[Union At All Costs: From Confederation to Consolidation by John M. Taylor. (Book Locker 2017; 378 pp.)]
Murray Rothbard strongly defended the cause of the South in the War Between the States, and John M. Taylor’s book confirms Rothbard’s view with a great deal of evidence. It is not accidental that this is so. As Taylor tells us,
It was not until later in life that I realized many of my beliefs are considered libertarian in modern vernacular and a mixed bag of “Old Right,” “classical liberal,” and “Jeffersonian” in prior times. Most of this realization began to make sense after discovering the writings, speeches, etc., of individuals connected to the Ludwig von Mises Institute, advocates of Austrian free market economics. My friendship with the late O.P. Alford was significant as is my continued friendship with John Sophocleus.
The case for the South rests on three propositions: First, the Southern states had the constitutional right to secede from the Union, because the policies of Lincoln and the Radical Republicans threatened to transform the American republic from a limited confederation of independent states into a centralized nation. Second, Lincoln invaded the South and suppressed civil liberties in an unprecedented way in order to force the Southern states to return to the Union and to prevent the border states from remaining neutral. Third, the invasion was characterized by extraordinary atrocities.
As Taylor points out, the Union was a confederation of states, but Lincoln sought to centralize the government and to weaken states’ rights:
When the treaty with Great Britain was signed in Paris in 1783, the independence of each sovereign State was recognized. The colonies had the option of remaining independent or joining an alliance where defined, specific powers would be delegated to the federal government. When the Constitution was adopted, there was belief in some States that they had the right to nullify any laws created by the central government if those laws were created in contravention of their granted powers. Another tactic designed to protect the States from the central government was a watered-down version of nullification known as interposition, which called for a State to interpose itself between the central government and the people of the State, essentially to block the enforcement of a federal law deemed to be unconstitutional. Fast-forwarding to the 1860s, concerns were raised in both North and South relative to the consolidation of power in the Executive Branch. Even those connected to Lincoln observed the post-war change in the Federal-State relationship as reflected in Supreme Court Justice Salmon P. Chase’s ominous comment, “State sovereignty died at Appomattox.” In modern times, Maine Professor Jay Hoar’s commentary mirrors Chase: “The worst fears of those boys in Gray are now a fact of American life—a Federal government completely out of control.”
Lincoln suppressed civil liberties and stopped at nothing to carry on his efforts to end secession:
With multiple pockets of resistance in the North and the Border States, Lincoln set about suppressing his opposition. Union General Frémont, a staunch Republican, lamented, “The administration has managed the war for personal ends, and with incapacity and selfish disregard of Constitutional rights, with violation of personal liberty of the press.” Just a few weeks into the war, on April 27, 1861, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, depriving his opposition of their most basic rights. This was soon followed by the program of shutting down newspapers and, finally, the call for more troops to invade the seceded States. No stone was left unturned as the Union war machine readied to coerce the seceded States. Suppression of newspapers generally worked hand-in-hand with draft resistance. As the war progressed, and it became clear the Union would subdue the seceded States, there was a corresponding decline in dissent. Ever the politician, Lincoln and his minions silenced critics, as they felt necessary to advance their agenda.
As we know, the interpretation of the War Between the States is controversial, but one elementary fact is indisputable and in itself suffices to make a strong prima facie case for the South. The fact in question is that the war was fought almost entirely in the South. It is odd, to say the least, to blame a war on those defending against an invasion rather than on the invaders.
And the invasion was carried out with atrocities that were not punished but led to promotions. Here is one example:
Under the direction of Union Colonel John Basil Turchin (born Ivan Basil Turchaninov in Cossack Russia), Federal soldiers terrorized Athens, Alabama, in May 1862. Many outrageous incidents were recorded during the Sacking of Athens. Union soldiers committed crimes of theft and destruction against storeowners D.H. Friend, George R. Peck, and R.C. David, as well as Allen’s drugstore and John Malone’s law office. Similar treatment was leveled against private citizens such as Milly Ann Clayton and Mrs. Hollingsworth. On the outskirts of town, the home of Charlotte Hine was ransacked for food and valuables. A blue-clad gang then invaded the slaves’ quarters and raped a black girl. At the plantation of John Malone, outside of town, troops went to the slaves’ quarters and there, too, committed rape. When one black woman dared charge a soldier with the crime, his commanding officer tried to hush it up, commenting, “I would not arrest one of my men on Negro testimony.” Theft, vandalism, and assault went on all day and continued for days to come. When Major General Don Carlos Buell heard of the Athens atrocities, he relieved Turchin of his command. Buell sought a court-martial of Turchin, and after being found guilty of all charges, Buell sought his removal from service. However, Union War Secretary Stanton lobbied Congress to have Turchin promoted to Brigadier General and Lincoln concurred.
General Sherman was notorious for his ruthlessness, and we can rely on his own words:
There were two main theories of warfare prevalent at the time. First, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini was a Swiss officer who served with the French and later the Russians. His three-fold philosophy involved strategy, grand tactics, and logistics. Napoleonic strategies were generally favored, and there was a belief that senseless death and destruction should be minimized. Second, Carl von Clausewitz was a German (Prussian) general who had fought in Napoleonic and European revolutionary wars. He espoused that war was also a political tool and civilians were not off limits, stating that it is a “fallacy to disarm or defeat an enemy by moderating the violence. If the enemy was to be coerced, he had to be put into a situation that he could not endure or simply ignore and wait until things got better.” The Confederate States applied Jomini and Napoleonic tactics. Several of the Northern generals also used these tactics. However, Grant also incorporated “the strategy of annihilation espoused by Clausewitz as the prescription for a victory in a war of popular nationalism.” Sherman readily bought into this type of warfare, and in 1864, while occupying Atlanta and planning his March to the Sea, sent a letter to Lincoln suggesting this strategy would end the war sooner. Sherman had already shown his intolerance for any civilian who refused to be obedient to the U.S. government. Though Lincoln was not initially a proponent of total war, he did not veto the actions of Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan, although he had the legal right to do so. As Sherman said, “There is a class of people [in the South] men, women, and children, who must be killed or banished before you can hope for peace and order.”
In a letter to Salmon P. Chase, Lincoln said, “I’ll make a cemetery of the South.” Faced with sentiments and conduct of this kind, libertarians should without hesitation agree with Murray Rothbard and defend the Southern cause.
