Lectures on Political Economy

LECTURES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY GENERAL THEORY

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INTRODUCTION

THE NATURE OF ECONOMICS: DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT

It is not easy to give a satisfactory definition of the term “political economy”.1 The conception itself is, indeed, somewhat vague—a natural state of affairs in the infancy of a science. Literally, the name indicates national housekeeping or the theory of national housekeeping. Yet, at any rate nowadays, a nation has no common housekeeping, but every individual manages his own affairs. The State itself constitutes a management of some affairs in common and the same is true of the local units; the housekeeping of those units is dealt with by the science of public finance, which, though it must be regarded as a part (and an important part) of political economy, is by no means the whole. In modern times, moreover, it has become customary to treat public finance as a distinct science.

The name political economy arose during the so-called “mercantile” age, when it was regarded as a duty of the State itself to exercise an extensive influence over the affairs of individuals, so that the latter enjoyed only a very restricted liberty, under the guidance and control of the State. At that time, therefore, it was appropriate to speak of political economy, a term which adequately represented the conception which underlay it. Its appropriateness diminished with the advent of the physiocratic ideas and the victory of the conception of unrestricted liberty and free trade, especially as the main thesis of the latter was that the State should interfere as little as possible in economic affairs and leave the individual, except in certain well-defined cases, free to attend to his own business. Thus, according to this view, the fundamental principle of political economy was that its subject matter, the national household, did not exist.

In our day, it is true, there has been a reaction against this ultra-liberal principle, but nevertheless it is still in reality the individualistic, purely private, system which predominates. For this reason many modern writers have desired to reject the qualifying adjective “political” or “national” and to speak merely of economics, or have invented entirely new names, such as “plutology” or “catallactics”. But in the absence of a better name we may perhaps retain the old one,2 provided that we are careful not to import into it the conception of a national unity in the economic field which does not exist in reality. In accordance with the modern outlook, the subject matter of political economy is becoming more and more the doctrine of economic phenomena, in their interrelations, seen as a whole; i.e. in so far as they uniformly affect whole classes of the community, or a whole people, or the totality of all peoples (what the Germans call Weltwirtschaft). By an economic phenomenon or activity is meant every systematic endeavour to satisfy a material need, or, more precisely, one which seeks with the available means to achieve the greatest possible result, or a given result with the least possible means. (The familiar expression, “to obtain the greatest possible results with the smallest possible means,” is illogical and should therefore be avoided.)

In many cases such an activity, though directed to the advantage of an individual, at the same time promotes, or is at least not inimical to, the general good. He who works and produces only for his own gain also confers benefits on others—indirectly, by means of exchange; the improvement of the soil and of technical plant in general, which is effected by the present generation, possibly only in its own interests, will, nevertheless, be of benefit to the coming generation. In such cases individual and national economic interests coincide. But it is equally common, or even more common, for one economic interest to conflict with another; circumstances or activities which benefit one branch of industry, one class of society, or one generation, are often more or less injurious to another. Examples of this kind are familiar to everybody; the most important is surely the distribution of property, in so far as possession of land or an exceptional monopoly of any kind necessarily excludes others from that land or that monopoly. Private and national economic interests then no longer coincide, and the question arises which is to be followed; in other words, which of two conflicting interests is to be preferred as contributing most to the general good. To answer this question is the practical and social duty of political economy, and it might be said that the definition of political economy as a practical science is the theory of the manner of satisfying human needs which gives the greatest possible satisfaction to society as a whole,3 having regard to future generations as well as to the present. The existing individualistic organization of society, in so far as it is socially justified, must then be regarded as a means to the attainment of that end.

The solution of this problem is frequently very difficult and the result is, of course, always dependent not only on technical economic considerations, but also on the degree of our sympathies; that is to say, on our understanding of the interests and demands of others. When we say that a thing is beneficial or injurious from the point of view of political economy, this manner of speaking is based on an ethical or philosophical postulate; that is to say, on certain conceptions concerning the natural right of men to live and enjoy the good things of life. We either consider all to have the same rights and reckon each individual member of society as a unit, or else, for one reason or another, we recognize a difference between them, though in that case the reasons must be clearly stated if we are to regard our view as scientifically established.

