XI: Ambassador Dodd Finds Berlin an Unpleasant Spot for a Wilsonian Democrat

XI Ambassador Dodd Finds Berlin an Unpleasant Spot for a Wilsonian Democrat

a. Nazi Germany Makes a Friendly Gesture towards America

WHILE the Roosevelt Administration was rapidly dissipating a large fund of Italian good will for the United States, a more serious crisis was developing in German-American relations. During the spring and early summer of 1933 the prospect seemed bright. When Ambassador Dodd arrived in Berlin on July 13 he discovered that the Germans “seemed very friendly.”1 Two days later he was presented to Konstantin von Neurath, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who proved “most agreeable.” It was not long before Louis P. Lochner, of the Associated Press, informed Dodd that one of Chancellor Hitler’s friends had extended an invitation to the new ambassador to meet the Führer at a “quiet, secret luncheon” where the relations between America and Germany could be frankly discussed. Dodd repelled this friendly gesture but he did consent to call upon the family of Professor Henry Wood, of Johns Hopkins University. In the Wood circle he found the conversation was “good” although the “tone was quite Hitlerite.”2

On July 17, Dodd sent to Secretary Hull a long dispatch dealing with economic conditions in the Reich. Dr. Frick, the Minister of the Interior, was sparing no effort to improve the situation. He had issued a “stern order” forbidding irresponsible Nazi officials to interfere in business affairs. It should now be clear that the German revolution was finished. The Nazi Party would devote all future efforts to “lawful constructive work.” There was no doubt that Hitler was strongly in support of this conservative movement, and Dodd regarded the Chancellor’s program as a “courageous step.”3

These favorable comments were repeated in a much louder tone by Lord Rothermere whose estimate of Nazi Germany was couched in the friendliest tone:

Of all the historic changes in our time this upset of Germany under Hitler has been the quickest and most complete and significant. The German people are filled with the courage of a crusade. . . . It would be fruitless and unfair to regret this rebirth of the German spirit. . . . It is Germany’s good fortune that it has found a leader who can bring together all the youthful elements in the country.4

The friendly attitude of the Nazi Government was further demonstrated in connection with the arrest of a young American student from New York who had boasted of his communist faith. He was promptly arrested and for a while kept incommunicado despite the efforts of Mr. Messersmith to get in touch with him. Mr. Messersmith was finally successful, and after ascertaining the facts in the case, he authorized Mr. Mowrer and Mr. Knickerbocker to cable the story to their papers in the United States. Ambassador Dodd noted that Mr. Messersmith did not have the courtesy to act in this matter with the permission of the Embassy. It developed that the young Communist was “an indiscreet sort of fellow.” When Mr. Dodd intervened in his behalf, he was immediately released and shipped to New York.5

On August 3, Dodd was entertained by the ebullient Karl von Wiegand, a veteran newspaper correspondent who disclosed many aspects of diplomacy hitherto unknown to the ambassador. Although von Wiegand was “sympathetic with the Hitler group,” he impressed Dodd “most favorably.”6

Dodd had not yet closed his mind to favorable impressions of Germans and of Germany, and even Mr. Messersmith was at times able to see something in the German scene that was not repellent. In August 1933 was apparent to Messersmith that the Nazi authorities were anxious to create a more friendly American public opinion. When a group of young American Boy Scouts visited Munich they were given such a friendly reception that the leader remarked that Hitler was “making true socialism a reality.” When some cadets of the United States Coast Guard Service passed through Berlin they were made the guests of the city. During a dinner given in their honor, one of the German officials expressed the hope that the cadets, when they returned to the United States, would “disabuse the American mind of the stories of outrages and persecutions of persons not connected with the Nazi movement.” Mr. Messersmith also called the attention of Secretary Hull to the recent statements of Mr. Joseph E. Ridder in the Berliner Tageblatt. Mr. Ridder, owner of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, had confided to a reporter of the Tageblatt that he had found the atmosphere “in Germany one of clear honesty in all things, whether it is in the political, commercial or cultural field.”7

On August 12, Mr. Dodd sent to President Roosevelt a letter describing the German scene. There was sharp friction between Germany and Great Britain over the disarmament issue. The situation was so strained that the British military attaché in Berlin reported a recent conversation with Winston Churchill “to the effect that their Government is ready, on the request of France, to apply utmost force against Germany.” It was evident to Dodd that the Nazi authorities were going out of their way to court American good will. One reason for this conciliatory attitude was the fact that all revolutionary movements, as soon as they are firmly fixed, “swing a little to the right.” Because of this growing conservatism in the Nazi Party, Dodd believed that if the President could “restrain” the British and the French, he was confident that the situation in Berlin would “ease off.”8

b. Dodd Declines to Attend the Nürnberg Party Congress

But despite these Nazi gestures of conciliation, Dodd was very cautious about taking any step that would indicate his approval of the Hitler regime. The program of anti-Semitism sponsored by the Nazis had many implications that were deeply distasteful to Dodd,9 and he was fully aware of the wave of anti-Hitler sentiment that was sweeping over the United States. In view of this situation he decided to ask for instructions with reference to acceptance of the invitation to attend the Nazi Party Congress at Nürnberg during the first week in September.10 William Phillips, the Acting Secretary of State, promptly informed Dodd that he did not feel “that it would be advisable for the Department to take any initiative or act directly in the matter. The implications of the local situation are better known to you than to the Department and I rely on your judgment to deal with this question with the minimum of embarrassment to yourself or to this Government.”11 Mr. Phillips then advised consultation with the French and British ambassadors in Berlin.

