Eminent Domain and Economic Development: The Mill Acts and the Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism

In Kelo v. City of New London (2005), the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of the eminent domain power to take property from homeowners for the purpose of economic development. Under the Fifth Amendment, wrote Justice John Paul Stevens for the majority, eminent domain may be used only for a public purpose. But “public purpose” is a broad concept.

Volume 21, Number 2 (2007)

Nozick’s Failed Defense of the Just State

In this paper, I argue that Nozick fails to adequately defend the claim that a just state would arise from a Lockean state of nature by a process which need not violate libertarian rights. In particular, I argue that the state-creating processes cited by Nozick are antithetical to the enforcement rights (those rights such as self-defense and the exacting of just restitution) of persons.

Volume 21, Number 1 (2007)

Is Government Really Inevitable?

In response to my article, “Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable” (2004), Walter Block (2005) offers a detailed refutation of my argument on the inevitability of government. I want to respond to some of what Block said because I think that in his zest to show where he thinks I have erred, he has overlooked the larger issue of how one might determine whether government really is inevitable.

Volume 21, Number 1 (2007)

Contra Anarcho-Capitalism

Mixing economics and government is a dangerous idea, nearly as dangerous as mixing church and government. With the latter, you get a theocracy, and with the former, the unwieldy behemoth of the American political-economic system—both very undesirable. After the trauma of the Great Depression and the wide-scale introduction of paternalistic government by Franklin Roosevelt, Americans have acquired an unhealthy mistrust of capitalism.

Volume 21, Number 1 (2007)

Anarchy Defended: Reply to Schneider

Jordan Schneider’s article is directed in part against a talk I gave in 2004 titled “Libertarian Anarchism: Responses to Ten Objections,” in which I defended the moral and practical superiority of stateless over state-based legal systems. Schneider is unconvinced, maintaining that market anarchism will be unworkable because of the absence of legal objectivity. Unfortunately, it’s not entirely clear to me what Schneider takes a legal system’s objectivity to consist in, or why this feature is supposed to be available to states but not to anarchies.

Volume 21, Number 1 (2007)