XXII: Europe Moves towards War

XXII Europe Moves towards War

WITH RUSSIA pushing China into conflict in the Far East it was soon evident to some observers that no armistice was in sight. If Chiang Kai-shek grew tired of pulling hot Soviet chestnuts out of the fires of war he would at once be smeared as a traitor to Chinese unity and communist agents throughout eastern Asia would clamor for his exile or execution. Peace would have to bear a communist tag.

a. Chamberlain Makes a Momentous Pledge to Poland

While Stalin was blowing upon the embers of war in the Far East, Hitler began to implement plans for expansion that would soon lead to conflict in Europe. As early as October 24, 1938, Ribbentrop suggested to Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, that the Polish Government should agree to a “reunion of Danzig with the Reich,” and should also consent to the building of “an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze.” In return Poland would be assured the “retention of railway and economic facilities” in Danzig, and Germany would guarantee the Polish-German frontiers. Lipski was not enthusiastic about these proposals,1 and the Polish Foreign Office returned a polite negative.2

Further conversations were held on November 19 when Lipski frankly informed Ribbentrop with disturbing candor that “any tendency to incorporate the Free City [of Danzig] in the Reich must inevitably lead to conflict.” The Foreign Minister promptly gave assurances, “in a very friendly tone,” that he felt so close to Poland that he did not wish to carry on relations with Lipski in a “formal diplomatic manner” but on a friendly plane, “frankly and openly.” After this cordial gesture he stressed his anxiety to find some solution of the Danzig problem that would be mutually satisfactory. With regard to a motor road across the Corridor, Lipski thought it might “be possible” to arrive at some understanding.3

The next scene in this drama of Danzig was staged at Berchtesgaden. Hitler was not inclined to accept the negative answer of Beck. As a realist in world politics he knew very well that Poland did not have the military strength to resist German demands and he was certain that no power or combination of powers could lend Poland sufficient assistance to repel a German attack upon Warsaw. But Hitler did not wish war with Poland. He could use her as a bulwark to neutralize any Russian threat to a vastly expanded Third Reich or perhaps as an ally in future aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. If Poland would accept the role of chief satellite in the Nazi orbit her expansion was guaranteed. Germany and Poland could dominate Europe and Hitler’s word would be law from Warsaw to Lisbon.

Beck, however, was not greatly attracted by the political possibilities that lay along the path of German-Polish co-operation. He preferred to nurse the hope of continued Polish independence in the face of overwhelming German strength. At the greatest cross roads in all history he rejected a ride in the German war machine along a path that promised Poland power and plunder as a satellite state. Instead, he and the Polish Cabinet followed the counsel of Chamberlain and chose the road that led to war with Germany and the consequent destruction of the Polish State. The British-Polish understanding in the spring of 1939 led Hitler to turn to Stalin in search of the alliance that was an incitement to a conflict that eventually brought Red domination over a beaten and dismembered Poland. Polish diplomacy in 1938-1939 was a design for disaster.

In the early days of 1939, Hitler believed that Beck was so well versed in the principles of Realpolitik that he would be glad to go hand in hand with the Nazi leaders in a joint search for plunder that was weakly guarded by the broken-down states of Europe. For this chance to hunt with Hitler he would have to pay a definite price. On January 5, 1939, Berchtesgaden, this matter was bluntly placed before Beck. With reference to the questions of Danzig and the Corridor it was necessary to get “out of the old grooves and seek a solution on completely novel lines.” This would mean a solution whereby “Danzig would return to Germany politically, but would remain with Poland economically.” As for the Corridor, a connection “with East Prussia was as vital a matter for the Reich as the connection with the sea was for Poland.” In return for these concessions Germany would give Poland a “definite guarantee of her frontiers . . . including the boundaries of the Corridor.” Beck had no glib answer for these proposals. The Danzig question was an “extraordinarily difficult” one, “but he was quite ready to think the matter over.”4

On January 6 at Munich, Ribbentrop proposed and Beck once more discussed the Danzig and Corridor questions. Ribbentrop proposed the “reunion of Danzig with Germany,” and in return all Polish economic interests in that territory would be “guaranteed in the most generous manner.” If Poland would consent to an “extra-territorial motor-road and railway across the Corridor,” Germany would then “guarantee the Corridor and all Poland’s present possessions.” Beck remained cool to these proposals and gloomily confided to von Ribbentrop that he saw “no possibility whatever of agreement” on these matters.5

