Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences

Different from the “historical orientation” and yet closely connected with its methodology is the so-called “ethical orientation” of our science. As its main representatives in German economics we can designate C. W. Ch. Schütz, B. Hildebrand, K. Dietzel, the Hungarian J. Kautz, et al. As its chief adherents, however, we can designate the majority of the historical economists of Germany.

We have already made it clear in principle in Book I1 that in respect to the theoretical portion of “political economy” this orientation means a methodological misunderstanding, a failure to recognize the true nature of theoretical research in the field of national economy and its special problems. What we should like to stress here particularly is the fact that we cannot rationally speak of an ethical orientation of theoretical economics either in respect to the exact orientation of theoretical research or to the empirical-realistic orientation.

Exact theories have in principle the task of making us understand theoretically2 individual aspects of the real world. Exact economics has the task of making us understand the economic aspect of national life. An “ethical orientation of exact economics” can thus by no means have the sense of aspiring to reveal to us at the same time the exact understanding of the ethical aspect of national life and of the economic aspect, that is, aspiring to unite the tasks of ethics and economics. The requirement of an ethical orientation of exact economics could only mean that this science must render to us exact understanding not simply of economic phenomena but of those influenced by ethical tendencies or even of those conformable to the demands of ethics. This is a postulate of research which, however, as scarcely needs to be noted, simply contradicts the nature of the exact orientation of theoretical research.3

Just as inappropriate is the idea of an ethical orientation of the empirical-realistic theory of national economy. For in this the consideration of ethical influences on national economy, as far as they are real in the phenomena of the latter, is involved in the very nature of the pertinent striving for cognition. Indeed, it is inevitable. It is impossible to attain laws of the phenomena of national economy in a realistic-empirical way without taking into consideration possible ethical influences on the phenomena. Thus we cannot imagine what sort of task an ethical orientation of empirical-realistic economics should really have.

The idea of an “ethical orientation” is in respect to the theoretical aspect of our science a vague postulate of research devoid of any deeper content.

A similar vagueness underlies the so-called “ethical orientation” in respect to the practical economic sciences. Certainly everyone is subject to the moral code in his economic activity, of whatever conceivable kind it may be. The scholar in the field of the practical sciences of economy will thus not be able to get rid of the influence of this fact, either. The basic principles of the economic action of people, as they are developed in the practical economic sciences, will have to be confined to the limits presented by law and custom.

However, this is a property of all practical sciences of whatever nature, even of politics, pedagogy, therapy, military science, even of technology. If the “ethical orientation” in the practical sciences of national economy were viewed in this sense, then there would be no practical sciences of any other but the ethical orientation, for all human endeavors, not just economic ones, are under the moral code.

Only practical sciences of economy in which ethical considerations beyond the above-characterized limits were fundamentally acknowledged as decisive for the economic activity of people, practical sciences in which economic considerations were fundamentally subordinated to those of morality—only those sciences could claim to have a distinctively ethical orientation. Presentations of this type, however, would not really be “practical sciences of economy,” but moral writings about human economy.

The so-called “ethical orientation” of political economy is thus a vague postulate devoid of any deeper meaning both in respect to the theoretical and the practical problems of the latter, a confusion in thought. We can, indeed, imagine a justified orientation of the desire for knowledge which establishes the relationship between law, morals, etc., on the one hand and economy on the other, or between ethics and economics. But the notion of an ethical orientation of economics has no greater justification than, for instance, that of an economic orientation of ethics.

Truly, this whole idea is rooted on the one hand in a failure to recognize the nature and peculiar problems of the theoretical and the practical sciences of national economy. On the other hand, it is rooted in the underestimation of the economic aspect of national life in relation to other more highly esteemed aspects and in the consequent effort of a number of our economists to ennoble by an “ethical orientation” of research an object of investigation which they do not regard highly. As if the worth of a science were dependent on its object, and the worth of those who profess it were dependent on the nature of the object, and not rather on the importance, depth, and originality of the results of their investigations! The desire for an ethical orientation of our science is in part a residue of a philosophy that comes from antiquity, and, in a different sense, of medieval-ascetic philosophy. In good part, however, it is a lamentable crutch for scientific insufficiency, just as in its day the ethical orientation of historical writing was. It is an almost typical sign of those who show insufficient ability for the solution of the problems of their science to want to get satisfactory solutions in their own field of research by bringing in the results of other sciences and utilizing them mechanically.