But Dodd did not wish to take the responsibility of acting upon his own judgment. He had consulted with the British chargé d’affaires who was undecided as to his course of action; the French Ambassador had not heard from the Foreign Office and could give no indication of the attitude of his Government. After wrestling with this diplomatic indecision Dodd felt constrained to make another appeal to the Department of State for instructions.12 He found Mr. Phillips distinctly coy. The Acting Secretary felt that “this government should not take the lead in this matter. The British and French have as much if not more at stake than we, and I should not wish to give them an opportunity later to justify a decision by claiming that it was made at the instance of this government.”13 Once more the matter was placed in the hands of Mr. Dodd who finally declined the invitation on the “ground that I could not absent myself from Berlin long enough to have the pleasure of accepting.”14

c. American Citizens Are Roughly Handled by Storm Troopers

Ambassador Dodd’s implausible excuse with reference to nonattendance during the exercises of the Nazi celebration at Nürnberg was regarded as a clear indication of his feeling towards the Hitler Government. Some Nazi officials were now ready to show their feeling of hostility for the Roosevelt regime. At times American citizens were roughly handled without the slightest excuse, and despite the protests of the ambassador these incidents were repeated. Even before Mr. Dodd had declined the Nürnberg invitation, Dr. Daniel Mulvihill, an American citizen, had been assaulted by some members of the Storm Troops (Sturmabteilung). Mulvihill was watching a parade of SA men along the Unter den Linden. When he failed to give the Nazi salute to the German colors, he was attacked and beaten. A protest was promptly filed with the Foreign Office and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry gave assurances of “immediate satisfactory action,”15 Group Leader Karl Ernst of the Berlin SA apologized to Dodd for the offense, and the offending storm trooper was imprisoned.16

On this particular occasion, Bernhard von Bülow, Under Secretary of State, paid a visit to the American Embassy for a “frank and cordial conversation” with Mr. Dodd. He explained that the Nazi armament and drill work was “purely defensive and in part as a means of training younger people to more serious attitudes toward life.” When Dodd warned that the “slightest aggression of Germany on any of her frontiers would likely produce a European conflict,” von Bülow replied: “That is exactly what I think.” He then observed that “whether the Treaty of Versailles forbids or not, we shall build anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and defences if the Geneva Conference does not bring about a reduction of air armaments in France.”

In conclusion von Bülow strongly deprecated the lurid nature of the accounts in American newspapers of alleged German “atrocities.” Dodd then explained to von Bülow the “relationship of the press to government and agreed that many articles which appear in our papers are exaggerated, and also said to him that I would endeavor to influence the Chicago Daily News in its treatment of the Mowrer case. Both of us agreed that Mowrer had overstepped the proper limitations. I, of course, told him that Mowrer is leaving on August 31, for which he expressed thanks.”17

d. Professor Coar Tries to Improve German-American Relations

In Berlin, Dodd soon discovered that there were many unofficial ambassadors of good will who were constantly working to create better feeling between Nazi Germany and the United States. In the early days of August 1933, Professor John F. Coar called at the American Embassy for a conversation with Mr. Dodd. Coar had been born in Germany, of American parents, and apparently knew a great deal about conditions in the Reich. He was about to leave for a visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, and wished to discuss certain problems with Dodd. The ambassador insisted that the Nazi persecution of the Jews was alienating American sentiment, and Coar agreed with this viewpoint. On August 16, Coar returned to Berlin after his conference with Hitler. Apparently Dodd’s words of warning had been wasted upon the Chancellor who informed Coar that the Jews were the world’s greatest curse which he was determined to lift.18

But Hitler did not wish to undertake this task by himself. He authorized Professor Coar to inform President Roosevelt of “his [Hitler’s] willingness to open diplomatic discussion with our Administration if he can be personally assured of this Administration’s attitude in certain matters.”19 The President consented to see Coar but was ill when he arrived in Washington, and Secretary Hull was so “occupied with the Cuban crisis” that he could spare no time for a conference with the anxious Professor. Coar finally had an extended conversation with Mr. Moffat, chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, who reported to Secretary Hull the substance of Coar’s remarks.20 Hull then assured Coar, by mail, that his views had been “of great help” but inasmuch as the situation in Germany was changing from “day to day it is impossible to give you from this end the type of information you desire.”21

e. George Sylvester Viereck Offers to Assist the President

As Professor Coar moved off the Washington stage his place was taken by George Sylvester Viereck. Viereck had been an important American literary figure before 1914. During the years from 1914 to 1917 he had been the editor of The Fatherland, a pro-German periodical. After the World War, Colonel House employed him to write an account of the House-Wilson relations during the war and during the troublous sessions of the Paris Peace Conference. While he was preparing his volume for publication (The Strangest Friendship in History) he came across the House-Grey Agreement of February 22, 1916. This agreement was a secret understanding between Britain and the United States, and in accordance with its terms America would give diplomatic assistance to Britain and France whenever they issued a call for help. This diplomatic assistance would be gradually transformed into military support at the most favorable moment. House believed that President Wilson had such secure control over Congress that the war-making power really resided in the Chief Executive. When the President indorsed the House-Grey Agreement the American people were secretly bound to share the military fortunes of the Allied powers whenever these powers would invoke the agreement.22

Viereck was greatly shocked when he realized all the implications of the House-Grey Agreement. Secret diplomacy had been one of the most important causes of the World War, and apparently it could have plunged America into that conflict in 1916 if Allied leaders had made the most of their opportunities. It was not difficult for Viereck to see that secret executive agreements could easily involve the United States in future wars. Filled with foreboding as to the future of America, Viereck wrote to President Roosevelt and called his attention to the dark side of Wilson’s foreign policy during the eventful years, 1915 to 1917. He felt free to write in this intimate manner to the President because he had once served as the ghost writer for three articles that had appeared in Liberty Magazine over the signature of Franklin D. Roosevelt.23

On October 11, 1933, Viereck wrote another letter to the President in which he once more directed his attention to the House-Grey Agreement:

You may remember some time ago I called your attention to a “gentleman’s agreement” which bound the United States to the chariot of the Entente. My article was published in Liberty and was subsequently included in my book “The Strangest Friendship in History,” a study of the psychic messmateship between Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House. At the time when I sent you the Liberty article you asked me to talk the matter over with you. I did not avail myself of that very kind invitation because I had no remedy to suggest.

The more I think about the problem the more I discover that it is impossible to maintain an international policy without some such informal understandings. I discussed the matter with Senator Gore and Senator Borah but neither had any concrete suggestion to make which I could have offered to you.

I have just returned from Germany where I had the opportunity to talk frankly to Chancellor Hitler, Foreign Minister von Neurath, Vice Chancellor von Papen, Minister of Economics Schmitt, to Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, Finance Minister Schacht and others. I also had some rather interesting talks with the Crown Prince, with Emperor William at Doorn, and with our own Ambassador Dodd.

