War and Foreign Policy

The Ukrainian regime thinks it knows better than husbands and fathers when it comes to caring for their families. But no bureaucrat ought to be allowed to make such a decision.

Europe would have been immeasurably better off had its regimes chosen compromise instead of "countering aggression" in 1914. Sometimes this lesson is heeded, as when the US refused to intervene in 1956 and 1968. 

The scale of the sanctions which Washington has imposed on Russia (and Russians) should not distract us from a crucial fact. What Washington is doing against Moscow is not rare. It is something that happens every day. 

A funny thing has happened on the way to accepting the standard ruling-class narrative on the war in Ukraine: inconvenient and unpleasant facts about the region and its recent history.

From economic power to demographics to military spending, Russia simply doesn't have the ability to be a great power that threatens anyone outside its "near abroad."

Murray Rothbard recounts how during the French and Indian War (1754–63), Americans continued the great tradi­tion of trading with the enemy, and even more readily than before.

Those gloating about Russia being "cut off" are overstating the case. In fact, many of the world's largest countries have shown a reluctance to participate in the US's sanction schemes, and even close US allies aren't going along with it.

Hitler recognized that his alliance with the bourgeois and right-wing forces—without which he would never have come to power—was irreconcilable with the radical revolutionary policies he had conceived.

President Harding wanted to see the end of war and a return to a more traditional American foreign policy.

Although social media says otherwise, neutrality in the Ukraine-Russia conflict is a good thing.