Leftism
16. Leftism Goes from War to War
However important that seismic area, however tragic American intervention in that region, the fact remains that the American public at large was not really interested in that part of the globe—at least until the “Sudeten Crisis” in September 1938. This is less true of the American left, and here we come to the great sin of omission of the American right—or perhaps of the right of conservative circles almost anywhere in the West. When Hitler actively intervened on behalf of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia in 1938 and effectively blackmailed England, Neville Chamberlain referred to Czechoslovakia as a country “of which we know so little.” This, at least, was an honest and candid confession.
This leftist monopoly on foreign affairs, however, is not only due to a conservative default, to a sour suspicious retreat in disappointment and offense. At the back of it lies something even more tragic: the imminent fear in the American noncommitted right that the left, so nicely rooted in American folklore, after all, is riding the Wave of the Future. How, otherwise, could one understand that temperamentally very conservative boards of trustees of colleges and universities have repeatedly hired professors notorious for their leftist ideas? How could one understand that archconservative American businessmen have sent their sons and especially their daughters to institutions of learning equally well known for their exorbitant rates and their extreme leftism, a leftism pertaining to politics, history, philosophy, economics—and morals? How often do well-paid Marxists in such places indirectly and even directly tell intellectually innocent maidens—at their hard-toiling fathers’ expense—that their procreators are real scoundrels and bloodsuckers? Yet the hard-toiling fathers know all this and both parents accept this state of affairs with a sigh: it is, after all, the “proper thing to do” to provide the dear little thing with a highbrow education in a college with high social rating and to acquaint her with all “advanced ideas.” They might hope that, once safely married to an equally hardworking stockbroker, the good girl would wake up from sweet leftist dreams and end up as secretary of the local Women’s Republican Club.
In Fascist Italy the execution of these two anarchists was taken as a national insult. In 1928 Luigi Rusticucci published a book in Naples, Tragedia e supplizip di Sacco e Vanzetti, whose preface was written by Arnaldo Mussolini, brother of the Duce. Vanzetti’s earthly remains were brought back to Italy and buried. Around his grave (with the connivance of Fascist authorities) a local cult developed. The fact that these men were anarchists (and not Communists) was an aggravating circumstance in European feelings. “That’s what we all are,” was a not infrequent reaction, “but unfortunately, it is an irrealistic attitude and conviction.” This is also one of the reasons why the Rosenberg trial and the execution of the ill-fated couple did not create the same stir in Europe as the Sacco-Vanzetti case had. Against the background of millions dying in Red concentration camps and hundreds executed for “speculation,” the protest movement in Europe did not materially transcend the Communist camp.
Nor was Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning too hostile toward Hitler or his henchmen. As a matter of fact, even the Anschluss was right away recognized by the United States, and the American Legation in Vienna swiftly transformed into a Consulate General. The Reichsmordwoche (“Reich Murder Week”), starting on June 30, 1934, during which the Nazis assassinated hundreds of opponents, “traitors,” and rivals within a few days, did not trouble American-German relations. American public opinion had neither been particularly upset by Japan’s grabbing Manchuria (aggression should have been stopped right there), nor by Mussolini’s conquest of Ethiopia—which even Mr. Herbert L. Matthews of the New York Times “underwrote.” (Only a black pilot in Harlem volunteered for the Abyssinian air force—a mulatto in sympathy with Semitic Amharas under the flag of “Negro solidarity.”) Americans, however, were duly aroused by the Spanish Civil War which broke out in July 1936. To the American left this was the Crusade of Crusades, a far more sacred cause than either World War I or World War II.
The birth of the Republic was marred by endless acts of mob violence, by the burning of churches and monasteries (see p. 269), by endless strikes, by outbreaks of brigandage and a rapid decline of general security. To every unbiased observer it was evident that a democratic Spanish republic is a grotesque proposition. The democratic republic might work in the United States and in Switzerland, but since Spaniards are radically different from Genevans or Philadelphians, it was obvious that the experiment would fail—and fail only slightly less than it did in Russia.
He certainly was not the most likely man in the Spanish Army to do what had been repeatedly done in Spanish America—establish military rule. General Sanjurjo was the man to do this. Sanjurjo failed, unfortunately, in a premature uprising and went to Portugal. After the elections in 1936, when matters went from bad to worse, Sanjurjo planned another uprising. Franco at that time had been sent to the Canary Islands by the leftist government; he had become suspect. At the same time the left also planned a takeover which was scheduled for late July.