Further conversations between Beck and Ribbentrop in Warsaw on January 25-27 led to no important results.6 In March 1939, Ribbentrop began to lose patience with Poland. On March 21 he rehearsed the Danzig and Corridor questions with Ambassador Lipski and remarked that the Führer was “increasingly surprised at the Polish attitude” with regard to them. He believed that a further attempt should be made to “put German-Polish policy on the right track,” and he hoped that Beck would soon visit Berlin for the purpose of seeking a solution of problems that demanded a speedy solution. With particular reference to the Corridor the Führer recognized the “justice of the Polish demand for free access to the sea,” and was willing “to renounce possession of the Corridor for once and for all.”7

It is apparent that Hitler thought he was going very far in his offers to Poland. The truculent tone so evident in his relations with Austria and Czechoslovakia was missing in his overtures to the Polish Foreign Office. But Beck was prompt in rejecting these conciliatory gestures. Poland could not agree to any extraterritorial road across the Corridor. With regard to Danzig the Polish Government thought it might be possible to solve that question by a “joint Polish-German guarantee” of the continued status of a “free city.”8

In taking this determined stand against concessions to Germany, Beck was embarking upon a desperate gamble which he eventually lost. He had decided to attempt to balance Britain against Germany even though he was uncertain as to the course the British Government might follow. He aimed to pay a visit to London early in April, but he was apprehensive lest Britain might try “to capitalize his visit in potential negotiations with Berlin” rather than endeavor to work out a basis for “constructive collaboration” with Poland.9

But Chamberlain had no intention of turning to Hitler. He suddenly produced a formula whereby four important powers—Britain, France, Poland, and Russia—would sign a declaration that they “would act together in the event of further signs of German aggressive ambitions.”10 In a dispatch to Secretary Hull, Ambassador Bullitt described the fate of this proposal:

I discussed the situation with Léger this morning. With regard to the British proposal, France, of course, accepted [it] and the Soviet Union accepted unconditionally. The key to the situation, however, is Poland. Yesterday morning it had been Chamberlain’s opinion that the Poles would not accept. The Poles had asked the British Government a large number of questions with regard to the exact aid which Great Britain would bring to Poland in case of a German attack. . . . Léger went on to say that in his opinion Beck would not dare to reject flatly the British proposal because the responsibility would be terrible if . . . later Germany should attack Poland.11

Beck did reject this British proposal, but he was careful to explain that he did so because he feared that it would not be “adequate” to meet the existing emergency. He greatly preferred a bilateral agreement between Britain and Poland.12 Chamberlain gave this suggestion prompt consideration and on March 27 the British Foreign Office informed Beck that if the Poles “would defend themselves if they are attacked,” Britain would make a statement pledging “all her forces and resources” to their assistance. But despite these bold words, Britain could not possibly send to the Corridor any effective fighting forces in case Germany launched an attack upon Poland. On March 27, Lord Halifax told Ambassador Kennedy that even in the face of possible conflict with Germany no move would be made down the road to conscription. The Chamberlain Government realized that Britain did not have the military equipment to arm prospective conscripts and they also feared that the trade unions were “prepared to upset the industrial program” if there was any serious attempt “to force conscription.”13

Notwithstanding this impasse as far as military preparedness was concerned, Chamberlain went ahead and on March 31 announced in the House of Commons that if any action were taken in Europe that “clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces,” His Majesty’s Government would feel “bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.”14

When one keeps in mind the fact that the British Government could not put one soldier in the Polish Corridor in the event of war between Poland and Germany, the dubious quality of this Chamberlain assurance is clearly evident. The inevitable question then arises: Why did Beck seek so anxiously for a promise of aid that was of no real value? By turning his back upon Hitler he invited a swift destruction that no European power could avert. Perhaps he felt that Hitler was merely bluffing and therefore it would be safe for him to assume the role of a Polish Ajax boldly defying the Nazi lightning!