As we all know, opinions on this question have changed greatly in the course of time. In earlier times, only the free, and afterwards only the propertied, classes were regarded as members of society in the true sense; slaves and those without property were regarded in much the same way as domestic animals in our day—merely as a means and not as an end. Aristotle’s well-known saying that shuttles and the plectron of the lyre would have to move of themselves before slavery could cease, is evidence of this view, though we need not go back so far in time to encounter similar opinions. Among eighteenth century Swedish writers on economics, mentioned by Arnberg in his Frihetstidens politiska ekonomi (“The Political Economy of the Age of Freedom”),4 we repeatedly find remarks which show that the conception, so repellent to our minds, of a workman as a mere beast of burden was, as recently as two centuries ago, still general and deep-rooted. Indeed, it may be regarded in some degree as one of the merits of economic science that in this respect it has produced a revolution in public opinion. As soon as we begin seriously to regard economic phenomena as a whole and to seek for the conditions of the welfare of the whole, consideration for the interests of the proletariat must emerge; and from thence to the proclamation of equal rights for all is only a short step.

The very concept of political economy, therefore, or the existence of a science with such a name, implies, strictly speaking, a thoroughly revolutionary programme. It is not surprising that the concept is vague, for that often happens with a revolutionary programme. Indeed, many practical and theoretical problems remain to be solved before the goal of economic or social development can be said to be clearly understood. Something can still be said in favour of the older point of view, but in any case it should be said straightforwardly and without prevarication. If, for example, we regard the working classes as beings of a lower type, or if, without going so far as this, we regard them as not yet being ready for a full share in the product of society, then we should say so clearly and base our further reasoning upon that opinion. There is only one thing which is unworthy of science—to conceal or pervert the truth; that is to say, in this case, to represent the position as if those classes had already received all they could reasonably wish or expect, or to rely upon unfounded, optimistic beliefs that economic developments in themselves tend to the greatest possible satisfaction of all. This latter mistake was made especially by the so-called “harmony” economists in the middle of the last century—the American, Carey, and the otherwise admirable Frenchman, Bastiat—both of whom in their own countries and in ours have had, and still have, many disciples.

The division of the subject which first suggests itself is into “theoretical” and “practical” political economy—economics in the narrow sense and national economic policy. Owing to the decisive difference which it makes to our handling of economic problems whether we assume the existence of private property and freedom of contract in anything like their present forms, or whether we do not, it might be more appropriate to subdivide the practical portion into two parts: one being an application of the theory founded on existing conditions, and the other a critical examination of the foundation itself.

The former of these would be, at the same time, a link between the latter and the theoretical portion. On the one hand, it amplifies the theoretical abstractions by a closer consideration of reality, whilst, on the other hand, the practical problems which emerge as soon as we approach reality can find their ultimate solution only in a criticism of the foundations of the whole economic life of society.

We thus arrive at the following division of our subject:—

(1) A theoretical part (pure, general, or theoretical economics), comprising a statement of economic laws or the connection between economic phenomena, in which, in order to discover or demonstrate these laws, we must necessarily proceed from certain simplifying assumptions.

(2) A practical part (applied economics, particular problems of the consumption, distribution and production of goods), comprising the application of these laws to various fields of activity in the concrete economic life of society.

(3) A social part (social economics or economic policy), comprising an investigation into the question how these economic laws and practical precepts should properly be applied in order to obtain the greatest possible social gain, and what changes in the existing economic and legal structure of society are necessary to this end.

In the first of these main parts there are certain subdivisions. First and foremost comes the theory of human wants, quantitative and qualitative, i.e. the general theory of consumption, which, since it is the purpose of all economic activity, should logically be placed first, even though in actual life it comes last in point of time. As regards such needs, or consumption, the quantitative point of view emerges first, and in this respect the number of consumers is of decisive importance. Thus, in our first subsection, we naturally treat of the theory of population, its composition and changes. Man is, indeed, not only a consumer; he is also a producer. Yet he is, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, both in racial and individual development, a consumer long before he is a producer. In the theory of production, moreover, man is only one of the productive factors; in the theory of consumption he and his purposes constitute the whole. Generally speaking, and even apart from the above division of the subject, it will be found that the theory of population, which can never be omitted from a complete treatise on political economy, can never find a suitable place in the system unless it forms an introduction to the whole. In actual fact, it is impossible to consider economic problems profitably, whether they are of a practical or theoretical kind, unless we constantly keep population and its changes in view. On the other hand, it would appear that certain problems of population are of such a complicated nature that they cannot be solved without a thorough knowledge of every part of the theory of economic structure. Thus we return to these problems at practically every point in a thorough economic investigation, and their solution may be regarded as its chief result.

