Mises Wire

The Confusion About Monopoly Power

Monopoly

People dislike monopolies. When asked why, the response is often some variation of mainstream monopoly theory, namely, that monopolists can “take advantage” of their situation—their “monopoly power”—by raising prices. In other words, a monopoly harms consumers, who end up paying higher (if not exorbitant or “usury”) prices. But this is an assertion without basis. As with so many other popular beliefs about economics, the claim as stated is false, but it can be true under certain circumstances. In other words, what is believed to be the cause of the effect is not actually so.

Monopoly means simply “single seller” (the opposite situation, a single buyer, is called “monopsony”). That there is a single seller of something is about as significant as there being two, three, or 12 sellers. The same logic applies: it is the reservation prices of the sellers that determine at what prices buyers can actually acquire a good. The market price is established through a bidding contest between buyers and sellers, respectively, based on each of their reservation prices.

The market price that emerges from this bidding process is an exchange ratio. In a market economy, it is expressed in the amount of money that is required to purchase the good in question. Money, as the commonly-used medium of exchange, is the common denominator, whose purchasing power is determined by buyers’ bidding for and choosing between different goods at specific prices.

Given this brief explanation of price formation, there is no way of determining a principal difference between a monopoly price and a competitive price. Both are the outcome of the same process. The reason we think of a situation with multiple competing sellers as more of a market situation is that sellers in a specialized economy rarely value the goods in themselves but rather are in the business of (producing and) selling them for money. So sellers may be willing to sell at lower prices if they have to. And they might indeed have to if buyers can choose between several sellers.

In order to avoid such a situation—price competition—producer-sellers often differentiate their products, engage in innovation, branding, etc. to increase the value of their offered good as compared to what other sellers offer. What this means, in effect, is to target different market segments that value different things. A MacBook Pro is different from a Surface Laptop, for example, not because they have different uses (they do not) but because their respective users appreciate different things from high-end laptops beyond such things as performance, size, and design.

We can already see that there is a fundamental problem with mainstream monopoly theory, because it requires that goods are substitutes and thus that price is the only discriminating factor. But how often is this the case in a real market?

There is an additional complicating factor here, namely, that Menger clearly defined a good in terms of the subjective want(s) that it satisfies. In other words, two goods that for an observer may appear identical may for the prospective buyers be completely different goods. To use the same example as above, despite their similar functionality, performance, and design, for MacBook Pro users a Surface Laptop is not even an option—and probably vice versa. (Already, then, the mainstream theory is starting to fall apart).

Even so, do not firms differentiate their products in order to raise prices? Yes, but because by doing so they better target a market niche where their products—their enhanced and differentiated such—are of greater value to customers. It is the market segment’s higher willingness to pay that allows for (and, in fact, leads to) a higher market price, not some vague notion of “power.”

This is the case also for monopolies, which are not in principle different from sellers’ differentiation of products, whether it occurs as tailoring the good to fit a specific type of user or innovating an entirely new one. The reason the market price for such a differentiated good is “higher” is that it is more highly valued by customers, who therefore are willing to pay more for it.

But what about monopolists taking advantage of their customers? The price of a good will indeed likely fall as competitors enter and attempt to capture the profits of an incumbent. So in this sense, the “monopoly price” (the market price when there is only one seller) should be higher than the later formed competitive price when more sellers have entered. But were it not for the higher price (and higher profitability), the competitors would not enter. It is the profit opportunity that incentivizes new entrants, which then force the market price down.

In other words, a monopolist in the open market can only hope to remain a monopolist for as long as the market price of the good is not high enough to attract new competitors. The only way to be able to “take advantage” of a market monopoly over any period of time is therefore to keep prices so low that willing potential competitors choose not to enter. In other words, to keep profits relatively low. (Or, alternatively, to keep innovating so that competitors cannot keep up with the level of value creation).

This is where most people choose to reject the market logic even if they have had no problem following along until now. Because we know instinctively that monopolies are (must be) bad and that monopolists take advantage of customers. So the free-market logic cannot be accurate.

No, the logic is accurate and it applies without exceptions. However, most monopolies are not in fact free-market phenomena. And this makes a real but often overlooked difference.

In regulated markets there are artificial barriers to entry, which protect incumbents in any industry from would-be competitors as well as from value-creative differentiation. Protected by regulations, a monopolist can indeed take advantage of the situation and maintain reservation prices that would in any other situation be at best foolish. This is possible because customers have no option and will not have options—the competitive pressure of an open market, regardless of how many sellers exist in the present, is greatly reduced because of the regulations.

What makes a monopoly exploitative, then, is not what the word seems to suggest—it is not simply because there is a single seller. The reason a monopolist can maintain exorbitant profitability over time is that there is no threat of profits attracting new entrants. That is because regulations make it all but impossible to compete with an incumbent for a share of their profits.

The real cause of “monopoly power” is not, as many seem to assume, that it is a monopoly, but the power to impose protective regulations.

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