Daladier seemed to share this opinion because he confided to Ambassador Bullitt that he was “especially delighted by the strong and courageous stand the Poles had taken.”15 But he was deeply concerned by the fact that Britain was not pushing a program of conscription. If a European war broke out Britain would be forced to play a minor role “except on the sea.” France, therefore, would have to bear a burden that “would be terrible.” In the back of Daladier’s mind there lingered the suspicion that Poland would be a weak ally. Although Beck would probably sign some type of alliance with Britain during his visit to London, there was always the possibility that the “Poles would find one excuse or another to wriggle out of their obligations to fight on the side of France and England.”16

Chamberlain did not have this distrust of Poland and he continued to hope that war was around such a distant corner that he would not have to worry about conscription for a long time. He was somewhat impressed by a statement Hitler had made to him at Godesberg: “I have won more with words than I have with bayonets.” To Ambassador Kennedy this remark seemed to indicate that Chamberlain, and the English people generally, were indulging in wishful thinking. But Chamberlain was enough of a realist to admit that Hitler was “definitely aware that the longer he permits England and France to arm the less likely he is to win with one decisive blow.”17

The importance of an early blow against Britain was emphasized in the German press. The British Embassy in Berlin warned Lord Halifax that these press comments reflected accurately the growing hostility of Hitler to the Chamberlain policy of “encirclement.” Halifax, in turn, informed President Roosevelt that the British fleet might at any moment be the object of a Nazi “lightning attack.”18

Despite Hitler’s hatred of the British policy of encirclement, Chamberlain went ahead and on April 6 he had the Foreign Office issue a statement that Britain and Poland were “prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent character” that would be reciprocal in its application. Until the signature of this permanent agreement, Poland was ready to give an assurance to Britain that it would render assistance to His Majesty’s Government under the same conditions as those contained in the British assurance of March 31.19 Beck had now pushed Poland far down the road to war and national destruction. Such a policy pointed directly to disaster.

b. Lord Halifax Tries to “Work Something Out” with the Duce

While Chamberlain was moving towards closer relations with Poland he was also endeavoring to drive a wedge between Hitler and Mussolini. On March 20 he wrote a personal letter to the Duce in which he stressed the dangers that attended Hitler’s plans for German expansion. If Italy allied herself with the Western democracies the peace of Europe would be preserved and definite advantages would be secured. Ambassador Kennedy learned of this letter from Lord Halifax who endeavored to keep him abreast of the more important aspects of British policy. When Kennedy inquired if Britain would be inclined to “pay a big price” for Italian co-operation, Halifax replied that he “thought so but would not want to deliver until he saw Mussolini’s performance.”20

Joseph Davies, American Ambassador in Brussels, agreed with Chamberlain in thinking that the moment was ripe for a deal with Mussolini. He greatly feared that the peace of Europe was “tottering.” It was important, therefore, for the President to make some move to stave off a war. He believed that Mussolini was the key figure in Europe. It was essential for the Duce to realize that Italy’s “present and future interests” were tied closely to the Western democracies. If Europe should become involved in a major conflict the dictatorships were bound to lose. The Duce should “go slow and not precipitate a crisis now by demands which French pride cannot accept.”21

While President Roosevelt was giving careful consideration to these suggestions from Davies, Lord Halifax still hoped that he would be able to “work something out” with Mussolini.22 But Chamberlain began to doubt that his Foreign Secretary could do much with the Duce. He remarked to Kennedy that Mussolini, as a dictator, had to “keep on moving.” His next adventure might be in Albania. When Kennedy inquired what action the British Government would take if the Duce moved in that direction, Chamberlain glumly muttered that it would be a “terrible calamity as far as England is concerned because he would not want to get into a war over Albania.”23

c. Mussolini Moves into Albania

The terrible calamity feared by Chamberlain was soon precipitated by Mussolini. Italian troops marched into Albania and had no trouble in taking over the entire country. This move had been planned for many months, and the Ciano Diaries are filled with references to the probable invasion of that country. The Duce’s desire to acquire Albania was greatly strengthened by Germany’s absorption of Czechoslovakia. The reasons presented by Germany for this bold action were so specious that Ciano was disgusted with their transparent character: “Such pretexts may be good for Goebbels propaganda, but they should not use them when talking with us.” To Mussolini it seemed imperative that Italy should take Albania as a counterbalance to German acquisitions.24