We next turn to the qualitative side of human needs: to their extent and intensity, relative importance, etc., and the comparative importance which we accordingly attribute to the means of satisfying these needs. The development of this inquiry will lead us to the theory of value and to the associated general theory of exchange. On the other hand, exchange as it appears in reality in modern society, and the regulation of exchange by society which may be considered desirable, belong respectively to the second and third main sections of our subject.

The next subdivision is the general theory of production and of the factors of production: land (or nature), labour, and capital, their part in production and their relative shares in the distribution of the product—rent, wages, and interest—all examined on certain simplifying assumptions, such as universal free competition or competition limited in a certain manner. It is already clear that the theory of production cannot be separated from the theory of distribution, though it should be noted that this applies only to distribution as it actually takes place under the individualistic economic system, or, more correctly, as it would take place on our simplifying assumptions. The social problem of distribution, on the other hand, which belongs to the third main division, is fundamentally different from this; it embraces, among other things, the question, not yet raised at this stage, of property rights in the various factors of production.

In these two subdivisions we shall treat the subject mainly from the static point of view, i.e. we shall assume, in principle, a society which retains unchanged from year to year the same population, the same area of territory and the same amount of capital, and remains on the same level of technical achievement. By way of transition to a more dynamic point of view, which can only be successfully presented in combination with the practical part of our subject, we shall briefly treat the problem of saving or accumulation of capital—which is equivalent to production without corresponding consumption—as well as its negative counterpart, capital consumption.

Finally, we include in the general or theoretical part of our work the theory of the medium of exchange, money as well as organized credit, which subjects are clearly connected and partly coincide. Many monetary questions, it is true, have their proper place in the special or applied section of our subject, but to avoid unnecessary length we shall treat most of them together, more especially since the actual technique of money is of much greater interest to pure economic theory than the technical details of production or trade.

We thus obtain the following five subdivisions of Part I of our work:—

(i) The theory of population.5

(ii) The theory of value and exchange.

(iii) The theory of production and distribution.

(iv) The theory of capital, all of which are treated in Volume I, and

(v) The theory of money and credit, which is the subject of the second volume of the theoretical part of our work.

As I shall probably not be in a position to publish either of the two other main parts, it is unnecessary to recount how I have conceived their content or how I have treated them in my lectures. I need only add that the third main division (or Social Economics) would include, as its last section, a theory of public finance—which is usually treated nowadays as a separate science, as a study of particular financial legislation—though in essence it undoubtedly constitutes a part, growing more important and extensive every day, of political economy.

This division of the subject accords in the main with that used by Walras in his Éléments d’économie politique pure, though it is not always based upon the same reasons. Formerly, following the example of J. B. Say and J. S. Mill, it was usual to divide economics into the theories of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption—a chronological order, as it were, according to which it was supposed that commodities must first be produced, then distributed between the persons participating in the production (workers, landlords, capitalists, etc.) and then exchanged, in so far as they were unable to avail themselves of their share in kind, and finally consumed. But this easy division of the subject is far from logical. Production and distribution cannot, as we have already pointed out, be understood except in combination, and the concept of value and exchange underlies both, a fact which has led to incessant anticipations and circumlocutions unfortunate from an expository point of view. And, again, there was not much left to say about consumption when everything else had been treated; so that the whole of this section was completely ignored by Mill. Yet, if this is allowed to happen, one loses sight of the fact that that which directs—or, more correctly, ought to direct—all economic activity is human needs. Thus the theory of wants or value should undoubtedly be placed first; and this is often done nowadays, even by writers of textbooks who, like Professor C. Gide, otherwise preserve the old division of the subject. On the other hand, it can hardly be right to postpone discussion of value, as Philippovich does, and only to treat of it in connection with the theory of commercial practice. The theory of value in its modern form has, as we shall see, been more or less responsible for the transformation of every branch of political economy and should, in combination with the theory of population, constitute the foundation of the whole edifice.

