Property, Freedom & Society

21. Classical Natural Law and Libertarian Theory

21 Classical Natural Law and Libertarian Theory

Carlo Lottieri

NATURAL RIGHTS AND LIVING LAW:
TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF ROTHBARD AND LEONI

If libertarianism wishes to give up modern political categories, it has to think about law in a different way.

Murray N. Rothbard, the most important exponent of the radical libertarian school, is right when he rejects the historicism and relativism of legal realism and when—for the same reasons—he criticizes Hayek and Leoni. But unfortunately, he does not really grasp the function of the evolution into classic natural law. Furthermore, his idea of building a libertarian code is completely inconsistent with his frequent references to the Greek and Christian legal heritage.1

In For a New Liberty, Rothbard points out that the history of a changing and evolving law can be useful in order to find just rules: “since we have a body of common law principles to draw on, however, the task of reason in correcting and amending the common law would be far easier than trying to construct a body of systematic legal principles de novo out of the thin air.”2 But the relationship between common law and natural law must be seen differently. Common law is not only an interesting tool for discovering natural law: it has its specific role. Positive law needs to interact with natural law principles, but even the latter cannot be considered as self-sufficient.

Moreover, in his defense of rationality, Rothbard does not realize that law cannot be entirely read into the praxeological framework, which is axiomatic and deductive. The division of theory and history puts some disciplines into opposition with others, but above all it makes a distinction within any single field of study. Economics, for instance, is a theoretical science if considered as political economics, but a historical and empiric activity if it analyzes what happened in the past.3 This is also true for legal studies, because they have a theoretical part but, at the same time, include many other aspects which are, on the contrary, historical and cannot be examined using logical and a priori methods.

In his methodological writings, Rothbard distinguishes between empiricism and experience, and remarks that the refusal of the first does not imply a devaluation of the second. When he criticizes Mises for his Kantian approach, he finds in human experience exactly the main source of the axioms, the fundamental truths that are the starting point of a theory based on deductive logic.4 But before the law, Rothbard seems to minimize the contextual and non-theoretical dimension of a large part of legal controversies and especially of positive law.

Using the Thomist framework, in this essay I will emphasize the importance of the lex naturalis, at the same time highlighting a lex humana deeply rooted in the complexity of different ages and societies, related to the subjectivity and specificity of opinions which cannot be fruitfully examined by a praxeological approach. Many problems, and even some inconsistencies of Rothbardian theory are a consequence of it.

Moreover, the way Rothbard deals with the arguments of causality and liability shows an inadequate understanding of the anthropology of the Austrian School, which moves from a study of human action (intentional and rational) and not by a simple behaviorist analysis.

In integrating Rothbardian libertarianism with positive law, an important contribution comes from Bruno Leoni, who in Freedom and the Law and other writings developed an original contribution to classical liberalism. The Italian scholar can help to improve some parts of Rothbard’s libertarian theory of law. If the author of The Ethics of Liberty is much more grounded in natural law and even less naïve before Wertfreiheit,5 Leoni can correct some limits of the Rothbardian approach and its incapacity to perceive the specificity of law: a practical and largely empirical science, historically situated and essentially oriented to finding reasonable solutions for very specific cases.

If philosophy of law has to investigate the eternal and immutable principles of justice, juridical scholarship must find the best translation of these for the specific problems of a society. For this reason, taking Leoni seriously means imagining a meeting point of natural law doctrine and the requirements of a positive law as a reality in evolution. And, it implies an effort to transfer into the legal context the Misesian methodology and its radical separation of theory and history: the sphere of axiomatic and deductive studies (praxeology) and the sphere of research based on experience (history).

We have to remember that specific attention to the historical and evolving features of legal orders has been a crucial element of the Austrian School since its origins. In his Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences, Carl Menger praises the Historical School of Jurisprudence (Gustav Hugo, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Barthold Georg Niebuhr), whose origins he dated back to Edmund Burke. Menger also highlights the individualistic content of evolutionary law with the goal of helping the classical liberal tradition to rediscover its lost roots: “law, like language, is (at least originally) not the product in general of an activity of public authorities aimed at producing it, nor in particular is it the product of positive legislation. It is, instead, the unintended result of a higher wisdom, of the historical development of the nations.”6

It is exactly in this sense that we can understand Leoni’s preference for evolutionary law (Anglo-Saxon law and Roman jus civile): a law not oriented to preserve tradition or spontaneous order per se. On the contrary, Leoni thinks that a polycentric and evolutionary order is in a better position to safeguard individual rights. Rules that emerge from the interpersonal exchange of claims are tools that can effectively protect society from the rulers.

As student of English legal history, Leoni shows a strong interest in the common law of nature that was at the heart of Edward Coke’s perspective. In fact, in that theory law does not express an anti-rationalist attitude, but on the contrary, embodies natural reason emerging in an evolutionary way. This legal culture is improved by various contributions (practical, pragmatic, professional) of many people. In this way, law is the consequence of a human activity oriented towards bettering reality using intelligence and experience.

Criticizing modern legal systems, Leoni remarks that

there is far more legislation, there are far more group decisions, far more rigid choices, and far fewer “laws written in living tables,” far fewer individual decisions, far fewer free choices in all contemporary political systems that would be necessary in order to preserve individual freedom of choice.7

Even if he never adhered to a consistent natural law theory, Leoni tried a sort of reconciliation of natural law and legal realism (positive law rightly understood), exploring the possibility of conjugating the flexibility of ancient common law and the just principles of a universal moral theory.

