XII: America Views the Hitler Regime with Increasing Dislike

XII America Views the Hitler Regime with Increasing Dislike

a. Similarities between Nazi and American fiscal Policies

THE PURGE of the Nazi Party temporarily disrupted the ordinary processes of government in the Third Reich. It was obvious to the average statesman that important diplomatic problems could not receive due attention until administrative order was completely restored. But Secretary Hull refused to recognize the realities of the situation in Germany: he was determined to press the Nazi Government with reference to financial obligations even though he knew it was in no position to return a satisfactory answer. If he could keep this fiscal sore from healing it might lead to a general inflammation that would spread over the whole body of German-American relations and lead to fatal results. It was somewhat surprising to see how this quiet lawyer from an agrarian state became so intensely interested in safeguarding the investments of Wall Street bankers.

While the embers of the crisis in Germany were still brightly glowing, he sent an instruction to Ambassador Dodd directing him to register a strong protest against the announced decision of the Nazi Government to discriminate in favor of British creditors. When this instruction reached the American Embassy on July 6, Dodd hurried with it to the Foreign Office and had a conference with von Neurath: “Both of us were embarrassed. He knew Germany had done wrong to promise the payment of English debts and not pay American; I knew the same; both of us knew Germany could not pay even the English debt. . . . He asked me to say that he was sorry and would pay, if any reserves were available, but these are not at all probable.”1

In his telegram to Secretary Hull recounting the interview with von Neurath, Dodd revealed a sympathy for Germany because of her desperate financial plight. Many other nations had passed through similar cycles, and America had been one of them: “Washington, Jefferson and Hamilton gave same excuses in 1790 for failure to pay ‘unpayable’ Revolutionary debts. English, French and Spanish markets were closed to the United States. . . . Between 1820 and 1850 our States borrowed $400,000,000 when national wealth was ten billions. Nearly all these States defaulted or repudiated. . . . The Federal Government refused to act in any way. . . . All these facts are known to competent officials here if not to some of our eminent men. One cannot banish facts from one’s mind no matter how patriotic one may be.”2

Despite Dodd’s clear telegram of July 14 indicating financial chaos in Germany, Secretary Hull sent repeated instructions directing him to continue his protests against Nazi financial discriminations. On July 16 he called at the Foreign Office and once more both he and von Neurath confessed their “embarrassment” at the situation,3 but there was no remedy in sight and no one knew this better than Secretary Hull. With Germany on the point of financial “collapse,”4 it was useless to continue a barrage of protests. Diplomatic vinegar attracted no flies of mutual understanding.

b. General Johnson Denounces the Nazi Party Purge

While the threatened collapse of the Nazi financial structure was sending tremors through American banking circles and thereby causing evident uneasiness in the Department of State, certain prominent Americans were widening the breach in German-American relations by their bitter denunciations of the Nazi Party purge. On July 12, General Hugh S. Johnson, the chief official in the National Recovery Administration, made a speech in which he vigorously criticized Hitler for permitting the murders that attended the cleansing of the party stables on June 30. These brutalities had made General Johnson “not figuratively, but physically and very actively sick. The idea that adult, responsible men can be taken from their homes, stood up against a wall . . . and shot to death is beyond expression. . . . That such a thing should happen in a country of some supposed culture passes comprehension.”

When the German chargé d’affaires made a hurried visit to the Department of State to protest against this vitriolic denunciation of Nazi Germany, Secretary Hull called his attention to General Johnson’s statement that he “was speaking as an individual and not for the State Department or for the Administration.” After assuring Dr. Leitner that “it was to be regretted that the position in the Government occupied by the speaker made it possible for remarks uttered by him as an individual to be misconstrued as official,” Mr. Hull brought the interview to an abrupt close.5

But this official explanation of General Johnson’s heated remarks did not please the German press which blazed into indignation. The following remarks from the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung were typical:

