XX: Russia Instigates War in the Far East; Roosevelt Blames Japan

XX Russia Instigates War in the Far East; Roosevelt Blames Japan

DURING THE long months that Hitler devoted to redrawing the frontier lines in Europe, Joseph Stalin was preparing to change the map of the Far East. Chiang Kai-shek, as his chief cartographer, would unwittingly splash Red across the chart of eastern Asia all the way from Outer Mongolia to Mukden and then draw back in sudden alarm at the implications of his handiwork. His task could best be done in the atmosphere of armed conflict, and this was produced by Russian agents who blew sparks of friction in North China into the wild flames of an undeclared Sino-Japanese war.

a. Communist Instigation of War in the Far East

Communist instigation of the outbreak of the undeclared war of July 7 is indicated in some revealing remarks of the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow. During a conversation with the American diplomatic representative he confessed that he had arrived in Moscow in November 1936 as a “firm supporter of Chinese-Soviet friendship.” One of the main purposes of his mission had been “to obtain assurances from the Soviet Government that if China pushed Japan so far as to make war inevitable, the Soviet Union would support China with supplies and armed forces.”1 Shortly after his arrival in Russia he had questioned Litvinov on this point but had received the answer that the Soviet Government would prefer to have this matter settled at Nanking. In this regard it was significant that during the spring and summer of 1937 the Russian Ambassador at Nanking had endeavored to “make the Chinese Government believe that if it would undertake to offer armed resistance to Japan it would confidently expect the armed support of the Soviet Union.”2

Communist instigation and continued support of the conflict between Chinese and Japanese armed forces in July 1937 were further illustrated by the evident reluctance of the Kuomintang to agree to a formula of accommodation. To do so would mean an open break with the Communists, who since the Sian agreement, had worked for a common front between themselves and the Nationalists against Japan. This situation is well described in a dispatch from Nanking:

Competent observers here consider the situation as one moving toward war; they point out that if the National Government should hold to the former plan of surrendering North China rather than resist Japanese aggression there, the National Government’s existence would be seriously jeopardized because it is believed to have pledged resistance to Japan as part of the settlement of the Sian revolt and non-resistance would cause the alienation of the Communist forces in the northwest who are about to be incorporated into the Government’s armies.3

Japanese military authorities did not at first appear to realize the strength of this tie between the Communists and the Nationalists, and they hoped for an early settlement of the clash on the night of July 7. Some of them were inclined to believe that “the firing by Chinese troops which started the incident was not premeditated.”4 This conciliatory attitude led to the agreement of July 11 which was formally signed by General Chang on the nineteenth. Its terms were mild. There would be an apology and some punishment for the Chinese captain responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. There would also be assurances for the future which provided for the voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in North China who impeded Sino-Japanese co-operation and the expulsion of the communistic elements from the Peiping district.5

On July 12 the Japanese Ambassador (Saito) had a long conversation with Secretary Hull during the course of which he explained the policy of the Foreign Office. At the conclusion of Saito’s remarks, Hull expressed his approval of Japanese efforts “to work out a friendly settlement” of the incident.6 On the following day Ambassador Grew informed the Department of State that he believed that “if some way of avoiding general hostilities without losing face could be found, the Japanese Government might possibly still be pleased to find this way.“7

It seemed to Mr. Hornbeck that the Japanese Foreign Office was taking the position that conversations should not be held by representatives of the Chinese and Japanese governments “but between Japanese officials in North China and the local Chinese officials on the theory that North China is a political entity separate from the authority and control of the Chinese (Nanking) Government.” It was his opinion that the American Government should “make no approach to either the Chinese or the Japanese authorities and make no public comment.”8

Secretary Hull followed this advice. On the evening of July 13 he summoned Ambassador Saito to his apartment in the Carlton Hotel and frankly informed him that the American Government was “paramountly concerned in the preservation of peace.” Because of this fact it would confine its utterances “to phases entirely within range of its impartial, friendly attitude towards all alike.” Its action would “stop entirely short of any question or phase of mediation.”9

This “hands off” attitude would continue to be observed by the Department of State if no general war followed the clash at Peiping. In the event of long-continued hostilities tremendous pressure would be exerted upon Secretary Hull to undertake some form of mediation. But in the early days of July 1937 there still seemed some hope for peace. It was true, however, that the action of the Chinese Nationalist Government in disavowing the agreement of July 11 was causing deep concern in the minds of many observers. When this disavowal was followed by the dispatch of “a large body of troops” to the Peiping area, it was obvious that a crisis had arrived.10

On July 15, Ambassador Grew was still hopeful that the Peiping Incident could be peacefully settled. Japan had sent to China only a small army to reinforce existing Japanese garrisons and he had received assurances that there was no intention to set up “any independent country” in North China. The main point at issue was the validity of the agreement of July 11 between the Chinese and Japanese military authorities. It was also significant that communist agitators were “active in disseminating misinformation with regard to the concentration of both Chinese and Japanese troops.”11 The Kremlin was bitterly opposed to any peaceful settlement of the dispute between China and Japan.

b. Secretary Hull Makes a Statement on U.S. Policy

The approach of a general war between China and Japan was viewed with open dismay by the British Foreign Office. As early as May 1937, Prime Minister Chamberlain had expressed great concern about the situation in the Far East and had proposed an exchange of views between the Foreign Office and the Department of State with reference to various means whereby Anglo-American-Japanese relations could be improved. On June 1, Secretary Hull handed to Sir Ronald Lindsay his reply to this British proposal. It had been intimated to the Department of State that Japan might be ready to adopt a policy of “co-operation with her neighbors in the Far East and with the Powers that had great interests there.” This intimation had been received by Secretary Hull with great interest. He believed that “there were forces within and between Japan and China working toward peace.” In the event, however, that war would break out in the Far East the American Government would follow traditional procedures with reference to the situation. It would not enter into any alliance to preserve peace, but, through frequent consultations, would hope to work out and follow a parallel policy with Britain and the other powers that were parties to the Four-Power and Nine-Power treaties.12

