An Economic Analysis of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Wagner Act, and the Labor Representation Industry

Tags Legal SystemPolitical TheoryProduction Theory

07/30/2014Morgan O. Reynolds

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Economists have been relatively silent about the legislation from the 1930's which supports unionism and collective bargaining in the United States. A failure to apply economic analysis to the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner acts has allowed a consensus about this legislation to develop among labor writers, basically by default.

Volume 6, Number 3 (1982)

Author:

Morgan O. Reynolds

Morgan O. Reynolds (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1971) was chief economist at the U.S. Department of Labor, 2001–2002. He is retired as a professor of economics at Texas A&M University. He is author of Power and Privilege: Labor Unions in America (1984), Economics of Labor (1995), and Making America Poorer (1987), and more than 60 articles in scholarly journals. He is an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute, and a senior fellow of the National Center for Policy Analysis based in Dallas, Texas. Contact: https://nomoregames.net/contact/

Cite This Article

Reynolds, Morgan O. "Economic Analysis of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Wagner Act, and the Labor Representation Industry." Journal of Libertarian Studies 6, No. 3 (1982): 227–266.

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