The German protest was to be expected, as the remarks of General Johnson, the head of the NIRA, concerning the events of June 30 were so monstrous that a sovereign state never could stand for such vilification of the head of its government. . . . Secretary of State Hull’s reply to the German protest. . . appears to us to settle the incident in a most unsatisfactory manner.6

After looking around for some way in which to express its displeasure at the mild manner in which the Department of State had handled the “Johnson incident,” the Nazi Government decided to give vent to its deep dissatisfaction by expelling from Germany Mrs. Sinclair Lewis (Dorothy Thompson). On August 24, Mrs. Lewis had called at the American Embassy for a pleasant chat with Dodd. After her return to her hotel she telephoned the Embassy to announce the unpleasant news that she had just received an order from the secret police to leave Germany within twenty-four hours. Her offense consisted of some articles she had written two years earlier that contained some critical comments on Hitler. Dodd immediately bent every effort to prevent the expulsion of Mrs. Lewis, but all his efforts were in vain.

Thoroughly angered by this action of the Nazi Government, Dodd sent a strong telegram to the Department of State and inquired as to the “position of our Government with reference to expulsion of undesirable foreigners from the United States.”7 He was promptly informed that the American Government had always held that “it is the sovereign right of our own country to determine exactly what aliens it may wish to deport from the United States,. . . This Government does not question the right of any foreign government to expel from its territory American citizens whom it considers undesirable.”8

There was nothing that Dodd could do to stay the expulsion of Mrs. Lewis, but the “solidarity of the foreign press corps of Berlin in escorting Dorothy Thompson to her train of banishment” was an unmistakable indication of the deep and widespread resentment that had been aroused by Nazi attacks upon the freedom of the press.9

c. The Assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss

In the summer of 1934 there was a stream of incidents that awakened in the United States a feeling of sharp dislike for Nazi Germany. Some weeks before the expulsion of Dorothy Thompson from Germany a group of Nazi sympathizers in Austria suddenly seized the Vienna broadcasting stations and then murdered the Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss. Mr. Messersmith, the American Consul General in Vienna, telephoned at once to the American Consul General in Berlin (Mr. Geist) and told the details of the Nazi Putsch. Dodd regarded this action by Messersmith as an “indiscretion” which would do “both of us and our government harm.”10 He had warned Messersmith to be especially careful about using the tapped telephones in Germany.

It was evident to Dodd that the American press would be filled with “bitter denunciations” of the assassination of Dollfuss, and in this regard he was entirely correct. The Birmingham News was quick to remark that intuition pointed “unwaveringly toward Adolf Hitler as the primary causative force behind the unspeakable crimes which have blotched the face of Europe this summer.”11 The Cleveland Plain Dealer thought that it was clear that the movement behind the assassination was of “Nazi origin.”12 Professor Sidney Fay expressed the view that one of the causes contributing to the crime was the “long announced determination of Hitler and his followers to bring Austria under Nazi rule.”13 The Seattle Daily Times dissented from the popular opinion which pinned the guilt upon Hitler: “Hitler, the only ruler against whom suspicion might have been directed, has been as prompt as any to denounce the act; and in sending his conservative critic, von Papen, to Vienna, has spiked the chance to charge him with collusion in Austrian Nazi madness.”14 The Albuquerque Journal believed that “the assassination of Premier Dollfuss has brought down the wrath of other Powers and wrecked Nazi hopes for sympathy and control of Austria.”15 The Milwaukee Sentinel agreed with this viewpoint: “One thing is fairly certain: the union of Austria and Germany is more remote than it has been at any time since it was proposed.”16

d. The Death of President Hindenburg

The death of President Hindenburg on August 1 was viewed with open dismay by most of the American press which regarded him as a check upon the excesses of Hitler. Hindenburg had been regarded with warm favor in many American circles, and the Hoover Administration had courted his good will. The Seattle Daily Times pronounced him “one of the greatest of warriors”;17 the Richmond Times-Dispatch was certain that he was the “idol of the German people,”18 while the St. Louis Globe-Democrat looked upon him as one of the greatest men that Germany has ever produced.19

