Mises Wire

Finland and Sweden in NATO: Disregarding the Benefits of Neutrality

Mises Wire Finn Andreen

Finland and Sweden’s recent decision to apply for North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership is a major win for the military alliance, but a far more dubious one for these two countries. NATO badly needs a success at this moment, since neither the economic war on Russia nor the conflict in Ukraine seems to be going the West’s way. Whether officially adding two more Nordic countries would have a real military advantage for NATO remains to be seen, but at least it would be a clear public relations win.

However, this could become a PR debacle for the West if Turkey is serious about refusing to allow Finland and Sweden into the organization. As so often in recent years, Turkey does not align itself directly with the West, but chooses to pursue a path halfway between the United States and Russia. Nevertheless, considering the very public and congratulatory announcements of the Finnish and Swedish candidacies by NATO headquarters and members, it seems possible that Turkey will eventually yield, provided at least some of its significant demands are met. In any case, this episode has yet again exposed the amateurism and the lack of preparedness of Western political leaders.

It is doubtful whether the military security of Finland and Sweden would be increased under NATO. For a start, the famous Article 5 “protection” of the North Atlantic Treaty is actually not a guarantee of military assistance from the member states to the country in need. It only states that NATO shall take “action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security.” It would be foolish to think that NATO, and in particular the untrustworthy USA, would engage militarily if conflict were to erupt between, say, Finland and … Russia.

If potential future NATO members Finland and Sweden were to limit the number of NATO troops and infrastructure on their territory, like the Baltic states, the security situation in Europe would probably not worsen, though NATO would not gain much, strategically, from their membership. This is essentially what President Putin concluded in his first remarks on this topic. However, not surprisingly, the Russian defense minister has already announced an immediate reinforcement its Western Military District has, not surprisingly. 

But, on the other hand, if Finland and Sweden, as members of NATO, were to decide—or be forced to accept—NATO missile launchers on their territory, like Romania and Poland have, a stronger Russian reaction should be expected. Were Finland to agree to host a potentially offensive NATO military base in Finnish Lapland, less than two hundred kilometers from the Russian naval and air bases in Murmansk, the whole northern European security balance would be disrupted. Russia would then understandably feel forced to try to resolve such a looming security threat.

Have the Finnish and Swedish governments thought through the implications of a NATO membership and how it could have the opposite effect of the increased security that they ostensibly seek? NATO is certainly not a defensive alliance, but clearly a tool of an aggressive US foreign policy, as has been evident on many occasions, from the attack on Serbia to the destruction of Libya.

The Benefits of Neutrality

The leaders of Finland and Sweden seem to have forgotten, or disregarded, the benefit of neutrality, particularly for small nations. In international relations, it is the logical position of a state that is weak relative to neighboring states. Neutrality in itself confers protection. There are, of course, cases where neutrality does not protect, as history has shown. But history has also shown that neutrality has often had advantages for those who practiced it.

Sweden in the past clearly benefited from its neutral status, allowing it to stay out of both world wars and keep cordial relationships across the Cold War blocs. For Finland, neutrality was even more important, since it secured Finnish independence after World War II and enabled peaceful relations with the Soviet Union afterward. Additionally, as neutral countries, Finland and Sweden punched far above their weight in international affairs; e.g., as mediators or hosts. But now, as political analyst Anatoly Lieven wrote:

By joining NATO, Finland is throwing away whatever remote possibility exists of playing a mediating role between Russia and the West, not just to help bring about an end to the war in Ukraine, but at some point in the future to promote wider reconciliation.

From a libertarian perspective, neutrality would also be the natural position of a (mostly) free society, with a state that is small in size and reach. Such a state, allowing significant economic and political freedom, would not have the right, the resources, or the interest to project power abroad and lead an aggressive foreign policy. Its main role would be the defense of private property within the territory it controls, including from foreign aggressors, while not taking sides in foreign conflicts.

It is relevant to revisit Murray N. Rothbard’s 1994 article “Just War,” in which he noted that neutrality used to be a cornerstone of international law:

In a theory which tried to limit war, neutrality was considered not only justifiable but a positive virtue…. Neutral states had “rights” which were mainly upheld, since every warring country knew that someday it too would be neutral. A warring state could not interfere with neutral shipping to an enemy state; neutrals could ship to such an enemy with impunity all goods except “contraband,” which was strictly defined as arms and ammunition, period. Wars were kept limited in those days, and neutrality was extolled.

This classic view of international law implies, of course, that a state that sends arms and ammunitions to a belligerent, or participates in an economic war against another state, cannot be considered neutral. Indeed, Finland and Sweden cannot be considered neutral today, which is not surprising, since long before their recent NATO applications, they had been neutral in name only.

Today, neutrality in foreign relations is no longer extolled; quite the opposite. As Rothbard continued:

In the modern corruption of international law that has prevailed since 1914, “neutrality” has been treated as somehow deeply immoral.

Nations have been increasingly pressured to take sides in conflicts, and even to contribute to war efforts. There is little political room left for neutrality, as governments feel tempted—or are forced—to band together in “collective security arrangements“—for instance through NATO, and also now the EU.

This pressure has intensified with the conflict in Ukraine, as the USA and the EU have openly been forcing and cajoling countries around the world to take sides against Russia in a conflict that generally does not concern them. Though Austria has somewhat resisted this political pressure by expressing a desire to remain neutral, Finland and Sweden have caved.

The strongly pro-US political elites in both countries had been waiting a long time for the political moment to convert an already existing cooperation with NATO into full membership. In that sense, the abrupt shift in public opinion in favor of full membership, the result of slanted Western reporting on the conflict in Ukraine, was a godsend for this political class, which quickly took advantage of it. The lack of public debate and transparency around this decision, and the speed at which it is being rushed through, is astounding from nations calling themselves “democracies.”

Even worse, the actual reasons given by the Finnish and Swedish governments for applying for NATO membership are not very clear or precise, considering the importance of this decision for the future security of these nations. This may not be surprising, since there is no indication of any Russian threat against the two Nordic countries.

Finland and Sweden seem to believe that they will gain security by joining NATO, but by officially giving up their neutrality, they will not only jeopardize their security but also lose independence. Thus, if both nations finally do become full NATO members, they will likely come to regret their decision. These two countries would have been better off if they had followed the fundamental principal of libertarianism in international affairs, which is neutrality. This is the position that is most likely to bring peace in the world over the long term.

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