Industrial Policy—a.k.a. Central Planning—Won’t Make America Great
China's industrial policy has been marked by many failures and few successes. Rather, China's real growth has been fueled by the regime's limited turn to markets.
China's industrial policy has been marked by many failures and few successes. Rather, China's real growth has been fueled by the regime's limited turn to markets.
Economics is not simply a series of transactions with hidden implications. Rather sound economics understands that long-term effects outlive the short-term effects of every economic principle or policy.
Left-leaning economists and journalists apparently still harbor nostalgia for the central planning and protectionism of the "good ol' days" of the Second World War.
Vaccine mandates are much easier to enforce thanks to the spread of government spending, government contracting, and monopolized government services.
The new proposal is framed as a tax on the ultrarich. The same was true of the new income tax in 1913. If given the power to tax unrealized gains, expect the feds to expand the tax to ordinary people.
In a normal universe, we have a name for this sort of monetary policy: it’s called “extreme dovishness” or “extremely accommodative.” In the bizarro world of 2021, it is anti-inflationary.
Our aim ought not to be to make democracy “work better” but to use revelations of corruption as a tool to question altogether its value as a political and social system of organization.
When it comes to both monetary and fiscal policy, sloppy definitions of inflation drive sloppy policymaking.
Francis should note that the move toward freer markets, in India and China especially, resulted in the huge reduction in extreme poverty we have witnessed over the last few decades.
China’s real estate problems are three: the massive size of the sector, its excessive leverage, and the amount of developer debt in the hands of average households and retail investors.