This encouraging note from Secretary Hull was undoubtedly shared with the French Foreign Office which suggested to Ambassador Bullitt the invocation of Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty which provided for a consultation of the signatory powers whenever a situation arose “which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty.” Léger expressed to Bullitt his fears that any call upon the League of Nations “to attempt to settle this dispute would be extremely damaging to the League which once again would prove to be impotent.” French Foreign Office officials were insistent that “it would be absolutely essential to get the United States into the discussion.”13

The British Foreign Office favored a “combined Anglo-American démarche” in Tokyo and Nanking rather than an invocation of the Nine-Power Treaty, and Foreign Secretary Eden suggested this to Ambassador Bingham. From Tokyo, Ambassador Grew expressed a strong dissent from this view. He could see “no reason why we should take action.”14 He also indicated that in Japan the unanimity of opinion relative to the situation in North China was “striking.” It was not “a case of unwilling deference by the Government to military initiative. The Cabinet enjoys high prestige, is wholly in command and lends full support to steps recently taken by the Japanese Army in North China. . . .

At no time during the period of my assignment at this post have I observed indications of so strong and unanimous a determination on the part of the Japanese Government to resist even at the cost of extensive hostilities any movement which might tend to weaken the position of Japan in North China.” Mr. Grew also remarked that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the hypothesis that “either the Japanese Government or the Army deliberately engineered the incident in order to force a ’show down.’ ”15

On the following day Ambassador Grew sent a long dispatch to Secretary Hull which stated that the British Embassy in Tokyo was opposed to any precipitate action on the part of Secretary Eden. A strong suggestion along this line had been sent to London. As far as American action was concerned, Grew advised that “the American Government refrain from offering its good offices toward settlement of the North China incident.” One of the principal objectives of Japanese foreign policy was “the elimination of the influence of western powers as a factor in Far Eastern politics.” There was no reason, therefore, for any belief that Japan would look with favor upon any attempt at American mediation. In conclusion Grew emphasized the fact that the recent improvement in Japanese-American relations had resulted from the fact that the Department of State had transferred the stress of its representations to Japan from an “endeavor to restrain the use by Japan of force to the laying down of reservations of American rights in China.”16

Under the impact of all this advice, Secretary Hull informed the British Foreign Office that it was felt that “co-operation on parallel but independent lines” would be the best policy for the Department of State to follow.17 This note had been given to the British Ambassador after long consultations between Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, Mr. Hornbeck, Norman Davis, and the President. The reaction of the ambassador to this note is interestingly told in a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck:

The British Ambassador read the memorandum very carefully. He then remarked: “This means, I would understand, that the American Government is not prepared to join in representations at Tokyo and at Nanking.” Under instruction, Mr. Hornbeck explained to the British Ambassador that it was fully the desire of this Government to co-operate with the British Government in the effort to discourage entry by the Japanese and Chinese upon serious hostilities, . . . that this Government has already urged upon both the Japanese and the Chinese the importance of maintaining peace; that we hoped that the British Government would do likewise; that we intended to continue our efforts; and that we felt that co-operation on parallel but independent lines would be more effective and less likely to have an effect the opposite of that desired than would joint or identical representations. . . . The Ambassador then read the memorandum again, maintained silence for some time, and then, with a smile, said that he understood.18

After Secretary Hull had made it clear to the British Foreign Office that he preferred to follow a policy along independent rather than joint lines, he issued (July 16) a public statement indicating the attitude of the Department of State with reference to the situation in the Far East. He began by expressing a viewpoint which had become quite familiar: “There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not in one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country.” American policy, therefore, strongly accented the importance of settling international disputes by peaceful means. Other items in the American creed were then cited: “We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations.”19

It was significant that this statement was in general and not in regional terms. There was no mention of the basic principles that had controlled American policy in the Far East: the Open Door and the maintenance of Chinese territorial integrity. It was evident that Secretary Hull was feeling his way with great care and still hoped for a peaceful settlement of the Peiping Incident. On July 21 he repeated to Ambassador Saito his earnest desire for peace in the Far East and gave further assurances of his “impartial” attitude towards both nations.20 When Ambassador Grew communicated to the Japanese Foreign Minister these sentiments of Secretary Hull, Hirota replied that he was still hopeful for peace. Everything depended upon the execution of “the agreement drawn up on July 11 and signed on July 19 by General Chang.” Japan was not asking Nanking to recognize the agreement “but only that it shall withhold obstruction.”21

c. The Situation in North China Becomes Ominous

When the Peiping Incident was only a week old, Mr. Hornbeck cherished hopes for a maintenance of peace. He felt that “unless the Chinese press too hard, diplomatically and militarily, from Nanking, there would appear to be substantial likelihood that an adjustment will be arrived at without the matter going to the point of military operations.”22 One straw in the wind in this regard was the fact that General Chang Tzu-chung (also the mayor of Tientsin), who had signed the agreement of July 11, had suddenly become ardently pro-Japanese and would “assist them in effecting autonomy in Hopei province.”23

Other important persons in the Far East were inclined to become pro-Japanese. The French Ambassador in Tokyo was firmly opposed to any action that would indicate pressure upon Japan. He was “convinced that the Japanese did not premeditate or commence the incident and he believes that they are anxious to avoid war.”24 Japanese explanations of the origin of the Peiping Incident carried conviction to other minds. At Nanking, the counselor of the Japanese Embassy made a long statement to Mr. Peck, the American chargé. He insisted that “first firing positively was by the Chinese. The only ammunition carried by [Japanese] troops in maneuvers consists of one cartridge per soldier and these are in possession of the commanding officer. Firing began again while two Japanese officers were in Wanping and obviously was started by the Chinese because the Japanese would not willingly endanger lives of these emissaries.”25

