Money and Banks

All the sophisticated quantitative methods by themselves can't help us understand the cause-and-effect of what's behind the boom-and-bust cycle.    

China’s stealth devaluation is not making the country more competitive, it is making household and corporate debt riskier as the purchasing power of the yuan is diminished.

In its blind search for the "correct" interest-rate policy, the Fed can't succeed in extending the boom indefinitely.

A strong GDP growth rate, in most cases, is likely to be associated with the intensive squandering of the pool of real wealth.

Expansions in credit and investment are only a problem when they result from inflationary monetary policy, and not from real saving.

Rothbard: "if proponents of the higher minimum wage were simply wrongheaded people of good will, they would not stop at $3 or $4 an hour, but indeed would pursue their dimwit logic into the stratosphere."

When I left Soviet Russia in 1991, I thought I would never see a command-and-control economy again. I was wrong. Over the past decade the global economy has started to resemble one.

As the credit expansion turns to bust, many capital goods remain unused, many investment processes cannot be completed, and capital goods produced are used in a manner not originally foreseen. A large portion of society’s scarce resources has been squandered.

Scratching beneath the surface of the debate around countercyclical capital buffers, we find the normal level of duplicity that characterizes most debates about monetary policy.

New York Fed Chief Dudley recently suggested asset bubbles "emerge from the way market participant’s process information and trade" — thus ignoring the role of the central bank.