Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics
Transparency or Deception: What the Fed Was Saying in 2007
ABSTRACT: Central banks have embarked on a transition from relative secrecy to relative transparency over the last two decades. This has led researchers to investigate the ramifications of transparency on important economic outcomes. By and large, the results reported have been favorable, favorable with qualifications, or ambiguous. This paper examines the communications of officials from the Federal Reserve during 2007, the year between the end of the housing bubble and the beginning of the financial crisis. In contrast to previous findings, these communications are indicative of either deception, incompetence, or a combination of both.
KEYWORDS: Federal Reserve, transparency, monetary policy, policy objectives and coordination
JEL CLASSIFICATION: E52, E58, E61, E65, Z18
Cite This Article
Thornton, Mark, "Transparency or Deception: What the Fed Was Saying in 2007," Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 19, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 65–84