Another consequence of this traditional division of the subject has been that, within the various main divisions, theoretical, practical, and social problems have been treated together. At an earlier stage in the development of the science, this might be defensible—and there is no doubt that it helped to give to the works of Mill, as previously to those of Adam Smith (whose division of the subject is somewhat different), a high degree of literary charm. But in proportion as science develops and becomes specialized, a different method becomes necessary and, by adopting it, it becomes easier to escape the criticism, advanced so often and with so much justice against the older economists, that the range of validity of their conclusions was not always clearly established.

It is a more especial disadvantage of the traditional division of the subject that the theory of money came to be treated as a mere episode in the theory of exchange, without regard to its great theoretical and practical importance in every branch of economics. This is probably the real reason why, despite the voluminous writings on the technical aspects of money and credit, no complete theory of money and its functions has ever been advanced, and why it remains one of the least explored fields in the theory of political economy.

Passing over to pure or theoretical economics (with which the present volume will be solely concerned) we should point out that the exposition in the whole of this section must of necessity be abstract and schematic; the results will be correspondingly hypothetical, that is to say, they can only claim validity under our simplifying assumptions. Whether, and to what extent, they will accord with reality will evidently depend on two circumstances: first and foremost, whether our assumptions are themselves founded on reality, i.e. contain at least some elements of reality—which we must always demand, for otherwise all reasoning about them would be sterile. We can, for example, safely assume that men are actuated by selfish motives, because that is always, at least to a very large extent, true. But we can no more assume that they are filled with a desire to injure each other than that they are purely altruistic. Further, the conditions from which we abstract must be relatively unessential, at least as regards the question under discussion: when we are considering certain economic problems such as, for example, price formation, we may forget that man is not entirely individualistic but has also social impulses. But we must not do so in other problems, as for example in the politico-social field or in the science of public finance. Having, by this means, obtained a first approximation, it is possible by successive approximations (i.e. by taking into consideration more and more of the conditions at first omitted) to approach nearer and nearer to reality, in much the same way as the astronomers were obliged to proceed in order to discover the laws of the real movements of the planetary system.

It is not, however, always possible to decide in advance whether the conditions from which we abstract are essential or not. It may even happen that we must deliberately ignore conditions which are in themselves of the greatest importance, because the problem in question is of so complex a nature that it cannot be rationally treated in any other way. Thus, in the theory of value, we shall ignore, for the time being, the functions of money—which in fact are essential and not merely of secondary importance. And we shall often regard the economic activities of a people as isolated, whereas among the peoples who interest us, such an isolation does not, even approximately, exist and therefore our assumption corresponds with reality only if we look at the economic activities of the world as a whole. Similarly, at the outset, we shall regard both exchange and production as if each existed independently of the other, which is practically never the case; and, in the theory of production, we shall first concern ourselves with non-capitalistic production, although this bears no possible resemblance to actual production and, strictly speaking, cannot exist in fact. In all these cases the results are, of course, not even approximately correct, but are purely hypothetical; though the inquiry is not, on that account, valueless. They constitute rather a necessary element in the full and correct solution of the problem under discussion and are, therefore, to be regarded as useful work, even if it should sometimes prove impossible, for the moment, to complete the reasoning by the inclusion of other factors hitherto omitted.6

It has been customary in the so-called historical school of political economy to deprecate all abstract reasoning within the science as being useless. This view, which, however, seems to be dying out, evidently disregards the fact that all human thought, of whatever kind, must necessarily be abstract. Historical research itself begins by abstracting from all those innumerable data influencing the problem at issue which are not mentioned in existing historical documents; and when it applies the results obtained by the historical method to modern times, or when it tests them—as it must almost always do—by contemporary thought, it also abstracts from all the material and spiritual changes of the intervening time—a process which may be permissible, but which may lead to serious error. If this school were consistent, therefore, it should refrain from all conclusions and from all thought beyond the purely mechanical recording of facts. Fortunately, it does not pursue its thesis to its logical conclusion, but, on the contrary, has enriched political economy by much extremely valuable research, which will always retain its place among the treasures of the science, even though it does not, and cannot, constitute the whole if it; and even though—like theoretical research—it cannot claim more than approximate validity.

 

7 [Swedish Nationalekonomi: German Nationalōkonomie.]

8 [i.e. Nationalekonomi (Swedish) or Nationalökonomie (German).]

