Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941

XV Britain Blocks an Effort of Roosevelt to Find a Path to Peace

WHILE Ambassador Dieckhoff was trying to convince the German Foreign Office that Roosevelt’s quarantine speech of October 5, 1937, was aimed at Japan and not at Germany, Secretary Ickes was striving desperately to prove to suspicious Nazis that America was definitely hostile to the Hitler regime.

a. Secretary Ickes Widens the Breach between the United States and Germany

In the early months of 1937 the Department of Commerce became deeply interested in promoting commercial travel by airships. This type of travel had been developed to a point of high efficiency by German scientists, with the Hindenburg as the test dirigible. On February 2, 1937, Colonel Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, wrote to Walton Moore, the Assistant Secretary of State, to inform him that the matter of additional flights for “the Hindenburg to and from the United States has been discussed at the White House. The reaction there is favorable.” In view of this fact the Department of Commerce was willing to grant a German request for a “reasonable number of flights, say ten or twelve.” On February 17 the Department granted “permission for not to exceed eighteen round trip flights by the Hindenburg between Frankfort-on-the-Main, Germany, and Lakehurst, New Jersey.” The Hindenburg was making its first flight under this permission when it exploded and burned on May 6.1

Secretary Roper was deeply shocked by this disaster, and on May 12 he issued a statement to the press in which he remarked that “some well-guarded plan will be worked out whereby helium gas from our reserves can be made available for world commercial needs without . . . any sacrifice whatever of our peace policy.”2 The following day Colonel Johnson expressed the opinion that Americans could look forward to a “modification of our national policy with respect to the release of helium for use beyond our own frontiers.”3

President Roosevelt acted promptly in this matter and appointed a five-member inter-Cabinet committee to “formulate and recommend a policy for the sale and exportation of helium gas.” On May 25 this committee consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, Commerce, and Interior sent a letter to the President stating that the helium reserves of the United States were “adequate for many years.” It therefore recommended that the Government be authorized to “make both domestic and export sales for operation of commercial lighter-than-air craft plying between the United States and other countries.” It was believed that these sales could be surrounded with safeguards that would “prevent the use of helium by foreign countries for military purposes.”4

Congress responded to this Executive pressure by passing the Helium Act of September 1, 1937, which permitted the exportation of helium gas for use in “commercial airships operating between the United States and a foreign country.” Sales of this gas would have to be approved by the National Munitions Control Board consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Commerce. The concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior was added as an extra precaution against any unwise sale of helium gas. Regulations governing the exportation of helium were promulgated on September 3.

In accordance with the terms of these regulations the German Zeppelin Company, through its agent, American Zeppelin Transport, Inc., applied to the Secretary of State for an allotment of 17,900,000 cubic feet of helium gas. On November 23, 1937, this application was granted by the Secretary of State with “the unanimous approval of all the members of the National Munitions Control Board and the Secretary of the Interior.” On January 31, 1938, a license was issued to the American Zeppelin Transport, Inc., to export 2,600,000 cubic feet of helium gas. The company then submitted to the Secretary of the Interior a contract for the purchase of 10,000,000 cubic feet of helium gas, and deposited with him a check for $76,850 as required by the sales regulations. All formalities had now been fulfilled and the company was informed “by officers of the Interior Department that the contract would be ready for signature within a few days.”5

After receiving this assurance, the American Zeppelin Transport, Inc., sent a vessel to Houston, Texas, with empty gas containers for the promised supply of helium gas. But this matter of the sale of helium gas assumed a political aspect in the early months of 1938 when it became apparent that Germany had aggressive intentions towards Austria. Representatives Bruce Barton, John M. O’Connell, Donald L. O’Toole, Alfred N. Phillips, James G. Polk, and Mark Wilcox voiced objections to the sale of helium to any German agency, their main argument being that such a sale would “exhaust for a year the available supply of helium and thus jeopardize the national defense.”

The Secretary of War, Admiral Leahy, and a series of experts in the War and Navy departments testified that it was “almost inconceivable that the German Government could contemplate the use of this helium for bombing purposes or that it could carry out such an intention.” After reviewing these facts, the executive secretary of the National Munitions Control Board remarked that “recent developments in the European situation do not affect the fundamental issues involved in this case. . . . This Government would lay itself open to a charge of bad faith if it were now to refuse to permit the proposed exportation or to employ indirect means such as the requirement of an exorbitant bond from the purchaser in order to make the proposed exportation impossible.”6

This charge of “bad faith” was given definite substance by the very “indirect means” that Mr. Green had feared. On March 31 a new set of regulations was issued which provided “both for the posting of a bond to guarantee the non-utilization of helium for war purposes and for control within Germany by American officers of the disposition of helium.” The German Foreign Office complained to Ambassador Hugh Wilson that “both of these conditions were impossible of acceptance for the reason that they cast doubt upon the good faith of the German Government.” Wilson himself expressed to Secretary Hull the opinion that the German Government was “sincere in its belief that the new regulations would constitute an unfair departure from the original understanding.” He was afraid that they would arouse “so deep a resentment” in the Foreign Office that it would be difficult thereafter to “obtain effective protection and fair treatment for American individuals and interests” in Germany.7

As soon as Hugo Eckener, the genius behind the German Zeppelin Company, heard of the regulations of March 31, he sent a telegram to President Roosevelt in which he emphasized the fact that it was the unanimous opinion of all experts in Germany that it was “absolutely impossible” for a helium-inflated airship to conduct military operations.