On July 16, Ambassador Grew reported from Tokyo that “the steady development of plans of the Chinese Government to mobilize its forces and to concentrate them in North China was the principal cause for the decision taken yesterday by the Japanese Government to send reinforcements from Japan to North China.” In this connection, the Ho-Umedzu Agreement of July 6, 1935, was of prime importance. In accordance with the terms of this instrument Chinese troops would be withdrawn from Hopeh Province. If they were sent into that province during the present difficulty, war pressures might quickly develop.26 On July 19 the Chinese Foreign Office sent a note to Japan offering an armistice and further diplomatic negotiations designed to find some formula of settlement. This proposal was obviously unsatisfactory to the Japanese Government which adhered to the viewpoint that the Peiping Incident had been settled by the agreement of July 11. The matter was one that concerned only the local authorities. It was essential, therefore, that the agreement of July 11 be carried out without any obstructions from Nanking. The fact that the Chinese military commander in North China had permitted his troops to cross the Ho-Umedzu line was an indication that he was looking for trouble.27

There was another factor in this grave Far Eastern equation. The Communists were evidently pushing for a clash between the Nationalist armies and the Japanese. On July 16 the counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking (Hidaka) complained to the Chinese Foreign Office that “an additional and very important element of danger has been injected into the situation by the Communists (he implied that he meant the Comintern and the Soviet Government) who ‘are attempting to aggravate the trouble between China and Japan.’ ” Hidaka also let it be known that he had been told by “a high Chinese official” that the “Chinese Government had been intercepting telegrams from Moscow to agents in China which revealed these activities.”28

d. The Department of State Insists upon an Independent Policy

In London, Anthony Eden felt increasing concern over the developments in the Far East. On July 20 he had a talk with Ambassador Bingham and expressed the view that the “situation” in North China “had taken a grave turn for the worse.” He felt “himself barren of ideas, [but] said he would welcome any suggestions from the American Government as to any action which might tend towards appeasement. . . . He understood and fully agreed with the Secretary of State’s position that American action and British action should be along parallel lines, and was confident that separate action by the two Governments with the same objective would have . . . greater weight than any action by his Government alone.”29

On the evening of July 20, Eden suddenly reverted to his former belief in the efficacy of Anglo-American joint action and inquiry was made whether the Department of State would agree to this approach.30 Secretary Hull promptly replied that he believed “the course of action thus far pursued” by both governments had “been truly co-operative and that. . . [they] should again, each in his own way, urge upon the Japanese and Chinese Governments the importance of maintaining peace.”31

After the Department of State had carried out this item, word came from China that Chiang Kai-shek had indicated to the British Ambassador at Nanking that he was willing to carry on negotiations with the Japanese Government but this information could best be imparted to Tokyo by some neutral nation with large interests in the Far East. Britain had indicated to Chiang that this task could not be undertaken by any British diplomat.32 Chiang then told Ambassador Johnson that “the Central Government of China, out of a sincere desire for peace, had acceded to Japanese demands and had withdrawn its opposition to a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. . . along the lines of the three points covered by the settlement of July 11.”33

This apparently pacific disposition on the part of Chiang Kai-shek was reassuring to many persons interested in Far Eastern development, and they felt even more optimistic when they read in the Paris Soir the following statement by the Japanese Ambassador in Paris: “I do not look for anything grave. To people who ask whether we want to go to war with China, I simply reply: ‘We are really not so stupid.’ ”34

But Japan could be pushed into war through Chinese intransigence. On July 27 the situation in North China took a definite turn for the worse. According to Japanese accounts, Chinese troops attacked a Japanese force at Lanfang and then entrapped a “Japanese force at the southwest gate of Peiping.”35 This news led Secretary Hull to cable to the American ambassadors in Peiping and Tokyo and instruct them “to confer immediately with the British Embassies and in their discretion to take action on lines parallel with the British action toward dissuading the Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger the lives of American nationals.”36

Mr. Hornbeck was not inclined to believe that such action would prove helpful:

Nothing short of a definite indication on the part of one or more of the great foreign Powers that it would be prepared to throw some type of force into the equation would appreciably affect the play of forces which is now taking place on the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic and military battlefield. . . . We have spoken on behalf of peace and we probably should continue to do so. . . . In whatever we say we should take great care to say only those things which may tend to pacify and to avoid saying those things which may tend to inflame the parties directly in conflict.37

Ambassador Grew supported the cautious policy suggested by Mr. Hornbeck. He did not “think that co-operative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted, or in fact any foreign diplomatic representation would favorably affect developments.”38

The British chargé d’affaires in Tokyo agreed with Ambassador Grew in this regard, but Anthony Eden in London thought otherwise. During a conversation with Ambassador Bingham he suggested that the “United States Government and ourselves should put forward proposals in an attempt to end existing deadlock.”39 On that same day (July 28) in Tokyo, Ambassador Grew and the British chargé had visited the Foreign Office, separately, and left strong notes that emphasized the importance, during military operations, of providing adequate protection for the lives and property of American and British nationals.40 Hirota had given Grew “explicit assurances” that every effort would be made to safeguard all American interests in China in the area of hostilities. A few days later he repeated his statement that “Japan does not want war with China. If the Chinese Central troops which have come up to Hopeh Province will withdraw there will be no more fighting.”41

Secretary Hull was interested in the type of proposals that Secretary Eden wished to place before Japan. On July 29 he forwarded this question to Eden who had no ready answer. The French Foreign Office was equally devoid of ideas. When Bullitt paid a visit to the Quai d’Orsay, Delbos declined “to discuss the position in the Far East. He said that in fact China was isolated though he was definitely opposed to an appeal by China to the League of Nations. The League . . . today was a cipher and the only result of a Chinese appeal would be [that] the cipher would become the shadow of a cipher. . . . He favored . . . an appeal by China to the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact. . . . He was certain that at the present moment the Soviet Union would do nothing to aid China. Indeed, he had just received a telegram from the French Ambassador in Nanking stating that Chiang Kai-shek was furious with the Russians. The Russians had led him to believe that they would support him and now had told him that they would do nothing.”42

