Facing a looming recession, the Federal Reserve resolutely lowered its discount rate and frantically expanded its credits. Eager to stimulate the sagging economy, it enabled and encouraged businessmen to invest more and consumers to go ever deeper into debt. Yet the specter of recession refuses to fade away. What is the Fed to do?
In the midst of a recession, and with the credibility of central banking itself being called into question, what is a central banker to do? Why, blame executive pay, of course, and impugn the morality of anyone who might believe that Fed governors are a greater threat to economic stability than shareholders that make wage decisions.
The current debate over Greenspan’s policy failures misses the crucial question, writes Robert Blumen: Could anyone, no matter how capable and well-informed, successfully perform the job that he is supposed to do? Were his errors sins of incompetence? Could a better man than Greenspan have done a better job?
The Federal Reserve is continuing to experiment with new, more counterfeit-proof paper money. Recently, it was big faces, along with the introduction of a variety of other difficult-to-counterfeit characteristics into our Federal Reserve Notes. Next, maybe, it will be color. Or, writes Clifford Thies, perhaps the real issue is not the color on the back of the money, but money’s real backing.
The trouble with lowering the interest rate, writes Frank Shostak, is not that the Fed may lose a tool to fight a further downturn; the problem is that a lower rate now will make things much worse rather than better. Fifty years of experience suggest it will set in motion a much more painful economic adjustment in the months ahead.
Somehow, someway, it always comes back to the central bank. Alan Greenspan is letting it be known that rate cuts are not out of the question. The hint alone sent the financial markets soaring. Yet, writes Lew Rockwell, to attempt more artificial credit injections at this stage is extremely dangerous.
Fannie Mae's monopoly privileges have given it an ever-increasing share of the secondary conforming mortgage market, writes Robert Blumen, and it currently is seeking to expand into other parts of the mortgage market. The net result has been a nightmare of resource misallocation and massive systemic risk.
Philadelphia was the home not only of the first two federal banks, but it was the home of the two libertarian political economists who introduced and defended the independent treasury idea into the public consciousness, and created public pressure for its enactment.
Argentina cannot afford to wait for an IMF rescue package, which will only prolong the current unsustainable monetary regime. It must act now to reform its paralyzed monetary and financial system. In this interview, QJAE editor Joseph Salerno discusses the financial and banking chaos in Argentina.
The burdens imposed upon producers by easy money and their consequent lack of profitability are among the main reasons why there is no significant capital expenditure. The overhang from the 2000 capital-spending boom only partly exacerbates this, since much of the outlay undertaken then was wastefully misallocated and is not germane to the needs of the current economy anyway.
