Mises Wire

The Two Powers Over Money

Money power

The Austrian tradition has a century of work on the first power over money—the power to decide who receives new money first. It has not said as much about the second—the power to decide whether you may spend the money you already hold. A central bank digital currency would hand that second power to the institutions that already have the first, and it is the more dangerous of the two.

Canada gave a preview in February 2022. During the trucker protests the government used emergency powers that allowed financial institutions to freeze certain accounts without a court order. The money stayed in the accounts under its owners’ names. They just could not touch it.

Money Asks No Questions

Carl Menger showed that money grew out of the market itself, as traders settled on the most marketable goods until the precious metals won out, and Mises’s regression theorem traces its purchasing power back to a good once wanted for its own sake. No committee designed it and none is needed to keep it going. A seller who takes money does not ask what the buyer will do with it, and that silence is the whole function. Strangers with different aims cooperate because the thing passing between them asks nothing. In The Theory of Money and Credit Mises wrote that sound money “belongs in the same class with political constitutions and bills of rights,” a shield for the citizen against despotic governments.

The First Power

Mainstream models treat money as a veil. Double the quantity and prices double, and nothing real has changed. That holds only if new money reaches everyone at once, and it never does. Richard Cantillon saw this around 1730. Money does not fall like rain. Someone creates it and someone spends it first, at yesterday’s prices, while the last in line meet tomorrow’s prices on yesterday’s income. Today, new money reaches banks, markets, the state, and the biggest borrowers long before it reaches wages. The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet grew roughly tenfold between 2008 and 2022, and stocks and houses pulled ahead of paychecks. Other forces were at work, but the direction is the one Cantillon’s account predicts.

The damage does not stop with the transfer. Credit expansion pushes interest rates below what real saving would have produced, and entrepreneurs read the low rate as a sign that resources exist for long projects. They do not, and the bust is the correction. The Austrian theory of the business cycle rests on that one fact about money, that it reaches some prices before others.

The Second Power

The first power is bad, and it still leaves the owner alone. Once money has reached you, it is yours. A banknote settles a trade without any bank or processor approving it, and bank deposits come close to the same freedom. That freedom has already been eroding. Most money is now a balance behind card networks and intermediaries that answer to regulators, and Operation Choke Point—in which US officials pressed banks between 2013 and 2017 to drop lawful but disfavored businesses—showed that this pressure works without a single new statute. Cash—the one form of money most people still use that needs no bank—is disappearing from daily life.

Mises described ownership as full control over the services a good can render. A balance that others may restrict fails that test. It is licensed. A central bank digital currency would give households a claim on the central bank itself. Supporters promise speed and lower costs, and some of that is real, but convenience has never been evidence of freedom. Officials say they do not plan programmable money; a promise is not a limit. When money is an entry on a ledger the central bank runs, a condition on its use is a few lines of code. Programmable payments that users set up themselves are harmless. Programmable money—which restricts how, when, or where money may be spent—is what should worry anyone who owns any.

The oldest condition is the expiry date. Funds that must be spent by a deadline are Silvio Gesell’s stamped money in digital form. The Austrian town of Wörgl tried the paper version in 1932, with scrip that lost value every month until the Austrian National Bank shut it down in 1933. The objection is about time preference. Saving is the willingness to wait, capital accumulation depends on it, and a currency that decays punishes waiting by decree.

Kenneth Rogoff has argued that phasing out paper currency would free central banks to push interest rates deeply negative. A digital currency could write that penalty into the balance itself, and the less cash remains, the fewer ways around it. China has already tested the mechanism. In a 2021 Beijing trial, winners of digital red packets had one week to spend them and could not move them into a bank account. They were promotional giveaways, not the whole currency, but the mechanism worked.

Next come limits on what money may buy. A token usable only for approved purchases is a coupon, a ration ticket in modern dress. Every such rule contains a judgment about what a person should do with his own resources, and no official knows enough to make that judgment for millions of people. That is Hayek’s knowledge problem at the scale of a wallet. Caps on holdings work the same way. The digital euro regulation moving through the European Parliament would limit individual holdings, and the Eurosystem’s own 2023 simulations assumed €3,000 per person. Nobody calls that programmable money. Its stated purpose is to keep deposits in commercial banks, which tells you whose stability the rule serves.

The freeze is the crudest tool and the most revealing. Law, even bad law, judges an act after it has been committed, and the accused may answer. Code can act before the act and judges nothing. Hayek defended the rule of law as general rules known in advance, and a freeze list is a decision about named persons.

The obvious objection is that bank deposits can be frozen too. They can, but the order has to pass through a bank—a separate party with duties to its depositor and interests of its own. That friction is thin, and it is still a check. When households hold balances directly at the central bank, the issuer, the ledger and the enforcer are one body, and the check goes away. A power that exists shapes conduct even when it is never used, because people adjust to what the holder of the switch could do. Whoever can disable a balance has permanent influence over the behavior of its owner.

The best defense of a digital currency is that it can be designed to protect its users, and the Parliament’s draft tries. It promises privacy by design, an offline version that works like cash, and a cap on holdings, and an ECB board member has said the bank would know nothing about who pays whom offline. But privacy that lives in a design document lives at the pleasure of whoever rewrites the document. Cash protects its holder because of what cash is. An offline digital euro would protect him only as long as the rules say so, and the issuer writes the rules.

Oversight is the other reply. Robert Higgs showed in Crisis and Leviathan that emergency powers, once taken, tend to outlive the emergency, and oversight arrives after the fact while a frozen balance is felt at once. A ledger that makes restrictions easier to impose makes the next occasion cheaper.

Paying citizens directly through a CBDC would, we are told, end the advantage of banks and the well connected. Someone still chooses the recipients and the timing, and the new money still reaches some prices before others. Choosing who gets the money is the redistribution.

Where the Power Has to Go

A more disciplined central bank would not fix this. Mises showed how one intervention breeds the problem that justifies the next, and the digital currency follows the pattern, arriving as the cure for a financial system that decades of earlier intervention made fragile. When a few institutions produce and control money, they hold economic power outside market exchange. They decide who receives new money first and they steer the interest rate on which every long plan depends. If the payment rails go digital and central, they gain the power to decide who can spend at all.

New rules for the same power will not do, because the holder of the power writes the rules. The power has to be dispersed. Hayek proposed competing private currencies in 1976, and Mises preferred a commodity standard no government could expand at will. The medium is beside the point. A digital token that no single party can freeze, expand or condition carries neither power. The danger is one issuer with write access to every balance. Gold and silver, and digital currencies that no one issuer controls, let a person hold and send wealth without asking anyone’s leave.

Today, a government that wants to restrict a balance still needs a bank to carry out the order. A ledger run from the center would need no one. The old question was how much money a central bank may create. The question that matters now is who decides whether you may use what you have, and a free society cannot leave that answer with the party that keeps the books.

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