Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics

Legal Monocentrism and the Paradox of Government

The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics
Downloads

Volume 16, No. 4 (Winter 2013)

In this paper I shall argue that, in contrast to its monocentric counterpart, only the institutional framework of legal polycentrism can overcome the problem of the so-called “paradox of government”—that is, establish effective and robust governance structures without simultaneously empowering them to overstep their contractually designated tasks and competencies. To accomplish this, I shall critically evaluate the logical consistency of the solutions advanced in this context by the proponents of legal monocentrism, based on the claim that institutional constraints in the form of democratic elections or checks-and-balances can place working constitutional limitations on the power of a coercive monopolist of law and defense.

CITE THIS ARTICLE

Wisniewski, Jakub Bozydar. “Legal Monocentrism and the Paradox of Government.” The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16, No. 4 (Winter 2013): 459–478.

All Rights Reserved ©
What is the Mises Institute?

The Mises Institute is a non-profit organization that exists to promote teaching and research in the Austrian School of economics, individual freedom, honest history, and international peace, in the tradition of Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard. 

Non-political, non-partisan, and non-PC, we advocate a radical shift in the intellectual climate, away from statism and toward a private property order. We believe that our foundational ideas are of permanent value, and oppose all efforts at compromise, sellout, and amalgamation of these ideas with fashionable political, cultural, and social doctrines inimical to their spirit.

Become a Member
Mises Institute