Colonel House thinks that possibly some of the facts I learned may be of interest to you. If so, I shall be very glad to present these to you. . . . It seems to me that the United States owes a debt of honor to Germany originating with the Fourteen Points. The only way our government can pay this debt is by using its utmost efforts to maintain peace and to restrain the victors of 1918 from pursuing an unfair advantage over Germany.

I am delighted that your Administration, so brilliant in its achievements at home, seems likely to be equally distinguished and brilliant abroad. At any rate, it seems dear that under your regime the United States will not again permit itself to be made the catspaw for other powers in their selfish struggle for predominance.24

The President was slow in sending a reply to this letter from Viereck. Finally, on November 3, Louis Howe extended to him an invitation to visit Washington so that he could talk things over with Secretary Hull or with Under Secretary of State William Phillips.25 Viereck next wrote to Secretary Hull and inclosed a copy of the letter from Mr. Howe. He remarked that he had recently talked with many of the Nazi leaders, including Chancellor Hitler. It was possible that a “stray bit of information or interpretation may possibly be helpful in one way or another.”26 Secretary Hull turned Viereck’s letter over to Mr. Phillips who arranged for a conference.27 What happened at this conference is not disclosed in any memoranda in the Department of State. According to Viereck he had a “pleasant talk with Phillips and with the heads of the various departments [in the Department of State.] I told them that Hitler was ‘the over compensation of Germany’s inferiority complex.’ I also said that ‘Anschluss was inevitable and that it was desired even more in Austria than it was in Germany.’ Incidentally, Hull gave me a special letter which recommended me to all diplomatic representatives of the United States in Europe.”

But this letter from Secretary Hull did not lead to any discussions abroad that helped to improve German-American relations. When Viereck, a little later, became a critic of the New Deal he received from Fulton Oursler, of Liberty Magazine, “an ultimatum that I [Viereck] must either write an article, ‘Why I Am Ashamed of Germany,’ and another endorsing the New Deal or sever my relations with Liberty. If I agreed, he promised to restore my name on the cover and feature my articles. I refused.”28

Mr. Viereck assures me that he did not talk with President Roosevelt during any of his administrations. This assurance makes distinctly doubtful the following statement by Mr. Erwin H. Klaus in a letter to the President in March 1939: “Mr. Viereck took it upon himself to tell the gathering [of the Roland German-American Democratic Society of Greater New York, March 16, 1939] that a few years ago you [the President] told him personally that you considered it your principal ambition to destroy Hitler and Germany with him if it would be the last thing you did.”29 It is not likely that the President would have expressed himself so bluntly to Mr. Viereck.

f. Mr. Kaltenborn Receives a Lesson in Incivility

During these informal negotiations by amateur diplomats, Ambassador Dodd went to the residence of President Hindenburg in order formally to present his credentials. In the course of his conversation with the President he found an opportunity to launch an attack upon the doctrine of economic nationalism which was becoming increasingly popular in Germany. When he found his viewpoint warmly echoed by the great warrior he suspected that Hindenburg might be engaging in some “indirect criticism of the Nazi extremists.”30

These extremists were constantly upsetting every little applecart that Dodd and the German moderates were trying to push down the rough lanes of German-American diplomatic intercourse. On September 9 the Department of State issued a press release stating that Mr. Samuel B. Bossard and a son of Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn, noted radio commentator, had been assaulted because they had not given the Nazi salute while watching a parade. The German Foreign Office was prompt in expressing its “deep regrets” at such outrages and it promised to take the most “energetic action” against the offenders.31 On September 14, Dodd had a conference with Baron von Neurath with regard to this matter: “I acknowledged that Americans were negligent but said that was their privilege. . . . He assured me that he had recently gone over the matter with Goering, . . . and also with the Chancellor, both agreeing that a ‘stricter enforcement of the law would be made thereafter.’ ”32

Dodd was far more successful than Mr. Messersmith in receiving verbal satisfaction from Nazi officials with reference to these assaults upon American nationals. When the consul general had a long talk with Dr. Funk, the State Secretary in the Ministry of Propaganda, the Nazi official blamed the Kaltenborns for “having turned their backs to the street and for having looked into a show-window” while a parade of Storm Troops passed. With regard to the assault upon Mr. Bossard, Dr. Funk stated that so many courtesies had been showered upon that young man that he had left Germany “quite satisfied that everything was all right here.”33

Mr. Messersmith was shocked at the callous manner in which Dr. Funk had dismissed the Kaltenborn and Bossard incidents. He was rapidly becoming intensely hostile to the Nazi regime, and he remarked in a letter to Mr. Phillips that the motto of the Nazi revolution should be “brutality, mendacity and loquacity.” The campaign against the Jews had been carried on with such “extreme brutality” that suicides were becoming commonplace. While there had been manifested some popular opposition to these outrages upon the Jews, the matter had been so skillfully handled by Dr. Goebbels that the position of Hitler

is stronger than ever. He has been practically deified by a certain part of the population and fits into the extraordinary psychological situation which has been created. He is the center of the present madness. . . . Goering is still the exponent of the physical force of the party. . . . He has shown himself to be what some of us really believed, a simple-minded, enthusiastic soldier who is a good deal of a boy still. . . . In all justice to Goering it must be said that he is the only one of the three primary leaders of the party who is reasonable and can be reasoned with.34

The friendly viewpoint of Mr. Messersmith is clearly shown in his estimate of Göring as a “simple-minded, enthusiastic soldier who is a good deal of a boy still.” Any capable person who had spent a few weeks in Germany in close contact with Göring would have arrived at a very different estimate of the man and his influence in Nazi ranks. Dodd judged Göring far more correctly than Messersmith, and he rightly held him responsible for the failure of the Nazi Government to take effective action against the outrages perpetrated upon American citizens by German hoodlums. Göring, as President of Prussia and chief of police, could easily have enforced order if he had been disposed to do so. When Dodd complained to the Foreign Office about these assaults by Storm Troops, von Neurath weakly murmured: “The S.A. men are so uncontrollable that I am afraid we cannot stop them.”35 He meant, of course, that Göring was not interested in protecting Americans.