The situation at that time was this: The larger part of the army and a minor part of the navy had joined the military rising. The air force was almost wholly Loyalist. The richest parts of Spain were under the control of the Republicans, the poorest and most “backward” on the Franco side. Almost all the industrial areas were Loyalist, but the most historical provinces (Old Castile, Léon, Galicia, part of Aragón, and Navarre) were Nationalist. The term “Nationalist” is not entirely wrong in view of the fact that the Franco side stressed national values, and that the cry “Viva España!” was used among the nationalists, but was strictly taboo on the Loyalist side.
German aid, outside of aviation, was merely technical (pioneers, materiel, signal corps) and after the conquest of the north Spanish industrial area (Basque provinces, Asturias) Nationalist Spain was financially quite independent. Italian military aid, for some time, had been substantial and the conquest of Málaga was carried out largely by Italian troops. But after the defeat of the Fascist units at Guadalajara the number of Fascist “volunteers” decreased and they were hardly visible during the spring offensive in 1938. As to mere manpower, the Loyalists had the edge over the Nationalists all the time and they were well provided with materiel, especially with tanks, by the Russians. The number of volunteers in the International Brigades—more genuinely convinced and certainly more fanatical than the Italian Fascist units—were considerable: Guesses vary from 40,000 to 60,000. A few volunteers, other than Germans or Italians, also fought on the Nationalist side. There were 600 to 700 Irish who withdrew relatively soon because they could not stand the Spanish food. There were some individual Portuguese and French volunteers (active Catholic monarchists). Actually, the only way to join was to enter the Spanish Foreign Legion—and to sign up for five years was a rather unattractive proposition.
Neither the Nazis nor the Italians were able to cash in on their “investments” in Spain. Franco saw Hitler only once and, as an old specialist on criminals from his days in the Tercio, he immediately sized up his partner. There never has been an Axis Madrid-Berlin; The Rome-Berlin Axis, on the other hand, had been largely the work of Western leftist ineptitude. Fascism and Nazism, as we have pointed out, were never sufficiently close to agree on a common foreign policy. Masters are often furious if their disciples go their own ways or achieve greater fame. The crucial point in Hitler’s expansionist plans was Austria—not because it was his (despised) land of birth, but because the geopolitical edifice of Central Europe as constructed by the Paris Treaties was such that the elimination of only one brick was enough to bring it down; with the Anschluss perfected, the most important part of Czechoslovakia (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) was totally encircled and could be strangled by merely closing the borders. When Czechoslovakia was incorporated into the Reich, Poland was similarly encircled, and so forth.
It was in Italy’s self-interest to preserve Austria’s independence and in the crisis of the summer 1934, after the murder of Dollfuss and the pitched battles fought in Central and Southern Austria between the Heimwehr and the illegal Nazi formations, Mussolini mobilized against Germany. Several divisions stood at the border of the North Tyrol and of Carinthia. The Italian army, for better or for worse, was then the guarantor of Austria’s survival.
In the eyes of the left, Austria was hardly worth saving because it was a “Fascist” state. It had started as a democratic republic in 1918, but ideological differences tore the country asunder. Already in 1927 a demonstration in Vienna had degenerated into a revolt, the Palace of Justice was burned down by a mixed Socialist-Communist mob, and there were over a hundred casualties. The non-Socialist element started to counterorganize and thus the Heimwehr, the “Home Defense League,” was born. But the Socialists too put up a private army, the “Republican Defense League” (Republikanischer Schutzbund), and although either formation hardly ever appeared with arms in public, it was obvious that they possessed weapons illegally. The Socialist bailiwick, naturally, was the city of Vienna which, for years, had engaged in big housing programs: Enormous fortresslike buildings were erected in a belt around Vienna and created the impression that, in a civil war, the Red city was ready to defend itself against the rest of the country whose predominantly non-Socialist convictions were only too well known.
In the meantime the Nazi peril arose. The Nazis also organized along military lines, also established para-military formations and prepared for the “Day X.” All through 1933 and in early 1934 the Nazis engaged in a terror campaign, similar to that of the Viet Cong. They threw bombs, committed arson, destroyed bridges, etc.
The government in the meantime consisted only of members of the Christian Social Party and the Heimwehr. The parliament had ceased to function due to a technicality, i.e., the absolute equality of mandates of government and opposition. The constitution stated that the largest party was to provide the Speaker, but since the government had eighty-one mandates, the opposition eighty (Socialists, Communists, and pro-Nazi Pan-Germans), and the Speaker was not permitted to participate in the voting, a complete stalemate had ensued. With the aid of a wartime emergency law the cabinet continued to be in power without consulting the parliament. No elections were decreed since a number of Nazis would have been voted into parliament, creating a situation not quite as bad but similar to that of Germany in 1932. There was no possibility for democratic government—and the government, relatively unmolested by the Socialists, desperately fought the terroristic Nazis.