Leoni had a strong interest in the exploration of the libertarian potentialities of a similar perspective. In his writings, there are many elements of a radical libertarianism refusing any coercion. When some participants of the Claremont seminar about Freedom and the Law asked him who should choose the judges in a free society, he answered: “it is rather immaterial to establish in advance who will appoint the judges, for, in a sense, everybody could do so, as happens to a certain extent when people resort to private arbiters to settle their own quarrels.”8 In his opinion, the contemporary, statist system should disappear, leaving room for a competitive order of private courts. The convergence of Leoni and Rothbard is evident on many levels, because both imagine the end of the state monopoly on justice and security, with the purpose of opening the road to an institutional competition between people in charge to avoid criminal behaviors.9

It is also for this reason that Rothbardian libertarian theory can find in Leoni and, above all, in his understanding of law, the way to overcome its theoretical and practical difficulties.

FROM PRAXEOLOGY TO THYMOLOGY:
THE ROLE OF POSITIVE LAW

In its daily development, law refers back to principles, but at the same time it concerns modest but not negligible disputes. Legal reasoning lives essentially in this pragmatic context and it leaves the specific topics of natural law in the background.

In Mises’s thought, there is a notion that is extremely useful in helping us grasp the relationship between theory and practice in the law. In fact, in Theory and History, he opposes praxeology to thymology, which is in close relationship with history.10 Thymology is a branch of history and “derives its knowledge from historical experience.”11 It stands for that set of empirical knowledge of psychological, sociological and even factual character that we use to find our way in relationships with other people. This “literary psychology” is the condition of a rational behavior: “for lack of any better tool, we must take recourse to thymology if we want to anticipate other people’s future attitudes and actions.”12

When Leoni returns to the legal realism tradition (to the law in action that Roscoe Pound opposes to the law in books) and remarks on a correspondence between positive law and what is foreseeable (often using the formula id quod plerumque accidit),13 he highlights that the positive law is always intelligible in a thymologic perspective. In his explicit purpose of applying Misesian methodology to law, Leoni discovers a praxeological dimension (the most theoretical part, coinciding with the analysis of the individual claims and their interaction), but also another thymological dimension (entirely depending on experience, common opinions and traditions).

His idea is that positive law has a strong relationship with customs. As practical activity, law must reduce uncertainty: it is for this reason that a creditor’s claim is legal, because generally a debtor pays back what he has received, while the thief’s claim is illegal, because generally people do not steal. The probabilistic analysis is purely empirical, but it is not unreasonable. Our behavior is led very often by the rationality of our past experiences and by our prejudices.

In this sense, Leonian theory of the individual claim is at the same time praxeological and thymological.

It is praxeological because it draws in a deductive way the theoretical conditions of the exchange and the meeting of different individual claims. When, in his writings, he opposes the point of view of the legal professionals (moving from the norms) and the perspective of the philosophers (interested in the origin of the rules), his aim is to reject the positivism prevalent in legal theory. He has the project of grasping the a priori categories—à la Reinach—subtending all legal orders. When he finds in the individual claim the starting point of a juridical relation, Leoni thinks he has understood a universal datum: his “demand and supply law.” If prices emerge from the meeting of the actions of people supplying and demanding, the norms are the effect of the interaction of different claims. This is a universal regularity and, on this ground, he also develops his theoretical (praxeological) remarks about the relationship between legislation and living law, certainty and law, and so on.

But—as in Mises—this positive evaluation of praxeology does not imply a negative opinion of history or of the competence of lawyers. On the contrary, Leoni has the ambition of describing the distinct but connected roles of every sphere.

For this reason, his theory is largely thymological when he remarks that, if it is true—as Mises says—that “thymology tells no more than that man is driven by various innate instincts, various passions, and various ideas,”14 then it is evident that norms are accepted when they satisfy the claims, the principles and the desires largely shared in a specific society; and the law professionals are exactly well-informed about this peculiar and “local” environment. When Leoni emphasizes the qualities of the ius civile and the ancient common law, he aims to highlight the role of the lawyers and of all the people engaged in the solution to specific and concrete disputes.

Positive Law and History

This is a very important point in a large part of the philosophical tradition. The main Greek and medieval thinkers were clear about the link between natural law (universal) and the contingent (historically defined and, lato sensu, subjective) dimension of situations that we can understand only in specific contexts, as result of the cross of individual preferences.

In Aristotle, for instance, it is clear that there are some universal principles judging every positive law. This passage is very outspoken at this regard:

Universal law is the law of nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles’s Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she says that it was just by nature.

Not of to-day or yesterday it is,

But lives eternal: none can date its birth.15

At the same time, Aristotle holds the opinion that “there are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten.” In the second group, a class “springs from exceptional goodness or badness” and it is related to honor, gratitude, friendship, and so on. But the other “makes up for the defects of a community’s written code of law. This is what we call equity.” This Aristotelian notion of equity is very important. And, at the same time, we have to perceive the relationship between this idea of equity (“the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law”)16 and the idea of phronesis, as prudence and practical wisdom.

Equity and phronesis do not destroy the universal natural law, but they give us a way to understand how it can be possible to arrange some (difficult) situations. We can build a bridge from the natural law and the positive law of our—imperfect—relationship with the others. The perception of the human limits and the complexity of the world push us to appreciate the knowledge preserved by a complex system of legal notions, as developed through centuries of legal history.

For Aristotle, it was clear that a purely deductive method would not suffice to satisfy our exigencies.

Aquinas’s lesson moves in the same direction, as is clear in his distinguishing between Natural Law (Lex naturalis) and Human Law (Lex humana). If the moral principles of natural law are unchangeable and can be rationally investigated by moving from some solid axioms, human law is the consequence of cultural and historic contingencies. As Summa Theologiae says, “the natural law contains certain universal precepts which are everlasting, whereas human law contains certain particular precepts according to various emergencies.” At the same time, “nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. And, therefore, human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.”17

Aquinas adds that “custom has the force of law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.”18 He accepts customary law because it has the approval of individuals: “because, by the very fact that they tolerate it, they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom.”19 This law that is dissolved in custom is not natural law, because Aquinas does not believe we can accept a legal order that has historically emerged if it is against justice; but historical evolution modifies positive law and even opens room for different interpretations.20

Law and Interpretation

In positive law, there is an essential function of interpretation, because there is always a distance between the norm and the cases in point. As Giorgio Agamben explains, “in the case of law, the application of a norm is no way contained within the norm and cannot be derived from it; otherwise, there would have been the need to create the grand edifice of trial law. Just as between language and world, so between the norm and its application there is no external nexus that allows one to be derived immediately from the other.”21

What’s the meaning of this? Using general rules in concrete and specific situations always implies a decision, and (at least hypothetically) an arbitrary power. The difference between the law in the books and the law in action is largely a consequence of this.