But there were some American newspapers that refused to join this chorus of praise. The Chicago Daily News complained that Hindenburg had lived too long. If he had died before Hitler became Chancellor his fame would have rested upon a more secure pedestal.20 The Milwaukee Sentinel saw much to criticize in Hindenburg: “History presently will sit in judgment on Paul von Hindenburg and the blame heaped upon his memory may exceed the praise. . . . The onus of a Hitler is a heavy burder for any man to bear.”21

The heavy burden Germany had to bear with Hitler as Chancellor was greatly increased when Hindenburg’s death was made the occasion for Hitler to assume also the office of President of the Reich. This new responsibility seemed to sober him for a little while. On August 6, in the Reichstag auditorium, there was an impressive service in commemoration of the contributions Hindenburg had made to the fatherland, and Hitler delivered an oration on the “military genius” of the late President. On the following day this ritual was repeated at Tannenberg, and it was noticeable that the Chancellor refrained from any remarks that could be regarded as “challenges to the French or English or Americans.”22

Hitler had his eyes upon the approaching Saar plebiscite in January 1935, and for the time being he wished to conciliate rather than anger public opinion in foreign countries.

e. American Opinion of the Saar Plebiscite

In December 1934 the French Government came to an agreement with Chancellor Hitler with reference to the implications of the Saar plebiscite. If the vote favored reabsorption into the Reich the Nazi Government would pay a large sum in settlement of French claims (900,000,000 francs). This payment would be made partly in cash and partly in future coal deliveries.

On January 13, 1935, the plebiscite was held and 528,541 votes were cast. The results were: 477,119 in favor of union with the Reich; 46,613 were in favor of a continuance of the existing regime (2,124 voted for union with France). In view of this overwhelming vote in favor of union with Germany (90%), the formal transfer of the territory took place on March 1, 1935.23 Needless to say, the outcome of the Saar plebiscite was a resounding victory for Hitler.

Many American newspapers were pleased with the outcome of the plebiscite because they regarded it as a form of peace insurance. They were particularly pleased by the fact that the League of Nations had handled the matter in a very efficient manner and had thereby increased its prestige. The Louisville Courier-Journal emphasized this aspect of the affair: “The Saar plebiscite adds another accomplishment of far-reaching importance to the credit of the League of Nations. In every way it was a complete success.24

Some papers were impressed with the plebiscite as an indication of the strength of the principle of nationalism. The Boston Daily Globe regarded it as “one of the most impressive barometer readings on nationalism available in recent European history,”25 while the Omaha World-Herald remarked that the Germans in the Saar seemed to “care not for the risk but gaily, defiantly, enthusiastically follow the dictates of their hearts to become a part again of the Fatherland.”26

The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle voiced a warning that victory in the Saar plebiscite might merely whet Hitler’s appetite for more territory. The “peace of Europe still requires careful nursing.”27 The Chicago Tribune was confident that the only way to preserve this peace was to give heed to the clear call of nationalism. The one-worlders with their accent upon internationalism were a disturbing factor in the delicate European equation: “The Saar vote ought to remind them . . . that the sentiment of race or nationalism is omnipresent and almost omnipotent in international affairs. . . . Except for a very small and in Europe, ineffectual minority, the sentiment of internationalism has little appeal and experiments based upon it . . . have no more chance of standing up against the deep and powerful sentiment of nationalism than a sapling has in a hurricane.”28

