A few early episodes of US history are commonly employed as alleged historical precedents and justifications for modern US foreign interventionism in foreign policy. One such episode is Jefferson’s dealings with the Barbary pirates during his administration without a congressional declaration of war.
This is important because this episode, among others, is used as something of a historic “rhetorical password”—an attempt to superficially raise a point in one’s favor, masquerading as evidence—in order to avoid further argumentation. Readers are surely familiar with several rhetorical passwords and attempts to use them. For example, often when defending freedom of speech, one will often hear, “But you can’t yell ‘fire!’ in a crowded theater.” Such passwords often are disanalogous to the topic debated and usually ignorant of key historical context. Whether used consciously or not, rhetorical passwords act as counterpoints without true argumentation and are usually an attempt to move beyond a point made.
Historical examples can be and are used to draw lessons for the present, in fact, knowledge of history is crucial regarding domestic and foreign policy. However, superficial uses of historical events—often with little knowledge of the history—are used as rhetorical passwords and often obscure rather than clarify. In attempts to justify modern foreign policy interventions, it is common to hear, more or less elaborately, “Well, George Washington did it.” This is also the case with Jefferson and the brief war with the Barbary pirates. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote in the New York Times in 1951, “[American presidents] repeatedly committed American armed forces abroad without prior Congressional consultation or approval.”
We should note several things before proceeding to the history itself. For one, even if Jefferson did go to war with the Barbary pirates without congressional approval, and even if this situation is analogous to the current situation one wants to justify, it does not follow that just because Jefferson did something that it was justified. That would be like saying you know someone who played Russian roulette and lived, therefore, there’s no danger in playing Russian roulette now. Further, there are often significant overlooked disanologies—breaks in continuity—between a current situation and a historical event. For a historical event to be valid as a precedent, there has to be significant situational and contextual overlap. A single point of contact—that an American president deployed military action without a congressional declaration of war—is insufficient to demonstrate a valid analogy, especially when key differences are prevalent.
Using the Barbary Pirates
This episode of American history is often utilized to justify three, often-related, points in modern American foreign policy: 1) the legitimate ability of the president to take military action without a congressional declaration of war; 2) the need to violently confront radical Islam abroad to avoid being attacked at home; and, 3) the dangers of attempting peace through “appeasement.”
One article says, “While Muslim terrorists kidnapped and killed innocent people around the world as they do today, Thomas Jefferson knew exactly how to end radical Islam’s bloodshed – with a classic American take-no-prisoners smackdown.” The article is titled, “Tough guy Thomas Jefferson crushed Muslim terrorists.” Popular historian, David Barton (whose degree is actually in religious education, not history), said of this episode,
The willingness to use force and inflict casualties is the kind of attitude it will take to answer this challenge because historically, that’s the kind of attitude that will make the Muslims say, “The price for us is too high to pay. We’ll back off and leave you guys alone.” Unfortunately, even if we do that, Muslims may not necessarily leave the others [sic] guys alone.
Apparently, the lessons to be learned by implication from Jefferson’s brief war with the Barbary pirates are that it is often necessary for presidents to take unilateral military actions without the approval of Congress despite what the Constitution stipulates, that radical Islam must be combatted abroad to avoid fighting them here, and that military interventionism is always a superior alternative to “appeasement.” However, these lessons cannot be legitimately drawn from the war with the Barbary pirates. Instead, we see that the cost-benefit analysis does not make it obvious that war was the only obvious option, there are significant disanalogies between this event and modern War on Terror, and the fact that—while the war was limitedly successful—tribute was still paid to other states following this episode.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Determined as we are to avoid, if possible, wasting the energies of our people in war and destruction, we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. They have so many other interests different from ours, that we must avoid being entangled in them. We believe we can enforce these principles as to ourselves by peaceable means, now that we are likely to have our public councils detached from foreign views. (Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, as quoted in The Life and Writings of Thomas Jefferson, p. 215)
Unlike most modern wars, addressing the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean involved discussions of cost-benefit analysis. In other words, officials actually attempted to weigh whether the costs of war would be greater or less than the cost of continuing to pay tribute and the costs of the capture and ransom of American soldiers. Prior to the Jefferson administration, previous administrations had dealt with similar problems from the pirates but elected to pay tribute rather than go to war, not because they wimped out, but because they recognized that the costs of war often outweigh the costs of tribute and the possible benefits from a war.
After 1787, though the Confederation Congress had concluded a favorable treaty with Morocco, the other Barbary States demanded higher tribute-taxes from American ships. Patrick Newman writes,
Minister to France Jefferson, usually cognizant of the cost of war, urged armed confrontation. Far more cogent was Minister to Great Britain John Adams, who wisely noted that tribute was less expensive than war. Secretary for Foreign Affairs John Jay, reactionary to the core, hoped to exploit the opportunity and develop a strong navy.