Among leftist circles between San Francisco and Moscow the indignation against “Austro-Fascism” and “Clerico-Fascism” was boundless. The crackdown on the Social Democrats (often represented as kind democrats with social leanings) was construed as an action of the Dollfuss regime in obedience to Mussolini’s orders, which was by no means the case. Mussolini was interested only in having a buffer between Italy and Germany. A right-of-center government suited him well. Yet the fact remained that in this outbreak the Socialists had in fact acted as Nazi collaborators—as certain Buddhists in South Vietnam acted in fact as Viet Cong collaborators—and that the Nazis had received orders from Berlin to stay put. The Socialists were ideologically nearer to the Nazis than the Heimwehr, the Monarchists, the Catholic Church, or all true right-wingers. True, there was an entente between Dollfuss and Mussolini (the only effective protector of Austrian independence!), but the Nazis loathed Austria’s cooperation with the Latin-Catholic world. Therefore they planned to murder Dollfuss before his forthcoming meeting with Mussolini, which was scheduled for the last days of July 1934.
At the Stresa Conference Mussolini informed Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Minister, and Monsieur Laval, that he intended to attack Abyssinia, a country with whom the Italians (as now the Somalis) had border difficulties. He made it clear that he would use the opportunity to take revenge for the defeat of Adowa in 1896 and would conquer all of Abyssinia. In the beginning his declaration made little impression and since he met with no protest he proceeded to prepare this war—no doubt a war of aggression against the spirit and the letter of the League of Nations Charter. To make matters worse, it was Italy who had introduced Abyssinia into the League of Nations, an entry opposed by Britain because Abyssinia was suspected of tolerating slavery and practicing barbaric punishments (mutilations, etc.).
With the buildup of Mussolini’s overseas forces British public opinion became increasingly restive and leftist circles, which also had a hold on a certain sector of the Conservative party, demanded that Britain adhere strictly to the League of Nations Charter and that military-economic sanctions should be imposed on Italy for breaking the rules. Of the great powers only the Soviet Union, Germany, the United States, and Japan did not belong to the League.
The tragic results of the sanctions soon made themselves felt. The Nazis in Austria greeted each other with a knowing smile saying “Haile Selassieh!” instead of “Heil Hitler!” They knew that the West’s stand in the Abyssinian case was the beginning of the end of Austria’s independence. And so it was. England could not possibly assume moral leadership in a general action to prevent Italy from acquiring colonies: Being the archcolonialist herself she could not really turn to Italy saying, “Colonial conquests were possible until 1919, but now that we have the League, now that we all believe in peace, democracy, equality, progress, universal brotherhood and other niceties, you have to stay where you are.” In Italian (and not only in Fascist) eyes England behaved like a millionaire organizing other rich men to prevent a shiftless proletarian from becoming a skilled worker. (Of course, Italy would not have greatly benefited from Abyssinia, but that’s not the point. Colonies meant prestige, and only in exceptional cases eventual riches!)
Mr. Anthony Eden (today the Earl of Avon) thus is the creator of the Axis. He embodied the policy that drove Italy into the arms of Germany. Mussolini, being not a gentleman but a common man personally hurt by all and any criticism, burst into obscene rantings against England. American public opinion under leftist leadership sided with Britain and the League. Germany, however, derived a great profit—material and political—from this development. Isolated Italy was her prey.
Why did Neville Chamberlain not collaborate with the conspirators? No ideological reasons were involved, only the curious inability of the Britishers and Americans to project themselves into the minds and temperaments of other nations. I can almost visualize the faces of the men in Downing Street after Theodor Kordt’s departure. They must have looked at each other with a mixture of embarrassment, suspicion, surprise, disdain, uneasiness, and discomfort—until one of them exclaimed, “Damn it, this is a preposterous E. Phillips Oppenheim story! Can any one of you chaps imagine a bloody general arresting His Majesty’s Prime Minister?” Indeed, no one could visualize a British general handcuffing Mr. Churchill or Mr. Attlee. Here, however, we are up against an old Anglo-Saxon limitation and an insoluble dilemma. The dilemma arises in the minds of the British or the Americans when their belief in radical human differences, if not in racial superiority, suddenly and mysteriously collapses giving way to the very opposite conviction, i.e., that human beings everywhere are “basically the same,” that they are “more alike than unlike.” Here is a source of endless miscalculations, misinterpretations, and catastrophic errors.
