The American people have not seen widespread bank runs since 1933. In that object at least, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has succeeded. But Scott Trask asks: at what cost? To insure deposits is to invite bad banking—and worse; it is to foster reckless speculation and unsound investments, help make inflation permanent instead of intermittent, obstruct the curative powers of economic contractions, and divorce freedom from responsibility.
Morgan Reynolds: "When the Bush administration took office in January, 2001, a downturn was already underway. The president and his coterie said so and blamed Clinton, but then hushed up. That was a mistake—a dose of truth about the economy would have worked better—but they learned an early lesson about psychology and confidence in Washington, D.C. Politics is all about (the) confidence (game) and prestige in the nation's capital."
Since the early 17th century, American governments (colonial, state, and federal) have tried and failed to restart business expansions by reflation, writes Scott Trask. But new money in the system is no substitute for genuine production. It is too early to see the long-run consequences of the Bush-Greenspan reflation, but if the past is any guide we can expect the next decade to more resemble the 1970s than the 1990s.
The disappearance of gold from the monetary scene is perhaps the most tragic economic calamity to befall the world of money in the twentieth century, writes Christopher Mayer. Views on gold in the first two decades of the twentieth century compared to those held today could scarcely be more different.
Thomas Fleming’s outstanding book poses a fundamental problem. Fleming shows that Woodrow Wilson led America into an unnecessary war.
During the 1920s and 30s, a majority of Americans came to believe that our involvement in World War I had been a horrendous mistake. The war was supposed to make the world safe for democracy,
The tax bills of many American families are falling during a period of exorbitant increases in federal spending due mainly to war and welfare spending. Odd? Not once we discover the record levels of government debt accumulation. It's the shell game of government finance at work.
H. Scott Trask sums it up: on the one hand, they believed in fractional-reserve banking, generally following Adam Smith's currency and banking theories. On the other hand, they were resolutely opposed to government-issued paper money, fiat money, legal tender laws, inconvertible paper currency, and land banks. On the question of a national bank, they were divided.
Complete privatization will not lead to ideal results, but it will unravel most of the anticompetitive practices that exist in the cable industry. The lesson that we should draw from the results of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is that efforts to partially privatize the industry are likely to retain those elements of regulations that benefit concentrated interests in business most.
Scott Trask shows that the period of the Articles of Confederation was not characterized by chaos and increasingly bad economic times, as historians tend to assume. Rather, the Articles proved themselves to be a perfectly viable structure for a free society, encouraging trade and prosperity and adherence to the highest ideals of 1776—until the mercantilists and nationalists overthrew it.