After having induced Chiang Kai-shek to follow a policy that would lead to war with Japan, Russia then promptly betrayed him. On July 30, Ambassador Bullitt talked to the Russian representative in Paris who “expressed the opinion that his government would do nothing whatsoever to assist China at the present time.”43 Chiang then turned to the United States. The Chinese Ambassador in London strongly pushed the matter of an invocation of the Nine-Power Pact, but he soon conceived the idea that the American Government was holding Britain back. When this viewpoint was presented to Mr. Hornbeck, assurances were immediately given that the Department of State had been “constantly in consultation” with the British Foreign Office and was “neglecting nothing” that would help to settle the situation in the Far East.44

In accordance with these assurances the Department of State continued to look to London for suggestions. On August 3, Vansittart saw Ambassador Bingham and strongly stressed the importance of an offer of good offices.45 In reply, Secretary Hull remarked that the British and American governments had already made advances that amounted to a proposal of mediation, but the Japanese Government had “clearly indicated that it is not responsively disposed toward these approaches . . . and will not tolerate interference by other countries.” But even in the face of this unresponsive attitude the Department of State had sent an inquiry to Ambassador Grew with reference to a new offer of mediation.46 Grew reported that in view of the “extreme importance” of leaving no stone unturned to avoid war he could not “conscientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good offices.”47

On August 6, J. L. Dodds, the British chargé d’affaires in Tokyo, and Ambassador Grew had a conference concerning the situation in Japan and came to the conclusion that an offer of mediation should be extended to the Chinese and Japanese governments. The chances of acceptance were “small but not necessarily hopeless.”48 Grew thought that the offer to the Japanese Government should take the form of an “oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.” The Department of State agreed with this suggestion and authorized him, when the British chargé was ready to take action, to approach the “Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines indicated.”49

While this instruction was en route to Tokyo, Ambassador Bullitt talked with H. H. Kung in Paris about the Far Eastern crisis. In answer to a question concerning the possibility of a large-scale war, Kung replied that “General Chiang personally wished to fight but that there was much opposition to fighting in the most influential circles in Nanking.” Kung then soberly added: “I’m afraid he [Chiang] will fight.” In discussing China’s finances, Kung said that he “considered it of the utmost importance that the $50,000,000 loan with regard to which he had talked with the President, Jesse Jones, and Pierson, should go through. . . . He had talked with Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, who had assured him that if the United States, England and France would make a joint protest against Japan’s action and would offer mediation, and if Japan should reject the offer, the Soviet Union would go to war on the side of China.”50

It is evident that Chiang Kai-shek, under the impact of continued Russian promises of armed assistance, “personally wished to fight.” There was little chance that any offer of mediation would be accepted. But the Department of State knew little of the real situation in Nanking: peace seemed just around the corner of a friendly conference. On August 10, Grew informed Hirota that he had been instructed to present a “definite offer of good offices” in an “informal, confidential and exploratory way.” If a meeting could be arranged between “Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries” at some convenient neutral spot, some formula of peace might be worked out. Hirota expressed his appreciation of this offer of mediation but he added that negotiations were in progress between Ambassador Kawagoe and Mr. Kao, of the Chinese Foreign Office. War might “still be avoided if Chiang Kai-shek would respond with some proposal’ which could serve as a basis for negotiations.”51

There was little hope that Chiang would make such a proposal. On August 12, Ambassador Johnson reported that he had been

reliably informed that Chu Teh and Mao Tze Tung, military leaders of the Communistic forces in Shensi, visited Nanking within past few days as sequel to an earlier visit by Chou En-lai, Secretary-General of the Communistic regime at Yennan, Shensi, and that an agreement was reached for the cooperation of the Communistic forces with Government troops against the Japanese.52

e. The Scene Shifts to Shanghai

While diplomats talked, the armies of Japan moved ahead in Manchuria. By August 1, Tientsin had fallen and Chinese troop concentrations in the Peiping area had been bombed by the active Japanese air force. Soon Japanese troops occupied the entire Hopeh Province, and the American public was shocked by stories of rape and looting. When the scene shifted to Shanghai there were detailed accounts of Japanese brutality that made an indelible impression upon Secretary Hull. The city did not fall to the Japanese until November 9, and during this long period of military activity there were many incidents that disturbed the Department of State.

Before heavy fighting started in the Shanghai area, Sumner Welles submitted to Secretary Hull a memorandum which emphasized the opinion that Japan would “neither be deterred from fighting China by financial considerations nor, if the two countries fight, find herself hamstrung and compelled to forego her objectives in consequence of financial exhaustion.”53

On the same day, Mr. Hornbeck submitted a memorandum which dealt specifically with Shanghai. He thought the Secretary of State might “reasonably suggest to and even urge upon the Chinese Government that it withdraw troops which it apparently has introduced . . . into the area around Shanghai which falls within the so-called ‘demilitarized zone’ which was set up by agreement between the Japanese and the Chinese in 1932 . . . . Regardless of reasons or rights, those [Chinese] troops are not needed there for purposes of maintaining order; . . . they serve as an irritant to the Japanese.”54

When Japanese marines landed in Shanghai on August 11 this question of the “demilitarized zone” immediately arose. But the Chinese mayor of the city stated that he and the local garrison commander had “no control over the Chinese troops of 88th Division arriving in the area.” Their commander was “somewhere in the rear.”55 On August 13 large Japanese reinforcements arrived in Shanghai and during the next ten days there was severe fighting with large casualties. The inevitable “incidents” now occurred. On August 14 the Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet sent to the American Embassy in Nanking a telegram requesting him to make a “vigorous protest to Chinese Government of bombing American vessel Shanghai by Chinese planes. Two bombs dropped within 20 yards of Augusta. . . . In case any further bombing of U. S. vessels will use anti-aircraft battery in self-defence.”56 This telegram was supported by a similar message from Consul General Gauss to Secretary Hull: “Repeated and increasingly heavy bombing by Chinese planes is continuing. Several bombs have dropped within area of foreign refuge near waterfront. . . . Chinese planes are not respecting Settlement or area of refuge. I urge strongest representations to the Generalissimo.”57 On August 15 the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council sent an urgent message to the “Consul General for Norway and Senior Consul” asking him to convey “to the Chinese Authorities the most solemn protest against the tragic and unpardonable bombing yesterday of part of the International Settlement, which was known to be entirely free of belligerent troops.”58 Three days later, Consul General Gauss informed Secretary Hull that “despite fact that Chinese have been informed officially that American tenders carrying women and children would leave Shanghai at a stated hour on yesterday, Chinese planes appeared over the area precisely at the hour of departure resulting in Japanese anti-aircraft fire until they were driven away.”59

