Universities and other institutions of higher learning are on a concerning trajectory. Public trust in these institutions has dropped precipitously, with only 36 percent of respondents in 2024 Gallup polling expressing “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in them—down from 57 percent in 2015. Employers of fresh college graduates are also finding themselves unimpressed with the level of preparedness for professional life found in these new hires.
General public sentiment seems to indicate a decline in quality of the product offered by these institutions. Yet, at the same time, college tuition has been inflating at an average rate of eight percent per year, and administrative bloat at these same universities has been markedly outpacing both the hiring of new faculty and the enrollment of new students. The focus on administrative hiring in the face of declining public trust suggests either that leadership in these institutions believes more administrators will fix the problem, that they haven’t identified a problem in the first place, or that their focus is something other than providing a product that will be useful to their customers.
On the consumer side, one would think that—given the decrease in appeal of attending these universities—market forces would move the cash flow away from them and towards other actors in the education sector that were doing the job better. But there exists a tool which can prevent this voluntary transfer of patronage from ever happening—accreditation.
Accreditation is—at least nominally—a means of ensuring the quality of a particular institution, and was introduced as such as part of the Higher Education Act of 1965. It is not afforded by any federal agency directly. Rather, the Department of Education has the role of selecting and authorizing private accrediting agencies which, in turn, are enabled to give or not give accreditation, bound only by 34 C.F.R. § 602 Subpart B.
The requirements set forth in this regulation are exceptionally minimal. For example, § 602.16 paragraph (a) enumerates ten categories which an accrediting agency must hold expectations in regards to. Notably, this section does not actually present any of the expectations which accrediting agencies are to hold. It simply directs that these agencies must have some expectations, and leaves to the discretion of the agencies what rules they are to impose on the institutions they accredit. Also of note is that the ten categories listed in the regulation are only a bare minimum. In fact, § 602.16 paragraph (f) states clearly that, “An agency that has established and applies the standards in paragraph (a) of this section may establish any additional accreditation standards it deems appropriate.”
Importantly, whether or not an institution receives accreditation is the difference between being able and unable to receive federal aid. An unaccredited institution’s students will be unable to receive federal student aid while attending the institution. An unaccredited institution—regardless of the actual quality of its programs—will have to survive in a market where its competitors’ customers have their costs significantly reduced or even fully covered by the federal government. In this way, accreditation functions—not just as a stamp of approval to inform the decisions of prospective students—but as a powerful market manipulator due to its influence on demand. The provision of federal student aid lowers the immediate cost to the consumer, and this lowered cost induces higher demand for only those institutions with the blessing of any of the accrediting agencies recognized by the Department of Education.
The combination of the minimal legally-required standards for accrediting agencies and the influence accreditation can have on the market outlook for an institution means that these agencies can effectively hold all institutions in their reach to whatever standards they please. Further, the institutions will have to play ball or be left to wrestle with the very real possibility of losing enough enrollment to have to shut down altogether. On top of this, the decision-making bodies within these agencies tend to be mostly comprised of current faculty and staff from various universities. This is not prevented by the regulations and—while the phrase “conflict of interest” does appear in the law—it is not therein defined and its prevention is left to the agencies themselves. In fact, despite creating a process to bestow immense economic power onto recognized accrediting agencies, little care seems to have been taken in the drafting of these laws to ensure that the power they conferred would not be misused.
Some attempts at forcing transparency were made, such as § 602.23 paragraph (a) which requires agencies to make publicly available the standards it holds institutions to. However, this can be easily worked around by making the standards vague and ethereal enough that providing them to the public does not actually inform anyone of how decisions are made. For an example of this, see the handbook provided by the Higher Learning Commission. It’s a fascinating showcase of exactly how little information can be put into 200 pages.
One can attempt to find patterns in how these agencies apply their vague standards by reviewing publicly-available action letters, which are sent to institutions by their accrediting agencies upon reevaluation and which contain details about decision making for such actions as issuing warning or probation. Doing so reveals that exactly the sort of administrative bloat that universities have been chronically exhibiting is encouraged by these agencies. This involves a preponderance of adverse actions being predicated, in part, on negative evaluation of the organization of school boards. It also requires an exhaustive enumeration of their roles, course and outcome analysis, and financial planning and its required administrative infrastructure. Action letters are not available, however, for decisions these agencies make in accrediting new, up-and-coming universities. How they deal with the rookies is hidden from prying eyes.
Individual members of any decision-making body within an accrediting agency are prevented from favoring their own institution above others by the inclusion of § 602.18, which requires consistent application of the agency’s standards. This, however, is not a perfect safeguard. In the case of, for example, a malicious actor who sits on one of these boards and who wishes to make their own job cushier and their own wallet fatter by influencing agency standards in a way that benefits themselves, this part of the regulation does not actually prevent this person from using their position on the board to achieve their goals. It simply requires that all standards and expectations—including ones that are meant to leverage accreditation to shape the market—must be applied to all institutions equally. The fact that the loss of public trust in universities is not traceable to one or two bad apples, but to the higher education “system” more generally, may be a result of the failure of this safeguard to account for collaboration between bad actors. If they are to misuse their influence, they must misuse it equally among all institutions they accredit.
Intent is difficult to prove in this case, largely due to the obfuscation of precise criteria for accreditation. This would be needed in order to determine how accrediting agencies shape the higher education market with their standards and policies. Further, this information would be necessary to determine if and how the members of agency boards benefit from the results of applying their policies. Publicly-available policies are vague enough for a wide variety of interpretations. Public records of how those policies are interpreted and applied to new applicants are scarce, at best. The laws and regulations which create the niche for these accrediting agencies in the first place and bestow upon them the power to decide which institutions can benefit from taxpayer money fail to provide adequate safeguards against the misuse of the very power they have bestowed.
Accrediting agencies have the means to cause damage to the higher education system thanks to the power they have over money flow in the space, and they have a motive to do so if it would make life easier or more lucrative for the majority of their decision making boards who work at the universities. The fact that higher education as a whole has suffered damage is well-documented and widely observed, and the alibi of the accreditation cartel is raising serious questions.
