The Monroe Doctrine occupies an unusual place in American political discourse. It is often invoked as though it announced a permanent rule of hemispheric governance, capable of being revived or enforced by later administrations. In contemporary usage, it is frequently treated as a declaration of American authority over the Western hemisphere or as a justification for intervention against foreign powers and regional governments. This understanding does not reflect the document as written, the circumstances that produced it, or the limits its authors assumed.
The Monroe Doctrine was not a standing policy. It was a situational proclamation issued in response to a narrow set of geopolitical concerns in the early nineteenth century. Once those conditions passed, the doctrine lost its operative meaning. What remains today is not a living policy, but a historical text repeatedly repurposed to justify authority it never conferred.
The doctrine originated in President James Monroe’s annual message to Congress in December 1823. At the time, the political landscape of the Americas was rapidly changing. Mexico won independence from Spain in 1821. The Central American provinces, including what would become Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, declared independence that same year. South America had been in revolt for more than a decade. These movements were largely complete by the early 1820s, though their political stability remained uncertain. In Europe, the Napoleonic Wars had recently ended, and conservative monarchies organized under the Holy Alliance asserted a right to suppress liberal revolutions and restore traditional regimes. France intervened militarily in Spain in 1823, raising concerns that European powers might assist Spain in reclaiming its former colonies. Russia, meanwhile, was advancing territorial claims along the Pacific coast of North America.
It was in response to these developments that Monroe articulated what later came to be called the Monroe Doctrine. The relevant passages of the message are explicit about their scope. Monroe stated that the American continents, “by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain,” were not to be considered subjects for future colonization by European powers. The conditional clause is central. The prohibition on colonization was tied directly to the existing independence of American states, not to any claim of American authority over them. Monroe further emphasized that the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of Europe or in existing European colonies. “In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves,” he stated, “we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do.” American action, he explained, would be defensive and limited to circumstances in which American rights were invaded or seriously menaced.
Nothing in the proclamation asserted a right to intervene in the internal affairs of other American states, to exercise supervisory authority, or to control regional politics. The doctrine functioned as a diplomatic warning directed outward, not as a charter of authority directed inward. It was inseparable from the conditions that produced it. The United States in 1823 lacked the military capacity to enforce hemispheric dominance. British naval power, driven by Britain’s interest in open trade rather than restored empires, was the principal deterrent to European recolonization.
This understanding of restraint was not unique to Monroe. In the aftermath of the 1837 Caroline affair during the Upper Canada rebellion, Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated what later became known as the Caroline doctrine. In correspondence with British officials, Webster rejected broad claims of preventive self-defense and insisted that any use of force must be justified by a necessity that was instant, overwhelming, and left no choice of means or moment for deliberation. The episode, which arose from tensions along the Maine and Canadian border, reflected the same underlying principle found in the Monroe Doctrine—force was permissible only as a last resort, tied to concrete threats, and limited by proportionality.
Even in its own century, the Monroe Doctrine did not operate as an enforceable rule of international conduct. European powers continued to intervene in the Americas after 1823, most notably through France’s installation of Emperor Maximilian in Mexico during the 1860s. More significantly, the doctrine’s reciprocal foundation eroded as the United States abandoned its own commitment to non-intervention. By the late nineteenth century, American foreign policy had shifted decisively away from restraint. The Spanish-American War (1898) and subsequent American control over Cuba and Puerto Rico marked a clear departure from the posture Monroe described.
This shift was formalized with the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt asserted that conditions of political disorder in the Western hemisphere could justify American intervention to forestall European involvement. This reasoning inverted the Monroe Doctrine’s logic. Where Monroe warned against external interference, Roosevelt asserted a discretionary right of internal interference. The corollary was not derived from the text of the Monroe Doctrine, it replaced it.
The subsequent Lodge Corollary of 1912 further illustrates how far American policy had moved from Monroe’s original premises. Proposed by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and adopted by the Senate, the resolution asserted that the United States would oppose the acquisition of territory in the Western hemisphere by non-American powers, including through private or corporate control. Although narrower than later interpretations, the Lodge Corollary marked a departure from Monroe’s concern with formal European colonization tied to post-Napoleonic restoration. It reflected a growing emphasis on exclusion rather than reciprocity. Even so, it did not purport to authorize regime change, military dominance, or political supervision of American states.
Once the United States engaged in repeated interventions throughout Central America and the Caribbean, and later committed itself permanently to European security through two world wars and enduring alliances, the reciprocal premise of the Monroe Doctrine ceased to exist. A policy grounded in mutual non-intervention cannot survive when one party abandons that principle. At that point, the doctrine no longer functioned as written; it persisted only as rhetoric.
Recent invocations of the Monroe Doctrine illustrate how far this rhetorical detachment has progressed. In a December 6, 2025 speech at the Reagan National Defense Forum, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said:
This is the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, recently codified so clearly in the National Security Strategy. After years of neglect, the United States will restore U.S. military dominance in the Western Hemisphere. We will use it to protect our homeland and access to key terrain throughout the region.
On January 3, 2026, Secretary Hegseth stated:
Venezuela has a long history of being a rich and prosperous country. It’s been stolen away from its people by horrific leadership. We can do both help them and help the United States in the western hemisphere by reestablishing the Monroe Doctrine. Peace through strength with our allies.
These statements treat the Monroe Doctrine as a basis for military dominance, territorial access, and political intervention. Yet nothing in the 1823 proclamation authorizes such actions. The doctrine does not confer a right to strike nations, change regimes, or manage regional politics. It addressed a specific fear that European monarchies might reimpose colonial rule on newly-independent American states in the early nineteenth century. That fear no longer defines the international system. The political geography of the Americas has been settled for generations. European colonial ambitions in the hemisphere collapsed long ago. The United States itself has repeatedly violated the reciprocal restraint on which the doctrine depended.
To speak of “reestablishing” the Monroe Doctrine under these conditions is to misunderstand the nature of the document. A presidential message tied to a specific historical moment cannot be revived as a standing policy any more than any other nineteenth-century speech can be treated as binding authority today. The doctrine was not a statute, a treaty, or a constitutional provision. It was a contextual warning issued in response to temporary conditions. Once those conditions disappeared, the doctrine’s operative meaning disappeared with them.
From an Austrian perspective, this process is neither surprising nor unique. Ludwig von Mises argued that state intervention rarely remains limited to its original scope, but instead generates pressures for further intervention as earlier measures fail to resolve the problems they create. In Interventionism: An Economic Analysis, Mises described this dynamic as a process in which political authorities continually expand their reach by reinterpreting prior actions as justifications for new ones, rather than as limits on power. The evolution of the Monroe Doctrine follows this pattern. A historically contingent warning, once untethered from its original context, becomes a flexible instrument of policy rather than a constraint on it.