In many writings, Chaïm Perelmen remarks that legal logic is:

a very elaborated, individual case of practical reasoning, which is not a formal demonstration, but an argumentation aiming to persuade and convince those whom it addresses that such a choice, decision or attitude is preferable to concurrent choices, decisions and attitudes.

Perelman adds: “what characterizes an argumentation is its non-constraining character.”22 So, legal reasoning “is not presented as a formally valid deduction from non-temporal truths,” because “reasons considered good at one period of time or in one milieu are not in another; they are socially and culturally conditioned as are the convictions and the aspirations of the audience they must convince.”23

In spite of his disputable skepticism, Perelman is right when he points out that positive law is a “practical” activity, because it is a case-solving operation and often emerges from a transaction of different interests. To a large extent, law is not a science: it is a technique oriented to solving specific problems, because lawyers and judges do not search for the truth, but only the legal truth.

Law and Intentionality

If we analyze liability and causality in Rothbard, we have to recall the fundamental principles of the Austrian tradition.

In a recent article, Hans-Hermann Hoppe criticized his mentor and highlighted how it is contradictory to focus attention on the birth of property (with the homesteading of land) and then to exclude it, accepting a strict liability theory whose positivist and behaviorist origins are evident. Hoppe remarks that “homesteading implies intent,” a subjective element; on the contrary, Rothbard’s theory of causation and liability ignores this aspect.24 Austrian School scholars emphasize the role of intentionality as a crucial element at the moment of the origin of private property and of its negation (theft, aggression, etc.).

Not all physical invasions imply liability and, to the contrary, some actions are liable even if there is no physical invasion. In economics, Rothbard was perfectly aware of this and was always very critical of economic schools with positivistic leanings. In 1985, in the Preface to Theory and History by Mises, he attacks mainstream positivism, remarking that “to become truly scientific like physics and the other natural sciences, then, economics must shun such concepts as purposes, goals and learning: it must abandon man’s mind and write only of mere events.”25 But the main mistake of the American scholar is in analyzing only simple events, avoiding the problem of intentionality and subjective liability, and the consequent need to understand a specific action—made by a particular person, in that one moment and context.

Hoppe is right when he notes a contradiction in Rothbard between this theory of strict liability and the defense of homesteading, which implies another vision of ethics and a different anthropology. When Rothbard condemns as aggression the act of a man claiming and occupying a land previously “homesteaded” by other people, his arguments call for a well-defined idea of morality that it is not consistent with that oversimplified and behaviorist theory of causality and liability.

AN ARISTOTELIAN-THOMIST LIBERTARIANISM

For all these reasons, the Thomist distinction between natural law and human law is fundamental, especially if by lex humana we do not conceive of the state law, but our ever-imperfect translation, into norms, of our aspiration to live in a just society. As Paul Sigmund correctly remarked, “human law is the application to specific circumstances of the precepts of reason contained in the natural law.”26 This mediation is always unsatisfying, but at the same time necessary.

Rothbard and Perelman make the symmetrically opposite mistake, because neither admits the autonomy of natural law and positive law. If Perelman reduces natural law to positive law (and reason to reasonableness), Rothbard reduces positive law to natural law (and reasonableness to reason). However, we have to admit the existence of a higher and objective dimension of law (where the rational method of Rothbard is justified) and of a much more prosaic and lower level, which can obtain many advantages from the dialogical and rhetorical approach used by Perelman.

The awareness of the need to mediate between the a priori principles of natural law and a largely inductive knowledge of the legal experience is not always present in Rothbard. But that’s why the intellectual heritage of Leoni can be useful in the attempt to develop a libertarian legal theory aiming to protect the dignity and freedom of the individual.27

If, in Rothbard, there is the risk of ignoring the specificity of legal reasoning, Leoni remarks on the empirical features of the law and adopts a Misesian standpoint in putting into the right perspective human experience and the role it plays in the practical unfolding of our existence.

Leoni perceives the importance of the positive law, also in a libertarian and anti-statist perspective. The vision of what is just by nature has to be rooted in a particular time, embodied in specific institutions and recognizable in many different situations. But the Italian thinker was quite aware that this proposal was a return to the old tradition of natural law. In a very interesting passage, he criticizes Kelsen, saying that sociology of law is “the modern heir of the natural law.”28 And he specifies his idea in this way:

contemporary sociology of law schools can be considered, in a limited sense, and without the derogatory features used by Kelsen, the “modern heirs of natural law,” exactly because they are inclined to re-evaluate in “law” the element of the “persuasions” leading the action of people, instead of the “legal order” conceived as dogmatics did.29

CONCLUSION

In spite of his positivism, Leoni can help us grasp the true nature of classical natural law, because he does not prospect for a “libertarian code” like the one envisioned by Rothbard, somewhat conceived on the model of the state legal systems. On the contrary, Freedom and the Law can be the starting-point for a more “classical” understanding of libertarian natural law actually rooted in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.

In other words, in Leoni there is a wide scope for juridical research and for historical evolution, because of his belief in a living law in continuous and close interaction with reality. The legal order has some “essential” elements, but it changes through time, and for this reason it requires constant and challenging work to adjust rules and behavior.

If we return to the classics, we can better understand the main problems.