During the Jefferson presidential administration, after having decreased government spending by 27 percent from 1800 to 1802, Newman explains the following events and how even Jefferson rejected the cost-benefit analysis of Gallatin and Randolph that war would cost more than tribute,
When Tripoli of the Barbary States demanded more tribute, the new president refused and the US entered another naval war. Jefferson failed to secure a congressional declaration of war, setting an atrocious precedent for executive overreach. In vain, Gallatin and Randolph protested to Jefferson that Congress should pay Tripoli because the cost of war would be greater than tribute and interfere with their retrenchment goals. But the adamant Jefferson pushed military spending back up. After collapsing 73 percent from 1800 to 1802, naval expenditures had increased 75 percent by 1805. Gallatin believed part of the splurge was due to Secretary Smith’s shipping background and he later accused the Smiths of embezzling war appropriations to their mercantile firm Smith & Buchanan. In addition, the Tripoli War forced Gallatin to request a slight increase in tariffs. Proponents argued for the tariff increases on the grounds that they would only be temporary, but Congress ended up making them permanent. (emphasis added)
This war did benefit pro-navy Federalists, especially northern merchants. In 1803, John Randolph opined that there were many “who pant for military command and the emoluments of office” which would be brought about by the war. While that may sound cynical, it would be naive to overlook, especially in discussing cost-benefit analysis, the many beneficiaries of a war. In wars, there are always people who benefit from the war spending—transferred from the taxpayer, directly or indirectly, to individuals who provide goods and services deemed necessary for the war. It is not uncommon that these beneficiaries have historically agitated for war. In fact, earlier in 1785, John Jay wrote upon hearing of Algiers declaring war against American shipping,
This war does not strike me as a great evil. The more we are ill-treated abroad, the more we shall unite and consolidate at home. Besides, as it may become a nursery for seamen, and lay the foundation for a respectable navy, it may eventually prove more beneficial than otherwise.
Disanalogy between the Barbary War and Present Circumstances
It ought to go without saying, but it is necessary to point out the fact that Jefferson’s limited military response against the aggressions of the Barbary pirates—while it may have some superficial similarities—is so significantly dissimilar to the modern War on Terror or post-WWII wars without congressional declaration that it becomes irrelevant as an example. The differences in scope, constitutional process, scale of forces, and geopolitical context are so great that the example becomes almost meaningless. To cite Jefferson’s brief naval actions as justification for contemporary wars is to ignore the massive disanalogies that make the comparison historically misleading.
Jefferson may arguably have set a bad precedent going forward, however, he did approach Congress and limited himself to congressional approval, even if there was no declaration of war. That Jefferson’s request for a declaration of war was rejected by Congress does not mean Jefferson simply ignored Congress. Political scientist and constitutional law expert, Louis Fisher, wrote in response to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s attempt (above) to use Jefferson’s actions to justify Truman’s actions in the Korean War,
As valid precedent for Truman’s actions in the Korean War, Schlesinger pointed to Jefferson’s use of ships to repel the Barbary pirates. In fact, Jefferson took limited defensive actions in the Mediterranean and came to Congress to seek authority for anything that went “beyond the line of defense.” And Congress enacted ten statutes to authorize military action by Presidents Jefferson and Madison in the Barbary wars. There is no connection between the actions of Jefferson and Truman. Truman seized the full warmaking authority––defensive and offensive––and never came to Congress for authority. Jefferson respected congressional prerogatives and constitutional limits. Truman did neither. None of the examples cited by Schlesinger were of a magnitude to justify or legalize what Truman did in Korea.
In fact, Jefferson said in his First Annual Message (December 8, 1801),
I communicate all material information on this subject, that in the exercise of this important function confided by the Constitution to the Legislature exclusively their judgment may form itself on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstance of weight.
Congress soon after passed “An Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers” (February 6, 1802) that allowed Jefferson “to equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite by the President of the United States, for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas.” The president would also be able to “instruct the commanders of the respective public vessels aforesaid, to subdue, seize and make prize of all vessels, goods and effects, belonging to the Bey of Tripoli, or to his subjects,...” Section 3 further enabled “owners of private armed vessels…like authority for subduing, seizing, taking, and bringing into port, any Tripolitan vessel, goods or effects,...”
Jefferson’s brief naval response to the Barbary pirates bears only superficial resemblance to modern wars, especially the War on Terror, and the differences are decisive. His campaign was narrowly circumscribed, involving only a handful of frigates and marines operating in the Mediterranean, not multi-theater deployments with thousands of troops and permanent occupation through military bases for decades. Jefferson acknowledged constitutional limits, insisting that only Congress could authorize offensive action, and Congress, in fact, passed multiple statutes explicitly empowering limited naval hostilities—unlike post-WWII presidents who have waged prolonged wars without congressional declarations. The Barbary conflict lasted only a few years (1801-1805) and cost a few million dollars, whereas the War on Terror has extended for decades and cost trillions and thousands of lives. Its purpose was limited—to defend commerce and end tribute demands—not regime change, counterinsurgency, or global ideological struggle. Even its conclusion was modest: Tripoli agreed to peace in 1805, but the United States continued paying tribute to other Barbary states until 1816. To equate Jefferson’s constrained naval defense with modern open-ended wars is to erase the vast disanalogies in scope, cost, objectives, and constitutional process. In fact, if Jefferson’s war could be termed a success, it may be said that modern users of Jefferson’s actions attempt to borrow capital from Jefferson’s success to justify their failures.
If the US wants to effectively reduce radical Islamic terror, it ought to consider the foreign policy history of the last five decades, explore the significant connection between foreign occupation and suicide terrorism, and stop funding radical Islamic jihadists abroad when they are perceived to be fighting in US interests.
