Foreign aid seems to many as the only answer for Iraq's shattered economy. Judging on the historical record of foreign aid, however, Iraq is in for a long, tumultuous ride. Because foreign aid is welfare for governments, the Iraqi project's success will largely depend on how little aid is given.
Can a few courageous writers like Tom DiLorenzo and his colleagues, using logic, evidence, and moral suasion, negate what their opponents thought they had won with over a million troops on battlefields 138 years ago?
"Iraq must be democratic," says the first point in the new U.S.-backed plan for Iraq's future. Had West Germany taken this route after the Second World War, writes D.W. MacKenzie, it would not have benefited from free markets and the prosperity that followed in its wake.
To celebrate the victory of a mightily armed imperial power over a small despotism is not a libertarian impulse. From under the rubble of buildings demolished by bombs, the corpses of tens of thousands of dead, the billions and billions spent by government, and the whole world impressed at the effectiveness of raw power, we can detect some very bad omens for the future.
If the government actually believed that the homeland would be safer due to its actions overseas, why does it impose (under the threat of violence) a terrorism insurance requirement? And why do its warnings of impending doom seem to be increasing rather than decreasing?
Of all the false charges leveled against capitalism, the indictment of promoting or requiring imperialism and warfare is most certainly the least deserved. Given recent events, this proposition has received much undeserved attention, but is by no means new. This claim has a long legacy, tracing back at least to 19th century critics of Political Economy.
As all readers of The Mises Review know, I always endeavor to avoid saying something bad about a book. But I cannot forbear from stating that Professor Honderich's book is a cheap and tawdry affair.
This book frightens me. The authors do not confine themselves to a justification of the American invasion of Iraq, which began shortly after their book was published.
Carl Schmitt offers a fundamental criticism of a way of thinking about politics and power. If he is right, some libertarians, among many others, have fallen victim to a radically misconceived view of political action, especially as regards war.
In the games planners play, the model builder wins by outsmarting an opponent programmed to react in predictable ways. The conclusion is decided by the assumptions built into the system. If this is true in peace, it is all the more true in war. The game called "war" is no better at preparing central planners for real life than the game called "market."