Thomist rationalism moves from the awareness of reason’s limits. Sigmund highlights exactly this when he says that “Aquinas’s system of natural law is and must be incomplete. He could not admit the Aristotelian possibility that nature could provide fully for man’s fulfillment.”30 Rothbard himself is not far from this when he points out that a rational approach needs an understanding of the structural imperfection of our minds: “No man is omniscient or infallible—a law, by the way, of man’s nature.”31 But this observation has to have significant consequences for legal theory. image

 

                             

Carlo Lottieri (lottieri@tiscalinet.it) is an Italian political philosopher with the University of Siena and Istituto Bruno Leoni whose main interests are in contemporary libertarian thought. Most recently he edited an anthology of writings by Bruno Leoni, Law, Liberty and the Competitive Market (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2009).

32The notion of code—in despotic Prussia as well as in Napoleonic France—was connected to the needs of a sovereign power oriented to absorbing the legal order and changing any norm in a simple political decision.

33Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1973), p. 318.

34See Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1985).

35See Murray N. Rothbard “In Defense of ‘Extreme Apriorism’,” The Logic of Action One (London: Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 100–08. Exactly in this sense Larry Sechrest outlines that a “careful examination of Austrian thought will reveal that the praxeological method itself is fundamentally empirical.” See Larry J. Sechrest, “Praxeology, Economics, and Law: Issues and Implications,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 7, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 22. In the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, experience is a source of knowledge: we meet the world (which is common to all us) and we have experiences with a meaning. Rothbard shares this perspective when he distinguishes his position and that of Mises. For this reason, Sechrest opposes Hoppe (and Mises) because of their Kantianism and shares the Rothbardian perspective, embracing the project of “positing an empirical base for the Austrian School.” Ibid., p. 23.

36See, in particular, Murray N. Rothbard, “The Symposium on Relativism: A Critique,” 1960, memo conserved in the Ludwig von Mises Archives, now in Murray N. Rothbard, Diritto, natura e ragione. Scritti inediti versus Hayek, Mises, Strauss e Polanyi, Roberta Modugno, ed. (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2005), pp. 125–45.

37Carl Menger, Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences, Francis J. Nock, trans. (New York: New York University Press, 1985), pp. 174–75.

38Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), p. 131; my italics.

39Ibid., p. 129.

40The notion of polycentric order—as it has been formulated by Michael Polanyi—can be useful to appreciate the complexity of a system based on checks and balances and operating without a written constitution imposed by an authority. Polanyi points out that the invisible hand pushing towards a free-market order is not so different from the forces defining common law and scientific research. The progress of knowledge is grounded on the principles that “every proposed addition to the body of science is subjected to a regular process of scrutiny.” We find a similar logic in the legal order, because common law “constitutes a sequence of adjustments between succeeding judges, guided by a parallel interaction between the judges and the general public.” Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 163, 162.

41Following Mises, “thymology is a historical discipline.” Mises, Theory and History, p. 313.

42Ibid., p. 272.

43Ibid., p. 313.

44Translation: “what usually happens.”

45Mises, Theory and History, p. 313.

46Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1373b.

47Ibid., 1374a.

48Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality, and Politics, William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, eds. (Indianapolis-Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), p. 77.

49Ibid., p. 80.

50Ibid., p. 81. As Anthony Lysska has pointed out, Aquinas “was aware of cultural diversity regarding mores.” Anthony J. Lysska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 112.

51In the latest development of his theory, Leoni introduced an interesting notion when he spoke about the a-legal claims (in Italian, pretese agiuridiche). Thus, we have not only legal and illegal claims, but also some claims not completely accepted today, that in the future might be considered lawful and legitimate. See Bruno Leoni, “Appunti di filosofia del diritto,” in Il diritto come pretesa (Macerata: Liberilibri, 2004), p. 200.

52Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 40.

53Chaïm Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument. Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning, with an Introduction by Harold J. Berman (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), p. 129.

54Ibid., p. 131.

55For Hoppe, in Rothbard there is “a strict liability theory.” Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Property, Causality, and Liability,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 7, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 88–89.

56Murray N. Rothbard, “Preface” to Mises, Theory and History, p. iii.

57Paul E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge Mass.: Winthrop, 1971), p. 39; the italics are mine.

58In this sense, natural law has to be ever conceived in a strict relationship with the contingency of social reality. If all were governed by destiny, there would be no room for natural law (because its normative features imply human liberty). But at the same time it is true that the ever-changing character of social relationships forces natural law to have a specific link with history.

59Bruno Leoni, Lezioni di filosofia del diritto (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004), p. 160.

60Bruno Leoni, “Oscurità ed incongruenze nella dottrina kelseniana del diritto,” in Scritti di scienza politica e teoria del diritto (Milan: Giuffrè, 1980) p. 202.

61Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought, p. 46.

62Murray Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982), p. 11.