f. The Anglo-French Declaration Looks towards Collective Security

This rapidly developing spirit of German nationalism under Hitler had many disturbing implications for the statesmen of Europe. With no general agreement on disarmament in sight the French Government became increasingly worried over the situation. In January 1935, Laval visited Rome for conversations with Mussolini. As a result of his efforts an agreement was concluded to the effect that the two powers would consult in the event of an aggressive act by a third power against Austria. This was the first step in a drive to insure the preservation of peace in Europe. On February 3, a second step was taken when the prime ministers of France and Great Britain issued a declaration which was to form the basis for a “general settlement freely negotiated among other Powers, including Germany.” It was in reality an invitation to Germany to join this proposed collective system and thereby give evidence of her desire to maintain peace. There would be a new agreement on armaments under whose terms the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles would be canceled. In addition to this repudiation of the settlement of 1919 there would be an Eastern pact of mutual assistance, a Central European pact for preserving the independence of Austria, and an air convention which would stipulate that the Western powers would provide immediate help to any of the signatory powers that were the victims of an unprovoked aerial attack.29

In the United States this Anglo-French declaration aroused great interest. The Portland Morning Oregonian was frankly skeptical of the proposed pact: “We dislike being derogatory towards agreements reached and announced in such an air of excitement, but they are very patently intended to trap Germany by offering her minor concessions. . . . After bolting the League and rearming in the face of a hostile Western Europe, Germany is not likely to be drawn into a trap so thinly disguised.”30

The Atlanta Constitution was hopeful that the proposed treaties would open “the way for a sound readjustment of troublesome conditions,”31 and the Cleveland Plain Dealer was favorable to them.32 The Nashville Banner believed that Hitler’s often repeated declarations in favor of peace would now be put to the test: “He has often proclaimed . . . that he contemplated no aggressive action, but sought only security and peace. The sincerity of those protestations is now to be tested.”33

On February 14, Hitler gave a conciliatory answer to the French and British ambassadors in Berlin and approved in principle an air treaty. But he showed no disposition to accept the proposed Eastern and Central European pacts. Instead, he suggested further discussion of the matters contained in these conventions. This suggestion greatly annoyed the Cleveland Plain Dealer: “The German reply to the French-British proposals is an invitation to talk and more talk.”34 The Detroit Free Press pointed out that the “attitude of Berlin isn’t precisely peace breeding,”35 while the New York Times was dubious about the sincerity of Hitler: “The Third Reich now looks forward to a long period of negotiation. For her every delay is a gain. Herr Hitler has enjoyed the freedom he gained by withdrawal from the League and the Disarmament Conference. He is in no hurry to sign an agreement sealing Germany within her present boundaries.”36

It was apparent that Hitler was endeavoring to arrange for a bilateral pact with Britain instead of a general European treaty, and his suggestion that the British Government send a spokesman to Berlin was regarded favorably in London. On February 24, Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Minister, announced that he would visit Berlin on March 7.37 But this pacific gesture was premature. Suddenly on March 4 the British Government published a White Paper which adverted to armament expenditures in other countries. Then, with special reference to Germany, it remarked that Hitler’s plans for rearmament had the unfortunate effect of aggravating the “existing anxieties of Germany’s neighbors,” and had produced “a situation where peace will be imperiled.”38

This British blast at Hitler had a depressing effect upon the Chancellor’s health. An announcement was made in Berlin that the Führer had contracted a severe cold. Apparently, in Germany, diplomatic negotiations could be conducted only when the top officials enjoyed the best of health. Sir John Simon’s visit to the capital of the Reich was indefinitely postponed.39

Many American newspapers deprecated the publication of the British White Paper. The Indianapolis News thought that it had considerably darkened the hopes for European peace and a general understanding with Germany,40 while the Springfield Republican raised the point as to whether the “British Government is playing a deep game or is merely in the not uncommon position of having its right hand ignorant of what its left is about.”41 The Christian Science Monitor expressed the belief that the British action “makes the situation clearer and brings fear closer, but it does little to turn the thoughts of men and women toward the greater friendliness and understanding which must be the real foundation of peace.”42 The Philadelphia Record was frankly critical of the British move: “Is the fault all Germany’s? What of the promises of the former Allied Powers to disarm? And what of British and other armament firms which have aided Germany in this perilous rearmament?”43

