[The Information State: Politics in the Age of Total Control, Jacob Siegel, March 24, 2026, Henry Holt and Co., 336 pages.]
Jacob Siegel visualizes that, in an information-state form of government, a republican form of government’s ultimate control by voters would get replaced by the digital monopolization of voters’ attention, adjustment of voters’ perceptions, and conditioning of voters to see certain outcomes as inevitable.
One of the Standard Holy Doctrines of modern macroeconomics is the claim that the only way to end a recession is to increase government spending. John Maynard Keynes formalized this doctrine in his infamous The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money and his disciples then spread the word in the halls of academe and government.
There is a basic and probably familiar tension in the economics of innovation: competition is regarded as desirable because it disciplines incumbents, reallocates resources toward more productive firms, and limits the rents associated with market power; however, innovation itself is an activity undertaken in pursuit of rents. If the innovator cannot expect to appropriate at least some of the surplus created by a successful innovation, why incur the cost and risk of producing it?
The “perp” was charged with causing $1,000 in damage, but what he actually destroyed was a 3D-printed decoy that was likely far cheaper.
Murray Sabrin in the Naples Daily News:
The proposal by senators to “fix” Social Security (August 3 article) ignores the program’s fundamental flaw: its financial structure depends on an intergenerational transfer of wealth rather than genuine savings and investment. Today’s workers finance today’s retirees, with the expectation that future workers will do the same. If an investment firm promoted such a scheme, it would likely face charges of operating an illegal pyramid or chain-letter arrangement.
From even the earliest days of written commentary on the French Revolution, it has been common for pundits and social critics and commentators to compare the American Revolution with the French Revolution. The reasons given for the difference vary significantly. Among conservatives—those who follow the Burkean line on the French Revolution—place most of the blame on ideological and religious difference between Americans the French. Other take a more comprehensive view, looking to the roles of feudalism, class conflict, and the nature of the French state.
Humans seem to love predictability. As a result we seem to choose the comfort of predictable outcomes rather than face the uncertainty of reality. We too often show this in the support we give to false economic prophets who espouse populist industrial policy, socialist central control, or perfection through technology. We could really use someone like the late Austrian School economist Ludwig Lachmann to remind us of the unpredictability of reality.
