Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics

A Note on Cartels

The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics
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Volume 12, Number 1 (Spring 2009)

 

Cartels, characterized by activities such as simultaneous price increases or decreases, or virtual price identity at almost the same time, without explicit communications or agreements, have long been discussed. For the first time, in this article,  the price leadership model is suggested as an explanation.

CITE THIS ARTICLE

Jeon, Yoong-Deok. "A Note on Cartels." The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 12, No. 1 (2009): 65–72.

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