The quirky nature of credit is that it is not necessarily better in abundance, writes Christopher Mayer. It's not like beer, butter, and bananas--where more means cheaper and cheaper is good. Credit is like money; it represents buying power. More credit means more buying power, which means a bidding up of assets and a spark for an unsustainable boom.
The burdens imposed upon producers by easy money and their consequent lack of profitability are among the main reasons why there is no significant capital expenditure. The overhang from the 2000 capital-spending boom only partly exacerbates this, since much of the outlay undertaken then was wastefully misallocated and is not germane to the needs of the current economy anyway.
The monetary situation in Argentina is a glaring example of confiscatory deflation. In 1992, after yet another bout of hyperinflation, Argentina pegged its new currency, the peso, to the US dollar at the rate of 1-to-1. In order to maintain this fixed peso/dollar peg, the Argentine central bank pledged to freely exchange dollars for pesos on demand and to back its own liabilities, consisting of peso notes and commercial bank reserve deposits denominated in pesos, almost 100 percent by dollars.
More than two centuries before our federal budget sped past the $2 trillion mark, those known as anti-federalists warned us that the price we would have to pay for government would rise. So as you struggle to understand the latest IRS forms, and particularly as you write that big check to the United States Treasury, it is worth remembering what they said.
It has been said that the stock market is not an actuarial table. The same can be said of the bond market. Rather than an infallible guide to the future, the bond market embodies the best guesses, hopes, dreams, and fears of many investors. Hence, the bond market can be fallible and, in fact, has been so—in spectacular fashion—in the past.
While it is perfectly clear that an individual capitalist or speculator may make losses on the stock exchange, it is very doubtful whether "society" can make such losses. The question with which we are concerned here is whether an individual's losses from domestic stock exchange transactions represent a loss to the society to which that individual belongs.
The standard interpretation of the Panic of 1837 and subsequent recession blamed state bank monetary inflation abetted by President Jackson's removal of the federal deposits from the Bank of the United States.
As with all economic calamities, pundits will find some way to blame the meltdown and collapse of Argentina on capitalism, deregulation, or the private sector generally. Such nonsense. This crisis is a product of government incompetence, made to order by the IMF, the Argentine political leadership, and the US. As a reminder that the choice of economic policy isn’t politically trivial, the government’s errors ended in hunger, bloodshed, and the resignation (and narrow escape) of the country’s president.
If we are to take one lesson from the current state of the world economy--and the geopolitical stresses and ideological divides which reflect this--we should alter the (oft-misquoted) phrase from the second book of Timothy. Rather than holding that "the love of money is the root of all evil," we should all fervently avow that "the existence of dishonest money is the root of all evil."
The prolonged Japanese economic slump is not due to price deflation but is the product of aggressive fiscal and monetary policies aimed at arresting the general fall in prices of goods and services. Contrary to the popular view, as a rule, price deflation is always good news for the economy. Thus, when prices are falling in response to the expansion of real wealth, this means that people's living standards are rising.
