The Catalan regional parliament today declared independence (on a vote of 70-10) from Spain, following threats by the central government in Madrid to abolish the region’s political autonomy.
At this point, it appears the Madrid government will employ physical violence to impose direct rule from Madrid on the region.
For more on this here at mises.org, see:
- Mises, Rothbard, and Catalonia by David Gordon
- Let Catalonia Decide by Jeff Deist
- A Spanish Libertarian on Catalonia by Daniel LaCalle
- Europe’s Secession Problems Aren’t Going Away by Ryan McMaken
Additionally, in my column “If the Majority Votes to Secede — What About the Minority?“ I pick apart the claim — using California as an example — that no region or municipality should be allowed to secede unless the separatists are libertarians.
This latter claim is perhaps the most often-repeated reason for opposing Catalan secession, as ultimately unconvincing as it is.Indeed, in his Tuesday article on the Catalonia situation, Alvaro Vargas Llosa takes the postition that no, Catalan secession must be quashed because the new regime would be insufficiently libertarian. Llosa concludes with:
Perhaps the day will come when individual self-determination will be feasible (and Mises’s “technical” problems can be overcome). But for the moment it is unrealistic to think that the Catalan nationalist movement will turn into a Misesian movement in favor of individual self-determination. For now, a better cause for libertarians to rally around than Catalan nationalism is replacement of the Spanish welfare state with a liberal order and decentralizing the financial system underpinning the system of autonomous communities much more.
There are a couple of assertions that must be corrected here. First of all, not even Mises himself — whom Llosa quotes repeatedly in favor of his own position — demanded that secessionist movements be “Misesian” to justify secession. When Mises specifically supported Catalan secession in his own lifetime, nowhere does he suggest that he was under the illusion that the Catalan government would be — unlike all the rest of Europe at the time — devoted to free markets. On the contrary, Mises supported secession as a prudential matter and a recognition that peace is better secured for minority groups through separation rather than secession.
Secondly, Llosa mistakenly seems to think that supporting a more restrained welfare state in Spain is a goal that is mutually exclusive from that of supporting the right of secession. When Llosa states that “a better cause for libertarians to rally around than Catalan nationalism is replacement of the Spanish welfare state” he appears to imply that this is an either/or choice, as if one could not support both at the same time. It is unclear why this should be so.
Moreover, it is entirely plausible that Catalan independence can be a catalyst to a smaller welfare state in Spain. If Catalonia is so hard left, as its detractors say it is, then Catalonias exit from Spain would enable the remaining Spanish state to further curtail welfare spending. Moreover, a Catalan exist may also highlight the benefits of political decentralization. After all, if the Spanish model were more decentralist, and followed more of a Swiss model, it’s unlikely that Catalonians would care much about secession at all. The net effect of secession for Spaniards — with with a California exit in America — would be a net gain for freedom.
And finally, the Llosa prediction that Catalan would become an even more interventionist state after secession assumes Catalonia could project its power as well as a small independent state than as part of a large nation-state like Spain. This is not at all clear, since as a small state, Catalonia would be under greater pressure to compromise with large employers to provide a hospitable business environment an openness to foreign investment. After all, under the status quo, any business that functions in Catalonia today has automatic and total access to the entirety of the Spanish market, which includes the 39 million Spaniards who live outside Catalonia. If Catalonia decides to impose a hard-left regime (all of Spain is anti-business by American standards, of course, but let’s assume Catalonia is even worse) why would any business choose to remain there for the sake of hacing access to Catalonia’s mere 7 million residents? Yes, Catalonia has a relatively high concentration of capital at the moment, but by taking a hard left turn, the regime would only drive capital across the border back into Spain.
To facilitate this, of course, the Spanish state need do nothing more than grant open borders to any Spaniard or business that wishes to secure access to the larger Spanish market. So, it doesn’t make much sense to assume that the current status quo would persist in Catalonia even after independence. This would be equally true of California, for example, were it to secede. In order to make up for the trouble of now gaining access to American markets, California would need to embrace more openness toward global business in order to maintain a comparable standard of living.