He therefore begged the President to take immediate favorable action upon the pending application for the export of helium gas.8

It was obvious that a crisis in German-American relations was inevitably approaching, and many important German leaders were apprehensive of what might happen. According to a competent American observer who had recently visited Germany, Hitler was “exceedingly perturbed at the relations between Germany and the United States and the extent of the feeling in America against him personally and to the Nazi regime in general.”9

Secretary Ickes shared this feeling of deep dislike for Hitler, and it was his refusal to approve any contract for the sale of helium gas to Germany that shattered the hope of Dr. Eckener. Many Americans regarded the action of Secretary Ickes as unfortunate. The periodical American Aviation published an editorial which commented upon the new regulation which required the posting of a bond to guarantee the non-military use of purchased helium. How any

domestic bonding agency can guarantee that a foreign government would not confiscate helium in time of war is one of those matters beyond human conception. The irony in the whole helium business is that Secretary Ickes is going on the assumption that helium for lighter-than-air craft is of military value. On the other hand, the Navy Department has refused to recognize any military value in the dirigible. . . . We fear that Secretary Ickes has acquired another one of his publicity phobias.10

On April 27 the Office of the National Munitions Control Board prepared a memorandum which frankly stated that all the evidence available to the board indicated that neither the German Zeppelin Company nor the German Government had “any intention whatever of using any of the helium, to be exported under the allotment mentioned above, otherwise than for the inflation of the airship LZ-130 in commercial operations between Germany and the United States.”11

During a conversation with Ambassador Wilson on April 28, General Göring spoke with “deep emotion and bluntness” about the helium matter. The American reversal of policy concerning the sale of helium gas to the German Zeppelin Company “could only mean deliberate unfriendliness on the part of the American Government.” Relations between Germany and the United States had been brought

to the lowest possible point and this over a matter of minor importance to both nations. He said “I cannot understand what leads a nation to earn the enmity of another over such a little thing.” . . . If it was impossible to get helium the German people would not forget America’s attitude.12

In a final effort to secure the delivery of helium gas the German Government, in May 1938, sent Dr. Eckener to the United States to talk with American officials. On May 21, Ambassador Dieckhoff and Dr. Eckener were received by President Roosevelt who was “plainly embarrassed.” He greeted them in an “excessively friendly manner” and said that he was “firmly convinced that helium should be delivered to us.” Regret was expressed that the stubborn opposition of Secretary Ickes had delayed any decision in the matter. Nothing could be done without his approval. But the question of the sale of helium to Germany was still under consideration, and there was “hope” that it would finally be settled to the “satisfaction” of the German Zeppelin Company.13

These hopes were never realized and the helium gas was never shipped to Germany. On May 14, Ambassador Wilson reported that hostile feeling was running “exceedingly high in German circles among those who are aware of our decision respecting helium.” It was apparent, however, that restraint had “been exercised on the German press,” and the Foreign Office was seemingly anxious to cultivate American good will.14 A week later Wilson informed Secretary Hull that Hitler was making a personal study of the “current strain in German-American relations” in the hope of finding a basis for a “rapprochement.” In this regard it was said that the Chancellor was considering approaching the President directly, proposing a joint effort to liquidate outstanding “controversies.”15 Before making such a proposal he would have to take steps to curb the activities of certain German societies in the United States. He was ready to take these steps.

b. Hitler Repudiates the German-American Bund

In 1937 the Roosevelt Administration became increasingly concerned over the activities of the German-American Bund. On October 2 the American chargé at Berlin called on Baron von Weizsäcker, the head of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, to discuss with him the “serious and disturbing effects upon German-American relations caused by the conduct of Germans in the United States.” Parades by “Germans in brown uniforms” and antidemocratic statements made by German nationals or German-Americans were creating much “uneasiness,” and there was widespread alarm at the possibility of “German meddling in American domestic politics.”16

This was not the first protest against the activities of German nationals in the United States. In 1935 the “Friends of the New Germany” had taken a conspicuous part in promoting a closer understanding between German-Americans and the “New Germany” under Hitler. Their efforts towards this goal had drawn a protest from the Department of State with the result that “German nationals were instructed to resign their membership in that society in order that it might appear to be a purely American organization.” After this action the “Friends of the New Germany” dissolved their organization and established another one under the title, the German-American Bund.