g. Germany Withdraws from the League of Nations

Göring was merely the symbol of the exaggerated nationalism that was fostered by the Nazi Government. In Germany this chauvinism was often expressed in attacks upon foreigners who did not give the Hitler salute during parades. In international relations it often took the form of a series of demands for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles and for equality with reference to armaments. The Geneva Conference, in June 1933, had adjourned all meetings until October 16. During the summer Norman Davis engaged in many conversations in London and Paris in an effort to reduce the scope of German demands and to expand French concessions. On October 9, Secretary Hull gave to Dr. Luther, the German Ambassador, a veiled warning that America looked with disfavor upon any acceleration of the European armaments race: “I stated to him [Luther] that the one primary and paramount purpose . . . of the United States Government was the promotion of general disarmament. I said that, naturally, any organized movement for this purpose could not logically contemplate a modified program by which some governments might proceed to rearm.”36

A few days later (October 14), Sir John Simon presented a plan which provided for the reorganization of continental armies upon a militia basis with a detailed system of international supervision. The powers with existing large armaments should reduce their military might in accordance with a plan which aimed at achieving equality of status in eight years. In the meantime the “Powers now under restrictions of the peace treaties” should make no effort to increase their armament. Germany, however, would be given some concessions with reference to the organization of the Reichswehr.37

Hitler took a dim view of any plan that would make Germany wait eight years for a status of equality with regard to armaments, and the Foreign Office immediately informed Geneva that Germany would no longer remain in the Disarmament Conference or in the League of Nations.38 In defense of this action Hitler stated on the radio that the studied refusals of the great powers to acknowledge the “moral and material equality” of Germany had compelled the Nazi Government to adopt a policy of withdrawal from participation in European conferences. In order to quiet any apprehensions of Nazi designs for aggression he adopted a conciliatory tone in his references to France and went so far as to imply a renunciation of any desire for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.39

In a confidential dispatch to Mr. Phillips, Mr. Messersmith gave an explanation of the abrupt manner of the German withdrawal from the League:

I think there is little doubt that Goebbels is more responsible than any other person for the quick decision to get out of Geneva entirely. I think it is quite certain . . . that Sir John Simon had a talk with Goebbels and Goebbels was made to thoroughly understand that England could not help Germany in any way as long as they kept on doing here what they were. I understand that Sir John was very plain, very direct and just as energetic and definite as it would be possible to be. I know Goebbels and I know what effect such a conversation would have on him. He would be absolutely furious. . . . He went posthaste to Hitler and as he and Hitler think alike about all these things and are temperamentally so much the same, I think there is every reason to believe that the decision to get out of Geneva was made then and there.

In order to illustrate the pathological state of mind of the Nazi leaders, Mr. Messersmith observed as follows:

I know of no way in which to emphasize the extraordinary mentality here better than by telling you how outraged I was to learn that in circles surrounding Hitler there is a widespread feeling that President and Mrs. Roosevelt have practically nothing but Jewish advisers. . . . They seem to believe that because we have Jews in official positions, . . . our policy is being dictated by the Jews alone and that particularly the President and Mrs. Roosevelt are conducting anti-German propaganda under the influence of Jewish friends and advisers.40

The early portraits that Ambassador Dodd painted of Hitler were in more sober color than those of Mr. Messersmith. On October 17, Dodd had an audience with the Chancellor whom he found to look “somewhat better than the pictures that appear in the papers.” Dodd discussed two matters of importance: the assaults upon American citizens and the discriminations against American creditors. Every request he made was acceded to and “the Chancellor assured me personally that he would see that any future attack was punished to the limit.” When Dodd turned to the matter of German withdrawal from the League, Hitler became “clearly excited.” After he completed an indictment of the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles, Dodd remarked: “There is evident injustice in the French attitude.” Hitler was instantly mollified by this frank admission, and the interview was concluded in an agreeable spirit.41

But if Dodd was willing to admit the injustice of the French attitude towards Germany he was also quick to criticize the manner in which pressure was exerted upon voters in order to influence their decisions. Opponents of the Nazi regime were “sysematically intimidated. Nazi speakers have openly boasted that, though the ballotting will be secret, a way has been devised of checking upon all the ‘traitors’ who fail to vote for Hitler.”42

Dodd’s comments had particular reference to the national election of November 12 which was a referendum on Hitler’s decision to withdraw Germany from the Arms Conference and from the League of Nations. Thanks to Nazi pressure, the result was that the “Government candidates received 39,500,000 votes out of a total of about 43,000,000.”43

In his pre-election speeches Hitler constantly claimed that he desired peace and not war. On November 10 he impressively observed: “One should not expect me to be so insane as to desire a war. If anyone in the world can feel menaced it is only we. We want peace and agreement, nothing else!”44 But these pacific expressions were discounted by Mr. Messersmith who was certain that Hitler was planning for eventual war: “Hitler and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it is found finally essential.”45

This desire for war, however, was checked by President Hindenburg who was strongly opposed to any rash military moves. The memory of Versailles still nestled in the mind of the great marshal, and he went out of his way to be conciliatory to foreign diplomats. On January 1, 1934, Dodd drove to the Presidential palace to pay his respects to the aged warrior. Hindenburg courteously inquired about the progress of Dodd’s son in the University of Berlin, and he even complimented Dodd himself on his use of the German language. Hitler, “very much subdued,” tried to carry on a conversation with Dodd who insisted upon talking about college professors and conditions in German universities. After several attempts to reach this high academic plane, Hitler moved away from the Dodd circle with a feeling that the American Ambassador had tried to “embarrass him a little.”46

h. The Debt Problem Embarrasses German-American Relations

It was not merely with reference to university matters that Ambassador Dodd would “embarrass” Chancellor Hitler. The problem of the debt owed to American creditors was a recurrent one that gave Hitler deep and lasting concern. The German moratorium of June 9, 1933, had at first applied to all public and private debts except short-term obligations to foreign banking institutions. It was modified so as to exempt from its scope the Dawes Plan loan of 1924 and the Young Plan loan of 1930. Provision was also made for the payment of 75 per cent of the interest on other loans through the operation of a plan that involved the use of scrip.

