The quirky nature of credit is that it is not necessarily better in abundance, writes Christopher Mayer. It's not like beer, butter, and bananas--where more means cheaper and cheaper is good. Credit is like money; it represents buying power. More credit means more buying power, which means a bidding up of assets and a spark for an unsustainable boom.
The well-being of the majority of any nation's economically disenfranchised citizens could be realized without any state control of the nation's money supply or state regulation of peaceful economic activity, writes Harry Valetine. It is a lesson that could inspire entire populations to wrest control of the economy away from the statist elitists.
Philadelphia was the home not only of the first two federal banks, but it was the home of the two libertarian political economists who introduced and defended the independent treasury idea into the public consciousness, and created public pressure for its enactment.
Any manager of a private trust fund who would dare to spend the funds entrusted to him and replace them with his IOUs would face criminal charges, writes Hans Sennholz. When the U.S. Treasury does it, it is called "creative financing." But there is a price to be paid.
This is how government works: If you can be really egregious at what you do--say you run Amtrak, the Defense or Education departments or, better yet, the SEC--you scream out that there is a dire national need. Then it will be easy to find legislators to turn on the money spigot for you and give you “whatever” you need.
The burdens imposed upon producers by easy money and their consequent lack of profitability are among the main reasons why there is no significant capital expenditure. The overhang from the 2000 capital-spending boom only partly exacerbates this, since much of the outlay undertaken then was wastefully misallocated and is not germane to the needs of the current economy anyway.
The monetary situation in Argentina is a glaring example of confiscatory deflation. In 1992, after yet another bout of hyperinflation, Argentina pegged its new currency, the peso, to the US dollar at the rate of 1-to-1. In order to maintain this fixed peso/dollar peg, the Argentine central bank pledged to freely exchange dollars for pesos on demand and to back its own liabilities, consisting of peso notes and commercial bank reserve deposits denominated in pesos, almost 100 percent by dollars.
It has been said that the stock market is not an actuarial table. The same can be said of the bond market. Rather than an infallible guide to the future, the bond market embodies the best guesses, hopes, dreams, and fears of many investors. Hence, the bond market can be fallible and, in fact, has been so—in spectacular fashion—in the past.
The U.S. government's plan to introduce an improved Consumer Price Index that theoretically would measure inflation more accurately is an exercise in futility. Inflation is not about a general increase in prices; it is about increases in the money supply. Hence, whatever the improved index would measure has nothing to do with true inflation.
As with all economic calamities, pundits will find some way to blame the meltdown and collapse of Argentina on capitalism, deregulation, or the private sector generally. Such nonsense. This crisis is a product of government incompetence, made to order by the IMF, the Argentine political leadership, and the US. As a reminder that the choice of economic policy isn’t politically trivial, the government’s errors ended in hunger, bloodshed, and the resignation (and narrow escape) of the country’s president.