The question before the German Foreign Office in 1937 was whether instructions should now be issued to German nationals in the United States to withdraw from the Bund. The North American Division of the Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on October 11 which answered this question in the affirmative. The Bund should be replaced by an organization with “purely cultural aims” like the Italian Dante Alighieri Society.17

This suggestion to dissolve all ties between German nationals and the German-American Bund was supported by Jacob G. Schurman, former American Ambassador to Germany. In November 1937, Schurman had a long conversation with Ambassador Dieckhoff during the course of which he expressed the fear that the activities of German nationals in the United States would lead to strained relations. Dieckhoff immediately assured him that the German Government was taking the “utmost pains not to interfere in any way whatever in the political concerns of American citizens, including American citizens of German descent. All that we expected from American citizens of German descent was interest in their German cultural heritage, especially in the German language.” Schurman promptly replied that he did not think the German-American societies in the United States limited “themselves to purely cultural matters.” In some cases they had “become the self-styled champions of German political philosophy on American soil” and had given the impression that “they were acting under German orders.” Any American, “regardless of where he stood politically, had to resist such interference.”

In reporting this conversation to the Foreign Office, Dieckhoff sharply criticized the “stupid and noisy activities” of the German-American Bund. Unless the German Government clearly indicated that it did not sponsor these activities, the relations between Germany and the United States would be “seriously impaired.”18

On December 20, Ambassador Dieckhoff wrote again to the Foreign Office concerning German-American relations which had not improved “during the last 7 months.” One of the main reasons for this coolness was the fact that in the United States many people were suspicious of the “increasing activity” of the German-American Bund. He thought that it was “incontestable” that American dislike of this organization had made relations between the two countries “more difficult.”19

Von Mackensen assured Ambassador Dieckhoff that the Foreign Office was following with “great concern the attacks of the press and of American authorities which are directed against alleged German interference in the American domestic situation.” All correspondence between “Governmental or Party offices and the German-American Bund” had been stopped, and the ambassador’s unfriendly attitude towards the Bund was approved.20

In the early part of January 1938, Ambassador Dieckhoff again adverted to the question of the unfortunate influence of the German-American Bund upon diplomatic relations. By its “program, by its uniformed parades, by its flag (identical with that of the German Reich), by its summer camps” and by numerous other activities, the Bund had given numerous Americans the impression that it is trying to “introduce an authoritarian regime in America.” The so-called cultural program of the Bund could not achieve any unification of German-Americans to the point where they could be an important political asset for Germany. Indeed, “any political connection between any authorities in Germany and the German-American element, if any such exists, must be broken off.” The methods of the Bund were likely to cause “difficulties and discord between the United States and Germany,” and its role in German-American relations should be carefully reviewed by the Foreign Office.21

In response to these dispatches from Ambassador Dieckhoff, the Foreign Office, through the head of the Auslandsorganization, decided to tell “Reich-Germans and Party members living in America immediately to renounce their membership” in the Bund. It was hoped that this action would “prove to the American Government and the American public that Germany had no intention whatever of interfering in America’s domestic affairs.”22 On February 10 the Foreign Office instructed Ambassador Dieckhoff to inform Reich Germans that they could not be members of the German-American Bund or of any substitute organizations. This was regarded as an important gesture of friendship which should win American good will.23

In the meantime Prentiss Gilbert, the American chargé in Berlin, had a lengthy conversation with Dr. Schacht. Schacht prefaced his remarks with some words of high praise for Hitler whom he described as a “man of sound principles on whom the German people should pin its entire faith.” He then professed great surprise that the activities of members of the German-American Bund should arouse so much concern in the United States. Von Neurath had definitely stated at Stuttgart that the “German Government was only interested in German citizens abroad.” Gilbert replied that the “American people were not convinced” that the activities of the Auslandsorganization were “confined to German citizens.”24 It would be expedient for the Nazi Government to clarify this situation.

Shortly after this conversation with Dr. Schacht, Gilbert attended a dinner given by the Foreign Office and was surprised to find that he was sought out by Dr. E. W. Bohle, the head of the Auslandsorganization in the Foreign Ministry. Bohle expressed his concern at “the hostility of American public opinion toward Germany and stated that because of this he was insistent that German citizens should refrain from National Socialist agitation in the United States.” Gilbert believed that this action on the part of Dr. Bohle revealed an “anxiety” on the part of German officials to have better relations with the United States. The new Four Year Plan of Hitler to strengthen the national economy of Germany was partly dependent upon a larger volume of trade with the United States. This objective could be achieved only on the basis of a friendly accord between the United States and Germany.25