In December 1933 the Reichsbank extended the moratorium through the first half of 1934, and reduced the interest on German bonds from 75 to 65 per cent. American creditors were greatly disturbed by arrangements with the Netherlands and with Switzerland whereby the bondholders of those countries were to be paid full interest in return for commercial concessions.

On January 3, 1934, Ambassador Dodd filed a strong protest at the Foreign Office against this discriminatory treatment of American creditors. Although the Foreign Office was sympathetic, it could do nothing to better the situation, and the only answer Dodd received was a statement that Germany could pay only in proportion as the creditor nations bought German goods. Thanks to a partial American boycott of German manufacturers, only a certain percentage of interest could be paid to American creditors.47

President Roosevelt refused to accept this German explanation. On January 22, 1934, he invited Dr. Luther to the White House and insisted that American creditors be placed on the same footing as the creditors of other nations.48 In response to this pressure, Dr. Schacht held a conference with the representatives of the creditor nations and he finally agreed to a compromise. According to this arrangement a portion of the interest would still be paid in scrip, but it would be redeemed at 76.9 per cent of the full value of the debts instead of the proposed 65 per cent. In carrying out his instructions of protest Dodd pressed the matter strongly but revealed his sympathy with the nearly bankrupt German Government by the following remark: “I shall do what I can but [I] agree with the Germans that rates of interest ought to be reduced to 4 per cent.”49

But this Schacht compromise lasted only a few months. On June 14 all the creditor governments were given notice of an “unavoidable suspension of the service of the medium-term and long-term foreign loans.” It was especially significant that the Dawes and Young Plan loans were included in the new moratorium.

On June 16, Ambassador Dodd was instructed to inform the Foreign Office that the American Government “takes occasion to express its strongest regret that new losses are to be imposed upon American citizens” and that new discriminations are to be put into operation against American creditors.50 Eleven days later Secretary Hull handed to Rudolf Leitner, the German charge d’affaires, a detailed protest against this latest action of the Reichsbank. In this memorandum “grave regret” was expressed relative to Nazi fiscal policy.51

Secretary Hull was never content to file protests with the German diplomatic representative in Washington concerning the debt problem. Within a week or two this complaint would reach Berlin and would be filed in the Foreign Office. No action could be taken upon it because the Reichsbank had no funds available for American debt service. Hull was fully aware of this fact but this knowledge did not prevent him from sending instructions to Dodd to press von Neurath for payment. Apparently he made full use of the nuisance value of the debt difficulty, and his persistence in this goading policy gave Dodd considerable embarrassment: “What more can I say than I have said a score of times? Germany is in a terrible plight and for once she recognizes war is no remedy.”52 It was apparent to Dodd that repressive measures against the Jews in Germany had produced in foreign countries a boycott against German manufactures. This action had seriously reduced Germany’s export trade and had adversely affected her ability to meet her foreign obligations. The collapse of the World Economic Conference at London had profoundly disturbed the European economic equilibrium and had postponed any return to normal times. Moreover, the recovery program in Germany, with its expansion of public works and the development of an armaments industry, had greatly increased imports of raw materials but did not produce goods that would create a favorable export balance. In June the reserves of gold in the Reichsbank had decreased to a mere 80,000,000 marks, so Dr. Schacht had felt that some drastic action was imperative.

Many American newspapers appreciated the difficulties that beset the German Government. The Cincinnati Enquirer feared that a tide of inflation was ready to engulf Germany,53 while the Springfield Republican54 and the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle55 thought the action of the President of the Reichsbank was no worse than the practice of other nations. The Seattle Daily Times56 and the Atlanta Constitution57 inclined towards the view that Germany had merely followed the example given to her by European nations that had defaulted on American loans.

Although several European countries had failed to meet their financial obligations to the American Government, they refused to permit Germany to follow a similar policy towards them. By threatening to impound German balances within their borders they compelled the Nazi Government to meet some of their demands. In July and August 1934, Germany signed agreements with Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands which made provision for partial payments of interest and principal on outstanding loans. The following table will indicate Germany’s excess of exports to those countries and the reason why she came to a financial understanding with them:

Germany’s Favorable Balance of Trade with Certain European Countries (In millions of reichsmarks)
Country	Full year, 1933	January-March 1933	January-March 1934
France	211.0	57-5	34-4
Great Britain	167.2	31.6	38-3
Netherlands	380.8	80.2	75.6
Sweden	88.5	16.3	23.0
Switzerland	269.9	61.9	51.0

The United States had no comparable economic club over Germany’s head which could enforce compliance with her wishes.58 Indeed, America had a favorable balance of trade with the Reich, so there was no possibility of impounding German funds in the United States. All that the Department of State could do was to send a series of protests against German discrimination in favor of European creditor nations.59 These complaints were clearly worded and cogently argued, but they made little impression upon the Nazi Government, and thus an old diplomatic sore was broken open again and again.60 It was a vicious cycle that helped to keep American public opinion hostile to Hitler.

i. New York City Stages a Mock Trial of Hitler

The debt problem was only one item in the long list of irritants that disturbed American relations with the Reich. Severe measures against the Jews aroused indignation in many American circles, and Hitler’s attack upon the principle of democracy offended large numbers of Americans who were deeply concerned over the passing of the Weimar Republic. Goebbels added strength to American dislike of Germany when he attempted on February 28, 1934, to explain the reasons why Germany had become great under the guidance of Hitler. After enlarging upon the theme of German genius, he stated that the outstanding difficulty in the relations of Germany with other nations was their insistence upon looking at the Nazi revolution through rationalistic and liberal eyes. The course of events had clearly shown that the “dynamic driving force of the mind and of the heart were stronger than those of reason, that the spontaneous outburst of the German soul could not be fathomed by the rationalistic methods of a liberalist dialectic, and that in the end the immortal genius of the German soul rose triumphant above the forces of decay.”61