In order to check this lawlessness and find some path to peace, the British chargé d’affaires (August 18) presented to the Japanese Foreign Office a proposal that if both the Chinese and Japanese governments would agree to withdraw their armed forces from the Shanghai area and would agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement be entrusted to foreign authorities, His Majesty’s Government would be “prepared to undertake this responsibility if other Powers will join them in doing so.”60 The Japanese Foreign Office did not accept this suggestion. When Secretary Hull heard from Ambassador Grew to this effect, he informed the British Foreign Office that there was no use in having the Department of State support the British proposal.61

As the clash between Chinese and Japanese forces at Shanghai continued, Chinese planes seemed unable to avoid bombing American ships. Even the Chinese shore batteries were careless in directing their fire. On the evening of August 20 a shell exploded on the deck of the United States Cruiser Augusta, killing one seaman and wounding eighteen others.62 Three days later two “air bombs,” believed to be of “Chinese origin,” were dropped in the International Settlement, seriously injuring an American citizen.63 But Secretary Hull was far more interested in reports of Japanese bombing of Nanking than in Chinese bombing of the International Settlement in Shanghai. On September 1, Ambassador Grew called at the Foreign Office to present a protest against Japanese bombing operations “in various parts of China.” Hirota replied that “it was the intention of the Japanese forces in China to attack only military establishments but that mistakes were unfortunately inevitable.” He then reported to Mr. Grew the lawless situation in Tsingtao since the removal of Japanese nationals. He thought it might be expedient for the powers to “make representations in Nanking” with regard to this situation. Turning to the matter of Sino-Soviet relations he remarked that the recent conclusion of a pact between China and Russia might have unfortunate results. There was “grave danger of the communists getting control in China.” The communist menace was “very real” because their actual aim was “to take over eventual complete control of the Government and country.” With reference to peace in the Far East, the Chinese could have it on three conditions: (1) good relations with Manchuria; (2) withdrawal of Chinese troops from North China; (3) the cessation in China of anti-Japanese activities and propaganda.64

The communist menace in China gave Secretary Hull little concern. He was now thoroughly aroused over reports of indiscriminate bombings in China by the Japanese. In a long instruction to Ambassador Grew he spoke his mind very plainly. It appeared to him that Japanese unresponsiveness to American protests against bombings showed that the Japanese Government did not set a high value upon American efforts “to cultivate good will, confidence, and stability in general.” If the Japanese Government would just follow the high principles enunciated by the American Government on July 16 the situation in the Far East would probably improve. While the American Government had endeavored to follow an “absolutely impartial course” during the current crisis in China, the actions of the Japanese armed forces had shocked American opinion. It would be expedient for the Japanese Government to keep in mind that their course in China was looked upon in America with the same degree of disapproval that it had evoked in Britain. American public opinion “has been outraged by the methods and strategy employed by the combatants, particularly by the Japanese military, and has become gradually more critical of Japan.” It was high time the Japanese Government gave heed to the principles so often expressed by the Department of State.65

It is evident that the statement of American principles by Secretary Hull on July 16 was a verbal bombshell directed against Japan. All talk of an “absolutely impartial course” towards China and Japan during the July crisis was mere diplomatic eyewash which no realistic statesmen took seriously. Hull was definitely antagonistic towards Japan, and his statement of July 16 was a prelude to the quarantine speech of President Roosevelt on October 5.

f. China Appeals to the League

On July 16 when Secretary Hull was giving sharp expression to the principles of international conduct advocated by the United States, the Chinese Government issued an appeal to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty against Japanese “aggression” in North China.66 The American and British governments had endeavored to mediate in this conflict between China and Japan, but the Japanese Government had not accepted these offers of good offices. When the fighting broke out in the Shanghai area the need for mediation grew more acute, but nothing was accomplished by the Nine-Power signatories. On August 12 the Chinese Ambassador (C.T. Wang) had a talk with Mr. Hornbeck with reference to the invocation of the Nine-Power Treaty. Hornbeck immediately made it clear to him that Article 7 of that treaty contained no directives that specified “what action, if any, is to be taken in case one or more of the signatory Powers disregard the pledges which they have made in the treaty.” The ambassador then meekly stated that what he wished to know was “what courses of action were being discussed in course of consultations between and among the American and the British and the French Governments.” He received no light from Mr. Hornbeck in this regard, so the conversation was concluded.67

On August 20 the Chinese Ambassador had another conversation with Mr. Hornbeck who, on this occasion, was flanked by Secretary Hull. When the ambassador inquired about the invocation of the Nine-Power Pact, Secretary Hull mumbled some generality and referred him to Mr. Hornbeck. Mr. Hornbeck was equally vague. He wondered “what the Chinese Government would estimate as likely to be the concrete effect of action such as it was suggesting.” The ambassador replied that “one effect at the outset might be the moral effect.” The conversation made no progress and soon closed with the ambassador and Secretary Hull exchanging “expressions of serious solicitude over the gravity of the situation.”68 On the following day Mr. Hornbeck sent a memorandum to Secretary Hull advising against “making any commitment” with reference to taking the initiative in an invocation of the Nine-Power Pact.69