But this accord was not possible unless there was a profound change in American opinion of Germany. Ambassador Dieckhoff wrote to the Foreign Office on April 14 that anti-German sentiment in the United States was still “strong” and that the German Government should “make greater efforts than ever to give it a more favorable turn.”26 While Ribbentrop was studying this problem he had a conversation with Ambassador Wilson on April 29. When Ribbentrop complained of the hostility of the American press, Wilson said that this animosity was largely confined to the press “on the East coast which was dependent on banks and trusts.” Among the American people as a whole there was still “much sympathy for Germany.” This evoked from Ribbentrop the remark that “the American people were regarded with respect and sympathy by Germans.”27

Ambassador Dieckhoff found little sympathy in America for Germany. In July 1938, on the eve of his departure for Germany, he paid a visit to the Department of State and sadly confessed to Secretary Hull that relations between the United States and the Reich had grown worse since his arrival as ambassador. Hull pointedly remarked that relations would be better if Germany would adopt the high-level program followed by the United States: equality of opportunity for all nations, fair play and fair dealing and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. In contrast with American fair play the German Government had recently announced that it did not recognize any liability for the payment of Austria’s “external indebtedness.” This meant that Germany, after absorbing Austria, was repudiating rather than paying Austria’s debts. This example of lack of fundamental principles, coupled with other examples of bad faith, had produced such a strong tide of disapproval in the United States that it was difficult for him and the President to hold it back in the hope that amicable relations between the two nations could be established.28

It was apparent to Dieckhoff that the German gesture of conciliation concerning the activities of the German-American Bund had not created a friendly climate of opinion in the Department of State. Germany, if she wished to win American friendship, would have to abandon all hope of expansion through military force or by “interference in the internal affairs of other countries.” The Treaty of Versailles had frozen the political structure of Europe. Any attempt to thaw this structure by the friction of armed pressure would awaken strong American disapproval. Peace was the President’s passion and he expected other nations to express some of his fervor. He would regard with deep dislike any design for aggression. In November 1937, Hitler had prepared a detailed plan for Austrian absorption. The successful execution of that plan profoundly affected German-American relations.

c. Austrian Independence Hangs in the Balance

Hitler’s plan for the absorption of Austria was disclosed on November 5, 1937, in the Reich Chancellery to an important group of trusted counselors—Field Marshal von Blomberg, Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Admiral Dr. Erich Raeder, Colonel General Hermann Göring, Baron von Neurath, and Colonel Hossbach. In his discussion of the problems facing Germany, Hitler stated that the future of the Reich could not be assured either by autarchy or by a wider participation in world economy. There was pressing need for Lebensraum and this could be secured only through the conquest of desirable territory: “The German question can be solved only by way of force.” The latest period when this war of aggression should be waged was during the period from 1943 to 1945. It was quite probable that war would come long before that date. In the event that “social tensions in France” should seriously reduce the efficiency of the French Army, or if France were engaged in a conflict with another state, Germany could then put her plan for expansion into effect.

The direction of this military thrust was clearly indicated: “It must be our first aim to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously.” But this directive was flexible. When the time for action arrived, the absorption of Austria was given priority although Czechoslovakia was regarded as the richer prize.

The opportunity for conflict might develop from an Anglo-French attack upon Italy because of her intervention in the Spanish Civil War and her continued occupation of the Balearic Islands. In this regard Hitler stated that the “date which appeared to him as a possibility was the summer of 1938.”29

d. Ambassador Bullitt Has Some Important Conversations

A few days after this important conference in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Ambassador Bullitt decided to pay a visit to Poland and Germany in order to discover if the ship of European peace were likely to founder upon some hidden rock of misunderstanding. During his visit to Warsaw, November 14-17, 1937, he had some extended conferences with important Polish leaders. Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, confided to him that he believed that Germany

in the near future would take some action against Czechoslovakia. . . . He and Marshal Smigly-Rydz both expressed the opinion that France would not intervene to save Czechoslovakia. . . . I [Bullitt] disagreed with this opinion as I believe that at the present moment the French would mobilize at once in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, either direct or through the Germans of Bohemia. I do not know how long this state of mind on the part of the French Government will prevail. . . .

I asked Beck what Poland would do in case France should become involved in war with Germany because of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. Beck replied that in the hypothetical case I had presented . . . Poland positively would not march. . . . Under no circumstances would Poland become involved in protecting French satellites in Central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia. . . . In discussing the question of Danzig, Beck said that Hitler personally had given Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, the most absolute assurance that he cared too much about Germany’s good relations with Poland to permit the Germans of Danzig to do anything which would be totally inacceptable to Poland.