g. Hitler Breaks Another Link in the Chain of Versailles

European statesmen anxiously awaited Hitler’s response to the British White Paper of March 4. It came on March 16 when he denounced the arms provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. After pointing out how France had recently broken these same provisions by enacting a law raising the term of service in the army to two years, he then referred to the Soviet Union’s large army of 960,000 troops. Because of this Franco-Russian threat Germany would have to increase its military strength to 550,000 carefully trained troops. He was aware that this number exceeded by 350,000 the estimate made by the concert of Europe with reference to Germany’s military needs.44

Hitler’s defiance of Europe did not throw the American press into a panic. The Detroit Free Press scoffed at the widespread fears of war.45 The Dallas Morning News agreed with this reassuring verdict,46 and the Milwaukee Journal believed that the “essential situation is not greatly different.”47 But in order to maintain peace Germany would have to be surrounded with a “ring of iron.”48

To the Richmond Times-Dispatch it was evident that the real responsibility for Hitler’s action rested upon the shoulders of the Allied statesmen because of the “revengeful policies” they had followed after the World War.49 This view was shared by the Portland Morning Oregonian: “France and her associates, by their timidity toward post-war republican Germany, and their lack of faith in the matter of disarmament, gave us Hitler.”50

The Cincinnati Enquirer inclined towards the opinion that neither Germany nor the Allies had a strong case, and it called attention to the fact that the British White Paper and the recent French legislation had definitely influenced the action of Hitler.51 The Raleigh News and Observer felt much the same way: “As even the Devil is entitled to his due, it should be pointed out that Hitler’s repudiation of the Versailles treaty prohibition against an armed Germany is not the only menace to peace in the modern world. Long before his announcement that Germany would arm again, walls of steel had grown in the increasing armaments of nations about Germany. . . . Certainly, Germany had no reason to do otherwise than fear so heavily armed and ancient enemy as France.”52

The Hearst press rejoiced that America had no European political ties and was “free to mind her own business without obligations to anybody abroad,”53 while the Philadelphia Record struck the same isolationist note.54

William Allen White assumed the role of prophet and his words of warning revealed keen insight into the problems of Europe: “The blunt announcement last week [by Hitler] was not a new departure [but] only another milestone on the road to ruin which Europe has been travelling for several years. . . . In a few weeks . . . certainly not less than a year, Germany will announce that she is fortifying the left bank of the Rhine. . . . Not even this will touch off the powder keg. But the fuse is sputtering, the hissing flame advances along the powder-dusted cord, notch by notch.”55

h. Apparent Agreement at Stresa

On April 11, Mussolini acted as the host to representatives of Great Britain and France during an important conference at Stresa. After a brief period of discussion the three powers issued on April 14 a communiqué which indicated a common front against Germany’s plans for rearmament.56

The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette took the Stresa declaration quite seriously: “The communiqué yesterday on the Anglo-French-Italian conference at Stresa indicates that. . . a united front is to be maintained against Hitlerism. . . . The situation demanded a firm stand in the face of the Hitler defiance, and it is the best hope of peace.”57 The Detroit Free Press expressed a similar optimistic viewpoint,58 but the Milwaukee Journal thought that the Stresa announcement was distinctly inadequate.59 Many other papers reflected this pessimism. The New Orleans Times-Picayune believed that the conference had left “in the air most of the questions that were considered”;60 the Los Angeles Times critically remarked that the meeting at Stresa “appears to have changed the situation in no material particular,”61 while the Dallas Morning News was fearful that Hitler had won a diplomatic victory.62

i. France Makes an Important Agreement with Russia

France was not content with the outcome of the Stresa conference. As the shadow of Germany began to darken the frontiers of France, the Laval Government felt additional fright and hastened to sign on May 2, 1935, a pact with the Soviet Government of Russia. Although this was a treaty of mutual assistance against aggression, this assistance could be extended only after consultations had been held with the Western Locarno powers and with representatives of the League of Nations.63

