Podcast

Bob gives a brief history of money in the United States, explaining that the dollar was much “harder” in, say, 1810 than it was in 1910.

The collapse of the monetary order in 1971 reflected the massive dislocations and malinvestment of resources that ultimately turned the decade into one crisis after another. Keynesians are doing something similar today.

Victor Davis Hanson's cartoonish conception of how foreign states act is not supported by history and contributes to the US government’s insane defense expenditures and destructive crusades around the globe.

Most Egyptians have lived their whole lives in a country where the government heavily subsidizes bread prices. But now the deeply indebted Egyptian state faces some tough choices, and Egypt's poor may suffer the most.

Even at a "mere" two-percent level, cumulative price increases over time are nothing to scoff at. Even worse, if we look at what people really spend money on, price inflation doesn't much reflect the conclusions of "official" stats.

Fifty years after Nixon closed the gold window, prices are heading toward 1970s-era increases. Yet the Fed cannot increase interest rates as long as the politicians keep creating billions of new debts.

Nixon’s closing the gold window should be seen as the end of the last remnant of the gold standard, not some kind of market failure. Governments controlled most of the gold and set its price.

It's not just the civilian politicians. For twenty years, the military itself pressed for more war, endlessly claiming that victory was right around the corner.

In 1971, David Rockefeller favored a “new international monetary system with greater flexibility” and “less reliance on gold.” Seeing an opportunity to expand his own power, Richard Nixon enthusiastically embraced the scheme.

There is no reason to expect the Afghanistan debacle to humble Washington policymakers. Korean War fiascos were swept under the rug, paving the way for the Vietnam War. The cycle didn't end there.