The recent kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by US special forces in Caracas perfectly symbolizes the resurgence of offensive realism in geopolitics. In this American continental theater, where regional ambitions and external interference clash, we witness the mechanisms described by realist theorists in action: the maximization of power, security paranoia, and the exploitation of threats to justify the expansion of control.
The Foundations of Offensive Realism
There are several visions of “realism” in geopolitics. The oldest is Bismarckian realpolitik—a pragmatic policy based on power relations rather than moral principles, agreements, or cultural affinities. The raison d’état and its interests take precedence over everything else. A well-known contemporary vision of realism is John J. Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism,” which he details in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. According to his thesis, heads of state primarily seek to maximize their relative power to avoid being in a position of weakness that their rivals could exploit. The ultimate goal is always the survival and continuity of the ruling power.
This theory helps us understand the current situation in Venezuela and why leaders behave similarly when their position is threatened, whether they govern a superpower like the US or a declining oil state like Venezuela. They seek not only to maintain what they have but also to accumulate more power as insurance against future uncertainty. Maduro is seeking security guarantees from China and Russia, while Trump views the emergence of geostrategic rivals in the region as a lasting threat to the US position in the Western hemisphere.
In a sense, heads of state live in constant paranoia, fearing that their power will be challenged by a competitor. This permanent anxiety is a structural condition of power itself and, above all, a pathological reality for the individuals who lead these nations. This is why wars of aggression are often perceived as defensive or preventive by those who wage them. The invader always presents himself as merely responding to an existential threat, whether real or imagined. This mimetic desire (René Girard) leads to a vicious cycle of violence between states. It is fatal and inevitable; it is the driving force behind events and, in more ways than one, history itself.
The Impossibility of the Status Quo
Realism is never solely “defensive,” as Kenneth Waltz suggested, and a lasting status quo is never what states truly seek, simply because such a static state is impossible to achieve and maintain over the long term—alliances crack, resources run out, technologies evolve, people change. In this constant flow, this human dynamism, standing still is like taking a step back.
The “offensive” balance of power therefore always prevails over the “defensive rest” temporarily guaranteed by international and supranational institutions. International organizations, treaties, and international law standards are only fragile veils thrown over the brutal reality of competition for power. They can slow down or channel this competition, but never eliminate it. Thus, what is true for individuals, the economy, and even the study of history (the impossibility of a permanent state of rest, according to Mises) is also true for our understanding of geopolitics and the balance of power between states.
Of the three key drivers of geopolitics—the weight of history, geographical determinism, and the security imperative—the latter seems to be determining international relations more than ever, energizing and accelerating the course of events.
The attack on Venezuela illustrates the United States’ return to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserts the Americas as its inviolable preserve to establish its sphere of influence. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) is straightforward: any external intervention on the American continent is considered a threat to US security. Today, the supposed risk is that China will exert too much influence over Venezuela.
Another important aspect of the doctrine is that it completely disengages the United States from foreign affairs. At the time, this meant that the United States would not intervene in European affairs. Now, the Trump administration is rebranding it as the “Donroe Doctrine,” describing it as a significant evolution of the old doctrine because it aims not only at geopolitical control of the American countries but also their resources and other strategic assets:
“We want a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains,” the administration said. “We want to ensure our continued access to key strategic locations. [...] We’re restoring a needed focus on defeating threats in the Western Hemisphere.”
What the State Fears
Another important dynamic in geopolitics is the emergence of “revolutionary” forces that redefine the rules of the game and bring about a complete renewal of the elites. These forces do not play by the established rules; rather, they seek to overturn them entirely. These forces are ideas carried by individuals. As Ludwig von Mises wrote, “Everything that is thought, done and accomplished is a performance of individuals. New ideas and innovations are always an achievement of uncommon men.” Those in power must therefore protect themselves from two things: internal risks (i.e., their own population) and external competitors.
These forces constantly threaten states, which seek to prevent their emergence before they take shape. These forces include direct political competitors as well as alternative systems to those proposed by the state, such as spontaneous institutions, parallel currencies, mutual aid networks, and decentralized technologies. Anything that escapes control is perceived as a potential threat. Rothbard writes:
What the State fears above all, of course, is any fundamental threat to its own power and its own existence. The death of a State can come about in two major ways: (a) through conquest by another State, or (b) through revolutionary overthrow by its own subjects—in short, by war or revolution. War and revolution, as the two basic threats, invariably arouse in the State rulers their maximum efforts and maximum propaganda among the people. As stated above, any way must always be used to mobilize the people to come to the State’s defense in the belief that they are defending themselves.
The history of power can be analyzed as a constant fear of losing control. As Murray Rothbard writes in The Anatomy of the State, the state always seeks to preserve itself because it fears being replaced by an internal or external competitor. Consequently, “the natural tendency of the state is to expand its power,” not out of greed alone, but out of an instinct for survival. The Anatomy of the State is, above all, an anatomy of fear.
Any means is good for mobilizing people to defend the state, as long as they believe they are defending themselves. Patriotic rhetoric, invoking external threats, and designating common enemies serve to transform defending the ruling power into defending the nation. These processes deliberately confuse the interests of the rulers with those of the ruled.
Ultimately, it is a downward spiral toward control because, deep down, all power is illegitimate and suffers from impostor syndrome. Even the leaders of authoritarian regimes know deep down that they rule only through force or manipulation, never through the free consent of those they govern. This awareness fuels paranoia and justifies escalating repression. After all, this is normal because, like everything else, state power is always an individual reality.