It was soon evident that in America few eyes could see in the Nazi movement the “immortal genius of the German soul” rising triumphant above the forces of decay. Americans were hopelessly rationalistic. A graphic illustration of this fact was the appearance of advertisements in the New York Times and the Herald-Tribune of a mock trial of Chancellor Hitler to be held on March 7 in Madison Square Garden. Hans Luther, the German Ambassador, rushed to the Department of State on February 19 to register a frenzied complaint against this insult to the Nazi Government. Secretary Hull coldly replied that he was “sorry to see these differences arise between persons in his country and mine; that I would give the matter all due attention such as might be possible and justifiable in all of the circumstances.”62

On March 1, Dr. Leitner, counselor of the German Embassy, had a hurried conference with Mr. John Hickerson of the Division of Western European Affairs in the Department of State. He presented a strong protest against the proposed mock trial of Hitler and mentioned the names of several persons, “close to the President,” who would participate in this demonstration against the Hitler regime. He particularly referred to Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, Alfred E. Smith, Judge Samuel Seabury, and Bainbridge Colby. Mr. Hickerson then pointed out to Dr. Leitner that “no person connected with the Federal Government” was listed as having any role in this proposed mock trial. He closed the conversation with the candid statement that “in view of our constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression” he could see “no action in the matter which the Federal Government could properly take.”63

On the following day, Dr. Luther registered his second protest against the mock trial of Hitler, but he was brushed off by Secretary Hull with the comment that the Department of State had not been able to “find any legal authority that would enable the Federal Government to instruct or order the participants to refrain from entering upon such mock trial.”64

The German Foreign Office was not satisfied with these explanations of Secretary Hull and Mr. Hickerson. On March 5, Ambassador Dodd was summoned to von Neurath’s office and found the Foreign Minister greatly excited. After the usual heated protest had been made, Dodd merely remarked that he had several times expressed the view that the “Jewish policy of Hitler would bring further trouble if not changed.” As far as he could see nothing could be done to “stop the trial.”65

After his visit to the Foreign Office, Dodd sent a telegram to Secretary Hull describing his conversation with von Neurath and closing with the intimation that if the Department of State felt disposed to “soothe injured susceptibilities” it could express regret for certain “irresponsible expressions of opinion in regard to problems outside our frontiers.”66

After these repeated protests to the Department of State concerning the mock trial of Hitler in New York City had failed to get any action, the White House began to show some concern over the matter. On March 5, Mr. Early sent a memorandum of inquiry to Secretary Hull. Mr. James C. Dunn replied that the situation had been carefully canvassed and the “precedents indicated that the Department of State has never recognized any duty to suppress public utterances regarded as hostile to friendly States.”67

Although this reply seemed satisfactory to Mr. Early, it was regarded with evident distaste by the German Ambassador who called at the Department of State on March 7 for an interview with Mr. Phillips. When his final appeal for intervention was denied by the Under Secretary of State, Dr. Luther expressed the hope that “some statement could be issued tomorrow morning indicating that the views expressed at the meeting were not in accord with those of the Federal Government.” Mr. Phillips refused to commit the Department of State “in any way,” so Dr. Luther’s protests elicited no favorable action.68

On March 8, Pierrepont Moffat, of the Division of Western European Affairs in the Department of State, had lunch with Dr. Leitner who repeatedly remarked that to him it was incredible that “such an attack on the Chief of a friendly nation was permitted, and that apart from its political repercussions in Germany, it was establishing a very dangerous precedent which might come home to plague us some day.”69

While the German Ambassador and his staff were busily engaged in filing protests against the mock trial of Hitler, the Chancellor himself had a long conference with Dodd and did not bother to make the slightest reference to that incident. Dodd found Hitler “very cordial” and quite anxious to review the general subject of German-American relations. When Dodd sharply criticized certain propaganda pamphlets which carried an appeal “to Germans in other countries to think of themselves always as Germans and owing moral, if not political allegiance to the Fatherland,” Hitler immediately “denounced everything of that sort and went on to say that it was almost certainly put out by Jews.” Dodd then directly referred to the Jewish problem in other countries, and the Chancellor frequently interrupted the ambassador’s discourse with sharp imprecations against the “damned Jews.”

Dodd argued against this anti-Semitism and pointed out that in the United States a “number of high positions . . . are at present occupied by Jews. . . . I explained to him that where a question of over-activity of Jews in university or official life made trouble, we had managed to redistribute the offices in such a way as not to give great offence. . . .

The Chancellor came back with a still more vigorous reply, saying that 59 per cent of all offices in Russia were held by Jews; that they had ruined the country and that they intended to ruin Germany, and, he added, ‘if they continue their activity we shall make a complete end of them in this country.’ ” When Dodd mentioned that the Communists had polled only a few votes in the United States in 1932, Hitler burst out with the exclamation: “Happy country! Your people seem to be so sensible in this respect.”

After Hitler had remarked that “Germany wants peace and will do everything in her power to keep the peace,” Dodd inquired if it were not possible for European nations to agree upon the following points:

(1) “No nation should cross another nation’s boundaries,” and (2) “all European nations should agree to a supervisory commission [to inspect armaments] and to respect the rulings of such a body.” Hitler agreed “heartily” with these points and then surprised Dodd by indicating his cordial support of the proposal to institute more exchange professorships between the two countries.70

Although Hitler had made no mention of the mock trial incident in New York, the difficulties arising out of it continued for some weeks to embarrass German-American relations. On March 13, Ambassador Luther delivered another protest against this insult to the Hitler regime,71 and ten days later he broadened his barrage so that it covered not only the mock trial but the activities of Samuel Untermyer, the Dickstein resolution in the House of Representatives, and the boycott of German manufactures by large department stores in the United States. He was fearful that “satisfactory relations” between Germany and the United States could not be maintained as long as American citizens used such abusive and insulting language with reference to the Nazi Government. Secretary Hull replied that the prime cause of ill feeling in the United States towards Germany was the repressive manner in which the Jews were treated in that country. After discussing anti-Semitism in Germany, Hull asked Luther if he thought the Jews in this nation should “resume buying goods from Germany.” Luther’s answer was distinctly naïve: “Yes, it would help to restore good relations.” Hull realized at once that Luther was purposely obtuse in this matter, so he quickly concluded the interview.72