  • 1Professors Hoppe’s publications, including links to translations and a detailed bibliography, are available at his website, www.hanshoppe.com.
  • 2“Hans-Hermann Hoppe: Potret Intelektual Anti-Intelektual” [“Interview with Hans-Hermann Hoppe, an Anti-Intellectual Intellectual”], interview by Sukasah Syahdan, Akal dan Kehendak (Indonesia) (Apr. 28, 2008) (English translation available at www.hanshoppe.com/publications).
  • 3“Principles of the Property and Freedom Society,” available at www.propertyandfreedom.org (quoting the Opening Declaration from the Inaugural Meeting: Bodrum, Turkey, May 2006).
  • 4Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), chs. 2 & 7; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006 [1993]), chs. 11–13, 15, and “Appendix: Four Critical Replies.”
  • 5Idem, Democracy.
  • 6Idem, “Government and the Private Production of Defense,” in idem, ed., The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2003).
  • 7On immigration, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Case for Free Trade and Restricted Immigration,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 13, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 221–33; idem, “Natural Order, the State, and the Immigration Problem,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 16, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 75–97.
  • 8Idem, “On Time Preference, Government, and the Process of De-Civilization,” p. 24, n. 25.
  • 9Cf. Hoppe’s discussion of Robert Nozick’s “disparate or loosely jointed arguments, conjectures, puzzles, counterexamples, experiments, paradoxes, surprising turns, startling twists, intellectual flashes, and philosophical razzle-dazzle,” in “Murray N. Rothbard and the Ethics of Liberty,” Introduction to Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, 2nd ed. (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998), pp. xxiv.
  • 10Stephan Kinsella & Jeffrey Tucker, “The Ordeal of Hoppe,” The Free Market 26, no. 4 (April 2005).
  • 11Ibid., p. 71; and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat: Studien zur Theorie des Kapitalismus (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987).
  • 12Hoppe, Democracy, p. 74; and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (Boston: Kluwer, 1993).
  • 13Hoppe, Democracy, p. 71.
  • 14Domenico Losurdo, Nietzsche il Ribelle Aristocratico: Biografia Intelettualle e Bilancio Critico (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002).
  • 15Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Der Gott, der keiner ist, Robert Grözinger, trans. (Waltrop & Leipzig: Manuscriptum Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2003), pp. 7–8 (English translation from Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Demokratie. Der Gott, Der Keiner Ist,” LewRockwell.com (December 5, 2003)). See also similar comments in Hoppe, Democracy, pp. x–xi; and xxiii, noting that “both Mises and Rothbard had a soft spot for democracy and tended to view the transition from monarchy to democracy as progress.”
  • 16Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing, Charakterwäsche: Die Politik der amerikanischen Umerziehung in Deutschland (Graz: Ares Verlag, 2004); and Ernst von Salomon, Der Fragebogen, seventeenth ed. (Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007).
  • 17Stephan Kinsella, “The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism [review essay of Hoppe’s The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (1993)],” St. Mary’s Law Journal 25 (1994), p. 1434.
  • 18Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Reflections on the Origin and the Stability of the State,” LewRockwell.com (June 23, 2008).
  • 19Alan Pendleton Grimes, American Political Thought (New York: Holt, 1960), p. 283.
  • 20Michael Vorenberg, Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 64.
  • 21Merle Curti, The Roots of American Loyalty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 175.
  • 22Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels, October 29th–November 17th, 1862, in Karl Marx on America and the Civil War, Saul K. Padover, ed. (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 263.
  • 23James A. Rawley, The Politics of Union: Northern Politics during the Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), p. 184.
  • 24Abraham Lincoln to H.L. Pierce et al. (April 6th 1859), Collected Works, vol. II, p. 375.
  • 25Just as an example, in the late Nineteenth century John W. Burgess offered a definition of sovereignty as an “original, absolute, unlimited, universal power over the individual subject and over all associations of subjects,” and of “the State . . . [as] the source of all titles to land and of all powers over it,” John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (Boston-London: Ginn, 1891), vol. I, pp. 47, 52.
  • 26Fries, “Staatstheorie and the New American Science of Politics,” p. 403.
  • 27Benjamin Zipursky, “Pragmatic Conceptualism,” Legal Theory 6, no. 4 (December 2000): 462.
  • 28Ibid., pp. 462–23.
  • 29Anthony T. Kronman, “Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle,” Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 2 (March 1980): 240. Despite the fact that conclusions of Kronman and Austrians in this particular normative question coincide, we shall, for the sake of fairness, not forget that his approach to criticism of Posner is heavily influenced by the neoclassical notion of economics. Kronman, for example, uses utils and without hesitation engages in an interpersonal comparison of utility. Walter Block once rightly raised this objection in his reply to Kronman. See Walter Block, “Alienability, Inalienability, Paternalism, and the Law: Reply to Kronman,” American Journal of Criminal Law 28, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 351–71.
  • 30Richard A. Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,” Journal of Legal Studies 8, no. 1 (1979): 119.
  • 31Posner, “Efficiency Norm,” p. 500.
  • 32Eventually, Hoppe turned into a full-blown Austrian when, in the early 1980s, he went to the United States on a prestigious Heisenberg fellowship. This time his research project concerned political philosophy, but it was again squarely built on Austrian economics. In 1986, he became Rothbard’s colleague at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), where he would teach for the next 21 years. After Rothbard’s untimely death in 1995, Professor Hoppe assumed a place of uncontested leadership among Austro-libertarian scholars, becoming the editor of the Journal of Libertarian Studies, a co-editor of the Review of Austrian Economics, and then a co-editor of the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. Professor Hoppe, now Professor Emeritus of Economics at UNLV and Distinguished Fellow with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, also serves on on the editorial board of Libertarian Papers. In addition to authoring numerous scholarly articles, his important books include Handeln und Erkennen (1976), Kritik der Kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung (1983), Eigentum, Anarchie, und Staat (1987), A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (1989), The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (1993, enlarged 2nd edition 2006), Democracy—The God that Failed (2001), and The Myth of National Defense (editor, 2003). His works have been translated into at least 21 languages, not counting English.