From Warsaw, Bullitt went to Berlin where he had several conversations with German officials. He found Baron von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, to be “supremely self-confident” and the atmosphere of “the Wilhelmstrasse was as cocky as before the war.” Neurath gave assurances that

Germany certainly desired peace. So far as France was concerned, there was absolutely no outstanding question whatsoever between Germany and France. . . . The national economies of the two countries supplemented each other perfectly, and there was no reason why their trade should conflict. . . . Furthermore, the French had made it clear that they were ready to return the German colonies they had been given by the Treaty of Versailles, provided that England should take a similar course. . . . He feared that the British were going to be extremely stiff-necked on the subject of the German colonies. . . .

In conclusion, Neurath said to me: “Tell your French friends that we are quite ready to establish the best possible relations with them.”

Bullitt found that Dr. Schacht was rather cautious in his comments. He did feel impelled to speak of the “absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe before the outbreak of war toward which the Continent was drifting.” Hitler was “determined to have Austria eventually and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia.” The one way “he could see peace was through direct negotiations between France and Germany.”

General Göring was quite voluble. He repeated Dr. Schacht’s opinion that there was no real quarrel between France and Germany. With regard to many of the problems that faced Germany, Göring expressed himself in great detail:

I asked Goering if . . . Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. . . . Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. . . . I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question: the Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich.

Goering then went on to say that he deplored greatly the present state of trade relations between Germany and the United States. The trade between the two countries was ceasing to be of any importance which was contrary to all reason. . . . He then asked me why I believed there was such hostility to Germany in the United States. I replied that there were many sources of this hostility. All Americans were devoted to the ideal of democracy. There has been a democratic government in Germany . . . which had been destroyed and replaced by Nazi dictatorship. . . . Furthermore, the German Government had at the same time attacked with the utmost violence the Jews, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church. . . .

He thought that the violence of the reaction in the United States probably was due to the Jews. I replied that in some measure it was due to the Jews as was only natural. . . . I then added that . . . it appeared that the Nazi Government was engaged in forming Nazi organizations in the United States. Neither the Government nor the people of the United States could tolerate the formation on their soil of any national group . . . directed by any foreign country. . . . Goering said that he considered this entirely reasonable and understandable. . . . The German Government had forbidden any German citizen to participate in any way in the formation of such groups. . . . Goering then said that he hoped I realized there was an intense desire on the part of the German Government to develop better relations with the United States.30

e. Hitler Plays Host to Lord Halifax

Germany desired “better relations” not only with the United States but also with Great Britain. Göring had been very frank with Ambassador Bullitt with regard to the absorption of Austria. This same candor might pay big dividends with some important British statesman. Göring felt that he and Lord Halifax had a common denominator of understanding that was created by a mutual love of hunting. In the autumn of 1937, Göring, as game warden of the Reich, invited Halifax to Berlin to attend the International Exhibition of Hunting. As a well-known master of foxhounds, Halifax had never accepted Oscar Wilde’s tart description of fox hunting: “The pursuit of the uneatable by the unspeakable.”

Before Halifax reached Berlin the German Government made a quick survey of the situation. Franz von Papen had left Vienna for a brief visit to Paris where he discussed with French statesmen some of the important problems that required prompt settlement. He was a more devious person than Göring and did not speak as frankly of Hitler’s ultimate aims. In a conversation with the French Minister of Finance he expressed the hope that France would “stop calling every extension of German influence in the Danube region a threat to French interests.” When Bonnet inquired as to the real objectives of Germany in that region, von Papen answered with the glib lie that Germany wished merely the “closest community of economic and intellectual interests, with the preservation of Austrian independence.” Later when talking with Premier Chautemps, von Papen repeated this exercise in mendacity. He did not reveal Hitler’s determination to absorb Austria. The Führer desired a “marked extension of German influence in Austria obtained through evolutionary means.” When Chautemps heard von Papen’s assurance that Hitler’s policy in the Danubian region was evolutionary rather than revolutionary, he was so overcome with emotion that he impulsively embraced the Nazi diplomat and exclaimed with delight: “Tell the Führer it would be a milestone in world history if we two were to place European politics on a new and healthier basis.”31

In London, Halifax had a brief talk with Ambassador Ribbentrop with reference to his approaching visit to Berchtesgaden. It was apparent that his conversations with the Führer would deal mainly with the “Austrian and Czech questions,’’ and with the important matter of the restoration of German colonies. Halifax stressed the viewpoint that a war between Britain and Germany would “mean the end of civilization.” Ribbentrop agreed with this dire prediction and then observed that “not a single German desired such a conflict.”32

On November 10, Halifax arrived in Berlin and soon had a talk with General Göring who confided to him that the German Government was bent upon incorporating Austria and the Sudetenland into the Reich. He made the further statement that Hitler also wished the return of Danzig to Germany and a reasonable solution of the Polish Corridor problem.

After hearing Göring’s candid statements concerning the aims of the Nazi Government, Halifax went to Berchtesgaden to match wits with Hitler. On November 19 he had his momentous conversation with the Führer. There are four versions of this conversation, three of them from the German Foreign Office,33 the fourth from the unpublished report Lord Halifax made to the British Foreign Office. A copy of this Foreign Office version was sent to the Department of State in order that President Roosevelt might have an “inside picture” of the European diplomatic crisis.