In Britain the Foreign Office was more responsive to the pressures exerted in favor of a positive policy in the Far East. On August 26 the London Times complained that the situation was a difficult one but it could be remedied by closer Anglo-American co-operation. This statement disturbed the American Embassy in London. American sensitive nerves were calmed by a note from the Foreign Office which criticized the paragraph in the London Times as an example of “irresponsible journalism.”70

The British Foreign Office now evinced a spirit of sweet reasonableness. During a conversation with one of the Chinese representatives in London, Mr. Eden remarked that the “British Government was prepared to support any course of action which the American Government might choose to embark upon.” When this observation was conveyed to Secretary Hull by the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, it brought forth the inevitable question: Did the ambassador think “that any course of action not involving force would be effective?” The ambassador admitted that “he thought that for effectiveness force would be essential.”71 This frank answer disclosed the essential difficulty in securing any invocation of the Nine-Power Pact. The signatory nations were not ready to supply the force that would be essential to any successful action against Japan.

These difficulties in securing an invocation of the Nine-Power Pact led the Chinese Government to turn to the League of Nations. On August 30 a note was addressed to M. Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League, which reviewed the incidents connected with the Marco Polo Bridge clash between Chinese and Japanese armed forces. M. Avenol was then requested to communicate this statement to the members of the League and to the Advisory Committee set up under the resolution adopted on February 24, 1933.72

This action by the Chinese Government spurred the British Foreign Office to inquire if the United States contemplated “being represented at Geneva in any way” in the event that the League would give a hearing to China’s appeal.73 Secretary Hull replied that America might be represented on the Advisory Committee if the League decided that the Advisory Committee was still in existence.74

While the Chinese Foreign Office was making preparations for a formal appeal to the League of Nations, Chiang Kai-shek had a long talk with Ambassador Johnson. He remarked that he was “puzzled over American policy in the present Far Eastern situation, particularly as regards our [America’s] unwillingness to associate ourselves with Great Britain in attempting to restrain Japan.” He questioned the word “parallel” and “asked why it was that we had not been willing to take joint action with the British.” Johnson told him that the Department of State “preferred to act in consultation” with Britain, and when “in agreement, independently.” He also stated that he had not been aware of “any difference of opinion or purpose as between the two Governments.”75

The next complaint filed against American apparent indifference to the cause of China came from Madame Chiang Kai-shek. She felt outraged that the American Government had refused “passports to American instructors in aviation whom the Chinese Government had invited to come to China even before the present conflict began.” She hoped that America would really “be neutral in this matter and not place any obstacles in China’s way when it is fighting for its very life.”76 Secretary Hull immediately replied that there was a strong feeling in the United States that American citizens “should not participate or become involved in fighting which may be taking place in any foreign country.” Such a belief was held “irrespective of the foreign country where such fighting is occurring.” The attitude of the government “must be responsive to the beliefs of the American people.”77

The Department of State was more co-operative with regard to action in concert with the League. On September 12, China formally appealed to the League under Articles 10, 11, and 17 of the Covenant. This appeal was referred to the Far-East Advisory Committee. The American Government was invited to appoint a representative on the committee, and on September 20 the Department of State accepted the invitation by appointing Leland Harrison to serve without any voting privileges. Mr. Harrison was also the American Minister to Switzerland. In its communication to the Secretary-General of the League, the Department of State emphasized the fact that the American Government would not take upon “itself those responsibilities which devolve from the fact of their membership upon members of the League.” It would be prepared, however, to “give careful consideration to definite proposals which the League may address to it.”78

On October 5 the Far-East Advisory Committee adopted two reports and laid them before the League Assembly. The first of these reviewed the situation in the Far East and concluded that the “military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air” could be justified “neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defense.” It was obvious that they were “in contravention of Japan’s obligations” under the Nine-Power Pact and the Pact of Paris.79

g. President Roosevelt Proposes a Quarantine

There is no doubt that the speedy action of the Far-East Advisory Committee was prompted by the belief that the American Government would support a policy of sharp denunciation of Japanese military operations in China. At Geneva it had long been realized that America was viewing Japan with increasing coolness. Hull’s statement of the principles of international conduct on July 16 had evoked within a month favorable replies from more than fifty nations. A moral sanitary cordon was being drawn around Japan. Moreover, there were certain points of friction that developed between Japan and the United States as a result of the conflict in China. On August 25 the Japanese Government announced a blockade of China’s coast from Shanghai southward; ten days later the blockade was extended to the entire coast of China. Although it was limited to Chinese shipping, Japan reserved the right to stop merchant vessels of other nations for the purpose of ascertaining their identity.80 Inasmuch as Japan had not declared war on China, this blockade was not legal as applied to American vessels, and Secretary Hull instructed the United States Consul General at Shanghai that there was no need to give “affirmative assent to measures which may be taken by the Japanese naval authorities in their enforcement of their blockade.” American vessels should show “to Japanese naval authorities evidence of nationality but permit further investigation only under express protest.”81

This dangerous situation in the Far East gave Ambassador Grew deep concern. He was particularly anxious to avoid any break with Japan. In a long dispatch to Secretary Hull he frankly gave his views as to the best policy for America to pursue. Up to this time the Department of State had shown an attitude of impartiality in its relations with China and Japan. He ardently hoped that this attitude would be maintained. While he believed that it was important to continue concerted action with Britain, yet there were certain limitations connected with such a policy. British methods were not “always best calculated to achieve desired results.” There was at times “an ineptitude in their methods, and especially in the tone and language and timing of their official communications.” He thought that the Department of State should aim to “avoid unnecessarily sacrificing our present relations” with Japan. There was nothing to be gained by hampering America’s “future interests, and perhaps our own future helpfulness in working for peace by creating among the Japanese people a renewed antagonism against the United States.”82