9 Here, too, one should avoid the very common, but fundamentally meaningless, expression “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”.

10 Cf. also G. Schauman, Studier i frihetstidens nationalekonomiska litteratur, Helsingfors, 1910.

11 [For reasons explained in the author’s preface, this section was omitted in the second Swedish edition and is not included in the present translation.]

12 In the exact natural sciences, there are many parallel cases. One of the finest discoveries in hydrodynamics made it possible, by Green’s analysis, to determine exactly the movement of a solid body of a liquid. Yet the formulæ so discovered do not (except superficially) correspond with observed facts, because it was impossible to take certain important details into consideration—especially the eddies produced by the movement of the body. Another, and older, example is Newton’s discovery of the speed of light through the atmosphere—which differed from the actual result by about one-third, because the heating of the air under pressure had not been taken into account. Even Newton’s famous Law of Gravitation at first gave an entirely incorrect result when he tried to verify it, because one element in the calculation—the length of the earth’s radius—was only imperfectly known.

• 1This expression is perhaps not entirely suitable, since, as will easily be seen, the essence of the argument is in both cases the same. It is therefore also possible that I ought to have endeavoured to combine sections II, 2, C and D in a single uniform presentation. I have found myself unable, however, for various reasons, to do this. As they now stand, these two collateral presentations may materially support and explain each other.
• 2Some of the matter included in this book had been published in Conrad’s Jahrbücher in the preceding year.
• 3Some of these contributions are now available in one or other of the world languages. The article on Professor Bowley’s Mathematical Economics, with its discussion of the theory of Bilateral Monopoly, appears in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, Bd. 58, pp. 252-281. Professor Hayek has included a celebrated article on Prices and the Exchanges in his Beiträge zur Geldtheorie, and two others on Dr. Gustav Åkermann’s Realkapital und Kapitalzins and Prof. Cassel’s “Theory of Social Economy” appear in English as appendices to the present volume. But an English translation of a comprehensive selection of these papers is still urgently to be desired.
• 4A short list of Wicksell’s principal contributions to foreign periodicals is given by Professor Ohlin, op. cit., p. 512.
• 5See, e.g., Schumpeter, “Knut Wicksell,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, Bd. 68, pp. 238-257.
• 6In this connection a comparison between Wicksteed’s article on Jevons’ “Theory of Political Economy” (Works, vol. ii, pp. 734–754) and the sections on Capital Theory in Uber Wert, Kapital und Rente is very instructive.
• 7The first edition of this book was a very limited one, for I did not wish to deprive myself of the opportunity of publishing a new edition and of availing myself of the improvements which experience and expert criticism might suggest. Unfortunately, very little criticism, either public or private, has reached me; but during the ten years or more in which I have been teaching I have naturally discovered various defects, which in this edition I have endeavoured to correct. By omitting the chapter on the theory of population, which was published a couple of years ago in a revised form as a “Verdandi” publication, it has been possible, without increasing the size of the work, to find space for certain additions, which, I hope, will increase its value and its usefulness. Thus the presentation of the theory of rent and the problem of distribution in a non-capitalistic economy has been expanded and, in connection with the theory of interest, some pages have been devoted to a résumé and criticism of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory in its original form. Similarly, I have given a detailed alternative explanation of the origin of interest and of the solution of the problem of distribution under capitalistic production, in which I assume that the whole of the available supply of current labour and land is either invested in production at once, at the same time, or possibly at different moments of time; after which, the products mature spontaneously under the influence of free natural forces—as for instance in the laying down of wine for consumption, etc. Interest then appears in its purest form as the “marginal productivity of waiting” (or of time), and the problem, in all its phases, is easily susceptible of exact treatment in a mathematical form, without it being necessary to have recourse to calculation with so-called simple interest, as in Böhm-Bawerk’s well-known exposition.
• 8Wicksell’s central contributions to theoretical economics are all outlined, if not fully developed, in three books, all in German, which appeared in rapid succession at the commencement of his career in the nineties: Uber Wert, Kapital und Rente, which appeared in 1893; Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, which appeared in 1896; and Geldzins und Güterpreise, which appeared in 1898. In the first he developed an outline solution of the main problems of the pure theory of value and distribution. In the second he applied certain elements in this solution to the special problems of the theory of public finance and the incidence of taxation. In the third he developed his now celebrated theory concerning the relationship between the money rate of interest and the general level of prices. His Vorlesungen über Nationalökonomie, of which the present volumes are a translation, were published first in Sweden in two parts, General Theory, and Money and Credit, in 1901 and 1906 respectively, and contain, with much new material, a systematic restatement of the main theorems of the first and the third of these earlier treatises.