After the conversation had been formally opened by Lord Halifax, Hitler remarked that an agreement between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy would not be worth much “unless it took account of realities however unpleasant.” The status quo “could not last forever. Changes could be brought about by (1) the play of forces—which meant war; (2) settlement by reason. We had had experience of (1) and it was therefore imperative to turn to (2), the way of reasonable solution.”

Hitler then complained that “democracies were difficult to do business with owing to the party system and freedom of the press. All his previous efforts except the Naval Agreement had failed owing to this difficulty of doing business with democracies.” Lord Halifax drily replied that “if agreement had to wait upon the abandonment of democracy by Great Britain, it was a waste of time to talk of an agreement.” Hitler then hurriedly remarked that his reference had been “mainly to French democracy.”34

Halifax then remarked that in England it was believed that it was “perfectly possible to clear out of the way the misunderstandings which existed at the present moment” between Britain and Germany. The solution sought for might be found in an “open exchange of views.” These views could possibly lead to an agreement that would include not only Britain and Germany but also France and Italy.

Hitler thought that such an agreement should go much farther than merely “mutually polite relations.” Germany should first of all be treated as a nation that “no longer bore the moral or material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles.” The nucleus of the problem was the question as to “what active political co-operation could be accorded by a country which in other respects was not even accorded the most urgent necessities of life.”

Halifax quickly replied that everyone in England “respected Germany as a great and sovereign country and that it was only upon this basis that she would be treated.” The British Government did not necessarily believe that the status quo “must be maintained under all circumstances.” Changes, however, should take place only upon “the basis of reasonable agreements reasonably reached.”

But Hitler expressed the fear that it would be difficult for democracies to negotiate “reasonable agreements” because of the pressure exerted by demagogues. In the matter of restoring the colonies taken from Germany at the close of the World War he knew that the British Conservatives would vigorously oppose such a measure. The “same was the case in France.” Political parties with their constant need to build political fences would erect high barriers along the road to realism.

Lord Halifax sharply challenged the view that the British Government was the “slave” of politicians with demagogic views. In England, no government “which was worthy of the name was under the domination of outside parties.” He wished also to make it clear that Britain did not take the position that the question of the return of German colonies must not be discussed. British statesmen, however, were firm in their belief that it was a problem that required a general settlement and therefore negotiations between Britain and Germany should be merely of a preparatory character.

The conversation shifted to the League of Nations and Halifax asked Hitler if he “saw any possibility of leading Germany back to a closer co-operation with the other nations in the League of Nations.” In what respect would Hitler want the League to be “altered before Germany could once more become a member?” Hitler expressed the view that the League without Germany, Italy, and Japan was not a real league of nations. Whether Germany would ever return to Geneva was a “question which could not at the moment be answered.”

With reference to the disarmament question Hitler confessed that he had no idea how it could be brought “within the realm of practical possibilities.” In any case he did not believe in conferences which were “doomed to failure from the start.”

As far as Austria was concerned Hitler referred to the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936, and expressed the hope that “it would lead to the removal of all difficulties.” In the case of Czechoslovakia the Czechs themselves were in a “position to clear away any existing difficulties.” Germany “set great store by good relations with all her neighbours.”35

In his report to the British Foreign Office, Lord Halifax remarked that the atmosphere at Berchtesgaden and the

whole conversation was quiet and friendly although the Chancellor showed a certain reserve due perhaps to tiredness or perhaps to a feeling that his outlook has so little in common with that of democratic Governments. Herr Hitler said that he hoped we might get away from the atmosphere of “imminent catastrophe.” The situation in Europe was not dangerous and of all the nations only Russia might think of war today.

The German Chancellor and others gave the impression that they were not likely to embark on adventures involving force or at least war. . . . Lord Halifax formed the view that they would pursue their objectives in Central or Eastern Europe in a fashion that would be perhaps unlikely to give other nations cause or at least the opportunity for intervention.36

On November 29, Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had a conference in London with the French Premier and the French Foreign Minister. Lord Halifax reviewed his conversation with Hitler and expressed the “general conclusion” that Germany thought that it was now up to Britain and France to “propose a solution of the colonial question if they wanted one.” In this regard Germany believed that “all her former African colonies should be restored.”

Halifax then gave his personal impressions of Hitler and of the European situation. His main impression was

that the Germans intended to press their colonial claim, but that they would not press it to the point of war. Unless the claim could be met in some form it would be impossible to improve relations in such a way as to make an advance towards the object which we all had in view. The question we had to ask ourselves, therefore, was whether it was possible to use this problem as a lever for getting some of the things both the French and British Governments wanted, such for example, as a contribution by Germany towards European peace. . . .

