Copyright, 1892,

By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.

Printed at the Appleton Press, U. S. A.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONFUSION OF ETHICAL THOUGHT.

§ 111. If, in common with other things, human feelings and ideas conform to the general law of evolution, the implication is that the set of conceptions constituting ethics, together with the associated sentiments, arise out of a relatively incoherent and indefinite consciousness; and slowly acquire coherence and definiteness at the same time that the aggregate of them differentiates from the larger aggregate with which it is originally mingled.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL?

§ 119. A silent protest has been made by many readers, and probably by most, while reading that section of the foregoing chapter which describes the ethics of enmity.

CHAPTER III.

AGGRESSION.

§ 125. Under this title, accepted in its full meaning, may be ranged many kinds of acts—acts so many and various that they cannot be dealt with in one chapter. Here I propose to restrict the application of the title to acts inflicting bodily injury on others to the extent of killing or wounding them—acts of kinds which we class as destructive.

CHAPTER IV.

ROBBERY.

§ 130. Between physically injuring another, partially or to the death, and injuring him either by taking possession of his body and labour, or of his property, the kinship in nature is obvious. Both direct and indirect injuries are comprehended under the title Aggression; and the second, like the first, might, without undue straining of words, have been brought within the limits of the last chapter.

CHAPTER V.

REVENGE.

§ 134. Among intelligent creatures the struggle for existence entails aggressions. Where these are not the destructive aggressions of carnivorous creatures on their prey, they are the aggressions, not necessarily destructive but commonly violent, of creatures competing with one another for food. Animals severally impelled by hunger are inevitably led into antagonisms by endeavours severally to seize whatever food they can; and injuries, more or less decided, are usual concomitants.

CHAPTER VI.

JUSTICE.

§ 138. Perhaps the soul of goodness in things evil is by nothing better exemplified than by the good thing, justice, which, in a rudimentary form, exists within the evil thing revenge. Meeting aggression by counter-aggression is, in the first place, an endeavour to avoid being suppressed by the aggressor, and to maintain that ability to carry on life which justice implies; and it is, in the second place, an endeavour to enforce justice by establishing an equality with the aggressor: inflicting injuries as great as have been received.

CHAPTER VII.

GENEROSITY.

§ 142. To bring into intelligible order the kinds of conduct ordinarily grouped under the name Generosity, is difficult; partly because much which passes under the name is not really prompted by generous feeling, and partly because generosity rightly so-called is complex in nature and its composition variable.

CHAPTER VIII.

HUMANITY.

§ 150. The division between the subject-matter of this chapter and that of the last chapter, is in large measure artificial, and defensible only for convenience sake. Kindness, pity, mercy, which we here group under the general head of humanity, are closely allied to generosity; though less liable than it to be simulated by lower feelings. They are all altruistic sentiments, and have for their common root, sympathy.