referred to Germany as a nation that had “exalted race and nationalism into a creed which is practised with the same fervour as it is preached. All the world is asking . . . whither these doctrines are to lead Germany, whither they are to lead all of us?”84

On January 24, Prime Minister Blum, in a speech at Lyons, underlined the British thesis that peace in Europe was indivisible. It would not be preserved by a series of bilateral treaties. No “engagements limited to France would guarantee the security of France.”85

k. Hitler’s Soft Answers Stir New Hope in Europe

On January 30, 1937, Chancellor Hitler gave his answer to the speeches of Eden and Blum. First he denounced the “war guilt” clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Next he expressed a desire for co-operation with other nations and cited as proof of this statement the German agreements with Austria, Italy, Japan, and Poland. Assurances were given of a disposition to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium and Holland. He once more asserted that the Nazi Government had no quarrel with France. His sharp shafts were feathered for only one nation—Soviet Russia. In this regard he referred to the untenability of the British thesis that European peace was indivisible. In fact Europe was divided into two camps and this division had been brought about by the proclamation of the bolshevist doctrine, the chief feature of which is to enforce itself on all peoples.86 Peace could be preserved only by preparation against the Red menace.

In America about one half the newspapers received Hitler’s words with suspicion as to his underlying motives. The Omaha World-Herald saw no promise of peace in the speech of January 30: “Europe must wait for more pacific assurances from Germany’s leader.”87 The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle thought that the “conditions on which Hitler would deal with other nations are impossible unless the world is willing to carry civilization back a thousand years.”88 The Memphis Commercial Appeal was certain that Hitler’s attack upon Russia was for the purpose of “inflaming the French conservative and peasant opposition to the Pink and Red Blum Government.”89 The San Francisco Chronicle attacked Hitler as “still unregenerate.” He had “offered to join any sort of a peace movement in Europe that left Russia out. So far, so bad. There can be no peace in Europe unless it includes everybody.”90

Some American newspapers saw Hitler as a herald of peace. The Boston Evening Transcript regarded the speech of January 30 as “reassuring.” What the “Fuehrer said was conciliatory in tone.”91 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch insisted that it was an “amiable Hitler the Reichstag listened to,”92 while the Des Moines Register called attention to his “generally conciliatory tone.”93 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle made similar comments: “He [Hitler] was surprisingly conciliatory on all of those matters which might add to the tension in Europe.”94

Louis Einstein, in London, believed that Hitler’s speech was “principally designed to influence British opinion towards exercising a greater forbearance in regard to future German expansion eastward.”95 In Paris, Prime Minister Blum told Bullitt that he had heard from the French Ambassador in Berlin to the effect that Hitler had prepared his speech under the influence of Neurath and Schacht but that Göring on his return from Italy had persuaded the Führer “to make it much less positive and conciliatory than the first draft.”96 Hugh Wilson, in Bern, thought that he saw in Hitler’s speech some evidence of a “slow evolution in favor of a better understanding with his neighbors. This may eventually make possible a meeting point although I do not believe that the meeting point is yet reached whether in respect to limitation of armaments, economic co-operation or colonial aspirations.”97

It was obvious to Ambassador Davies that the Soviet Government was concerned about the effect of Hitler’s speech upon the British and French governments. Litvinov complained to Davies that he “failed to understand why England and France were continually making overtures to Hitler. . . . Hitler’s policy was still that outlined in his book Mein Kampf and he continued to be dominated by a lust for conquest.” After listening to Litvinov’s acidulous remarks, Davies gained the impression that the Russian Foreign Office was “apprehensive lest there should be some composition of differences between France, Great Britain and Germany.”98

l. France Is Hopeful of American Support

The French Foreign Office thought there might be some basis for this Russian fear that Britain, France, and Germany would compose all their difficulties. Since January, the Nazi Government had “definitely inaugurated a more moderate policy.” The French Ambassador in Berlin had just sent word that “Schacht and the businessmen of Germany once more had rather more influence with Hitler than the leaders of the Nazi party.” Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, thought this information so significant that he was “sending the experts of the Ministry of Commerce to Berlin tomorrow to conduct the negotiations for the renewal of the Franco-German Treaty of Commerce. He had given them orders to act with the greatest liberality.”

One important barrier to a Franco-German accord was the opposition of the British Foreign Office. Delbos was certain that Eden was a “good European and would really like to see France and Germany get together. Unfortunately, however, Eden often did not control British foreign policy. The ground was cut from under him by other members of the British Cabinet and even by the permanent officials of the British Foreign Office. He believed that the British would pretend to desire Franco-German reconciliation but would continue to follow their old policy of keeping France and Germany hostile to each other though not at war.”99

This official French suspicion of Britain did not extend to the United States. In America the working of the radical leaven in France was viewed with sympathetic understanding. Prime Minister Blum confided to Bullitt that he wished to extend his “most profound thanks” to President Roosevelt for the support he was giving to the “forces of democracy in France.” America, alone of the great powers, was “genuinely interested in the same policies” that Blum was “trying to put through.” The British Government was conservative and it “disapproved highly” of Blum’s radical “domestic policy.” Moreover, the British Foreign Office was always “reluctant to see France and Germany begin to approach each other.” It was evident, said Blum, that France counted greatly upon “American good will for the preservation of peace in Europe.”100

No matter how strongly Bullitt admonished French statesmen not to expect American assistance in the event of a European war, Blum and the Foreign Office continued to cherish a hope that President Roosevelt would soon take an active role in world affairs. The President was loath to disappoint those hopes.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
90Ibid., p. 5.
91Ibid., pp. 6-7.
92Ibid., p. 9.
93Ibid., pp. 10-11.
94Ibid., p. ix.
95Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. III, 4389.
96January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
97January 9, 1927.
98January 25, 1927.
99March 17, 1927.
100January 21, 26, 1927.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941