Hitler saw the weakness of this Franco-Soviet pact and he denounced it (May 21) as decidedly dangerous because the ideology of the Russian leaders was fundamentally opposed to the concept of capitalism. Capitalism and communism had no common ground on which their representatives could meet with safety. He then indicated his willingness to negotiate treaties of nonaggression and consultation with neighboring powers. He was also ready to become a party to agreements for localizing conflicts and for isolating aggressor nations. After hinting that he would not oppose the re-entry of Germany into the League of Nations on the basis of equality, he stated that the Reich must have air parity with the strongest Western power and a naval force equal to 35 per cent of the British Navy.64

To numerous American editors this speech by the German Chancellor seemed so reasonable that it evoked a favorable response. The Christian Science Monitor thought it should be welcomed as “tentatively opening several bridges over the chasm that has deepened so alarmingly in Europe in the last few months”;65 the Chicago Tribune regarded the speech as an “even-toned discussion” which declared clear purposes with which “very little quarrel can be had”;66 while the Louisville Courier-Journal was fulsome in its praise of this Hitler gesture: “Hitler’s speech . . . was a full and frank avowal of Germany’s foreign policy. . . . As a candid statement of the aims and aspirations of the Third Reich nothing is wanting. As such it offers a basis for reconciliation and understanding provided the other Powers will accept the Fatherland as an equal and not as an inferior. . . . It offers the way to a just and lasting peace.”67

The New York Times was distinctly skeptical of any promise that Hitler might make,68 and the Washington News delivered a sharp blast against the Chancellor and all his devious schemes: “As usual everybody is out of step but Adolf, . . . He proposes to open a systematic attack ‘upon the poisoning of public opinion’ through the press. This from the arch-poisoner of the press of all time.”69

j. Britain and Germany Negotiate a Naval Treaty

Hitler’s address of May 21 with its bid for a bilateral treaty with Great Britain bore fruit in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935. In accordance with its terms the strength of the German fleet was fixed at 35 per cent of the total tonnage of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was obvious that this agreement had far-reaching implications for the other naval powers. France and Italy were sharply critical of the British Government for “conniving with the Reich” in a breach of the Treaty of Versailles.70 In Germany the agreement gave great satisfaction because it not only permitted the Reich to have a navy three times as large as the naval armament allowed by the peace settlement of 1919, but it also granted eventual parity with Britain in submarines.71

In the United States the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was received with general approval. The Cincinnati Enquirer was quick to give its blessing to the arrangement: “Wiser than their friends in Paris, the British have made a sane compromise with Germany and have thereby reached a satisfactory agreement on naval ratios without impairing their friendly relations.”72 The Des Moines Register was pleased with any accord that “curbed the Nazi craze for maximum armaments,”73 while the Albuquerque Journal looked upon it as an “important foundation stone” in the rebuilding of the “wreck which is now political Europe.”74

There were some voices raised in sharp disapproval of the British desire to appease Hitler. The Washington News hoped that Britain’s “present quixotic course will not do more harm than good”;75 the New York Times deprecated the fact that Britain “allowed itself to do what in another it condemns as a breach of international law”;76 while the Chicago Daily News regarded the agreement as an important German diplomatic victory: “This agreement is the greatest triumph of German diplomacy since its successful repudiation of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty last March.”77

k. Secretary Hull Is Fearful of the Role of Moral Leadership

The tension in European diplomatic circles in the spring of 1935 made a deep impression upon American observers. But no matter how desperate the situation became in Europe it was believed that America should abstain from taking an active role in an effort to better conditions. Ambassador Bingham, in London, was distinctly of this opinion. In a telegram to Secretary Hull he remarked: “If a . . . European meeting is called in which Germany is to participate, we are now of the opinion that the United States should not attend or send an observer. . . . It is our opinion that if we mingle in the European situation we must be prepared to accept the responsibilities therein entailed; we cannot participate merely on the basis of that specious form of ‘moral leadership’ from which the present administration has thus far wisely refrained.”78