This feeling of impartiality towards the combatants in the Far East seemed to color the opinions expressed by Under Secretary Sumner Welles in a conversation with M. Oumansky, the Soviet chargé d’affaires. The Russian representative quickly showed that he was deeply dissatisfied with the cautious attitude of the Department of State in the China conflict. He wished to know if the American Government intended to co-operate with other governments in connection with the possible imposition of “military or economic sanctions” upon Japan. Welles made the chilling reply that M. Oumansky appeared to have “completely misunderstood the whole basis of the United States policy . . . of taking no sides in the present conflict.” Oumansky mumbled that such a policy was a “very discouraging one” and hurriedly left the Department of State.83

But this impartial attitude towards China and Japan was completely abandoned by President Roosevelt in his address in Chicago on October 5. He was strongly in favor of a quarantine against aggressor nations.84 His words of criticism and warning were directed chiefly against Japan and their baleful effect was all that Grew had feared. It was really big talk in a high key. He was far more worried about party reverses at home than about Japanese movements in Manchuria. An economic recession in the United States had made it clear that the ballyhoo of New Deal politicians had struck some very sour notes that greatly annoyed the ears of American workers who were out of jobs. The Morgenthau Diaries give indisputable proof of the deep concern the Administration felt over the wide break in the economic structure of the nation.85

Joined with this bad news from the economic front was the hostile reaction in the press over the appointment of Senator Hugo Black to the Supreme Court. In September it was made known that Mr. Black had once hidden his face under the wide hood of a Klansman. In dismay he fled to Europe and President Roosevelt found it convenient to make a hurried trip to the Far West. It was highly expedient for him to make some address that would divert public attention from the widespread effects of economic recession and to cover the flight of the nimble Justice Black. A sharp denunciation of the Japanese advance in North China would draw a big herring across a noisome trail.

The quarantine speech of October 5 had many macabre overtones designed to frighten the American people. It indicated that large portions of the world were experiencing a “reign of terror,” and that the “landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order and justice” were being “wiped away.” “Innocent peoples and nations” were being “cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy” which was “devoid of all sense of justice and humane consideration.” If this sad condition of affairs existed in other parts of the world it was vain for anyone to “imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked, and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization.”

Newspapers of a one-world persuasion sprang to the President’s support. The New York Times and the World-Telegram promptly attacked the “unrealities of isolation,”86 while the New York Daily News suggested a long-range Anglo-American naval blockade of Japan if that nation were to overrun China and threaten the interests of the Western powers.87

Some papers advocated an economic boycott as a means to bring Japan to reason. The Washington Post urged that America “immediately cease to buy Japanese goods,”88 and this opinion was strongly seconded by the Washington Evening Star89 and the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle.90 The Atlanta Constitution expressed the emphatic opinion that “war-diseased nations must be quarantined,”91 and the Birmingham News92 and the Raleigh News and Observer93 joined this chorus. In the Middle West the Chicago Daily News,94 the St. Louis Globe-Democrat,95 and the Cincinnati Enquirer96 expressed agreement with the “general principles” of the President’s address. On the Pacific Coast the San Francisco Chronicle,97 the Los Angeles Times,98 and the Portland Morning Oregonian99 adopted a favorable attitude.

But there was a large legion of newspapers that rejected any thought of economic sanctions against Japan. Such action would lead to war. The New York Herald-Tribune believed that the President’s speech had been based upon the “identical sands of confusion, emotion and wishful thinking which so tragically engulfed Mr. Wilson’s great vision.”100 The New York Sun warned the President that American public opinion would not approve any policy of “pulling chestnuts out of the fire for any association of foreign nations.”101 The Boston Herald boldly declared that “Americans must not embark on another costly attempt to reform the world,”102 while even the stanchly Democratic Boston Post cried out in protest: “He [the President] must know that the American people are in no mood for a crusade.”103

The Chicago Tribune was openly hostile to any threat of a boycott against Japan. Economic sanctions would lead America down the road to war.104 The Detroit Tree Press voiced the opinion that there was no “adequate reason for remarks that were evangelistic rather than statesmanlike, and were manifestly designed to stir emotions rather than provoke careful thought.”105 The Milwaukee Journal remarked that a boycott is a “first cousin to outright war,”106 and the Spokane Spokesman-Review stated ominously that the President’s Chicago address “approximated a declaration of war.”107

The columnists were divided in their opinions of the Chicago address. Boake Carter was fearful that the President suffered from the “disease of moral fervor for reform.”108 Paul Mallon regarded the address as a clever move to divert attention from the unfortunate appointment of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court,109 while General Hugh S. Johnson was worried that America, as in 1917, would play the role of “sucker.”110

On the other hand, David Lawrence hailed the address as the “speech the whole world has been waiting for several months to hear”;111 Dorothy Thompson was delighted that she could now envisage the end of American “neutrality,”112 and Walter Lippmann praised the President for a much-needed clarion call to the democracies to resist aggressor nations.113

The Catholic press had few words of praise for the President’s Chicago challenge. America flatly stated that the “people of the United States positively are opposed to foreign imbroglios”;114 the Ave Maria was filled with misgivings,115 while Father Gillis, in the Catholic World, was sharply critical of any pressure in favor of American intervention in the Far East.116

It is interesting to note that the Christian Century, which reflected the Protestant viewpoint, was distinctly suspicious of the Chicago speech. In a forecast of the future it warned that if America went to war on behalf of China the result would be a victory for Russia.117

This Russian angle of the situation in the Far East was clearly perceived by many observers. On October 12 the Division of Far Eastern Affairs prepared a memorandum for the use of Secretary Hull. With reference to possible economic sanctions, the memorandum asks the question whether the United States should take the lead in such a movement. In answer to this question it remarks: “It is believed that the assuming of such a position by any country would bring that country face to face with a very real hazard. . . . It seems to me [Mr. Hamilton, chief of the Division] that public opinion in the United States is definitely opposed to the United States assuming a position of leadership in the imposing of restrictive measures directed at Japan. Moreover it should be borne in mind that if restrictive measures should take the form of economic ’sanctions,’ the United States would be called upon to carry the heaviest burden.118 . . . If some program could be worked out which would give Japan a reasonable prospect of economic security and which would remove Japan’s fear of Communism and attack from the Soviet Union, there would be removed some basic elements in the situation responsible for Japan’s present imperialistic program.”119

