International Economic Disintegration
Chapter XII: The Methods of Agrarianization and Agricultural Nationalism
THE way in which agricultural nationalism, driven by the forces explained in the preceding chapter, is trying to achieve its ambitious aims presents a special subject worthy of a penetrating analysis. Its interest for our study lies not so much in the picture it offers of the technique of economic policy, as in the fact that the development of new methods truly indicates not only the excessive character of modern agricultural nationalism, but also its immense difficulties, contradictions, conflicts, and complexities.
In general, the methods of modern agricultural nationalism developed in such a way as to complete the traditional policy of protection, which was based principally on the instrument of import duties, and replace it more and more by new means which largely belong to the category of “non-conformable” measures and involve agriculture increasingly in a system of planning of production, marketing, the formation of prices, capital and labour supply, imports and exports. Studying this development, we are able to see once more how the first steps along the road to planning and “non-conformable” interventionism inevitably lead further and further in that direction, how unforeseen new problems and complications always arise, and how these demand ever bolder measures. There is, however, practically no country on the map which can say with all sincerity that by following this road of modern agricultural nationalism it has reached a stable and half-way satisfactory situation, and there is no government which, looking complacently on its agricultural policy, can exclaim with Faust: “Ah, still delay—thou art so fair!”
To give a complete account of this development for the different countries and different branches of agriculture is a task which is quite obviously beyond the scope of this book. It would fill a number of large volumes and leave the reader bewildered by a maze of technicalities. What has to be done here, is to try to find in the complex material some illuminating points of a general character and thereby bring some logical order into it.
One way of doing this, is to attempt to classify the agricultural policies of the different countries in larger groups according to their economic structure, their prevailing aims or the methods preferred.1 In this respect there is, among others, the fundamental difference between the agricultural policy of the agricultural-import countries and that of the agricultural-export countries, which, in its turn, can be sub-divided into several groups. The specific methods of agricultural policy developed in the latter countries are, indeed, to be understood as more or less successful attempts at solving the special and formidable problem of giving protection and stability to the agriculture of a country which is on an agricultural-export basis. Another interesting classification could be made according to the degree (1) in which methods of collectivist planning, state control of production and even of socialized farming have been applied in the different countries, and (2) in which the substance or at least the form of individual farm ownership and initiative have been preserved. A further method would be to classify according to the extent to which it has been possible to develop a system of agricultural policy, which induces agriculture to make sound readjustments and contrariwise by the extent to which agricultural policy makes agriculture a veritable hot-house plant. Furthermore, there remains the interesting task of making comparative studies of the way in which the different countries have tried to solve problems more or less common to them all, like that of dairy farming, or to analyse the attempts at tackling problems confined to peculiar countries, like that of viticulture in France.
A question of special interest is, why did hardly a single country think it need not have recourse to a more or less complete system of agricultural planning. Why is it that practically no one any longer is satisfied with the more traditional methods of agricultural policy? To some extent, the possible answers to this question have already been suggested, when it was mentioned that the new planned type of agricultural nationalism reflects the growing obstacles in the way of attaining the ends desired or that the first steps along this road are bound to lead to still further planning on an ever-growing scale. But here it should be added that there is more in it than this, and that the task of probing more deeply into the problem should be left to a special study. In indicating the general direction of such a study, it may be said that agricultural planning of to-day can be conceived largely as an effort to give agriculture some sort of monopolistic organization equal to that of industry (“cartelization”), and to do this in spite of some natural obstacles agriculture puts in the way of monopoly. Above all, however, it has to be explored how far such special branches of agriculture like forestry are badly in need of that kind of planning which the Germans call “Raumplanung,” and which aims at obtaining by planned control that rational use of the soil, water and other natural resources, which laissez-faire seems no longer able to assure. It will only lead to confusion and misguided judgments if this sort of planning is not clearly placed in a category by itself and judged separately on its own merits. It is common knowledge that agricultural planning in the United States under the New Deal comes partly under this heading, which, to say the least, is much more respectable than many other kinds of planning.
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2 In the vast literature following this line of analysis, special attention must be called to Karl Brandt, “Recent Agrarian Policies in Germany, Great Britain and the United States,” Social Research, May, 1936. Cf. also the Proceedings of the several “International Conferences of Agricultural Economists” (last volume, London, 1939).
- 1Cf. my paper “A Value Judgment on Value Judgments” in which I am explaining my attitude in this very important methodological question. It will probably be published in the “American Economic Review.”
- 2The purpose of this book is to make a new and more promising approach to the diagnostics of that long-run crisis in international economic relations which is one of the most striking symptoms of the general economic, social, and political crisis of occidental society. I believe that the urgent necessity of such an approach has been enhanced rather than diminished by the outbreak of the war. However, I would betray my own philosophy if I regarded this book as anything more than a mere beginning, an invitation to constructive criticism, and a way of opening or furthering a discussion for which the world seems to be ripe. In submitting this book to criticism, I am not afraid to expose myself as one who believes not only in the scientific legitimacy but even in the utmost scientific necessity of employing a measure of judgments, which is ultimately based on a definite conception of what is wrong with the world, and of what should be done in order to put it right again. Those who are shocked by such an attitude may be reassured that I gave more thought to this methodological problem than I am able to explain on this occasion.