Secretary Hull was not ready to assume any “specious” role of “moral leadership” in the early months of 1935. He knew only too well how badly Europe needed such leadership, but there was no possibility that European statesmen would respond to any clarion call. In order, however, to be ready for any emergency he scanned with great care the dispatches from American embassies in Europe, and during March he became increasingly concerned over the danger of an outbreak of hostilities. On April 4, Ambassador Dodd received a telegram from Hull inquiring whether “war in Europe is imminent.” On the following day, Dodd sent a reassuring answer to the Department of State but he confided to his diary that the “irresponsible trio, Hitler, Goering and Goebbels might easily do a wild thing, knowing so little of past history.”79

The negotiation of the Anglo-German naval pact appeared to Dodd as the first step in a German move to “encircle” Russia. Absolute control “of the Baltic was the major point. . . in the naval agreement. The other means of encircling Russia is the entente with Japan which gives that country an almost free hand in Asia.” Germany had to be cautious, however, because the Franco-Italian understanding and the Franco-Russian pact were major obstacles along the road to conflict. Thus “we have Europe stalled in a way which fairly guarantees peace for some years to come.”80

l. The Bremen Incident

The course of German-American relations was never permitted to run smoothly even for a brief period. There was always some incident to provoke ill will. In this regard it should be remembered that in 1934 the Communist Party in America was taking an active part in stirring the embers of American discontent with both Germany and Japan. Those powers were barriers against a Red tide that might engulf Europe and Asia. If America could be “needled” into war with those Russian rivals it would be a great victory for Soviet diplomacy. Nothing would suit the Kremlin better than to have the United States fight for Russian objectives. As one reads the diplomatic correspondence of the thirties it is easy to see how communist agents worked untiringly to inject the poison of hatred into German-American relations. A good example of their technique was the Bremen Incident.

On July 25 the Third Division Office of the Police Department of New York City received a copy of a circular issued by the Communist Party which called for a “demonstration” on Pier 86 at midnight on July 26 “on the occasion of the sailing of the S.S. Bremen.” The wording of the circular is very interesting. It presumed a union of Communists, Catholics, Jews, and Anti-Fascists against Nazi Germany:

All Catholics must immediately come to the aid of their fellow-Catholics in Germany. While you are at mass today, the Hitler fascist government is launching the most brutal attack on religious liberty in modern history. . . . The Communist Party is calling on all anti-fascist individuals and organizations to rally to the defence of the Catholic people of Germany. . . . THOSE WHO TALK AGAINST COMMUNISM WANT FASCISM. LEARN FROM GERMANY. We urge you to flood the pier with antifascist workers.81

On the evening of July 26 some Communists were able to slip aboard the Bremen, and at 11:45 they began to assault the German sailors. When the New York police hurried to quell this disturbance, they were immediately attacked by the belligerent Communists and firearms were freely used. During this pitched battle some Communists were able to reach the “flagstaff of the S.S. Bremen and pulled down the German Swastika, throwing it into the river.” After a lengthy and spirited contest the Communists were finally subdued and many of them were arrested.82

Three days after this incident occurred, Dr. Rudolf Leitner, the chargé d’affaires of Germany, paid a formal visit to the Department of State to make a “most emphatic protest against this serious insult to the German national emblem.” In his note addressed to Mr. Phillips, the Acting Secretary of State, Dr. Leitner expressed the expectation that the “guilty persons may be duly punished.”83

Dr. Leitner was not able to see Mr. Phillips, so he had a long conversation with Mr. James C. Dunn:

He [Dr. Leitner] said that the combination of the La Guardia ruling against granting a masseur’s license to a German citizen and the Bremen flag incident caused a great deal of resentment in Germany and said that as far as he could see, whenever there is presented an opportunity to do so, all the American press fulminates against the German Government as if they were directed to do so by some superior authority. . . . He handed me a page from the illustrated section of the Minneapolis Sunday Tribune of July 7, 1935 which is clearly an attack upon Hitler, stating that his father was a drunkard, mistreated his wife and frequently beat his son.

