Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences

Theoretical investigations in the field of political economy, particularly in Germany, have by no means progressed as yet to a true methodology of this science. Rather, the theoretical issues which occupy German economists, and to no small extent their non-German colleagues, revolve chiefly about the nature and the very concept of political economy and of its subdivisions, the nature of its truths, the matter of conceiving economic problems in such wise as to do justice to real conditions, and other such problems. They do not revolve about the intellectual roads to the goals of economic research, for the latter are themselves still in question.

To be sure, this phenomenon is of fairly recent date. The time is not so far back when the nature of political economy and the formal nature of its verities seemed established, and theoretical investigations in the field of our science were actually concerned with its true methodological problems. That political economy is “the science of the laws of national economy” was considered just as settled as sufficient, since the view of it as a mere technology had been overcome. Scientific discussion could go on to the investigation of the question of whether those laws had to be obtained speculatively or empirically, inductively or deductively, to the question of what particular form was suitable for these methods in the realm of social phenomena in general and of national economy in particular. It could go on to the investigation of other such questions of true methodology.

All this, of course, had to change as soon as one began to deal more thoroughly with methodological problems. Scholars in our science had to become aware that political economy exhibits in its theoretical and practical subdivisions knowledge of a completely different formal nature. Accordingly, we cannot speak of one method, the method of political economy, but only of its methods. Ways of attaining knowledge and the methods of research are oriented by the goals of research and by the formal nature of the truths of which we desire knowledge. The methods of theoretical economics and of the practical sciences of national economy cannot be the same. But even where this fundamental distinction was adhered to in treating methodological problems, or where only theoretical economics was thought of at first, upon closer investigation it necessarily became clear that even the concept of “laws of phenomena” was an ambiguous one comprising truths of very different formal nature. Therefore, the conception of political economy, or even of theoretical economics, as a science of the “laws of national economy” was inadequate.

The writers of the postclassical period had for the most part simply connected with the concept of economics the idea of a science of the laws of national economy, of the laws of the coexistence and succession of the phenomena of economics, somewhat in the fashion of laws of nature. They did this without becoming aware of the different nature of this knowledge and, with this, of the indefiniteness of the above concept. But, beside the concept of political economy as a science analogous to physics and chemistry the anatomical-physiological point of view soon made itself felt more clearly than had previously been suggested by individual workers in our science. The conception of the national economy as an organism and of its laws as analogous to those of anatomy and physiology confronted the physical conception; the biological point of view in research confronted the atomistic.

Scientific investigation did not stop at this complication of the methodological problem. It was pointed out that social phenomena in general and the phenomena of national economy in particular gained a special character through national individuality, through local conditions, and particularly in virtue of the developmental stage of society; they showed spatial and temporal differences which could not be without determinative influence on the laws that applied to them. The desire for universal and immutable laws of national economy independent of spatial and temporal conditions, and thus the desire for a science based on such laws, seemed from this point of view to be inadmissible and misconceived; it seemed to involve an undue abstraction from the “full empirical reality” of phenomena. The consideration of spatial and temporal differences of economic phenomena seemed to be an inevitable postulate of research not only in the field of “practical economics,” but also in that of theoretical economics, the “science of the laws of economy.”

Others went even a step farther by believing that they did not have to acknowledge any analogy at all between the laws of nature and those of national economy, and by characterizing the latter, rather, as laws of historical development (as parallelisms of economic history) and as laws of great numbers (as parallelisms of the statistics of national economy). The historical-philosophical and the statistical-theoretical orientations of research took their place beside the atomistic and the organic conception of the problems of our science and the desire to retain the national and the historical points of view in theoretical economics.

As if that were not enough, an orientation of research prevailed which even questioned the character of political economy as a “science of the laws of national economy.” On the contrary, it characterized political economy, like historical jurisprudence and the science of language, as a specifically historical science, and historical understanding as the exclusively justified and attainable goal of research in the field of national economy. The conception of political economy as a specifically historical science was added to the multitude of views of the nature of economic laws, and accordingly of theoretical economics, which, indeed, was thought of as the essence of these laws.

The conflict of opinions was not limited to the formal nature of the truths of our science. While some characterized economics as the science of the laws of “economic phenomena,” others saw in this view an improper isolation of a special side of national life. The theory that the phenomena of national economy are to be treated in inseparable connection with the total social and political development of nations gained numerous adherents among economists. To the dispute about the formal nature of the truths of our science and the character of the latter itself was joined controversy about the extent and limits of the realm of phenomena that the science is to deal with. Indeed, it even appeared doubtful to many whether political economy in general is to be dealt with as an independent science and not rather as an organic part of a universal social science.

Discussion has now for almost half a century been revolving about the justification of all these orientations of research, which in part are contradictory and in part merge and complement each other. The remark is scarcely necessary that this state of the development of the methodology of our science could not be at all beneficial. How is investigation of the ways to the goals of research in the field of political economy (of true methodology!) to reach a satisfactory conclusion, how is even the interest of the scholarly world to turn seriously to the pertinent problems, if the goals themselves are so completely in question?

It is my intention for the present work, which developed from what I feel to be the immediate need of the present in the field of political economy, to serve this need first. This work, too, in conformity with the present-day standpoint of theoretical investigations, is primarily concerned with determining the nature of political economy, of its subdivisions, of its truths, in brief, with the goals of research in the field of our science. Methodology in the narrower sense of the word is chiefly to be reserved for future investigations, for which interest will of course be aroused immediately, as soon as some agreement has been reached concerning the basic problems treated here.

With such agreement attained, the solution of the second part of the problem characterized above will perhaps seem much easier than at first. After all, anyone who is to any extent familiar with the pertinent literature knows to what a high degree philosophical investigation has from the beginning turned to true methodological problems and how it has reached its most valuable results here. Let us just be quite clear about the goals of research in the field of national economy, and it may be hoped that it will not be too difficult for us to determine the paths to these goals if only all those who feel called upon to collaborate in establishing a methodology of political economy will endeavor to utilize the results of general theoretical investigations for the special problems of our science, to utilize them seriously—more seriously and intelligently than has, perhaps, been the case up to now.

Of course, we will look in vain in the writings of the logicians for enlightenment about the goals of research in the field of political economy. Insight into the nature of the truths of this field of knowledge can only be the result of comprehensive and competent consideration of the realm of phenomena to be examined by us and of the special demands life makes on our science. There can be no doubt that in the above respect we are not justified in expecting pretty much everything from the logicians, but that they are justified in expecting it from us. The desire to find enlightenment in the writings of prominent logicians on the goals of research in the field of our science has often been manifest recently among German economists. There can be no doubt that this must be regarded merely as a symptom of the extremely unsatisfactory state of this part of the theoretical structure of our science. However, I do, indeed, believe that general theoretical investigations will be highly beneficial to us as soon as we have reached assured results on the nature of the truths of political economy. They will be beneficial in examining the formal conditions for determining these truths and the intellectual paths to their attainment.

To be sure, even then only a comparatively slight amount will be accomplished for our science, which has remained far behind other disciplines. Indeed, I cannot really refrain from remarking that I am far from overrating the significance of methodology for research in general and in particular for research in the field of political economy. The most important scientific results have come from men who were far removed from methodological investigations, while the greatest methodologists have not infrequently proved to be extremely barren scholars in the field of those sciences whose methods they could expound with imposing clarity. Between the establishment of a methodology and the satisfactory development of a science there is an immeasurable gap which only the genius of its scholars can bridge over. Positive research talent has often enough created a science or changed it in an epoch-making fashion without developed methodology. But methodology without talent never has done this. Methodology, of incomparable importance for secondary achievements in the field of a science, is of lesser importance for those great problems reserved for genius to solve.

Only in one case, to be sure, do methodological investigations appear to be the most important, the most immediate and the most urgent thing that can be done for the development of a science. It may happen in a field of knowledge, for some reason or other, that accurate feeling for the goals of research coming from the nature of the subject matter has been lost. It may happen that an exaggerated or even decisive significance is attributed to secondary problems of the science. Erroneous methodological principles supported by powerful schools prevail completely and one-sidedness judges all efforts in a field of knowledge. In a word, the progress of a science is blocked because erroneous methodological principles prevail. In this case, to be sure, clarification of methodological problems is the condition of any further progress, and with this the time has come when even those are obligated to enter the quarrel about methods who otherwise would have preferred to apply their powers to the solution of the distinctive problems of their science.

But this seems to me now to be the presently prevailing state of research in the field of political economy in Germany. It is a state hardly intelligible to those who have not followed the development of this science in recent decades attentively.

The conflict of views about the nature of our science, its problems, and its limits, especially the effort to set new goals for research in the field of political economy, did not originally develop from the interest of economists in theoretical investigations. It begins with the recognition becoming more and more evident that the theory of economics as it left the hands of Adam Smith and his followers lacks any assured basis, that even its most elementary problems have found no solution, and that it is especially an insufficient basis for the practical sciences of national economy, and thus also of practice in this field. Even before the appearance of the historical school of German economists the conviction grew more and more that the previously prevailing belief in the perfection of our science was false and that, on the contrary, the science needed thorough revision.

Three ways were open for the reform of our science, as soon as this conviction had been reached. Either a reform of political economy had to be attempted on the basis of the previous views of its nature and problems and the doctrine founded by Adam Smith had to be perfected from the points of view from which it started, or else new paths had to be opened for research. The reform could be of previous practice, or it could be of the theory of research.

Aside from these two orientations of reform effort differing according to their nature and trend, one could also ultimately be adopted which in a certain higher sense combined the above two notions of reform. A reform of political economy could be striven for from the previous points of view and yet the way opened for new orientations. No single orientation of research encompasses all research problems. Rather, advancing cognition of the real world and its processes and increasing claims on theoretical and practical knowledge ceaselessly bring to light new orientations of the desire for knowledge. Justified in itself, the single orientation of research still seems inadequate in view of the totality of the problems which science has to solve. This is especially true of the theory of a science. Its perfection can only be found in the satisfactory development of all justified orientations of theoretical research and in the ordering of its results into one theoretical scheme, or into a system. It is thus in the theoretical natural sciences; it is thus in the theoretical social sciences in general and in the theoretical science of national economy in particular. The opening up of new branches of theoretical research can go hand in hand with the reform of the previous ones.

The first of the above ways to the reform of economics, although apparently the simplest and most obvious, nevertheless really presented quite unusual difficulties, for more than one reason. What the best minds of all nations had striven for in vain on the previous paths of research was now to be attained; what their genius ran aground on was now to be mastered. Not only was criticism to be practiced or some grand perspective opened, but something positive was to be created. The orientation to be adopted demanded of its representatives an originality capable of positive accomplishments. This was in a field of knowledge which, on account of its incomparable difficulties, makes the highest demands on the scholarly mind.

The efforts characterized here also offered little that was appealing for other reasons. Never is the reform of a science on previous paths of research more difficult and, at least at first, less rewarding than when outstanding minds have already undertaken it without success. For the pressure of their authority paralyzes the confidence of the individual who tries to follow, and at the same time it prevents acknowledgment of successes really attained. It paralyzes the energy of creative minds and the free judgment of receiving minds.

All these circumstances combined to cause a reform of our science, in the sense of the older view of it, to appear just as difficult as unalluring. The theory of economics, as the so-called classical school of English economists shaped it in the main, has not been able to solve the problem of a science of the laws of national economy satisfactorily. But the authority of its doctrine is a burden on us all and prevents progress on those paths on which the scholarly mind for centuries, long before the appearance of A. Smith, sought the solution of the great problem of establishing theoretical social sciences.

The other way to reform our science seemed much simpler and more rewarding. Its unsatisfactory state was not to be considered the result of a scholarly ability inadequate for the solution of its problems, but of an erroneous orientation of research, and a cure-all was to be expected from a new orientation. Whoever could establish such a new orientation would be considered a reformer of political economy, even if he did nothing worthy of mention in a factual way to deepen and justify it, even if he did not do anything directly for the solution of its problems. This would be so even if he was content, rather, to open up large perspectives or to work in fields of knowledge justified per se, but essentially different from political economy; even if he was content, for the rest, with a compilation, devoid of any unifying conception, of the results of just those previous orientations of research designated as erroneous and most emphatically criticized.

A variety of circumstances was added to further the above efforts. In the field of linguistic research, of political science, and of jurisprudence new orientations of research had come to prevail and had led to results which had not been valued according to merit by the scholarly world and public opinion, particularly in Germany, but had been considerably overestimated, at least temporarily. How obvious was the notion of applying these efforts to our field of knowledge! To become famous as a reformer of political economy there was scarcely need of anything more than a lively sense for the analogies of research. The reform of political economy in the previous conception of it was just as difficult as devoid of glory. The fame of a pioneer, a creator of new orientations of research, on the other hand, had come within reach with such a moderate expenditure of intellectual means. No wonder that among the truly scholarly economists of Germany the development of theory declined more and more. All those who were desirous of quick success struck out in new directions, particularly in those directions where any talent could assert itself usefully, even a lesser talent which was not sufficient for research into the great relationships of national economy and for the exact analysis of its phenomena.

To be sure, in doing this men overlooked the fundamental difference between the formal nature of political economy and of those sciences from which basic principles, even results of research, were borrowed more or less mechanically. They failed in particular to recognize the real trend of that scientific movement which had altered jurisprudence on a historical basis. Rare misunderstandings, as I will prove, have played a decisive part in the reform of political economy by its German reformers. The new orientations of research were to no small extent the result of misleading analogies and a failure to recognize the true problems of political economy.