• 9It would be a great mistake, however, to regard Wicksell’s work as an economist as limited to these four major publications. He published much on the population problem, played an active part in the discussion of public affairs in Sweden, and throughout his career was a regular contributor to the scientific journals in Sweden and elsewhere. The files of the Ekonomisk Tidskrift are full of lengthy articles by Wicksell, tantalizingly inaccessible to those of us who have not the good fortune to possess a sufficient knowledge of Swedish. The German periodicals contain a number of contributions, and the Economic Journal and the Quarterly Journal of Economics, once at least, each secured an important article from his pen. Few economists of his generation were more productive or—if those articles which are accessible in one or other of the world languages are any criterion—maintained so consistently high a level.
• 10It would be a great mistake, however, to regard Wicksell’s work as an economist as limited to these four major publications. He published much on the population problem, played an active part in the discussion of public affairs in Sweden, and throughout his career was a regular contributor to the scientific journals in Sweden and elsewhere. The files of the Ekonomisk Tidskrift are full of lengthy articles by Wicksell, tantalizingly inaccessible to those of us who have not the good fortune to possess a sufficient knowledge of Swedish. The German periodicals contain a number of contributions, and the Economic Journal and the Quarterly Journal of Economics, once at least, each secured an important article from his pen. Few economists of his generation were more productive or—if those articles which are accessible in one or other of the world languages are any criterion—maintained so consistently high a level.
• 11In this respect, perhaps, he is more to be compared with Marshall, and more than one critic has made the comparison. But here, too, there are important differences. There can be little doubt that in general knowledge of the details of economic relationships in the modern world, Marshall was greatly Wicksell’s superior, as indeed he was the superior of most others of his generation. But as a systematizer of pure theory he had the defects of his qualities. The peculiar blend of realistic knowledge and theoretical insight which enabled him to present with such ingenuity the world as he saw it, was not necessarily conducive to clear presentation of abstract theoretical issues. He was so anxious to explain the reality he knew, to make his theory appear plausible, that he was apt to be impatient with refinements which, though useless for this purpose, might be fruitful in other connections. Moreover, as Mr. Keynes has pointed out, he lacked that aesthetic feeling for order and proportion which is essential to a theoretical synthesis on the grandest scale. It was just here that Wicksell excelled. There is no work in the whole range of modern economic literature which presents a clearer general view of the main significance and interrelations of the central propositions of economic analysis than these lectures. The arrangement is exemplary. The successive propositions are presented in a setting which emphasizes both their implications and—what is just as important—their limitations: and the whole is built up in such a way that at each successive point in the argument attention is always focused upon the new elements in the problem, the rest having been satisfactorily disposed of at an earlier stage. In this no doubt Wicksell learnt much from Walras. But no, one would contend that the exposition of the Éléments d’Économie Politique Pure, littered up as it is with so much superfluous and somewhat crude mathematics, is a model of expository clarity.
• 12In certain respects, the closest comparison is with Wicksteed. For Wicksteed had the architechtonic instinct, and he, too, had derived both from Lausanne and Vienna. He had not, however, Wicksell’s feeling for the English classics, and the development of his thought was on different lines. Strongly influenced by Pareto’s modifications of utility theory, in later years he became more and more interested in the philosophical and methodological implications of the general theory of value. Wicksell, on the other hand, who was a bit old fashioned on pure utility theory, turned his attention more and more to the development of that part of the Jevonian-Böhm-Bawerkian theory of capital, which, just because he rejected the classical writers so completely, in certain respects Wicksteed failed to comprehend; and as time went on his interests became more technical and practical. But the two supplement each other in admirable fashion. The subjective side of modern theory is at its best in Wicksteed, the objective in Wicksell; a combination of the two covers much of the essential ground. I am not clear that Wicksteed was acquainted with Wicksell. But there is ample evidence that Wicksell knew Wicksteed’s work and appreciated it long before much was thought of it in England.