I told Dr. Leitner that we considered the Bremen flag incident as most unfortunate. I said, however, that . . . the police of New York had acted promptly and efficiently. . . . As far as concerned the article in the Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, there was nothing this Government could do . . . as the press in this country was entirely free to express itself in any manner it desired to on any subject.84

On August 1, Mr. Phillips sent a formal note to Dr. Leitner which merely stated that it was “unfortunate” that the “German national emblem should not have received that respect to which it is entitled.”85 There was no assurance that Communists would not be able to repeat their performance of July 26. As far as the Department of State was concerned the incident was closed, but the German Foreign Office was far from pleased with this cool, verbal settlement of the affair, and it remained in their minds as an important item of unfinished business.

m. American Hostility towards the Hitler Regime

Some officials in the Department of State were inclined to pass over the Bremen Incident lightly because they hoped for an early collapse of the Hitler Government. But Ambassador Dodd dashed these hopes in some of his telegrams. On August 9 he canvassed the strength of Nazi organization and came to the conclusion that there was “nothing to warrant prediction of an early break-down of economic or political regime.”86

This view was partially confirmed by Mr. Clifton M. Utley, director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Utley had a conversation with Mr. R. E. Schoenfeld of the Division of Western European Affairs in the Department of State. During the course of this conversation Mr. Utley voiced the view that the German people were strongly in support of the Hitler Government. This fact was demonstrated in the recent elections: “As for Hitler, personally, Mr. Utley felt that the two referenda held [recently] accurately represented the feeling of the people.” Mr. Utley then made some interesting remarks concerning Himmler: “Himmler was personally a completely honest and upright man.”

The concentration camp at Dachau was “well organized.” The discipline of the “inmates was excellent and their health was apparently satisfactory.” These inmates were largely Communists, and inasmuch as in Germany the officials regarded communism as Jewish inspired, this fact had sinister implications for the large Jewish population.87

In the summer of 1935 there was a great deal of discussion in Nazi ranks about the advisability of issuing new decrees that would supplement the anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws. At this period, however, it was believed that Hitler was opposed to harsher measures:

It is fairly well established that a sharp conflict has broken out in Party and Government circles respecting the scope of the application of the [anti-Semitic] legislation. According to good authority, Herr Hitler and Dr. Schacht, at a meeting of Gauleiters and Reichleiters held immediately after the [Nürnberg] Congress, drove home to their hearers the necessity for discipline and the avoidance of excesses against the Jews. . . . On the other hand, it appears that the concession was made to radicals that the class to be known as “full Jews” would be subject to severer restrictions.88

The very fact that supplementary anti-Semitic decrees were being projected in Germany helped to increase in the United States the deep-seated hostility that made it difficult to continue diplomatic relations with the Reich. The anti-Jewish rioting in certain German cities in July clearly indicated the insecure status of the Jews. Moreover the projected supplementary regulations were already “being enforced by the Party against Jews and Jewish business concerns.”89 American indignation over these repressive measures aroused the anger of Goebbels who remarked on January 17, 1936, in a speech in Berlin that American public opinion defied understanding. Lindbergh, once a national hero, was now despised by many in America because he refused to ride the anti-German wave that was sweeping over America: “We do not wish to be Pharisees, but a people who would let such a thing happen have every cause to attend to their own affairs. As regards the rest of the world, if it loves the Jews so much, let it take them!”90 This defiant attitude towards world opinion presaged some new Nazi thrust for power. It was not long before the Führer startled Europe with another repudiation of treaty obligations.

862.00/3552, MS, Department of State.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
90Ibid., p. 5.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941