  • 33Among Professor Hoppe’s many achievements we should stress in particular his brilliant critique of positivist methodology as applied to the social sciences, a new praxeological approach to political philosophy, an encompassing comparative analysis of socialism and capitalism, and a theory of secession as a means of political reform. Most importantly, in his book Democracy—The God that Failed, Professor Hoppe has delivered a profound critique of democracy, as well as an original reinterpretation of Western history in the twentieth century, both of which have stirred international debate in academia and among the wider public. Other influential works from his pen have dealt with the role of migrations within a free society, and with the role of public intellectuals in political transformation processes. Moreover, he has excelled as an historian of thought and made path-breaking contributions to other areas such as monopoly theory; the theory of public goods; the sociology of taxation; the positive methodology of the social sciences; the theory of risk; the production of security; the transformation of formerly socialist countries; and the evolution of monetary institutions and their impact on international relations. And Professor Hoppe’s work is ongoing: he is currently working on a major book project that will restate and elaborate on his previous work in the fields of epistemology and ethics—more generally, the nature of human rationality. The goal of the book is to provide “a systematic and interdisciplinary reconstruction of human history (pre-history, hunter-gatherer societies, agricultural societies, industrial societies).”
  • 34for justly acquired private property, freedom of contract, freedom of association—which logically implies the right to not associate with, or to discriminate against—anyone in one’s personal and business relations—and unconditional free trade. It condemns imperialism and militarism and their fomenters, and champions peace. It rejects positivism, relativism, and egalitarianism in any form, whether of “outcome” or “opportunity,” and it has an outspoken distaste for politics and politicians.
  • 35Hoppe’s axiom of private property is also of crucial importance. If you debate about ethical issues, it means that you presuppose your own right, as well as the right of other people, to debate the issue. This acceptance implies that you do respect the rights of others people involved in the debate to control their own bodies. And the conclusion is crucial: if you even begin debating what is right and what is wrong, it means that you already have acknowledged that private property is necessary and inescapable for any moral judgment. This applies even to those who try to argue against private property. The ethical ground for private property has never been so strong and deep before.
  • 36There are also many other fields where Hans Hoppe has pushed the limits of political and economic science. Monarchy is not as bad as democracy, he argues. This was and still is unacceptable to many intellectuals, and most people have followed the lead of the intellectuals because they have had no good arguments to the contrary. A simple reference to the “strong hand” of a dictator was not only politically incorrect and old fashioned, but also contrary to the goals and the image of society most people actually have. Hoppe provides a clear explanation to sort through this intellectual mess. The absence of democracy in public decision-making does not necessarily mean dictatorship and the most terrible exploitation of the people. On the contrary: democracy is the system which leads to dictatorship, exploitation of others, ignorance, and vulgarity.
  • 37The private provision of security is another topic which has benefitted from Hoppe’s insights. Every decent person often feels that the police are actually not providing adequate protection. But what is the alternative? Better this than nothing, or so many of those unsatisfied with government tend to conclude. An army of intellectuals is ready to help them reach this conclusion. Hoppe provides sound arguments and explains the economics of the private production of defense. No serious scholar can ignore Hoppe’s important arguments. Those who claim that there will be no security without government are simply mistaken. Now, you can direct them to Hans Hoppe’s works.
  • 38Immigration, democracy, regulation—so many bad ideas abound concerning all of these issues, and Hoppe addresses them so well in his writings and speeches.
  • 39Hans knows how to present an argument in a way which is very understandable, even to a man of average intellectual capacities. His examples are sometimes so unexpected and direct that they really help or even force you to rethink what you have thought about the world before. It appears very natural for him, for example, to put a footnote in a book with a short explanation why public slavery is even worse than private slavery. It does not mean that Hans tries to be simple. He is just very straightforward. He does not hesitate to criticize even free-market advocates who are not consistent in their argumentation. If you say something absurd or make flawed arguments, he usually will not hide the fact from you. Perhaps for this reason, some people even seem to be intimidated by Hans Hoppe. Understandably, it is not always pleasant to have your arguments smashed in public.
  • 40Hans does not present himself as a big scholar. On the contrary, his ambition is not very great when he speaks about the role of the scholar (including himself) in society. It is not his ambition to invent some completely new theory or find a terra incognito. On the contrary, Hoppe claims that the role of a decent scholar is, first of all, to preserve what is already found, explained, and discovered. Not to waste the knowledge of the mankind, but to preserve and explain it in modern language to new generations, is to him an already ambitious task. He does it perfectly. Contrary to many of those who are happy with their ambitious and often fallacious new theories, or with “philosophical razzle-dazzle,” he is always stressing the role of his teachers and predecessors, Rothbard and Mises.
  • 41Courage is another thing which goes well with Hans Hoppe’s name. Political correctness is not a good principle to hold to when you are looking for the truth, and while many people pay lip service to the importance of truth, not everyone will defend it even when his own career and name are at stake. But when liberty and the truth are at the stake, Hans Hoppe will never give up. The well-known controversy surrounding an example given about the different time preferences among different groups of people perfectly illustrates this courage.
  • 42Significantly, Hans does not hold back in criticizing monarchies for doing in a quite primitive way what democratic administrations have succeeded in accomplishing with less fallout, which is monopolizing power. Like democrats, kings tried to marginalize their opposition by declaring all political authority to be a prerogative of the centralized state. Monarchical sovereignty was a prelude to democratic sovereignty, and it was based the same “original sin,” “the monopolization of the function of judge and peacemaker.” The best form of authority for Hans is, in fact, “the natural order,” one that is “[t]he natural outcome of the voluntary transactions between various private property owners” and which is “decidedly nonegalitarian, hierarchical, and elitist.” Any effort to bring this about in our democratic, late modernity is hailed as a positive step: “Thus, in addition to advocating the abdication of democracy, it is now of central strategic importance that at the same time ideological support be given to all decentralizing or even secessionist social forces.”
  • 43Significantly, Hans does not hold back in criticizing monarchies for doing in a quite primitive way what democratic administrations have succeeded in accomplishing with less fallout, which is monopolizing power. Like democrats, kings tried to marginalize their opposition by declaring all political authority to be a prerogative of the centralized state. Monarchical sovereignty was a prelude to democratic sovereignty, and it was based the same “original sin,” “the monopolization of the function of judge and peacemaker.” The best form of authority for Hans is, in fact, “the natural order,” one that is “[t]he natural outcome of the voluntary transactions between various private property owners” and which is “decidedly nonegalitarian, hierarchical, and elitist.” Any effort to bring this about in our democratic, late modernity is hailed as a positive step: “Thus, in addition to advocating the abdication of democracy, it is now of central strategic importance that at the same time ideological support be given to all decentralizing or even secessionist social forces.”