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4 See Chapters 6 and 7 of Book I.

5 See p. 75 ff.

6 Many writers on national economy look for the ethical orientation of theoretical economics in considering the phenomena of national economy from the point of view of morality; thus, e.g., in investigating which goods might be acknowledged as such from the standpoint of the latter, that is, might be acknowledged as “true” goods; in investigating which prices, incomes on capital, etc., are to be designated as morally objectionable. In this, however, as scarcely needs to be noted, there is no ethical orientation of research in economics, but a moral judgment on single phenomena of national economy. This judgment in no way can touch the results of theoretical research in the field of national economy. An ever so “untrue” or “immoral” item of goods is subject to the economic laws of value, of price, etc., and is thus from the economic standpoint an “item of goods” whose value, price, etc., must be interpreted theoretically just as well as the value or price of goods serving the highest purposes. Or should an “ethical” theory of national economy perhaps reject in principle the interpretation of economic phenomena to be observed in connection with goods which serve immoral purposes? Is it to limit itself to the theoretical interpretation of that part of economic phenomena which are in harmony with the principles of ethics or a certain ethical orientation? What science, then, would have the task of giving us theoretical understanding of the laws of “not true” goods, or of the “not ethical” phenomena of national economy?

• 1See Chapters 6 and 7 of Book I.
• 2See p. 75 ff.
• 3Many writers on national economy look for the ethical orientation of theoretical economics in considering the phenomena of national economy from the point of view of morality; thus, e.g., in investigating which goods might be acknowledged as such from the standpoint of the latter, that is, might be acknowledged as “true” goods; in investigating which prices, incomes on capital, etc., are to be designated as morally objectionable. In this, however, as scarcely needs to be noted, there is no ethical orientation of research in economics, but a moral judgment on single phenomena of national economy. This judgment in no way can touch the results of theoretical research in the field of national economy. An ever so “untrue” or “immoral” item of goods is subject to the economic laws of value, of price, etc., and is thus from the economic standpoint an “item of goods” whose value, price, etc., must be interpreted theoretically just as well as the value or price of goods serving the highest purposes. Or should an “ethical” theory of national economy perhaps reject in principle the interpretation of economic phenomena to be observed in connection with goods which serve immoral purposes? Is it to limit itself to the theoretical interpretation of that part of economic phenomena which are in harmony with the principles of ethics or a certain ethical orientation? What science, then, would have the task of giving us theoretical understanding of the laws of “not true” goods, or of the “not ethical” phenomena of national economy?
• 4We have already made it clear in principle in Book I that in respect to the theoretical portion of “political economy” this orientation means a methodological misunderstanding, a failure to recognize the true nature of theoretical research in the field of national economy and its special problems. What we should like to stress here particularly is the fact that we cannot rationally speak of an ethical orientation of theoretical economics either in respect to the exact orientation of theoretical research or to the empirical-realistic orientation.
• 5Exact theories have in principle the task of making us understand theoretically individual aspects of the real world. Exact economics has the task of making us understand the economic aspect of national life. An “ethical orientation of exact economics” can thus by no means have the sense of aspiring to reveal to us at the same time the exact understanding of the ethical aspect of national life and of the economic aspect, that is, aspiring to unite the tasks of ethics and economics. The requirement of an ethical orientation of exact economics could only mean that this science must render to us exact understanding not simply of economic phenomena but of those influenced by ethical tendencies or even of those conformable to the demands of ethics. This is a postulate of research which, however, as scarcely needs to be noted, simply contradicts the nature of the exact orientation of theoretical research.
• 6Exact theories have in principle the task of making us understand theoretically individual aspects of the real world. Exact economics has the task of making us understand the economic aspect of national life. An “ethical orientation of exact economics” can thus by no means have the sense of aspiring to reveal to us at the same time the exact understanding of the ethical aspect of national life and of the economic aspect, that is, aspiring to unite the tasks of ethics and economics. The requirement of an ethical orientation of exact economics could only mean that this science must render to us exact understanding not simply of economic phenomena but of those influenced by ethical tendencies or even of those conformable to the demands of ethics. This is a postulate of research which, however, as scarcely needs to be noted, simply contradicts the nature of the exact orientation of theoretical research.