I am curious if anyone is aware of any good reason why “means” in the praxeological structure of action (actor chooses and employs certain means to attain his chosen end) cannot generally include both non-human (causal) and human means? If my aim is to acquire a fish, I have a variety of means to attain this end: I can use a fishing pole, in which case my means is the pole and my act-of-fishing, or I could buy the fish from a fishmonger, or I could hire a fisherman to go catch one for me. Likewise, two or more people cooperating in a business venture or in the employer-employment relationship are using each other as means to achieve goals. In fact in any relationship each party is the others’ means for the attainment of some goals. In every action the means have to have some causal connection to bring about the end; but I see no reason this means that one part of the means (or one of the means) can’t be a volitional human being whose actions are not “caused”.
Is there something I’m missing here, some obvious or clear reason why the non-causal nature of a fellow human actor implies he cannot be regarded as another’s “means” for purposes of analyzing the other’s action? Stephan -at- KinsellaLaw dot com