Ciano was deeply angered by the cavalier attitude assumed by Hitler in conveying to the Duce the news of the seizure of Czechoslovakia. To his diary he confided the belief that the Führer was “unfaithful and treacherous.” He then noted that the King had denounced the Germans as “rascals and beggars,” while Marshal Balbo had vehemently expressed his disgust at the Duce’s acquiescent attitude. At the close of one of Mussolini’s ardent speeches in favor of collaboration with Germany, Balbo had acidly remarked: “You are shining Germany’s boots.” But the Duce continued to cling to Hitler and addressed to his critics the querulous comment: “We can’t be political whores.”25

King Zog of Albania thought this was a colossal understatement when he learned on April 7 that Italian troops were attacking Durazzo. On the following day Tiranë was occupied by the Duce’s military forces and the fighting was over. On April 16 an Albanian delegation paid a visit to Rome to offer the crown to the King of Italy. Ciano noted that the leader of this delegation (Verlaci) appeared very “depressed” and delivered his speech with a “tired air” that betrayed no enthusiasm.26 The requirements for a Roman holiday were very exhausting.

d. American Reaction to the Seizure of Albania

American reaction to Italian absorption of Albania was immediate and hostile. The old friendship that had marked Italian-American relations during the early years of the Mussolini regime had been shattered by the Duce’s alignment with Hitler. In 1937 the Italian Government had been greatly disappointed at the tardiness which attended the negotiations for a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the two countries, and efforts had been made to push the Department of State along the path to an early conclusion of the pact.27 Ambassador Philipps was apprehensive that this continued American delay would push Italy firmly into the eager arms of Hitler, but Secretary Hull insisted that it was “unwise to bind our hands” by entering into a most-favored-nation treaty with Italy “at least for the present.” It would be best to let matters “hang fire” and await a clarification of the international situation. A policy of delay should be continued and American replies to Italian notes should be “more deliberate than usual.”28

This developing coolness between Italy and the United States led Ambassador Kennedy to leave London for a brief visit to Rome. He discovered that the Countess Ciano deprecated the disappearance of cordiality that had marked the relations between the two countries at the beginning of the Mussolini regime. She expressed the opinion that the policy of the democracies had made it necessary for her father to “play along with Hitler for his own protection.”

Kennedy had some furtive admiration for Countess Ciano but his dispatches express only contempt for her flirtatious husband. After meeting Ciano at a tea he sent to Secretary Hull one of his most pungent dispatches:

I also met Ciano. . . . I have no idea how able he is in his office, but I have never met a more pompous ass in my life. He spent most of his time rushing girls into a corner for conversation, and at the dinner he would not talk seriously for five minutes for fear that the two or three girls who were invited in order to get him to come, might get out of sight. . . . I came away with the belief that we would accomplish much more by sending a dozen beautiful chorus girls to Rome than a flock of diplomats and a fleet of airplanes. . . . The President’s speeches drive them absolutely crazy. . . . Every time the President says anything, nobody in the Cabinet or Government in Rome is fit to talk with for the rest of the day.29

After the Department of State received this dispatch, Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt seemed to take a definite delight in making speeches or issuing statements that would keep Mussolini and his Cabinet in a state of high nervous excitement. On April 8, Hull denounced the Italian invasion of Albania as an “additional threat to the peace of the world,”30 while, on the same day, at Warm Springs, the President voiced the opinion that the continued independence of small nations everywhere had a definite bearing upon American safety and prosperity.31

On Easter Sunday (April 9), as he was leaving Warm Springs for Washington, the President turned to the small crowd that had pressed close to his private car and significantly remarked: “I’ll be back in the fall if we don’t have a war.”32 To Walter Lippmann this statement seemed a plain intimation to Hitler and Mussolini that the United States would not remain indifferent if the dictators kept undermining the independence of small nations.33

When the President reached Washington on April 10 he read a confidential dispatch from Ambassador Bullitt which contained strong hints of impending war: “I talked with Bonnet briefly tonight. He asked me to inform my Government that ‘it was five minutes before twelve.’ There might be war at any moment.”34 Two days later, Bullitt talked with Premier Daladier who believed that Hitler and Mussolini would probably “make war within the next week or two. . . . He was utterly unable to understand the reasons which at this moment led Chamberlain to be optimistic. He felt that Chamberlain was either misled or criminally weak.”35

