Bernanke’s Money Bomb

It so happens that the Austrian Scholars Conference this year takes place in the midst of one of the most spectacular attempts to reflate the economy ever undertaken in American history. Ben Bernanke might as well be bombing Wall Street with silos full of cash.

What we see here is different in degree but not in kind to what has been attempted many times in American history, and also around the world.

Ferraro Won’t Be Shut Up

The headlines are so packed with hilarious things that it’s hard not to comment, particularly on this Ferraro/race thing. She has caused a firestorm with her comments on Obama: “If Obama was a white man, he would not be in this position. And if he was a woman of any color, he would not be in this position. He happens to be very lucky to be who he is. And the country is caught up in the concept.”

We’ve only just begun

According to my reckoning, between the close of business Thursday and Tuesday, the Fed’s extra $352 billion in liquidity enhancing measures bought a 1.3% increase in the S&P500. Since we need a 19.4% rally to regain October’s Suckers’ High at 1576, we might only need another $4.8 trillion in new measures to do the trick! Neatly, that would equate to the Fed buying out the outstanding total of Agency/GSE-backed mortgage pools, with enough room to nationalize Freddie and Fannie at current market value, into the bargain. Over to you Ben...

How Not To Write American History

In a never-before-published essay, Murray Rothbard points to a book on American history as an archetype of how not to write history. “The first test of a historical work then, and one that the author fails, is a richness of factual material. But the historian is more than a chronicler; he must also have a command of the significance of events. The historian must have a ‘vision’ of the meaning, of the significance, of the material he is presenting.”

Another day, another crisis measure

Only on Friday, did the Fed take two sizeable steps to reliquefy financial markets: firstly by increasing its new Term Auction Facility to $100 billion from the previous $60 billion and also by introducing another $100 billion of 28-day term special repos. The importance of the first is that the facility is not just available to primary dealers, as are ordinary repos, but to all Fed member banks; that of the second is not only that it offers longer-term liquidity than the norm, but that it explicitly relieves dealers of having to offer up their best collateral first, before they get to the s