His [Lord Halifax’s] broad impression was that Germany was extremely anxious for friendly relations with us. The Germans to whom he had spoken were also anxious to convince him that Germany had no direct cause of difficulty with France. . . . At the same time, while he [Hitler] desired to be friendly with us, the Chancellor was not prepared to run after us and was conscious of his own strength. He was not bent on early adventures, partly because these might be unprofitable, and partly because he was busy building up Germany internally. . . . General Goering had assured him that not one drop of German blood would be shed in Europe unless Germany was absolutely forced to it.

The Germans gave him [Lord Halifax] the impression of being convinced that time was on their side and of intending to achieve their aims in orderly fashion.

Premier Chautemps broke into the Halifax discourse and asked about the sincerity of Hitler’s “reassuring words about Czechoslovakia.” Halifax replied that he had been “surprised at the moderation of Herr Hitler’s remarks on this point. He could only suppose the degree of permanence would in part depend on Germany’s general international position and on the influence which we might exercise on the later developments of German policy.” It was obvious, he believed, that Hitler was awaiting for some concrete proposal on the colonial issue before engaging in a discussion of other issues.37

Shortly after Premier Chautemps returned to Paris, Ambassador Bullitt had a long talk with him concerning the European situation. Chautemps stated that he

believed any immediate practical developments would be impossible due to the unwillingness of the British to make any concessions in the colonial domain to Germany. During the conversations in London his [Chamberlain’s] Government had begun to approach delicately the question of whether France might be disposed to hand the Cameroons to Germany at once without any quid pro quo. Chamberlain had not made any direct statement on this subject, but he, Chautemps, had perceived what was in Chamberlain’s thoughts and had therefore said at once that France could not place herself in the position of being the only country to make concessions to Germany in the colonial domain and would do so only if England was prepared to make similar concessions, and if such concessions should be a part of a general settlement. . . . Chautemps said that his declaration had stopped all suggestions which might conceivably have come from the British to satisfy Germany’s colonial ambitions by giving her Portuguese, Belgian or French colonies. . . .

Chautemps went on to say that Halifax had made one blunder of the first water in his conversation with Hitler. He had begun by saying to Hitler that he had not come to discuss matters in Central Europe and had accepted without protest Hitler’s reply that Great Britain was indeed very little interested in what might happen in Central Europe. . . .

I asked Chautemps if he saw any possibility of using the London conversations as the basis for an improvement in relations between France and Germany. . . . Chautemps said he felt there was a genuine desire in Germany at the present time to develop closer relations with France. It was, of course, impossible for France to rush into the arms of Germany and form overnight an offensive and defensive alliance; but it might be possible to inaugurate a period of genuine search for friendship. . . .

Chautemps went on to say that both he and Chamberlain believed that the Germans were entirely right in their view that Article XVI [dealing with the imposition of sanctions] should be eliminated from the Covenant of the League of Nations. He scarcely dared to say this above his breath because Delbos did not agree with him; and Herriot and Paul Boncour . . . were still quite unaware that their God had died. They were on their knees in front of the altar of the League from which the Deity had long since been removed. . . .

Chautemps said he would also say something else to me which was highly indiscreet. So far as he was concerned he looked with considerable equanimity on the possibility that Germany might annex Austria because he believed that this would produce an immediate reaction of Italy against Germany.38

In December 1937 the French Foreign Minister, Delbos, made a hurried trip to Poland and to the countries of the so-called Little Entente. He assured Ambassador Bullitt that he was “well satisfied” with the results of this brief survey. He had been able to “ascertain by personal contact that the Little Entente and Poland were determined to continue to occupy their positions within the orb of French policy.” He was fearful, however, of a “German movement against Austria which would meet with little resistance either within Austria or from outside Powers.” He had no “constructive plans for the future but felt compelled to follow a policy of wait and see.”39

f. Britain Blocks a Presidential Program for Peace

President Roosevelt did not accept the Delbos policy of “wait and see.” Shortly after his quarantine speech of October 5 he decided to launch a real peace offensive. As President of the United States he would issue an appeal to the nations of the world to attempt to find some path to peace. He would emphasize the necessity for a close adherence to basic principles of international conduct. A suggestion would be made with reference to the problem of disarmament and he would call attention to the importance of breaking down the main barriers to world trade. Because of the horrors of modern warfare, he planned to ask the nations of the world to adopt far-reaching regulations that would conserve the safety and welfare of civilian populations. The detailed plan for carrying out these suggestions should be intrusted to a committee of ten nations whose membership would be representative of all parts of the world.40