  • 44A question that might be raised is whether the generality of humankind would endorse the tendencies that Hans is promoting. Would democratic populations (who have ceased to be citoyens (citizens) or Staatsbürger in any meaningful sense) really want to live in the decentralized, elitist society that Hans recommends, one in which a “natural elite” possess “natural authority,” and, because of “selective mating” and the “laws of civil and genetic inheritance,” these “positions of natural authority are more likely than not passed on within a few noble families.” Why would the majority want to acknowledge these “authority persons,” who presumably would arbitrate conflicts on the basis of the social deference that others extend to them? It is hard to see why most people would accept such arrangements, as opposed to a democracy, in which the promise is made and often fulfilled of redistributing goods to the voters. The question is not whether the democratic state robs from Peter to pay Paul (it obviously does that!) but whether Hans’s “natural order” offers most people what they want. The answer is an emphatic “no” and therefore this order (which looks a bit like Friedrich Hayek’s conception of “spontaneous order”) depends for its realization on the possibility of “decentralization and secession.” Absent such a possibility, this order is in no way feasible.
  • 45Two other observations may be appropriate for understanding more fully the libertarianism of the Right that Hans exemplifies. One, this libertarianism is a recognizable subspecies of what the Italian Marxist Domenico Losurdo calls “aristocratic radicalism,” which he explores in voluminous works on Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1901). According to Losurdo, Nietzsche’s “critique of modernity” is based on his opposition to the leveling tendencies that he perceives in democracy and socialism. It was therefore perfectly consistent for Nietzsche to praise aristocratic societies, including the Indian caste system, and to advocate liberty in the Western world of his time. That is because the state, as Nietzsche understood it, was becoming an instrument of equalization; and its attack on property relations would belong to a larger effort to remove all social and gender distinctions. Nietzsche, as Losurdo points out, also disliked Christianity, because he thought the “slave morality” that pervaded this religion and the culture it nurtured rendered them ineffective against the Left. He therefore broke with classical conservatives, who had viewed established religions as bulwarks against revolution. From Nietzsche’s perspective, Christianity and the Left were related worldviews, and only a new aristocratic order, one that had shed its Christian past, could save civilization from the unfolding of the egalitarian ideal, going from democracy into socialism and feminism.
  • 46“Politically incorrect” is what the rulers and in particular the victors among the rulers proclaim. The great victor of the 20th century, in particular as far as Germany is concerned, is the USA. Hence, the USA has determined the “correct” interpretation especially of recent history. Defeated Germany was not only occupied, but also reeducated. Germany’s schools and universities, under almost complete government control, and the governmentally licensed mass media, have proclaimed to this day the official American view of history and in particular of the 20th century as a triumph of good over evil.
  • 47It is hard to ignore the likely connection between Hans’s detestation of the “State” in all of its modern manifestations and the use of postwar public administration in West Germany, perhaps even more than in the Communist East, to humiliate his nation. His sense of what was done to “reeducate” defeated Germans after the War, which is documented in detail in Caspar von Schrenk-Notzing’s Charakterwäsche: Die Politik der amerikanischen Umerziehung in Deutschland, has left Hans understandably skeptical about the modern democratic project. His relation as a student to Jürgen Habermas, the German thinker and publicist who more than anyone else in his country has called for a rejection of a German national identity and for the creation of a new “constitutional patriotism,” based on supposedly universal democratic values, may explain even more about Hans’s intellectual odyssey.
  • 48His study at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University with Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel was time well spent, however, as it shaped Hoppe as a first class social scientist and helped him to put forth an “argumentation ethics” defense of individual rights, based in part on the discourse ethics theories of the Frankfurt School. His intellectual independence prevented him from accepting his mentors’ apology for socialism and their anti-capitalist mentality. As one reviewer noted, “Hoppe believes his former teacher Habermas’s discourse-ethics theories, while correct at core, are applied incorrectly by Habermas to yield a socialistic ethic; Hoppe feels that Habermas’s theories, if correctly applied (as Hoppe himself does), yield the libertarian non-aggression norm.”
  • 49The first and foremost task of the intellectual anti-intellectuals, then, is to counter this dogmatic slumber of the masses by offering a precise definition of the state, as I have done at the outset, and then to ask if there is not something truly remarkable, odd, strange, awkward, ridiculous, indeed ludicrous about an institution such as this. I am confident that such simple, definitional work will produce some serious doubt regarding an institution that one previously had been taken for granted.
  • 50Lieber’s doctrine is “a prophetic conception,” according to Vernon Parrington, based on “the principle of an evolving state that draws all lesser sovereignties into its orbit by the law of attraction.” Parrington was well aware of the importance of Francis Lieber, who “provided a philosophical background” to the legal theory of Joseph Story. “Under the combined legal and philosophical attack the compact theory found its philosophical breastworks leveled, its natural rights theory undermined, and its commanding position effectively turned.” Alan Grimes places Lieber at the transition between “the constitutional and legal approach to an understanding of the nature of the American Union, and the rise of the organic concept of the nation.” The importance of the German professor in shaping the ideas which Lincoln exploited fully has been noticed by other historians. Lieber “had indeed argued before the war that the original Constitution was insufficient to the needs of the nation . . . in the 1830s and 1840s, he had gained prominence, North and South, by attacking the idea of a fixed Constitution.” A staunch advocate of federal growth, he thought “that federal power should expand slowly and organically—and thus constitutionally—as the nation grew. . . . He believed that the war would solidify the Union and thus fulfill his dream, nurtured during his school years in Germany, of living in a modern nation-state.” Later on, during the war Lieber became very popular, wrote dozens of articles and pamphlets in order “to popularize his distinctive brand of nationalism.” In practice, “[h]is many public statements used the South’s insurrection to justify an expansion of federal power beyond what the Constitution expressly sanctioned.”
