While it is perfectly clear that an individual capitalist or speculator may make losses on the stock exchange, it is very doubtful whether "society" can make such losses. The question with which we are concerned here is whether an individual's losses from domestic stock exchange transactions represent a loss to the society to which that individual belongs.
The standard interpretation of the Panic of 1837 and subsequent recession blamed state bank monetary inflation abetted by President Jackson's removal of the federal deposits from the Bank of the United States.
As with all economic calamities, pundits will find some way to blame the meltdown and collapse of Argentina on capitalism, deregulation, or the private sector generally. Such nonsense. This crisis is a product of government incompetence, made to order by the IMF, the Argentine political leadership, and the US. As a reminder that the choice of economic policy isn’t politically trivial, the government’s errors ended in hunger, bloodshed, and the resignation (and narrow escape) of the country’s president.
If we are to take one lesson from the current state of the world economy--and the geopolitical stresses and ideological divides which reflect this--we should alter the (oft-misquoted) phrase from the second book of Timothy. Rather than holding that "the love of money is the root of all evil," we should all fervently avow that "the existence of dishonest money is the root of all evil."
The prolonged Japanese economic slump is not due to price deflation but is the product of aggressive fiscal and monetary policies aimed at arresting the general fall in prices of goods and services. Contrary to the popular view, as a rule, price deflation is always good news for the economy. Thus, when prices are falling in response to the expansion of real wealth, this means that people's living standards are rising.
While assorted financial journalists, market pundits, policy wonks, Fed governors and even mainstream macroeconomists have been thrown into a panic by the slight whiff of price deflation they detected in the last few months in the U.S. economy, they have almost completely ignored the wrenching confiscatory deflation that is now going on in Argentina
During the early 1800s, the U.S. paper money in circulation was issued by banks, most of which were privately owned and state-chartered. There were, in fact, hundreds of banks across the country that issued their own--often distinctive--paper money. From these banking practices arose the infamous $3 bill.
Far from an example of a market failure, Enron's saga shows that firms that invest too much in politics can easily become complacent in the face of changing market conditions. In economics, this is called government failure, and we can blame the growing requirement for firms to divert resources to grease palms in Washington as a necessary business investment for its occurrence.
The significance of Jesús Huerta de Soto's new 681-page book, Dinero, crédito bancario y ciclos económicos (Money, bank credit, and business cycles), is precisely that it is the first Misesian treatise on money and banking to appear since the publication of Mises's original work, Theory of Money and Credit, eighty-eight years ago. De Soto's work is the most comprehensive analysis of fractional-reserve banking and of business cycles in print.
In its original meaning, "crisis" signifies a turning point that can either lead to improvement and recovery or to more severe deterioration. In the case of Argentina, with the future of the Argentinean people in mind, one must hope for the abandonment of its interventionist economic system, with its reliance on a bureaucratic apparatus and its self-chosen dependency on foreign credits.