While Daladier was talking war to Bullitt, Lord Halifax was talking peace to Kennedy. On April 11, Halifax had a long conversation with Kennedy and appeared “strangely optimistic.” He expressed the opinion that he did “not expect war. He said he hesitates always to tell me this because he feels I think he is ‘burying his head in the sand’ and he admits that up to date he has been a little bit wrong.” This optimism Kennedy ascribed in part to reassurances from the Duce: “Mussolini’s attitude as expressed to the Government over the Albanian matter has not increased their concern. It has rather made them feel that the situation is not as hopeless as everybody else seems to think it is.”36

It was obvious to Bullitt that the British Foreign Office was being led astray by rose-colored reports from Lord Perth, the British Ambassador in Rome. Bonnet told Bullitt that he had learned from François-Poncet, the French Ambassador in Rome, that Mussolini had recently sent “a warm personal message to Chamberlain assuring him that he desired the most friendly relations with England and that he intended to respect fully the Anglo-Italian pact with regard to the Mediterranean.” Lord Perth had further informed François-Poncet that Ciano “had promised him that Italy positively would not attack Greece.” He had also promised Perth that “the Italian troops would be withdrawn from Spain immediately after the victory parade in Madrid on May 2.” To Bullitt these statements of Lord Perth proved him to be “just as great an ass as he had been all his life and that Mussolini was playing the British for ’suckers.’ ” The British Ambassador in Paris agreed that Bullitt’s characterization of Perth was entirely just.37

On the basis of this false hope that Mussolini was really on the side of the democracies, Chamberlain felt strong enough to develop his policy of reassurance to nations threatened by German aggression. On April 13, he made another one of his momentous announcements. The House of Commons was informed that any action that menaced the independence of either Greece or Romania would cause the British Government to extend to those countries all the assistance within its power.38

While Chamberlain was busily engaged in extending promises of aid that he could not possibly deliver, Hitler was preparing for war. On April 12 the chief of the German General Staff had a talk with the American chargé d’affaires in Berlin. He was not backward in intimating that “unless fewer obstacles were placed in the way of Germany’s eastern expansion it would be necessary for Hitler to end the opposition . . . in the West.”39

With this feeling of war in the European atmosphere, President Roosevelt made an address on April 14 to the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union which everyone realized was really beamed at European dictators. He challenged Hitler’s complaint of encirclement by stating that there was “no such thing as encircling . . . any peaceful nation by other peaceful nations.” And then as a direct thrust at Nazi and Fascist methods of expansion, he asked a question that was topped with a sharp barb: “Do we really have to assume that nations can find no better methods of realizing their destinies than those which were used by the Huns and Vandals 1500 years ago?”40

As a postscript to this critical and provocative address, he sent by cable an appeal to Hitler and Mussolini requesting them to make no further moves that might lead to a European war. He also asked them to give assurances that their armed forces would “not attack or invade” for a period of at least ten years the territory or possessions of a long list of nations. It should be clear, even to dictators, that “international problems” could best be solved “at the council table.”41 At this point he must have pushed his tongue hard upon his cheek because he was well aware of the fact that none of the European nations that had profited by the Treaty of Versailles was willing to give up one crumb of the spoils of war. The injustices of that treaty could be rectified only through war.

The British and French governments knew this was true and their fears of eventual conflict made them welcome the President’s intervention in the affairs of Europe. Ambassador Kennedy sent word of Chamberlain’s “great appreciation” of the message from the White House, but he noted that the Prime Minister had “failed more in the past week than he has in the past year. He walks like an old man and yesterday talked like one.”42 He was beginning to realize the complete failure of his policy.