  • 51Lieber’s doctrine is “a prophetic conception,” according to Vernon Parrington, based on “the principle of an evolving state that draws all lesser sovereignties into its orbit by the law of attraction.” Parrington was well aware of the importance of Francis Lieber, who “provided a philosophical background” to the legal theory of Joseph Story. “Under the combined legal and philosophical attack the compact theory found its philosophical breastworks leveled, its natural rights theory undermined, and its commanding position effectively turned.” Alan Grimes places Lieber at the transition between “the constitutional and legal approach to an understanding of the nature of the American Union, and the rise of the organic concept of the nation.” The importance of the German professor in shaping the ideas which Lincoln exploited fully has been noticed by other historians. Lieber “had indeed argued before the war that the original Constitution was insufficient to the needs of the nation . . . in the 1830s and 1840s, he had gained prominence, North and South, by attacking the idea of a fixed Constitution.” A staunch advocate of federal growth, he thought “that federal power should expand slowly and organically—and thus constitutionally—as the nation grew. . . . He believed that the war would solidify the Union and thus fulfill his dream, nurtured during his school years in Germany, of living in a modern nation-state.” Later on, during the war Lieber became very popular, wrote dozens of articles and pamphlets in order “to popularize his distinctive brand of nationalism.” In practice, “[h]is many public statements used the South’s insurrection to justify an expansion of federal power beyond what the Constitution expressly sanctioned.”
  • 52During and after the Civil War, Northern intellectuals developed the incipient organic theory, which at first did not reach the rank and file even in the North. In the Old World the organic theory was likewise serving the integral type of nationalism that had largely replaced the older, humanitarian variety of the early nineteenth century.
  • 53In the words of Karl Marx, the Civil War was a “world-transforming . . . revolutionary movement.” Dating from the year 1862, this must be considered as one of his few correct prophecies, albeit an easy one.
  • 54The Supreme Court, under Chase . . . upheld the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act. Before the end of Reconstruction, Greenbackers were clamoring for more paper money. Few citizens before the war had contributed directly to the treasury. By the war’s close everyone and everything was taxed.
  • 55In the end, it was the presidency of Lincoln—the very statesman who said “the principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society”—that wrote finis to those very same principles and ended the American experiment in limited government and self-government. One of the major consequences of the metaconstitutional theory of the Union as an end in itself (and of equating its dissolution with a “moral catastrophe”) embraced by Abraham Lincoln was that of making American political thought more receptive to European theories. America proceeded towards a “normalization” of sorts, growing ever more similar to Europe. And this process of “convergence” was to reach its peak during the last century. Lincoln “normalized” America, thus opening the door for the Americanization of the world.
  • 56In the end, it was the presidency of Lincoln—the very statesman who said “the principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society”—that wrote finis to those very same principles and ended the American experiment in limited government and self-government. One of the major consequences of the metaconstitutional theory of the Union as an end in itself (and of equating its dissolution with a “moral catastrophe”) embraced by Abraham Lincoln was that of making American political thought more receptive to European theories. America proceeded towards a “normalization” of sorts, growing ever more similar to Europe. And this process of “convergence” was to reach its peak during the last century. Lincoln “normalized” America, thus opening the door for the Americanization of the world.
  • 57In conclusion, we must turn again to the American Staatstheorie professors. It is true that their dominance in the profession faded after World War I, and their ultimate failure might be linked to the fact that they were “unable to apply the German idea of the state to the American Political tradition.” But this is true only from a purely theoretical perspective. Abraham Lincoln was not engaging in such a complex pursuit. He did not have to render the two traditions compatible, but rather to burn the bridges with the old American notion of “liberty vs. government.” In addition, he did not have to win any sophisticated scholarly dispute, as he had better weapons than continental authorities on the subject of liberty and the State. It was his army that, in fact made every citizen, North and South of the Potomac, appreciate the notion that there was an identity of interest between the individual and the State (by now understood as the Nation).
  • 58Austrians like Hoppe are not alone in this particular criticism of L&E. Benjamin Zipursky, a representative of so called “pragmatic conceptualism,” challenges the theory of economic analysis of tort law. According to him, tort law is, in essence, “backward-looking.” If we turn to the factory example, the right way of looking at the situation is to investigate the past, determine the structure of rights that was in place before the pollution, describe the actions of both plaintiff and defendant and, on this basis, decide who is to be held liable. On the other hand, the economic (Posnerian) approach is “forward looking;” the initial distribution of rights is of no importance—“where liability should lie ultimately depends on an answer to a question about the future, not about the past.” This, unfortunately, leads us to the conclusion that, for L&E what is right and what is wrong are merely contingent. A just legal system can hardly be based on the contingent notions of right and wrong.
  • 59Austrians like Hoppe are not alone in this particular criticism of L&E. Benjamin Zipursky, a representative of so called “pragmatic conceptualism,” challenges the theory of economic analysis of tort law. According to him, tort law is, in essence, “backward-looking.” If we turn to the factory example, the right way of looking at the situation is to investigate the past, determine the structure of rights that was in place before the pollution, describe the actions of both plaintiff and defendant and, on this basis, decide who is to be held liable. On the other hand, the economic (Posnerian) approach is “forward looking;” the initial distribution of rights is of no importance—“where liability should lie ultimately depends on an answer to a question about the future, not about the past.” This, unfortunately, leads us to the conclusion that, for L&E what is right and what is wrong are merely contingent. A just legal system can hardly be based on the contingent notions of right and wrong.
  • 60The principle of wealth maximization necessarily favors those who already have money, or the resources with which to earn it, and are therefore able to pay more than others to have a new legal rule defined in the way that is favorable to them.
  • 61A less welcome implication of the wealth-maximization approach is that people who are very poor . . . count only if they are part of the utility function of somebody who has wealth.
  • 62According to Posner, not only property rights to chattels are to be instrumentally distributed according to the wealth maximization principle. Posner seeks to present a universal, normative benchmark for allocation of all sorts of rights, including the self-ownership of one’s own labor. In other words, the issue of initial assignment of property rights is considered, since it is “the starting point for a market system.” The fact that people own their own lives and labor is, according to Posner, explicable by the wealth maximization principle itself; assignment of these rights to “natural owners” is a result of calculus. States Posner: