Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences

In the Realm of Human Phenomena Exact Laws (So-Called “Laws of Nature”) Can Be Established Under the Same Formal Presuppositions as in the Realm of Natural Phenomena

No opinion is more widespread among social philosophers than that exact laws (so-called laws of nature) prevail in the realm of natural phenomena, but not in that of human phenomena, and that exact theories can be established in the former, but not in the latter. This opinion is based on the one hand on the fact that strictly typical phenomena can be observed in the realm of nature (e.g., the simplest elements of chemistry, the most elementary agencies of physics, etc.), but in the realm of human phenomena the complexity of phenomena (completely disregarding the factor of their development!) excludes a strictly typical character and thus the possibility of exact laws applying to them. On the other hand it is based on the fact that the phenomena of nature follow forces that act only mechanically, while in human phenomena the factor of will plays a decisive rôle.

But in this line of argument there are a number of fundamental errors. We admit quite unreservedly that real human phenomena are not strictly typical. We admit that just for this reason, and also as a result of the freedom of the human will—and we, of course, have no intention of denying this as a practical category—empirical laws of absolute strictness are out of the question in the realm of the phenomena of human activity. What we do attack, however, is the opinion that natural phenomena are strictly typical in their full empirical reality, or else that laws of natural phenomena of absolute strictness can be established by way of the empirical-realistic orientation of theoretical research in nature.1 From the standpoint of empirical realism exact laws of nature are just as unattainable as exact laws of social phenomena. The exact laws of nature, also, in the true meaning of this word, are not the result of empirical-realistic research in nature, but of exact research. But this, by its basic character, is analogous to exact research in the realm of social phenomena.2

The error of the social philosophers consists in the fact that they try to arrive at exact social laws by means of empirical research, and thus in a way in which exact laws of phenomena cannot be established at all, neither exact social laws nor exact natural laws.

The opinion predominating with the social philosophers that the strict laws of physics, chemistry, etc., are the result of the empirical orientation of theoretical research has had the consequence of causing some of them to try to attain exact laws of social phenomena in an “empirical” way, that is, not in an exact way. But it induces others of them to apply the standards of exact research to the results of empirical research in the realm of the social sciences and conversely the standards of empirical research to the results of exact social research. These are two errors which have had an equally pernicious effect on the development of the social sciences. We must attribute to them the greater part of the misunderstandings which dominate theoretical social research in its present-day form and in its present endeavors (cf. concerning this chapters 4, 5, and 7 of Book I).

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3 Every exact law of nature, for whatever realm of the empirical world it may claim validity, is based on two unempirical assumptions. First, that all concrete phenomena of any definite type (e.g., all oxygen, all hydrogen, all iron, etc., in the sense that the law of nature concerned conceives of these things) are qualitatively identical, and second, that they can be measured in an exact way. In reality, however, the above phenomena are neither strictly typical, nor can they be measured in an exact way (cf. p. 85 ff.).

4 It is a peculiarity of the exact social sciences that exact research in the realm of the phenomena of human activity starts with the assumption of a definite volitional orientation of the active subjects. This does not, however, establish an essential distinction between exact research in nature and exact social research, for the former starts with presuppositions which exhibit a formal analogy to the one under discussion here.

• 1Every exact law of nature, for whatever realm of the empirical world it may claim validity, is based on two unempirical assumptions. First, that all concrete phenomena of any definite type (e.g., all oxygen, all hydrogen, all iron, etc., in the sense that the law of nature concerned conceives of these things) are qualitatively identical, and second, that they can be measured in an exact way. In reality, however, the above phenomena are neither strictly typical, nor can they be measured in an exact way (cf. p. 85 ff.).
• 2It is a peculiarity of the exact social sciences that exact research in the realm of the phenomena of human activity starts with the assumption of a definite volitional orientation of the active subjects. This does not, however, establish an essential distinction between exact research in nature and exact social research, for the former starts with presuppositions which exhibit a formal analogy to the one under discussion here.
• 3But in this line of argument there are a number of fundamental errors. We admit quite unreservedly that real human phenomena are not strictly typical. We admit that just for this reason, and also as a result of the freedom of the human will—and we, of course, have no intention of denying this as a practical category—empirical laws of absolute strictness are out of the question in the realm of the phenomena of human activity. What we do attack, however, is the opinion that natural phenomena are strictly typical in their full empirical reality, or else that laws of natural phenomena of absolute strictness can be established by way of the empirical-realistic orientation of theoretical research in nature. From the standpoint of empirical realism exact laws of nature are just as unattainable as exact laws of social phenomena. The exact laws of nature, also, in the true meaning of this word, are not the result of empirical-realistic research in nature, but of exact research. But this, by its basic character, is analogous to exact research in the realm of social phenomena.
• 4But in this line of argument there are a number of fundamental errors. We admit quite unreservedly that real human phenomena are not strictly typical. We admit that just for this reason, and also as a result of the freedom of the human will—and we, of course, have no intention of denying this as a practical category—empirical laws of absolute strictness are out of the question in the realm of the phenomena of human activity. What we do attack, however, is the opinion that natural phenomena are strictly typical in their full empirical reality, or else that laws of natural phenomena of absolute strictness can be established by way of the empirical-realistic orientation of theoretical research in nature. From the standpoint of empirical realism exact laws of nature are just as unattainable as exact laws of social phenomena. The exact laws of nature, also, in the true meaning of this word, are not the result of empirical-realistic research in nature, but of exact research. But this, by its basic character, is analogous to exact research in the realm of social phenomena.