While Ambassador Luther was wearing the patience of Secretary Hull very thin by his numerous protests, Chancellor Hitler decided to placate American public opinion by adopting a more lenient attitude towards the Jews. On March 12 he ordered the closing of Columbia House, “the place where the Jews and others had been tortured.” He also announced that “warrants must be proved before anyone could be detained for more than twenty-four hours on any charge.”73

But these steps indicated a mere relaxation and not a cessation of the campaign of anti-Semitism in Germany. The roots of this movement had penetrated very deep and had spread very far in the dark soil of the Reich. There were several factors that promoted this growth. Nazi racial theories helped to spread a hatred of Jews. It should also be remembered that since 1918 there had existed in many German minds the firm conviction that the military and political collapse that came during the last months of the World War was due primarily to “Jewish perfidy.” A third reason for anti-Semitism was the belief that “Marxism is firmly bound up with the Jewish people.” The Communist Government in Russia was based upon the principles of Marxism, and these principles with their emphasis upon world revolution were regarded as a distinct menace to the safety of the Reich.74 It was not hard for Hitler to compose a hymn of hate that was sung with great gusto by millions of Germans.

j. The Nazi Regime Is Placed upon an Uneasy Defensive

Anti-Semitism was not the only shadow that fell across the German landscape in 1934. Large numbers of Germans had been devoted to the Weimar Republic and they deeply resented the way in which Hitler had slowly undermined its foundations. From Vienna word came to the Department of State that the “financial and economic situation” in Germany was growing rapidly worse and a “crisis” was approaching.75 From Prague a similar message was received. Mr. Beneš was certain that the Nazi Government was “in a precarious position, and it is difficult to see how [it] can last much longer.”76

In Berlin, Dodd found that some Germans in important official positions were definitely hostile to the Nazi administration. On May 24 he had luncheon with Dr. Dieckhoff of the Foreign Office. During a lengthy conversation Dr. Dieckhoff “revealed his whole attitude of opposition to Goebbels and his expectation that Hitler would be overthrown soon.” He could hardly have said more “if he had been in England or in the United States. . . . I felt the deep concern of a high official who would thus risk his life in criticism of the existing regime.”77

Dieckhoff was probably reflecting the viewpoint of many of the officials in the Foreign Office. In the last week in May, Dodd had two conferences with von Neurath. The Foreign Minister was greatly concerned about “the decline of German gold reserves to only 4 per cent of German paper money.” In a mood of deep dejection he exclaimed: “What shall we do? It is the Jewish boycott, the tariff barriers of all countries and our inability to purchase cotton and rubber or to sell anything abroad.” With reference to a moratorium on debts due to American bankers, von Neurath feared there was no other course that could be taken: “Germany has no exports to the United States and only promises of exports to Denmark and other countries.” It was apparent that he was “very uneasy but did not say revolution was in waiting.”78

When Dodd lunched with Herr Kurt Schmitt, the Minister of Economics, he encountered the same spirit of despair and uneasiness. Schmitt took him on a tour of his extensive gardens and poured his laments into the sympathetic ear of the ambassador: “Schmitt talked for an hour about Germany’s calamitous situation; a great and threatening drought, no exports to the outside world, intense hostility in the United States and England on account of Hitler’s treatment of the Jews, Protestants and Catholics. . . . I have never seen a German statesman so much distressed. . . . He again and again referred to the folly of Hitler’s policy.”79

Schmitt’s litany of laments on the folly of Hitler’s policy was repeated in many houses which Dodd visited. Even within the ranks of devout Nazis there were murmurs of discontent. They had looked forward to the recovery of the Polish Corridor and had learned with bitterness of a ten-year pact of nonaggression with Poland. Instead of a Germany remolded according to the leveling principles of National Socialism they had discovered that the important industrial leaders and large landowners were still holding the seats of the mighty. And the Storm Troops were in a ferment of revolt because Hitler had revealed plans for a radical reduction of their legions. Röhm was bitterly opposed to this proposed reduction, and it was rumored that he was plotting with General von Schleicher for a drastic change in the Nazi organization.

In the meantime von Papen had paid an important visit to President Hindenburg at Neudeck and secured his assent to a speech that would stress the importance of preserving in Germany the right of free speech and constructive criticism. At the University of Marburg, on June 17, von Papen flung his verbal bombshell full in the faces of the Nazi extremists like Goebbels:

A free press ought to exist to inform the Government with open and manly statements where corruption has made its nest, when bad mistakes have been made, where the wrong men are in the wrong place, and where the spirit of the German Revolution has been sinned against. . . . If the official organs of public opinion do not throw sufficient light on the mysterious darkness which at present hides the spirit of the German people, then a statesman must step in and call a spade a spade.80

In the United States this speech by von Papen received wide attention. The Chicago Daily News believed the utterance at Marburg to be nothing less than a “body blow at Hitler.” It was a “manifestation of the very spirit of individualism which national socialism was supposed to eradicate.”81 The Springfield Republican was shrewd enough to surmise that the speech was “the signal for some important development in the internal affairs of Germany”;82 while the New York Times hit the nail on the head by a statement that von Papen’s ringing words “unquestionably had the acquiescence of Hitler.”83

There is little doubt that Hitler was fully aware of the rising tide of dissatisfaction within the Nazi ranks. He knew of Röhm’s determined opposition to any large reduction in the numbers of the Storm Troops, and he had heard of von Schleicher’s devious schemes. He knew he could count upon the support of von Blomberg and Göring, and it is quite possible that he himself lighted the fuse in von Papen’s bombshell. One sentence in the Marburg speech prepared the way for Hitler’s dynamic entrance upon the German stage prepared to wield new thunderbolts of power: “If the official organs of public opinion do not throw sufficient light on the mysterious darkness which at present hides the spirit of the German people, then a statesman must step in and call a spade a spade.”