In France, Daladier and Bonnet were outspoken in their praise of the President’s challenge to the dictators. Daladier assured Ambassador Bullitt that he regarded the message as a “historic act of the first importance,” and then he remarked with reference to the President: “He is the last of the Mohicans.”43 The symbolism was ominous. Would the Americans, like the Mohicans, be a vanishing race because of the impact of devastating wars?

e. The Dictators’ Reply to the President’s Criticism

The President’s denunciation of the dictators as modern “Huns and Vandals” was bound to evoke a bitter reply. In order to raise the pitch of their anger and make their replies so extreme in language that the American public would become increasingly war-minded, the President held a press conference on April 15 and took advantage of his gifts as a showman to impress his audience with the manner in which he had verbally spanked Hitler and Mussolini.44

Mussolini made an indirect reply on April 20 at a meeting of influential Fascists who had assembled to discuss the holding of a World’s Fair in Rome in 1942. The fact that such a fair was being planned was a clear demonstration, according to the Duce, of his pacific purposes. With specific reference to the President’s message he contemptuously remarked that he was not greatly impressed “by Messiah-like” communications.45

Hitler’s reply was a more formidable affair. On April 28 he delivered an address to the Reichstag during which he played the dual role of Führer and court jester. The words he directed to European listeners carried a covert menace. The nonaggression pact with Poland had been terminated by Polish adherence to the encirclement policy sponsored by Britain and France. This same policy carried such a strong note of hostility towards Germany that it had automatically invalidated the Anglo-German Naval Pact of 1935 and the consultative agreement Hitler had concluded with Chamberlain at Munich.

After this defiant introduction, Hitler answered President Roosevelt’s message in a series of questions and answers. The answers were couched in a serio-comic style that revealed the bright glow of anger beneath the thin fabric of forced humor.46 He rejected any thought of acceptance of the President’s proposals and in Washington the heralds of war began to blow a muted message that troubled the anxious ears of millions of Americans. Senator Borah believed that Hitler had closed the door on further discussions of peace proposals, and Senator Nye expressed the opinion that the President had invited “at least in part” the sharp words of the Führer.47 There was little doubt that the provocative words of the President’s message had provided additional tinder that awaited the sparks of war.

f. The Role of Russia Becomes Increasingly Important

As Chamberlain’s dreams of co-operation with Hitler and Mussolini began to fade he slowly turned in the direction of another dictator, Joseph Stalin. In the third week in March he had devised a four-power formula that might stop Hitler, but the Polish Government had objected to any association with Russia. Chamberlain did not blame the Poles for their suspicious attitude because he himself had long cherished a “most profound distrust of Russia.”48 The British Foreign Office shared this viewpoint and was ready to “relegate Russia to a second line of defence not only because of the practical difficulties of including her in any agreement reached with the Poles but also because they have little confidence in Russia’s reliability.”49

Lord Halifax, however, cautiously kept the line to Moscow open, and on April 11, he had a conference with Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London. He found Maisky “cynical about the whole situation and rather of the opinion that the fat is in the fire as far as everybody is concerned with Russia sitting on the side lines.” This candid cynicism caused Halifax “completely to distrust” Maisky and led him to refrain from telling the ambassador anything of importance for fear that it might be passed on to possible enemies.50

French officials felt much the same way. Bonnet informed Bullitt that the Soviet Government had “replied evasively” to French proposals for military conversations between French and Russian staff officers. He found the Russians were “much stronger in their speeches and statements than they were when it came to negotiation.”51 But Bonnet had persisted in asking the Russians for a “unilateral guarantee” of Romanian frontiers in the event of German aggression against that country. He had also suggested that the Soviet Union seriously consider the negotiation of an “agreement with France for immediate assistance in case of war similar to the Anglo-Polish Agreement.”52

It is evident that despite the distrust that both Britain and France had for Russia, they still tried to extract from the Russian Foreign Office some promises of aid if Hitler made another step along the road to German expansion. On April 15, Sir William Seeds, at Moscow, presented to Litvinov a suggestion that his government, following British and French action, should make upon its own initiative a public declaration that “in the event of any act of aggression against any neighboring State to the Soviet Union which that State were to resist, the assistance of the Soviet Government would be given, if the desire for it were expressed.”53

Bonnet told Bullitt that the Soviet Government had rejected this British proposal and had suggested instead that “Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France should conclude accords for immediate military support in case of aggression similar to the pact recently concluded between Great Britain and Poland.”54 Apparently the Russian proposals also included suggestions that British assistance to Poland should be restricted to the contingency of German aggression and that any Polish-Romanian alliance should apply to all States and not merely to Russia. According to the Polish Ambassador at Moscow, Grzbowski, the terms of the Russian proposals included permission for Soviet troops to enter Poland by northern and southern routes and for a declaration by Britain that her guarantee of Poland applied only to her western frontier.55 Jules Lukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador at Paris, adds that Russia also wished a free hand in the Baltic states and a Polish-Russian treaty with far-reaching implications.56