However, even where a new orientation of research, justified per se, came to prevail, it was not the result of a comprehensive insight into the system of problems which science has to solve in the field of national economy. Everywhere we see the phenomenon repeated that special orientations of research, not infrequently of more or less secondary importance, make the reform of political economy dependent exclusively on their success, but deny the justification of any other orientation of research. The desire to do away with the unsatisfactory state of political economy by opening up new paths of research has led in Germany to a series of partly misleading, partly one-sided views of the nature of our science and its problems. It has led to views which separate the German economists from the movement in the literature of the subject of all other nations. Indeed, it has led to views which have caused the German efforts, on account of their one-sidedness, to appear unintelligible in individual cases to the non-German economists.

There is scarcely need to remark that in this situation a reform of political economy on the universal bases I indicated above was far removed from the mental sphere of the German reformers of this science. Among all representatives of the previously characterized orientations not one mind has been found which could have surveyed the totality of those problems which a science of the laws of national economy has to solve. Not one mind has been found which would survey the individual orientations of theoretical research as justified branches of a totality of a theoretical science of national economy, or which could even survey its relationship to the remaining nontheoretical branches of research in the field of national economy. Indeed, nowhere has even the desire for such a universal conception of the methodological problem come to light. Everywhere, on the contrary, we meet orientations of research, partly misleading and partly justified per se, but more or less secondary in respect to all of political economy. Yet each one of these is identified with research in the field of national economy in general.

But in this is to be found the real perniciousness of the present state of political economy in Germany. It is not the circumstance that the reformers of our science, who came to the fore with such confidence, did not truly do away with its defective state, which forms the real core of the evil. Nor is it that in pursuing relatively secondary problems they lost sight of the main goals of research in the field of political economy and even lost sight of the science itself. The core is to be found in the poorly cloaked contempt for and basic negation of all other orientations of research, not infrequently of those which prove to be the most significant in respect to the whole of our science.

With this, to be sure, the time has come when methodological investigations in the field of political economy necessarily take first place in scientific interest. The progress of our science at present is hindered by the sway of erroneous methodological principles. Methodology thus has the floor and will keep it until, through clarification of the goals of research and subsequent clarification of the ways to attain the goals, those obstacles are removed which arose for the progress of political economy in Germany in virtue of misleading methodological principles.

As regards the results I have reached, I think it hardly necessary to say anything about them. I have presented them in words as simple and clear as I could, considering the difficulty of the questions dealt with. I have also sorted and arranged them as far as I was able. Let them speak for themselves. But I cannot keep from making one remark here, for it concerns my attitude toward my colleagues in Germany.

The largely polemic character of this writing, of which I am aware, was not caused even in a single instance by ill will toward meritorious representatives of our science. It came about rather because of the nature of the task I set myself. It was produced of necessity by my conception of the present state of political economy in Germany. The polemics against the presently prevailing orientation of research in economics were for me neither an end in themselves nor even a merely superficial ornamentation. They were an essential part of my task; indeed, they had to be forcible and sweeping, even at the risk of hurting feelings in individual cases.

Even if this should prove somewhat prejudicial to the external success of my writing, at least at first, I will not complain of this. The modern literature on economics in Germany, really but little scrutinized by the outside world and hardly understandable to it because of its trends, was not influenced by serious opponents in the decades of its constant isolation. It frequently lacked even any really strict self-criticism in its unshakable confidence in its methods. Anyone who followed a different direction in Germany was ignored rather than refuted. Thus long-lasting practice developed a phraseology concerning the basic problems of methodology in our science which is in part senseless. It is a phraseology which became so much the more harmful to the development of political economy in Germany as it was repeated thoughtlessly, untouched by serious criticism. It could even make the claim of signifying an epoch-making upheaval in the field of our science. Under such circumstances there was above all need of an unprejudiced survey and examination, and of a serious criticism. In this direction so much that had been neglected by others had to be made up.

But the unprejudiced reader will at once realize how little it was my intention in this case to belittle my German colleagues. I have nowhere neglected to do justice to the merits of others, to the best of my knowledge. Even where I had to oppose erroneous orientations of research or one-sidedness, I have always endeavored to stress most carefully the elements of truth in the doctrines I have attacked. Nor have I disposed of anything with mere general phrases, but in each case have tried to get to the bottom of the points at issue. I was guided by the thought of making research in the field of political economy in Germany aware of its real tasks again. I thought of liberating it from the one-sided aspects harmful to the development of our science, of freeing it from its isolation in the general literary movement, and thus of preparing for the reform of political economy on German soil, a reform which this science so urgently needs in the light of its unsatisfactory state.

All great civilized nations have their specific mission in the development of sciences, and every aberration of the scholarly world of a nation, or of a considerable part of it, leaves a gap in the development of scientific knowledge. Political economy, too, cannot dispense with the single-minded cooperation of the German mind. To contribute to bringing it back to the right paths was the task of this work, which was pursued without secondary considerations.