From Tehran there came a message that confirmed Japan’s fear of the rising tide of bolshevism in China. On October 14 the American Minister in Tehran had a conversation with the newly arrived Japanese Minister who “predicted that the next upheaval in China would proceed along Bolshevistic lines and he felt that the great tragedy in the present situation was that England and America were by their attitude unconsciously pushing China nearer the abyss.”120

There was no doubt about the increasingly intimate relations between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists under Mao Tse-tung. By 1937, Russia had practically detached Outer Mongolia from China and Chinese representatives endeavored to hide this fact while pressing their attack upon Japan for expansion in North China. On October 14, Secretary Hull had a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador (Dr. C. T. Wang). He inquired “very confidentially as to Russia’s attitude towards Outer Mongolia and with respect to observing the integrity of China generally.” The ambassador was careful not to “undertake to give an opinion, except to minimize the influence and attitude of Russia with respect to Outer Mongolia at this time, adding that Outer Mongolia continues to claim herself as a part of China and to assert Chinese sovereignty.”121

In the face of a great deal of information available in the Department of State showing communist control over Outer Mongolia, it is hardly likely that Secretary Hull gave much credence to this observation by the Chinese Ambassador. It is certainly true, however, that the Secretary closed his eyes to the rapid Red advance in many parts of China and he certainly did not understand the implications of the close tie between Chiang Kai-shek and the communist armies. There was a world of truth in the statement of the Japanese Minister to Tehran: “The next upheaval in China will proceed along Bolshevistic lines.” Few persons in the Department of State realized the accuracy of this prophecy or gave it any real consideration. Since the recognition of Russia in 1933, bolshevism appeared to many Americans as a challenge to our social order rather than as a military threat.

1John H. Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9.
2February 10, 1904.
3February 10, 1904.
4February 11, 1904.
5Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.
6Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.
7Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38.
8A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34.
9Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress.
10John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.
11Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12.
12Merle E. Curti, “Bryan and World Peace,” Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).
13Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6.
14Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183.
15Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60.
16Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America’s entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: “I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed.” House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.
17President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: “There are certain phrases in the President’s ‘Fourteen Points’ [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. . . . He [the President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well.” Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
18Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504.
19The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
20Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35-36.
21David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9.
22Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York, 1939), p. 18.
23The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343.
24Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.
25Ibid., p. 69.
26Ibid., pp. 832-33.
27Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258.
28Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240.
29Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), p. 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: “This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. . . . it is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable.” Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.
30Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6.
31Arthur P. Scott, “George Louis Beer,” in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315.
32Ibid., p. 319.
33George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60.
34Bailey, op. cit., p. 163.
35Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
36Bailey, op. cit., p. 167.
37It is significant that most of Professor Lord’s colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was “excessive.” Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289.
38Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38.
39Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26.
40Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35.
41Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42.
42René Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50.
43William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52.
44Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503.
45Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424.
46Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
47E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62.
48Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936).
49Powell, op. cit., p. 66.
50Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 1930), p. 423.
51In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland.
52(London, 1930), pp. 79-88.
53Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.
54Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), pp. 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930).
55Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383.
56Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55.
57General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives.
58Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
59Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
60Dawson, op. cit., p. 84.
61Nevins, op. cit., p. 372.
62G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31.
63Herbert Hoover, “Communism Erupts in Europe,” Collier’s, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71.
64Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124.
65Ibid., pp. 98-100.
66George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State.
67George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State.
68George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.
69George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State.
70George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State.
71The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126.
72The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
73New York Times, June 3, 1933.
74The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414.
75New York Times, June 21, 1933.
76Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247.
77Ibid., pp. 261-62.
78The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.
79Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98.
80Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.
81Ibid., pp. 417-19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation.
82Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.
83Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: “I sent two nominations to the President, your’s and Nicholas Butler’s, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence.”
84Ibid., p. 5.
85Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38.
86New York Times, January 19, 1933.
87New York Times, March 19, 1933.
88New York Times, May 8, 1933.
89Dodd, op. cit., p. 9.
90Ibid., p. 5.
91Ibid., pp. 6-7.
92Ibid., p. 9.
93Ibid., pp. 10-11.
94Ibid., p. ix.
95Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. III, 4389.
96January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
97January 9, 1927.
98January 25, 1927.
99March 17, 1927.
100January 21, 26, 1927.
101January 23, 28, 30; February 3, 5, 9, 1927.
102March 22, 1927.
103January 25, 1927.
104Consul John K. Davis to Secretary Kellogg, Nanking, March 28, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1927, II, 151-63.
105MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 151.
106Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 164.
107British Ambassador (Howard) to Secretary Kellogg, April 5, 1927. Ibid., pp. 179-81.
108Memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 6, 1927. Ibid., pp. 182-83.
109Consul General at Hankow (Lockhart) to Eugene Ch’en, April 11, 1927. Ibid., pp. 189-90. These demands included the following items: (1) adequate punishment of commanders of the troops responsible for the murders, personal injuries, and indignities and the material damage done as also of all persons found to be implicated; (2) apology in writing by the Commander in Chief of the Nationalist Army including an express written undertaking to refrain from all forms of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property; (3) complete reparation for the personal injuries and material damage done.
110Memorandum by the Secretary or State, April 20, 1927. Ibid., 204-5.
111MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, April 23, 1927. Ibid., pp. 209-10.
112Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, April 25, 1927. Ibid., pp. 210-11.
113Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, April 28, 1927. Ibid., pp. 215-16.
114United States Daily, April 26, 1927.
115North China Herald, April 30. 1927.
116Borg, op. cit., p. 344.
117Ibid., p. 351.
118Bulletin of the American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, August, 1927.
119China in Chaos, p. 2.
120June 18, 1927.
121MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, June 20, 1928. Foreign Relations, 1928, II, 184-85.

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941