But even though Polish officials knew of these Russian hopes to control her future, they continued to reject any German proposal for an understanding. On March 26, Ribbentrop once more pressed upon Ambassador Lipski an agreement that would include the “reunion of Danzig with the Reich and the construction of an extra-territorial motor-road and railway connection between the Reich and East Prussia.” Lipski curtly countered with the remark that “any further pursuance of these German plans . . . meant war with Poland.”57 By May 2 the Polish press had proceeded to the point where a demand was made that “Danzig become Polish.”58 With Warsaw expressing a rising sentiment of Polish nationalism there was little prospect for a German-Polish agreement.

g. Pope Pius XII Makes a Plea for Peace

As the clouds of misunderstanding gathered along the German-Polish frontier, Pope Pius XII made an important move in the direction of peace. On May 5 the Papal Nuncio in Paris called on Foreign Minister Bonnet to inform him that the Pope had decided to summon “immediately a peace conference to consist of representatives of France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain and Poland.” Bonnet conveyed this news to Daladier who promptly advised the Nuncio that France “would not participate in any conference held under the threat of German guns.” Such a conference would be “foredoomed to failure.” When the Nuncio remarked that it was “too late to change this project,” Daladier said he regretted this fact because His Holiness “would destroy by such action the immense influence in the world which had been obtained for the Church by the last Pope.” It would be “clear to everyone that the Pope would be engaged merely in pulling Italian chestnuts out of the fire and preparing a new Munich.”

These words of warning made a deep impression upon the Nuncio who later returned to see Daladier and assured him that the decision of the Pope with regard to the proposed conference was “not irrevocable and the opinion of the French Government would have great weight in the Papal decision.”59

On May 8, Bonnet told Bullitt that he had learned that the Pope had information which he regarded “as positive that Hitler would attack Poland in the near future. This was the reason why he wished to call a conference of the leading European powers in order to seek a formula of peace.” The Nuncio then assured Bonnet that His Holiness had “not consulted Mussolini nor had he been inspired by Mussolini.”60 On the following day Bullitt talked with Alexis Léger, the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office, who said that he had discussed with Bonnet and Daladier the Pope’s proposal for a conference of powers with regard to peace and it had been decided to reject it. If such a conference were held “both France and Poland would be expected to make concessions to Germany and Italy with the Pope as arbitrator and Great Britain as super-arbitrator.” The French Government held to the belief that any establishment of “good relations between France and Italy could be achieved only by direct negotiations.” The Foreign Office was certain that Poland “would not accept the arbitration of any foreign Power in the matter of Germany’s demands.” At this, point Léger expressed the suspicion of Britain that seemed always to lie at the back of French minds. He believed that the British Government had “sensed that at such a conference German demands for British colonies might be brought up. Halifax therefore had replied to the Papal Nuncio in London that he believed the French Government would not accept such a conference and that in consequence, Great Britain would not favor it.” Halifax had then made a “counterproposal which showed clearly that once all question of discussions of British colonies should be eliminated, Great Britain would be very glad to arbitrate away the possessions and interests of her associates, France and Poland.” Léger informed Bullitt that he was then preparing the draft of a note to Britain saying that Halifax’s proposal would be “just as inacceptable to the French Government as the Pope’s proposal.”61

From Warsaw came word that the Papal Nuncio in that city had broached the matter of a five-power conference to the Polish Foreign Office. Beck was fearful that such a conference would deal mainly with French concessions to Italy and would then turn to the matter of Polish concessions to Germany. Poland did not wish to participate in a second Munich conference in which she would be one of the chief victims.62 It was the opinion in Warsaw that the Papal proposal could be traced “indirectly to Mussolini.”63

On May 9 the Papal Secretary of State, Maglione, confided to the French Ambassador to the Vatican that “in view of the replies the Pope had received which seemed to indicate that there was no immediate danger of war, the Pope had decided to withdraw his suggestion.” Bonnet expressed to Bullitt his great relief at “this conclusion of the affair as he considered it most important not to offend the Pope, and he felt that the Pope had not had his feelings hurt in any way.”64 To Bonnet the ceremonies of diplomacy were more important than the substance.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941