The President had planned to issue this appeal on Armistice Day at a White House meeting of all the Diplomatic Corps, but he ran into the almost “hysterical opposition” of certain of his “closest advisers.” He finally decided to take the matter up first with the British Foreign Office and get their reaction to it. When the Roosevelt proposal arrived at the Foreign Office on January 12, 1938, Anthony Eden was in France enjoying a brief vacation. Prime Minister Chamberlain read the proposal with surprise and immediately sent a strong negative. The British Government was ready to present an appeasement plan to Germany and Italy which might be adversely affected by any American diplomatic intervention. Prime Minister Chamberlain sent a letter to President Roosevelt in which he remarked that the American Government was well aware of

the efforts which His Majesty’s Government for their part are making to bring about a measure of appeasement [with reference to Germany and Italy]. He [the President] will be interested to know that recently his Majesty’s Government received an enquiry from the Italian Government as to when conversations could be re-opened with His Majesty’s Government and that in the last few days I have agreed with the Secretary of State that the latter should on January 16th discuss with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Geneva the possibility of making a fresh approach towards reconciliation with Italy that might bring appeasement to the Mediterranean region at least. . . .

Our plan, both as regards Germany and Italy, rests upon the view that we and they are both in a position each to make a contribution towards the objective we both desire to obtain. There would be no need to discuss whether our contribution were greater or less than theirs. . . .

I mention these facts so that the President may consider . . . whether there is not a risk of his proposal cutting across our efforts here. It is probable that the Italian and German Governments, of whom we should have to ask a contribution, . . . will be none too ready to give . . . on the ground that the subjects under discussion, which for the most part will be specific and concrete in character, seem all merged in the wider problems which the President contemplates tackling as a whole. . . .

It would, I feel, be regrettable if what I am sure the President intends to be . . . action taken by him parallel to the efforts which we are making, were found to be capable of being used to block progress in the directions which over recent months we have laboriously worked, and for which we feel the stage has at last been set in not too unfavourable a manner. This leads me to ask the President to consider whether it would not be wiser to consider holding his hand for a short while to see what progress we can make in beginning to tackle some of the problems—see my letter of May 23rd.41

In response to this appeal from the Prime Minister, the President abandoned all thought of taking the initiative in proposing to the nations of the world a plan that might insure peace. In his reply to Mr. Chamberlain, the President made the following comments:

In view of the opinions and considerations advanced by the Prime Minister, I readily agree to defer making the proposal I had intended to make for a short while as he suggests in order that His Majesty’s Government may see what progress they can make in beginning the negotiations they are contemplating. . . .

I will express the hope that he may be good enough to keep me advised of developments with regard to some aspects of the direct negotiations with Germany and Italy. . . . With regard to the political features of these negotiations, this Government of course has no connection. I feel, however, that it would be most helpful to this Government to be apprised of those features of the negotiations which would have a material effect upon the maintenance of those international principles and upon the policies of world appeasement which this Government endeavors to support.42

Anthony Eden was an ardent advocate of working in close co-operation with the United States. When he heard that Prime Minister Chamberlain had rejected the President’s proposal of January 12 he returned at once to England and voiced strong disapproval of this action. As a result of this pressure the Prime Minister soon sent a second letter to the President in which he declared that he would “welcome the President’s initiative and that the British government would do its utmost to contribute to the success of the scheme whenever the President decided to launch it.”43

But President Roosevelt now thought that it was too late for him to embark upon a major adventure on the seas of diplomacy that were growing constantly more rough as the Ides of March approached. It would be expedient for him to follow a policy of watchful waiting. His proposal of January 12, therefore, remains as one of the great might-have-beens of world history. In this regard Sumner Welles remarks:

In November, 1937, the European situation was still fluid. While Hitler had undoubtedly already fully formulated his plans in co-operation with the German General Staff, the policies of Italy were far from crystallized. The full participation by the United States in such a world-wide effort to keep the peace as that envisaged by the President might have given Italy pause. It might have resulted in a radical modification of Japanese policy. . . .

With the annexation of Austria and with the threatened attack upon Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1938, the President had no longer any real opportunity to arrest impending calamity.44

The vacillations of Chamberlain were so profoundly disturbing to Anthony Eden that he resigned his office as Foreign Secretary on February 20. Lord Halifax and Chamberlain could now carry on their policy of appeasement which ended abruptly when Hitler’s legions made their long-feared entry into Prague.

• 1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
• 2February 10, 1904.
• 3February 10, 1904.
• 4February 11, 1904.
• 5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
• 6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
• 7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
• 8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
• 9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
• 10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
• 11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
• 12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
• 13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
• 14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
• 15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
• 16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
• 17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
• 18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
• 19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
• 20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
• 21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
• 22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
• 23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
• 24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
• 25Ibid., p. 69.
• 26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
• 27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
• 28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
• 29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
• 30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
• 31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
• 32Ibid., p. 319.
• 33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
• 34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
• 35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
• 36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
• 37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
• 38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
• 39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
• 40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
• 41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
• 42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
• 43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
• 44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.