Money and Banking

Expansions in credit and investment are only a problem when they result from inflationary monetary policy, and not from real saving.

Rothbard: "if proponents of the higher minimum wage were simply wrongheaded people of good will, they would not stop at $3 or $4 an hour, but indeed would pursue their dimwit logic into the stratosphere."

When I left Soviet Russia in 1991, I thought I would never see a command-and-control economy again. I was wrong. Over the past decade the global economy has started to resemble one.

Lehman was a prime example of mainstream consensus analysis of risk and economic opportunity. We "solved" it with more of the same.

As the credit expansion turns to bust, many capital goods remain unused, many investment processes cannot be completed, and capital goods produced are used in a manner not originally foreseen. A large portion of society’s scarce resources has been squandered.

Scratching beneath the surface of the debate around countercyclical capital buffers, we find the normal level of duplicity that characterizes most debates about monetary policy.

New York Fed Chief Dudley recently suggested asset bubbles "emerge from the way market participant’s process information and trade" — thus ignoring the role of the central bank.

Selgin thinks fractional reserve banking critics are akin to "flat-earthers", but he gets some important points wrong. 

John Law's disastrous Mississippi Company bubble can still instruct us today.

It is impossible to force the economic development of society by artificially encouraging investment and initially financing it with credit expansion.  This policy can only have benefits if economic actors also elect to begin saving more at the same time.