But before he moved out boldly on this German stage Hitler wanted to be certain of his lines. If he should assume the role of stern dictator bent upon a party purge it might be a wise move to get some sage advice from that master Italian actor, Benito Mussolini. Therefore, on June 14-15, Hitler had some lengthy conversations with the Duce at Venice. According to Breckinridge Long, the American Ambassador in Rome, Mussolini “no doubt advised Hitler that it would be necessary to take drastic steps to maintain his authority and exert the power of the Government over the members of his forces who were not disposed to adhere to his policies. Hitler left Italy with the firm determination to take action which up to that time had been foreign to his character.”84

On June 28, Dodd confided to his diary that in Berlin the atmosphere was more “tense than any time since I have been in Germany.” On the following day he gave a luncheon which von Papen attended. After some discussion of the situation in Germany, von Papen left the luncheon with the significant remark: “Anyway I shall not be torpedoed.”85

Von Papen knew that a party purge was just around the corner, but he was certain that he was safe. The purge came on the morning of June 30 when Hitler, with a party of devoted adherents, raided a villa near Munich and discovered Röhm and Heines in compromising circumstances. Heines was immediately shot, and later Röhm faced a firing squad in his own cellar. General von Schleicher and his wife were shot down in their residence in Berlin. Throughout the period, June 30-July 2, the executions continued until, as admitted by Hitler in his speech on July 13, some seventy-seven persons had been slain. All the diplomats in Berlin paid particular attention to the fact that von Papen escaped this bloody purge. His parting remark to Dodd on July 29 took on additional significance: “I shall not be torpedoed.”

In the United States many newspapers believed that Hitler would not be able completely to suppress the strong spirit of opposition that was rising in the Reich. A real showdown would soon come: “Germany and the waiting world will soon see whether they have to do with another Bismarck or a punctured balloon.”86 The Baltimore Sun saw in the events of June 30-July 2 the “beginning of an elemental uprising by a people deceived and betrayed”;87 the Richmond Times-Dispatch was of the opinion that “much blood will flow before the little Austrian paperhanger consolidates his position or is hurled from power,”88 while the Buffalo Evening News capped the situation with the ominous remark: “He [Hitler] is sitting on a powder keg, and the fuse may be burning to an explosion that will skyrocket the whole Nazi plan of Government.”89

Drew Pearson and Robert Allen predicted a dark future for Hitler: “The State Department has been receiving detailed reports on Hitler’s ‘purging’ of his Nazi party. These indicate that the Austrian house painter may not long remain in power.”90 Paul Mallon, in his syndicated column, expressed the view that Hitler was copying the methods of the American underworld: “It seems that big shot Hitler adopted A1 Capone’s methods for the same reason that A1 did. His own gang was getting restless and the radicals were trying to muscle in.”91

Some American papers believed that the bloody purge in Germany would be the prelude to the adoption of more moderate policies by the Nazi leaders. The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle predicted that “moderation of extreme Nazi policies may now be expected”;92 the New Republic thought that Hitler had turned to the Right and had rejected the radical views of some of his former followers,93 while the Literary Digest inclined to the view that the Chancellor had “apparently embarked on a moderate political policy.”94

Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag on July 13, in defense of his party purge, failed to win many converts in the United States, although the Louisville Courier-Journal spoke of him as an “almost pathetic figure” who was pleading for support “of his tottering regime.”95 The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle thought he had not “succeeded in wiping the blood guilt from his hands”;96 the New York Times regarded his speech as an indication that he was “distinctly on the defensive,”97 while Oswald G. Villard expressed the conviction that it was “impossible to read Hitler’s defense of his atrocious murders without taking heart. . . . I cannot but feel that this orgy of blood-letting marks the beginning of the end of Hitler.”98

The St. Louis Globe-Democrat completely disagreed with Mr. Villard. It regarded Hitler’s address on July 13 as one of his great oratorical successes: “There need be no surprise if it should develop that he has by it not only regained the confidence of the people of Germany but strengthened their faith in him.”99 This view was shared by Arthur Brisbane who believed that “Hitler still retains his power in Germany and his grip on the German imagination.”100

Brisbane was correct in his belief that Hitler still maintained a “grip on the German imagination,” but he did not seem to realize the extent and bitterness of the dislike in America for the Hitler regime. The party purge had removed from the Hitler entourage some persons he was glad to get rid of, but it had also removed from most American minds any lingering respect for the Nazi movement and its leaders. When Ambassador Dodd was invited to hear Hitler’s speech (July 13) in defense of the purge, he promptly declined to be present at the ceremony. In explaining his absence to Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador, he remarked: “He is such a horror to me I cannot endure his presence.”101

Before June 30, Dodd had disliked Hitler and was out of sympathy with his objectives, but he had been glad to confer with him and he had helped to prevent a repetition in Chicago of the mock trial of Hitler that had been staged in New York. After the purge, Dodd and a host of other Americans felt that Hitler was capable of any action that would further his selfish interests. It made little difference if this indictment were too harsh. Hitler was now a tremendous liability for the German people to bear, and the burden eventually broke them and the whole German way of life.

	Exports to Germany	Imports from Germany
1934	$108,738,000	$68,805,000
1935	91,981,000	77,792,000
1936	101,956,000	79,679,000
1937	126,343,000	92,468,000

“The ex-Crown Prince meanwhile became active in favor of restoration, enlisting the aid of the masonic lodges and monarchistic associations, and also collecting further sums for his purpose. . . . The authorities became aware of his plans, and while not being able to locate and seize the funds, dissolved the aforementioned organizations. In order to exculpate himself, the ex-Crown Prince presented 12,000,000 marks to the SA, and he and his sons donned SA uniforms. Roehm determined to avail himself of this financial windfall to promote his own plans of revolt. Agents of the Secret State police discovered the plot and . . . turned to von Papen who welcomed the opportunity to frustrate Roehm’s radical tendencies. . . . Von Papen collected all the material concerning the plot . . . and showed it to Hindenburg. The President . . . sent for Hitler and presented him an ultimatum—either Hitler must immediately suppress the planned revolt or Hindenburg would do so himself. . . . Hitler . . . had a nerve-crisis, and . . . ordered the shootings of June 30.” Dodd to Secretary Hull, July 25, 1934. 862.00/3344, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
90Ibid., p. 5.
91Ibid., pp. 6-7.
92Ibid., p. 9.
93Ibid., pp. 10-11.
94Ibid., p. ix.
95Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. III, 4389.
96January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
97January 9, 1927.
98January 25, 1927.
99March 17, 1927.
100January 21, 26, 1927.
101January 23, 28, 30; February 3, 5, 9, 1927.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941